


Afghanistan Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index 2021

Evidence-based policy recommendations to address emerging challenges in Afghanistan.



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE



This report encompasses a series of research briefs, aiming to inform policy and programme design with a quantitative evidence basis. It is divided into six topics, each of which tackles a specific programmatic issue. Each contains a visual summary of results, a discussion of the findings and relevant recommendations, and can be disseminated separately or as part of the complete report.

The research addresses atrocity prevention and, separately, effective government control, presenting programmatic possibilities for prevention or early warning and response, given the current escalation of violence, and the volatile status of control. The study also examines aspects of community security, food security and mental health, outlining programmatic and policy implications for building Afghan citizens' resilience at a time when climate and conflict-related adversities remain prevalent. Further, it investigates the rights and inclusion of women and girls, and probes the future political configurations that are accepted by Afghans, proposing points of policy and programmatic relevance, in view of the current political negotiations.

About the SCORE

The Afghanistan Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index¹ was implemented in 2021 by the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD)² in partnership with the Afghanistan Peace Support Initiative (APSI), funded by USAID/OTI and implemented by DAI.

The aim of the Afghanistan SCORE 2021 was to support the APSI by providing vital information about social cohesion, reconciliation, and other important socioeconomic and political challenges, as well as allowing the citizens of Afghanistan to express their opinions about the evolving peacebuilding process, the shifting security situation, and their visions for the future.

The SCORE Index uses a mixed-methods participatory research approach. This includes multi-level stakeholder and expert consultations to design and calibrate indicators and develop relevant conceptual methods that can answer the context-specific research objectives. Following data collection and analysis, results are shared and reviewed with key stakeholders to ensure local

ownership of results and relevance of the findings and recommendations. The SCORE Index was developed in Cyprus through the joint efforts of SeeD and UNDP's Action for Cooperation and Trust programme (UNDP-ACT), with USAID funding. Among other countries, it has been implemented in South Sudan, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Ukraine³. SCORE examines the factors which lead towards socially cohesive and sustainable peace by probing context-specific components of stability and helping to build a complete understanding of social, psychological, and economic dynamics.

About SeeD

SeeD works with international development organisations, governments, and civil society to design and implement people-centred and evidence-based strategies for promoting peaceful, inclusive and resilient societies, in areas facing extreme adversities. Through its global project portfolio, SeeD provides social transformation policy recommendations that are rooted in an empirical understanding of the behaviours of individuals, groups, and communities. SeeD's approach focusses on understanding the root causes of conflicts by developing an evidence-based theory of change which is empirically tested using the SCORE Index.

About Criterion Research Consultancy Services

Criterion Research Consultancy Services (CRCS) is an Afghan-based research and consultancy organisation with a portfolio of partnerships with government, national and international clients. CRCS employs management and field personnel in all 34 provinces. CRCS also has experience in questionnaire development, reporting as well as data entry, data cleaning and analysis.

Acknowledgements

The team is grateful to colleagues at USAID/OTI and DAI in Afghanistan, Criterion Research Consultancy Services in Afghanistan for their indispensable field work, as well as all the researchers, experts and representatives of local organisations who provided invaluable information during our consultations.

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¹ For more about the SCORE methodology, visit www.scoreforpeace.org/en/methodology

² For more about SeeD, see seedsofpeace.eu

³ For more details, visit www.scoreforpeace.org/en/methodology

Methodology

The present study served as a pilot for a full-country SCORE Index, with sampling in 6 provinces in Afghanistan. The provinces were selected based on their ability to provide a representative picture of the diverse segments of Afghan society, taking into account the demographics, urbanity and topography of these areas, and considering the APSI's programmatic experience and interests.

The provinces surveyed were Balkh, Bamiyan, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar and Nangarhar. Between 200 and 222 interviews were conducted in each of these areas, resulting in a total sample size of 1248. The provinces were surveyed proportionally, with interviews conducted in 40 to 50% of the districts in each province, reaching a total of 51 districts.

In all analyses, weighting was applied to bring the sample to proportionality. All estimates were based on the Afghanistan Population Estimates for the year 1398 (2019-20) of the National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA) of Afghanistan⁴.

Data collection was conducted by Criterion Research Consultancy Services (Karte 3, Kabul, Afghanistan). Interviews were carried out in Dari and Pashto. The quantitative survey, designed by SeeD, included contextually relevant questions on social, psychological, economic, and political factors, from which the SCORE indicators were created (see SCORE Indicators and Heatmaps).

The sample included districts controlled by the government of Afghanistan and districts not under effective government control. The latter are defined as those which are contested or are controlled by the Taliban, according to FDD's Long War Journal data⁵ from April 2021.

Districts controlled by the government were surveyed using face-to-face interviews (N=945). Districts not under government control were surveyed using remote telephone surveys (N=303). Surveying was carried out between the 17th May 2021 and 28th May 2021. Interviews lasted between 50 and 100 minutes, with an average duration of one hour.

Following selection of the 6 target provinces, districts were randomly drawn in proportion to their population. For face-to-face interviews, households were selected using the random walk method and respondents were selected using Kish Grid selection. For telephone interviews, random telephone numbers were selected from the CRCS telephone database.

Monitoring for quality control was carried out by independent monitors, and 40% of all interviews were backchecked and validated. Data quality was assessed, and logic tests were conducted post-survey. Invalid interviews were removed and resurveyed where necessary. In certain cases, logic checks were also applied by the enumerators during the interview

⁴ Estimated Population of Afghanistan 2019-20, National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA), available at: nsia.gov.af/library

⁵ Mapping Taliban Contested and Controlled Districts in Afghanistan, Bill Roggio, FDD's Long War Journal, available at: www.longwarjournal.org/mapping-taliban-control-in-afghanistan

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Future Visions for Afghanistan: Building Consensus and Tracking Priorities

Where is there consensus between people who support the Taliban and those who do not?

Consensus

Having a council of ulema making important decisions

important for **76% / 79%**
of non supporters / Taliban supporters

Having a religious council to ensure true Islamic law

75% / 86%
non supporters / Taliban supporters

Preferred by non supporters

Voting for president

84% / 57%
non supporters / Taliban supporters

Voting for a parliament that makes laws

81% / 53%
non supporters / Taliban supporters

Preferred by Taliban supporters

Having an Amir chosen by the ulema not by election

59% / 69%
non supporters / Taliban supporters

Changing Afghanistan from an Islamic Republic to an Emirate



26% / 47%
non supporters / Taliban supporters

Contestation between voting for a president and having an Amir chosen by the ulema


Factors encouraging support for a democratic political system...

-  Stronger government presence, trust in government
-  Efficiency of services
-  Access to inclusive local shura or jirga
-  Civic engagement & empowerment
-  Inclusive identity, intergroup harmony
-  Support for gender rights
-  Economic security
-  Access to radio and television

Support for Taliban reintegration into society



Women's rights in the peace negotiations



Priorities for non supporters

-  Comprehensive ceasefire
-  The fight against corruption
-  Afghanistan's national development

Priorities for Taliban supporters

-  Comprehensive ceasefire
-  Resolving ethnic tensions
-  The fight against corruption

Future Visions for Afghanistan: Building Consensus and Tracking Priorities

Given the uncertainty surrounding the current Intra-Afghan Negotiations (IANs), this analysis aims to inform policy makers about Afghan citizens' views on acceptable political configurations and their priorities for a peace settlement. This analysis seeks to outline to negotiators and their advisors where Afghans who do not support the Taliban and those who do support the Taliban reach a consensus on their future visions, revealing how to develop a political settlement that is endorsed by the Afghan people. Considering the escalating insecurity in Afghanistan, it has become all the more important to give a voice to Afghans and their desires for the future of the country.

Support for peace negotiations is high, with 79% of respondents supporting negotiations to reach a political settlement between the government and the Taliban. This marks a decrease from 90% reported by The Asia Foundation in 2019 (The Asia Foundation, 2019). Support for peace negotiations is linked to confidence in the current IANs⁶, which 73% of respondents believed would lead to peace in Afghanistan at the time of surveying.

There is consensus on the future structure of Afghanistan's government between people who support the Taliban and those who do not. Over 75% of both believe it is important to have a council of ulema that makes decisions about the country and a religious council that ensures all legislative matters are based on true Islamic law.

However, there is contestation on how to select the country's leadership, with Taliban supporters preferring an appointed Amir and non-supporters preferring elections to select a president and parliament. People with access to information and communication networks, civic empowerment, harmonious interethnic relations and who experience good governance are more likely to support democratic processes.

There is not a strong desire to change Afghanistan from an Islamic Republic to an Emirate, even among Taliban supporters, of which only 47% said this was an important aspect (11% very, 36% somewhat important). Subsequently, even among Taliban supporters, voting for a president and parliament are more important than changing to an Emirate. Of the full sample, just 9% said it is very important to change from a Republic to an Emirate, coinciding with previous findings where 7% preferred an emirate when selecting between an Emirate, Republic, or combination of the two (The Heart of Asia Society, 2020).

With respect to their priorities for peace negotiations, Afghans' primary concern is a ceasefire, with 83% of all respondents declaring its importance, echoing previous findings on the urgency of peace and security (Criterion Research Consultancy Services, 2021; The Heart of Asia Society, 2020).

Taliban supporters lean marginally towards a ceasefire after peace is reached (91%) rather than immediately (80%), while those who do not support the Taliban assign equal importance to an immediate (83%) and later-stage ceasefire (84%). Both agree on the importance of fighting corruption (83% of non-supporters; 75% of Taliban supporters say that this is important) and resolving ethnic tensions (79% of non-supporters; 76% of Taliban supporters). Women assign more priority to preserving their rights than men do (83% of women; 72% of men). Citizens are less interested in the process of transition following a peace deal, with 47% saying an interim government is important, just 42% saying it is important for President Ghani to step down (51% of Taliban supporters say this is important), and just 35% saying it is important to divide the ministries between the two sides.

⁶ Pearson correlation analysis, $p < 0.01$, $R > 0.2$

Afghans are cautious about compromising on their rights and liberties in order to reach a peace settlement. Changes to the current constitution are the most acceptable compromise, but just 34% of respondents accept this. Citizens are reluctant to compromise on freedom of the press (33%) and minority rights (29%), and are adamant about protecting and conserving girls' education and women's right to work outside the home. This illustrates that any settlement which sacrifices women's rights may face strong opposition from Afghan citizens. People living in Taliban controlled and contested areas at the time of surveying reported more willingness to compromise on human rights and to accept political dominance by the Taliban (see SCORE Indicators and Heatmaps).

Citizens' views on reintegration of the Taliban differ when it comes to the organisation versus individual members. People support the reintegration of fighters into communities and accept integration of the Taliban leadership into government (53% of non-supporters; 69% of supporters) but are uncertain about blanket amnesty for the Taliban (32% of non-supporters; 71% of Taliban supporters).

Recommendations

A strong majority of Afghans support peace negotiations, although there is a slight downward trend in this support. Among other factors, this is linked to decreasing confidence in the current IANs.

- At a minimum, it is important to apply immediate pressure so that negotiations restart and the Taliban halts its advance. Given the increasing prevalence of violence, maintaining a channel of communication between the Government of Afghanistan, the Taliban leadership, and the international community is all the more crucial.

There is consensus between Taliban supporters and non-Taliban supporters on the future form of government: both believe it is important to have a council of ulema making important decisions about Afghanistan, and a religious council that ensures all legislative matters are based on true Islamic law.

- There emerges a need for alternative constitutional configurations that solve the conflict and satisfy citizens' preferences.
- Likely solutions are the governmental structures on which there is already consensus among Afghans. A council of ulema to make important decisions and a religious council to ensure legislature is based on true Islamic law are popular components, likely to address the desire for an Islamic political system. Any imminent negotiations should explore these as the basis of the future constitution of Afghanistan.

There is contestation on selecting leadership, with non-Taliban supporters preferring an elected president and parliament, and Taliban supporters preferring an Amir appointed by the ulema.

- This is an area that merits focus during the negotiations. Ways forward could include concession from the government on religious councils in exchange for ensuring that top leadership is democratically elected in the future.
- There is also a need for current, elected representatives to demonstrate good governance, strengthen local structures to enable citizens' empowerment, and improve access to information and communication networks, all of which are likely to give legitimacy to democratic political processes.

There is not a strong desire to change Afghanistan to an Emirate, even among Taliban supporters.

- This should inform future negotiations, and clarify what Afghan citizens' expectations of an Islamic system are: not an Emirate, but a key role for religious councils and scholars to ensure a democratic system within an Islamic framework.

Both sides prioritise a ceasefire. While citizens also prioritise the fight against corruption, they are less interested in the precise composition of the government (i.e., who will lead ministries, whether President Ghani steps down, and if there is an interim government).

- Negotiations should be steered towards reaching a ceasefire and addressing areas of common concern, as opposed to dividing power in the aftermath of the agreement.

Citizens are cautious about accepting compromises in order to reach a peace deal, and there is no space for compromise on gender rights.

- The results cement that Afghans are unwilling to turn the clock back on gender rights and women's inclusion. It is important that negotiators do not rationalise a solution that neglects the rights of women and girls, as any agreement which sacrifices women's rights will likely face strong backlash.


People support local-level reintegration for individual Taliban fighters into communities, and are accepting of political integration of the Taliban leadership, but are uncertain about blanket amnesty for the organisation as a whole.

- Citizens want an end to the Taliban as a warring entity but are ready to welcome fighters back into their communities, indicating that it is unlikely that there will be extensive challenges in reintegration.
- Rather, the government and international community should ensure that vulnerable groups, or groups previously targeted by the Taliban, are able to maintain their security once the Taliban return to communities. Given the intensified conflict in Afghanistan over the recent weeks, international organisations should focus on preventing the violence inflicted on citizens (see Atrocity Prevention).

This analysis highlights that there is a consensus on some aspects of a future political configuration for Afghanistan, as well as enshrining basic rights and protections for women, and a strong desire for a ceasefire. In the present context of fast-closing windows of opportunity, these results could give momentum to a political settlement in Afghanistan.

Resilient Community Security

Which adversities undermine Community Security?



How can we build resilience and limit fragility against these adversities?

Resilience Factors	Fragility Factors
Access to a phone	Proliferation of communal decision-making institutions
Efficiency of Electricity Services	Being an IDP, returnee, migrant, war victims
Efficiency of Security Services	Population Density
Water, Roads, Electricity, Irrigation and Dispute Resolution managed by the Community	Communities and individuals that have these resilience factors are more likely to cope well in maintaining Community Security in the face of all adversities. Fragility factors lead to coping worse, meaning security is not maintained in the face of adversities.
Education, Healthcare, Security managed by Central Government	
Distance from the Ring Road	
Food Security	

* The indicator measuring Exposure to Economic Shocks was found to have a Cronbach’s alpha of only 0.58, implying that it may not be a perfectly reliable measure of the phenomenon. Nevertheless it has an impact on the outcome.

Resilient Community Security

The SCORE researched the impact of various adversities on Community Security in Afghanistan, to understand which were the challenges which most potently disrupt communities' security by leading to disputes and violence. These stressors, shown in the image above, include the impacts of conflict, violence, marginalisation, economic and climactic shocks. In many cases they are very difficult to reduce or directly address, especially so in an unstable context.

In the SCORE, **Community Security** is defined as a low frequency of local disputes, and a rare tendency for such disputes to escalate into violence. It is measured by asking community members about the frequency and violence of various types of local disputes.

Therefore, the SCORE also identified resilience and fragility factors that may be easier for policymakers to impact. Building resilience factors can help individuals and communities to cope better and remain secure in the face of adversities. In this analysis, being resilient means being able to maintain a high level of Community Security despite being exposed to adversities.

Using predictive analysis, several adversities were tested to see if and how strongly they would impact the outcome. The upper table shows that Exposure to Conflict, Marginalisation and the Presence of Vulnerable Groups (IDPs, wounded, war victims, migrants, etc) are the three factors which most strongly lead to a disruption of Community Security, meaning a higher frequency and intensity of violent disputes in the community. Other adversities, including Service Disruption, and Activity of the Taliban, also generate violent disputes in communities. More frequent activity of either foreign or Afghan security forces had no significant impact on Community Security.

Given that the three most disruptive adversities are not easy to reduce, and are likely to intensify given the ramp-up of violence in 2021 (UNAMA, 2021), institutions and stakeholders who are seeking to safeguard Community Security can focus on bolstering resilience and tackling fragility. SCORE resilience analysis shows that access to a phone, or the internet, food security, and good electricity and security services considerably contribute to increased resilience against these adversities. Communities where infrastructure is managed by the local community, but social and security services are managed by the state, were found to be the most resilient in dealing with these adversities. On the other hand, communities where the Taliban manages security and dispute resolution, or where the government is managing infrastructure, are more fragile. Any resilience-building strategy must integrate these factors into interventions to insulate communities against violence.

The SCORE also integrated data on World Bank interventions into our analysis, and tested if districts which underwent any of the nineteen WB interventions tended to be more resilient or more fragile. Of the nineteen interventions tested, districts undergoing the Citizens' Charter Afghanistan Project (CCAP) were more resilient than those that didn't. The CCAP aims to improve infrastructure and services through setting up Community Development Councils (*Citizens' Charter Afghanistan Project*, 2021). This impacts already-identified resilience factors, like local management of infrastructure and quality of infrastructure and services, but may also contribute to local social cohesion, thus allowing communities to cope better and not descend into violence. This result also highlights the importance of including other data-streams into the SCORE, and using the analysis to assess interventions and inform future programmatic design, as part of a learning, monitoring and evaluation strategy.

SCORE has also identified several fragility factors characterising areas which are struggling to cope. These include urban and densely populated areas and areas with an over-proliferation of local decision-making institutions (shuras, jirgas, maliks, etc). Kandahar province was found to be more fragile in maintaining levels of Community Security in the face of adversities, while Balkh and Bamyan were more resilient.

Recommendations

The most significant adversities undermining Community Security and generating local violence are Exposure to Conflict and Marginalisation. Regional powers should exert diplomatic pressure to limit the spread of violence and start building a common roadmap for achieving stability. However, at the local level, the violent conflict is difficult to directly respond to, in the current context. Supplementary strategies, beyond ending the conflict itself, include:

- Focus on building resilience and mitigating fragility, to help communities and individuals cope with increasing adversities.
- Use the resilience and fragilities as a checklist to assess areas where resilience programming is most needed.

To build resilience:

- In the short term, ensure that households have some access to a phone or the internet, as they are vital resilience factors. Remote communication links individuals together, allowing them to react to deteriorating situations. In the short term, safeguard such infrastructure from Taliban attacks. Investigate what other local communication networks arise when the network is disrupted, identify opportunities to reinforce such informal networks. In the midterm, invest in more efficient electricity and communication networks, and reconstruction.
- In the longer term, ensure appropriate division of labour between community and government. Communities must be empowered to take responsibility for management of local infrastructure and dispute resolution in a formalised way. This could be done through CDC-like mechanisms given that the CCAP was also found to characterise resilient areas. Health, education and security services should remain in the control of central government rather than devolved.
- Taliban involvement in service provision and dispute resolution should be avoided given it is a fragility factor. In areas where this is unavoidable, given the Taliban advance, policymakers need to be aware of the increased fragility of communities where the Taliban play a big role in dispute resolution and security, and identify other potential resilience factors.
- Longer term, capacity should be built at the level of local institutions to take on management of infrastructure and dispute resolution in a formalised way, while central institutions should be reformed to take full responsibility for education, healthcare and security.
- Ensure that Food Security exists, as its absence escalates disputes into violent conflicts. See Building Resilience for Food Security and Post-Traumatic Wellbeing for more on how this could be achieved.
- Try to limit the proliferation of overlapping local decision-making institutions, encourage local power-brokers to coalesce into one council, or to better coordinate with each other, or at least to not generate division and disputes.
- Focus efforts on resilience-building work in fragile areas, identified as: areas with a proliferation of overlapping local institutions, with a high proportion of vulnerable groups (IDPs, migrants, war victims), among dense urban populations, and in Kandahar province


Atrocity Prevention

By combining SCORE data from May with ACLED data¹ on violence against civilians from June and July, we can identify which SCORE indicators were associated with areas which subsequently experienced more violence.

Characteristics of areas with <u>less</u> intense violent events in May - July	Characteristics of areas with <u>more</u> intense violent events in May - July
Resilience for Community Security	Exposure to Violence in the last year
Electricity Network not disrupted by conflict	Exposure to Conflict in the last year
Intergroup Harmony with Hazaras	Dense Urban Areas
Food Security	Proximity to the Ring Road and to Population Centres

Potential for Atrocities

Aggregating the above SCORE indicators which are related to violence, we calculate a score for each district based on the potential for violent atrocities against civilians. This tool can be used to give an estimate of which areas may have a heightened likelihood of violent acts against civilians.



The table on the right shows the districts scoring the most in Potential for Atrocities among our sample.	District	Province	Score
	Kabul District 9	Kabul	4.3
	Shah Wali Kot	Kandahar	4.3
	Zhire	Kandahar	4.2
	Kandahar City	Kandahar	4.1
	Arghandab	Kandahar	4.0

¹ Data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) downloaded from acledata.com on August 2nd.

Atrocity Prevention

The first half of 2021 has seen a steep increase in violence against civilians, with 1,659 killed and 3,524 injured (UNAMA, 2021). July and August have seen rapid Taliban advances and intense conflict, also affecting civilians (Reuters, 2021, 2021). Furthermore, Afghanistan was ranked as having the 2nd highest risk of a new mass killing beginning in 2020-21 (Early Warning Project, 2020). Thus, SCORE turned its attention to preventing violence and atrocities. The SCORE integrated into its analysis data on the location and intensity of violence against civilians from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)⁷. Data for the SCORE was collected up until May 28th, and so we integrated ACLED data on violence and atrocities against civilians in the period immediately following that (from May 29th until July 28th). By taking the frequency of violent events and their death-toll from the ACLED data we can create a metric of the intensity of violent atrocities against citizens⁸. We relate the two data streams to uncover which SCORE indicators were associated with areas which then underwent a higher intensity of atrocities, and compare to the profile of areas which did not experience atrocities. Given that the SCORE data precedes the ACLED data used, this method can reveal factors which protect against violence, or which predict a potential for future atrocities. This analysis builds upon existing work which pinpoints what may precede atrocities (USAID, 2015), and can specify which factors apply to Afghanistan in particular.

Citizens that live in areas which experienced more intense atrocities tended to report a higher level both of Exposure to Violence and Exposure to Conflict in the last year. These two indicators measure levels of community violence (physical abuse, burglaries, violent crime) and impact from warfare (bombings, witnessing fighting, destruction of buildings). This confirms analyses which found that the most important factors contributing to Afghanistan's risk of future atrocities include conflicts, death, and past mass killings (Early Warning Project, 2020). Urban areas with high population density, and areas which are close to big cities and Afghanistan's Ring Road also tended to face more violence directed at civilians.

On the other side of the coin, SCORE also identified characteristics associated with communities which faced significantly less violence or none at all in the period under study. Most crucially, Resilience for Community Security in the face of adversities and conflict was found to be significantly higher in citizens living in areas that underwent less violence. This means that working on resilience factors for Community Security (Resilient Community Security) is also an entry point for preventing atrocities against citizens.

Residents of areas that had fewer violent atrocities tended to report more Food Security. Food insecurity may exacerbate individual and community issues make a community more vulnerable to atrocities. Extreme poverty and food insecurity may lead to violent outbursts, and building resilience to maintain food security in the face of conflict (Building Resilience for Food Security and Post-Traumatic Wellbeing) could buffer against recurring violence.

The disruption of electricity networks also significantly distinguishes areas with more atrocities from those with fewer atrocities. Districts that faced destruction of electricity networks due to conflict were more likely to then undergo atrocities. This resonates with the Taliban strategy of weakening communities by destroying electricity, communication and internet services as part of their takeover

⁷ Data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) downloaded from www.acleddata.com on August 2nd.

⁸ To get a metric of atrocities per district, data from ACLED on the number of events and of fatalities per capita were combined. Events tracked included shootings, violence, and bombings directed against civilians, and perpetrated by any armed actor.

and of ramping up of violence (Al Jazeera, 2021). Disruption of electricity services can therefore serve as an early warning factor for impending violence against citizens.

Attitudes towards Hazaras also was a distinguishing factor. In areas that had citizens harbouring warm and open feelings towards the Hazara, violent atrocities were less common. In areas where intergroup tension to the Hazara exists, violence and fatalities were higher, on average. This implies that negative feelings towards certain ethnic groups may precede intense violence directed against them. The field has already identified that peacebuilding strategies must work to reverse dehumanisation of other groups to prevent later violent outbursts (Peace Direct, 2017) and in this case the SCORE highlights attitudes towards Hazaras as crucial. This is particularly important given the atrocities on the 8th of May 2021 against a school in a Hazara neighbourhood in Kabul that took the lives of 90 people, including many young girls (CNN, 2021).

The activity of the Taliban in a locality was very weakly associated with more violent atrocities. This may mean that atrocities are less likely to occur in areas which a high presence and activity of the Taliban. Rather, they are likely to be carried out in areas not yet consolidated by the Taliban, especially given the use of IEDs or of attacks in contested and government controlled districts.

All these characteristics differentiate areas based on the level of violence directed at citizens. They were then aggregated into an indicator which can reveal areas where there is higher potential for atrocities to be committed against civilians. This composite indicator revealed that several districts in Kandahar scored among the highest, while District 9 of Kabul also had a high score. Herat and Bamyān were found to have the lowest scores in factors associated with atrocities against civilians.

Recommendations


- Past exposure to violence and conflict could predict atrocities and be an early warning sign, even going 12 months back. Identify areas that have gone through high levels of conflict and violence in recent months. Expect atrocities more frequently there.
- Early warning systems for atrocity prevention and response typically use indicators which track the onset of violence, meaning that violence has already begun, and it may be too late to prevent the atrocity from occurring. The factors discovered by the SCORE preceded atrocities by weeks or months, and go beyond indicators tracking violence or conflict. Therefore, actors working to prevent atrocities should use the factors SCORE has uncovered as part of their early warning tools.
- Stopping violence conflict stops atrocities from occurring. SCORE results on violence and conflict show this, as do many other quantitative and qualitative studies. Pressure should be placed on the Taliban at the highest diplomatic levels to halt the recent military offensive, as atrocities will occur as part of the conflict.
- Given that the Taliban is unlikely to halt a momentous offensive, it is important to predict areas where atrocities may be more likely, and deploy preventative measures. For areas surveyed by SCORE, we detected a higher potential for atrocities in districts of Kandahar, as well as Kabul's District 9. More broadly, by using the identified factors as a checklist, this can be generalised to other parts of Afghanistan, to assess potential for atrocities in other communities of interest.
- Disruption of the local electricity network by armed groups is a marker of future violence. It should be taken as an early warning sign. Given having a phone is a resilience factor for Community Security (see Resilient Community Security), and that even a few hours warning to civilians can save lives, efforts should be made by Afghan security services to safeguard electricity and communications installations.
- In the longer term, to stop recurrence of atrocities, focus on policies which reduce negative sentiment towards ethno-religious minorities, particularly the Hazara. First, combat divisive

narratives, particularly those rooted in religious discourses. Then, once safe and harmonious social contact between ethnic groups can occur, implement contact interventions.

- Fragility in maintaining Community Security characterises areas that subsequently experienced violence against citizens, while resilient citizens tended to live in areas with fewer atrocities. Build resilience for Community Security through the factors found in the chapter Resilient Community Security. This should form the basis of a mid- to long-term strategy for atrocity prevention.
- There is a nexus between Food Insecurity, violence against civilians and atrocities, and community insecurity. Tackling underlying livelihoods issues may resolve many of the root causes of violent acts. See the chapter Building Resilience for Food Security and Post-Traumatic Wellbeing for a deeper view on how to maintain Food Security in the face of conflict and adversities.
- When atrocities occur in Afghanistan, response and recovery strategies must be based on an understanding of the impacts of conflict and violence. Conflict has been shown to seriously destabilise communities, leading to a vicious cycle of local disputes and violence (see Resilient Community Security). Violence disrupts both food security and mental health (see Building Resilience for Food Security and Post-Traumatic Wellbeing). In both cases, a recovery strategy must focus on building resilience factors identified to respond to conflict and violence.

Resilient Food Security & Post-Traumatic Wellbeing

Which adversities disrupt post-traumatic wellbeing & food security?



Predictive model with lighter and darker the corresponding predictive pathways of each adversity on **Food Security** & **Post-Traumatic Wellbeing**, respectively. Model was controlled for gender, urbanity, and Taliban control.

How can we build resilience and limit fragility against adversities?

Resilience Factors – Food Security	Fragility Factors – Food Security
Availability & Inclusivity of CDCs	Taliban Responsibility for Service Provision
Household Income	Presence of Vulnerable Groups in the Community
Household Income	
Resilience Factors – Post-Traumatic Wellbeing	Fragility Factors – Post-Traumatic Wellbeing
Household includes Homemakers	Contact with Outgroups
Community Responsibility for Service Provision	Central Government Responsibility for Service Provision
Owning an Animal Cart	Activity of Foreign Forces and the Taliban Locally
Multidimensional Resilience	
Household Asset: Phone	Individuals that have these resilience factors are more likely to cope well in maintaining Food Security and Post-Traumatic Wellbeing in the face of adversity. Fragility factors lead to coping worse, meaning Food Security and/or Mental Wellbeing are not preserved. Multidimensional resilience factors positively contribute to both outcomes.
Economic Security	
Household Asset: Fuel to Keep Warm	
Trust in Community Leaders	
Information Consumption: Social	

Building Resilience for Food Security and Post-Traumatic Wellbeing

Prolonged conflict, chronic violence, severe natural hazards, and economic uncertainty have had a profound impact on the wellbeing and livelihoods of the Afghan people (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2016). Inevitably, Afghans citizens are struggling to preserve subsistence and psychological wellbeing in the face of these challenges. For policymakers to develop impactful programmes, there is need to identify the daily, context-specific adversities Afghan people face, and the capacities and assets that characterise individuals who remain resilient in the face of these adversities. These resilience factors can then form the basis of resilience-building and early recovery strategies.

SCORE therefore performed a resilience analysis, firstly to explore the impact of various contextual stressors which can disrupt Food Security and Post-Traumatic Wellbeing (top half of page 16) and secondly reveal core factors which enable individuals to remain resilient in the face of adversity (bottom half of page 16). The goal of this analysis is to identify which resilience and fragility factors can serve as strategic entry points for programmatic design.

Using predictive analysis, several adversities are tested to understand if and how strongly they impact the two outcomes. The top half of the figure shows that people who are exposed to violence (e.g., physical violence, sexual abuse, crime), who feel marginalised (due to their gender, ethnicity, political views, etc.), or who were exposed to Covid-19 are more likely to experience poor mental health and food insecurity. Also, people in areas vulnerable to natural hazards (e.g., droughts, floods) were found to experience more food insecurity. The most important adversity undermining Food Security was Exposure to Violence, while the adversity most disruptive for Post-Traumatic Wellbeing was found to be Marginalisation. This implies that although there is a multisystemic array of adversities undermining positive outcomes, certain most salient disruptive pathways exist, and need to be targeted.

The SCORE identified several hunger hotspots, mainly in the provinces of Kabul, Kandahar and Nangahar, that are at risk of falling in famine-like conditions and thus require humanitarian assistance (see SCORE Indicators and Heatmaps “Food Security”). In the week prior to data collection, 25% of respondents from Jalalabad had to skip at least 4 days without eating due to lack of food. By extending this pilot study to a full-scale research effort covering all 34 provinces of Afghanistan, the SCORE can identify critical areas in need of food aid and humanitarian support.

Given current uncertainties in Afghanistan, most adversities are difficult to address directly. Accordingly, the SCORE revealed factors which can provide resilience for Post-Traumatic Wellbeing and Food Security. These can serve as entry points to build coping mechanisms in the face of these challenges. Resilience refers to the ability of an individual to resist, absorb or cope with the effects of contextual stressors (Pasteur, 2011). In this analysis, being resilient means effective adaptation to the contextual stressors we identified, without undermining food security or mental wellbeing.

Households that were resilient tended to have fuel and access to a phone, meaning these two household assets provide resilience against violence, marginalisation, and other adversities. Programmes should contribute to resilience by providing communication technologies and fuel,

Post-Traumatic Wellbeing was gauged using the Post-Traumatic Stress scale (PLC-5) in which individuals reported how often they have been bothered by stressful experiences related to past trauma. Higher scores in Mental Wellbeing suggest less frequent post-traumatic stress experiences.

Food Security refers to the extent to which an individual and/or other members of their household had to rely on food saving strategies and regulated consumption to ensure adequate food for the household in the past year. Lower scores suggest food insecurity and potential malnutrition.

enabling communities to better cope with adversities without undermining food security and mental wellbeing.

Moreover, having a homemaker in the household has a positive impact on resilience for Post-Traumatic Wellbeing. Homemakers assume the role of caregivers providing emotional support to other household members. Having warm, caring, and responsive home environments helps to build household members' capacity for resilience and mitigation of stress related to past trauma. Programmatic design should focus on developing family resilience programmes that recognise and empower homemakers and their social and emotional support role in their households and communities.

Resilience factors at the community level were also identified. First, Trust in Community Leaders is an important resilience factor for both Food Security and Post-Traumatic Wellbeing. Having accountable and trustworthy institutions at the community level can act as a protective buffer against post-traumatic stress and food insecurity. Indeed, compared to other institutions (i.e., Central Government, Huquq Department), local community leaders are perceived to be the most effective at resolving disputes by Afghans. Second, having inclusive and responsive CDCs helps to build community members' resilience against food insecurity.

Further, the analysis reveals that more resilient areas tend to have a particular division of responsibility of services. Local Community Responsibility for Service Provision, particularly services related to infrastructure (i.e., irrigation, electricity, roads), is a resilience factor against post-traumatic stress. Community responsibility of services related to infrastructure, as mentioned in Resilient Community Security, also bolsters Community Security. On the other hand, communities where provision of these services is assumed by the Central Government or the Taliban tend to be more fragile and further exacerbate post-traumatic stress and food insecurity, respectively. Taken together, policymakers should then focus on empowering communities to self-organise, build social networks and the capacities to manage their community. Given that CDCs are a source of resilience, similar community-based mechanisms may be appropriate for managing local infrastructure. However, CDCs or local infrastructure management mechanisms should not be established without a deep understanding of local community institutions. Other SCORE analyses have shown that a proliferation of conflicting and overlapping institutions leads to another kind of fragility, namely generating community insecurity and violent disputes (see chapter Resilient Community Security). Such infrastructure management mechanisms must cooperate with existing institutions rather than compete for local influence as a distinct actor.

Beyond resilience factors, the SCORE also identified characteristics of individuals and communities which were coping worse than expected. These characteristics are thus classed as fragility factors, and must be mitigated, or areas exhibiting them focussed on. Multi-ethnic areas where Contact between different ethnic groups occurs, and areas with a Presence of Vulnerable Groups (i.e., War Victims, Migrants, Internally Displaced Persons) tend to be more fragile⁹. To reduce fragility, programmatic design should prioritise working in areas where different ethnic groups are in constant contact with each other and areas which have members of vulnerable groups. Also, long-term programming should focus on developing social inclusion programmes which offer psychosocial support and facilitate the effective integration of different groups into the community, while recognising that multi-ethnic communities are more fragile, due to social cohesion issues. USAID ongoing humanitarian efforts as well as ongoing and upcoming projects like REACH by World Bank (World Bank, 2020) and ECHO by INTERSOS (INTERsos, 2019) should thus make sure their relief programmes further reinforce their psychosocial support services with social inclusion interventions targeting vulnerable groups thereby facilitating the development of community-based mechanisms that provide the necessary psychosocial support and social cohesion.

⁹ Marginalisation is a critical adversity undermining both Food Security and Post-Traumatic Wellbeing. One in three Afghans reported marginalisation by others due to their ethnicity and their religious beliefs.

Economic insecurity and the lack of a dependable income are also critical fragility factors. These tend to undermine the ability of citizens to maintain Post-Traumatic Wellbeing and Food Security in the face of adversity. This, in turn, can contribute to further societal instability and conflict escalation as Afghan people may resort to violence to obtain necessary resources. This calls for emergency food aid and thus short-term programming should concentrate in providing immediate relief through humanitarian efforts designed to ensure availability and accessibility of food for critical groups and areas. A return to the normal functioning of local economies, such that citizens can have a sustainable livelihood will be a critical mid-term goal, following current instability.

Recommendations


The most significant adversities undermining Food Security and Post-Traumatic Wellbeing are Exposure to Violence and Marginalisation, which are difficult to directly address in the current context. Instead, actors should work towards designing an early recovery strategy which builds resilience. This can be informed using SCORE results:

- Use a portion of humanitarian assistance to support more long term and sustainable development activities which can serve as a basis for transitioning more efficiently from emergency to mainstream development assistance.
- In the short term, consider aiding humanitarian efforts by providing food and shelter. This should be focused on districts particularly in Kandahar, Kabul, and Nangahar that are at risk of falling into famine-like conditions.
- To build resilience, provide phones and fuel. Both were found to contribute to resilience simultaneously for food security and mental wellbeing. Given that possession of a phone in many Taliban controlled areas is forbidden, instead of providing phones, aid organisations should focus on any local alternatives to keep communication lines open.
- Use the SCORE to identify areas doing relatively poorly on Food Security and Post-Traumatic Wellbeing, and target interventions there.
- In the long-term, promote livelihood support to facilitate the effective integration of fragile populations into the community. Focus on the vulnerable, IDPs, multi-ethnic communities, and those in poverty. Encourage the development of social support systems to promote healing.
- Also, promote the improvement of economic collaboration systems. Encourage the development of informal economy practices and aid them in transforming these into more sustainable models. These should be tailored to the unique context and needs of each area and should include skills development and trainings facilitating the incorporation of vulnerable and/or isolated groups into the community.
- Build resilience by effectively dividing responsibilities between local communities and central government. Community-based institutions and local decision-makers (like CDCs) are better placed to manage local infrastructure, and so their capacities should be built to take on such responsibilities. Involvement of either the government or the Taliban in managing local infrastructure is a fragility factor, and so their involvement should be gradually phased out as local institutions step into the role. This should take place as part of a formal constitutional process of political, fiscal, and administrative decentralisation. This finding also chimes in with similar results about local infrastructure management contributing to resilience for Community Security (see also Resilient Community Security)
- To ensure resilient mental wellbeing, develop household-focused programming to support homemakers (who tend to be mostly women), in their role of primary caregiver. Recognise the role that homemakers play in psychological support and empower them to play a greater role in supporting the mental wellbeing of their communities. Support them to develop the necessary psychosocial tools to promote healing and alleviate trauma in times of conflict.

Rights and inclusion of women and girls

Limitations in girls' schooling

The map shows the average schooling rate among girls



The table below shows the difference in the schooling rate between girls and boys.

Full Sample	-14%
Balkh	-9%
Bamyan	-8%
Herat	-8%
Kabul	-16%
Kandahar	-29%
Nangarhar	-11%
Government controlled	-13%
Contested	-16%
Taliban controlled	-17%


Increasing women's participation

Women score lower in Civic Engagement than men. These factors could increase their participation.

Characteristics of women with high Civic Engagement	
Trust towards outgroups	Trust in security services
Higher schooling rate in household	Locally active government & foreign forces
Trust in NGOs	Economic security
Identify as peace activists	Service efficiency
Trust in government	Access to television and internet

Broad support for women's rights, but not for women in leadership

The chart shows the level of support for various women's rights among men and women.



Rights and Inclusion of Women and Girls

Considering the obstacles that continue to prevent Afghan women from fully realising their fundamental rights, this analysis aims to outline Afghans' views on issues surrounding gender equality, particularly as negotiations stall and instability remains. Views on gender rights remain paramount as effective government influence sways and as accounts from districts newly-captured by the Taliban already cite restrictions to women's liberties (Clark, 2021). This analysis aims to inform policy and programmatic decisions centred around strengthening the equal participation of women and girls in education, and in civic and public life.

SCORE measured several indicators relevant to girls' education, women's Civic Engagement, and Support for Gender Rights, with the aim of providing a deeper understanding of the gender deficit in access to education, what factors empower women to be more civically active, and where support for gender rights falters.

A key gender difference was the disparity in the schooling rate of boys and girls. On average, in the SCORE sample, 55% of school-age boys were in school, compared to just 41% of girls. This difference was especially striking in Kandahar, with an average deficit of 29% in girls' schooling rate. In certain rural districts of Kandahar and Herat (see SCORE Indicators and Heatmaps). Compared to government controlled areas, the deficit in girls' schooling rate is further exacerbated in areas not controlled by the government.

Women were found to have lower levels of Civic Engagement than men (average scores of 2.4 and 3.1 out of 10, respectively), measured using their reported frequency of participation in civic activities such as voting, attending community meetings, participating in peaceful demonstrations, volunteering, or taking part in peace-related events. Civic engagement was lowest in Herat (average score for female respondents of 1.6 out of 10) and highest in Balkh (average score for female respondents of 3.6 out of 10). Women are also less included in local decision-making, with 43% reporting that CDCs take their views into account, compared to 56% of men. When it comes to local councils (shuras, jirgas, elders) 45% of women report that their views are taken into account, compared to 54% of men. Finally, 53% of women report that community elders take their views into account, compared to 68% of men.

Certain factors were identified as key characteristics¹⁰ of women with high civic participation, which may reveal entry points for increasing civic engagement in women. Trust in NGOs, access to women's councils, and overall availability of inclusive decision-making structures were linked to higher levels of civic engagement. International NGOs are mistrusted by 49% of women in the sample, and national NGOs by 57%. There is a need to understand the source of this mistrust, address women's concerns, and resolve these as part of programme implementation. Higher engagement levels are also observed in women who trust the government, security services, and the government of the USA, and those who live in areas where the government and foreign forces are active. Certain socioeconomic factors also come into play, as demonstrated from the finding that women with more economic security, efficient access to services, and access to television and the internet had higher levels of civic engagement.

Both men and women support gender rights, demonstrating the reluctance of Afghans to reverse any progress made on gender equality. Elsewhere, results showed that even among people who support the Taliban, compromise on gender rights is not accepted (see Future Visions for Afghanistan: Building Consensus and Tracking Priorities). However, just 58% of women and 52% of men believe

¹⁰ Correlation analysis, $R > 0.2$, $p < 0.01$

that leadership positions should also be held by women, despite this being enshrined in the constitution of Afghanistan (Nijat & Murtazashvili, 2015). Male respondents were slightly less supportive of women's equal right to own land (agreed by 89% of women; 75% of men), to education (91% of women; 81% of men), and to make decisions about their own life (87% of women; 73% of men). In male respondents, support for gender rights was higher in those who support a democratic political system (see Future Visions for Afghanistan: Building Consensus and Tracking Priorities) and lower in men who support divisive narratives and who live in rural areas¹¹. Support for gender rights also declines in areas not controlled by the government, and in Kandahar and Herat¹².

Recommendations

The disparity between the schooling rate of girls and boys remains, particularly in areas where government presence is lacking, and in rural areas.

- Efforts should concentrate on narrowing the gap in schooling rates, focusing on the areas with the largest discrepancies between girls and boys: rural northern Kandahar, and rural Herat.
- Programme design should prioritise investigating the relative success of districts in Balkh and Nangarhar, where a larger proportion of girls are in school, and apply these to similar contexts, such as Kabul, which is urban yet underperforming.

Females are less active civically, with less inclusion in local decision making. This is a result of fewer mechanisms involving women in civic and public life, more barriers to participation in areas where government presence is lacking, as well as socioeconomic factors, such as education level, economic security and access to technology or communications. Women's civic engagement is also higher when they trust NGOs, suggesting that reinforcing this could lead to higher participation levels.

- Programming that engages women must recognise the influence of economic security, which forms a barrier to participation for poorer women. Opportunities for participation must extend to more rural areas and areas where government presence is lacking.
- Policymakers should concentrate efforts on dispelling mistrust in NGOs, understanding why it has arisen, and working with NGOs and local communities to rebuild that trust.
- Establish mechanisms for the inclusion of women in existing local decision-making bodies. Increase awareness of the importance of women's public participation, beyond the use of civic mechanisms to resolve isolated personal affairs or disputes.

Both men and women are generally supportive of gender rights, but less enthusiastic about women's participation in governance.

- Programming should prioritise the promotion of gender rights in areas that are less urban and in communities where government presence is lacking.
- Organisations working to promote gender rights should take into account that opposition often comes from segments of the population who are generally more supportive of divisive or traditionalist narratives. Working with religious and traditional local leadership who are supportive of gender rights, is important to win over those who are more reluctant.
- The SCORE could be used as an advocacy tool in high-level forums, such as the current negotiations or elsewhere, relaying the high level of support for women's rights that Afghans display, which demonstrates their reluctance to turn the clock back on women's rights.

¹¹ Correlation analysis, $R>0.2$, $P<0.01$

¹² ANOVA, $F>20$, $p<0.05$

- As political uncertainty mounts, programming should keep women's empowerment at the forefront of their programmes, focussing on women's inclusion in everyday civic and public life. At the political level, pressure should be applied to increase and ensure women's representation in leadership (e.g., in future peace negotiations) and to ensure that this is maintained in any future political configurations.

This analysis highlights key areas where girls' access to education is limited, identifying the key factors that empower women to be engaged in civic life, and crucial areas of consensus and cleavage on rights central to gender equality. In doing so, this analysis illustrates potential entry points and opportunities for strengthening the equal participation of women and girls in education, civic and public life.

Views of Afghans in Taliban Controlled & Contested Districts

This analysis identified which indicators characterise government controlled, contested and Taliban controlled districts.

Government controlled districts

Urban



- Access to television and the internet
- Efficient services, infrastructure
- Unwilling to accept Taliban dominance
- Support gender rights
- Access to women’s councils

Contested districts have the highest

- Security and justice provided by Taliban
- Supportive attitudes to Taliban
- Presence of the Taliban

Taliban controlled districts

- Isolated and far from major roads
- Exposed to economic shocks and land disputes
- Fewer girls in school
- Fewer women’s councils



Contested and Taliban controlled areas are very similar:

- | | |
|---|--|
| Rural | Support traditionalist narratives, Islamic governance and religion in politics |
| Conflict exposure and service disruption | Less support for gender rights |
| Taliban active locally | Interethnic harmony |
| Tolerance to Taliban members, support reintegration and amnesty | Inclusive local decision making |



After data collection in May, certain districts fell to the Taliban. These are their characteristics.

Districts which fell to the Taliban between April and July:

- | | |
|---|--|
| Conflict exposure | Trust in Afghan security services |
| Sympathy and trust in Taliban | Justice and security provision by government |
| Accept Taliban dominance | Government activity |
| Presence of the Taliban | |
| Justice and security provision by Taliban | |

higher

lower

Views of Afghans in Taliban Controlled and Contested Districts

This analysis outlines the characteristics¹³ of areas under government control, Taliban control, or contested status and uncovers the features of districts which fell to the Taliban between April and July 2021¹⁴. The control of a district is designated according to its status during data collection¹⁵. This is based on the understanding that a change in control would immediately impact the social phenomena measured by the SCORE. It is therefore only appropriate to characterise a district based on its control at the time of surveying, and to refer to the characteristics of districts which fell to the Taliban in terms of the respondents' views while they were still living under government control or contested status. By using SCORE indicators to compare the perceptions and realities of Afghans living in districts where effective control and governance differ, the results can be used to inform programme design, highlighting the sensitivities and challenges of operating in key areas, and serving as a predictive tool for areas at risk of falling to the Taliban.

The continued loss of districts to the Taliban between May and July 2021 (Clark, 2021) motivates questions regarding the realities that Afghans face living under the Taliban, the reach of governance and institutions to these citizens, and the ability of nongovernmental organisations to operate in these areas.

SCORE data indicates that Taliban controlled districts have the least efficient infrastructure, administrative and judicial services, and government controlled districts the highest. However, it is in contested districts that residents report the Taliban is most responsible for service provision, particularly in security, justice and informal dispute resolution¹⁶. Indicators surrounding service, security and justice provision are among the most relevant when profiling Taliban control (Clark & Bjelica, 2019), and these results quantitatively validate that "governance does not come after the capture of territory, but precedes it" (Jackson, 2018). While respondents in contested districts report the highest level of Taliban responsibility for service provision, in all districts the government and community itself are more responsible for services than the Taliban. Although respondents in both contested and Taliban controlled districts report hearing about or witnessing Taliban activity to the same extent, the presence of the Taliban is higher in contested communities. Meanwhile, it is in the districts under Taliban control that the highest number of children (especially girls) are out of school, and in which women's councils are absent, demonstrating the sustained impact on women's life when an area is under Taliban control.

Overall, the SCORE revealed that contested districts have more in common with Taliban controlled than government controlled districts. Exposure to conflict and service disruption are higher in both contested and Taliban controlled districts, which are also more rural than those under government control. Respondents are less supportive of gender rights and more supportive of an Islamic political system and of religion in politics. Understanding attitudes in Taliban controlled areas is important for aid agencies working in contexts where the Taliban have influence, as they may form resistance to certain policies (Jackson, 2013). Furthermore, contested and Taliban controlled areas report more

¹³ ANOVA, $F > 20$, $p < 0.05$. For a detailed view at the mean scores of indicators mentioned in text, please see Views of Afghans in Taliban Controlled and Contested Districts

¹⁴ Correlation analysis, $R > 0.2$, $p < 0.05$, controlled by urbanity.

¹⁵ For more information on data collection and classification of districts' control status, please see Methodology.

¹⁶ It is noteworthy that Taliban involvement in dispute resolution emerged as a fragility factor contributing to community insecurity and to an increase in local violence (Resilient Community Security).

positive perceptions of the Taliban, accepting Taliban dominance and supporting their reintegration and amnesty.

Respondents in these districts also report more access to local decision-making, and higher harmony with people from other ethnic groups. These apparent strengths of these rural communities contrast with urban, government controlled areas, where tension between ethnic groups and an absence of resolution mechanisms could threaten social cohesion.

Following data collection in May 2021, several districts in the SCORE sample fell to the Taliban (Clark, 2021; Roggio, 2021). This provided a sizeable subsample of districts, enabling the characterisation of areas which fell to the Taliban between April and July 2021. The researchers acknowledge that a plethora of other factors – including topographic, demographic and military – have also influenced the change in control. The SCORE data can add to understanding of what other social and attitudinal factors may have led to the fall of districts.

At the time of surveying in May, respondents in districts which then fell to the Taliban by July reported more trust in and sympathy for the Taliban, willingness to accept Taliban dominance and a higher presence of Taliban in their community. They also reported higher levels of conflict exposure at the time of surveying, including exposure to roadblocks by armed groups, bombings or shootings, death or injury. These people were more likely to mistrust government security services and report a low level of government responsibility for service provision, as well as low activity of the government in their local area. These sentiments and perceptions could serve as predictors of districts at risk of falling from government control.

Recommendations

Governance strategies and locals' sentiments towards the Taliban precede control. The Taliban has a stronger influence on service delivery, justice and dispute resolution in contested districts, and a stronger local presence. People in contested districts also report warmer attitudes towards the Taliban, more so than those in Taliban or government controlled areas.

In areas which fell to the Taliban, respondents report warmer attitudes towards the Taliban, before the subsequent fall. These respondents echoed a lower level of government responsibility for service provision, low activity of the government, as well as mistrust in government security services.

- SCORE data could be used to detect fragile areas, identifying where government service delivery and presence is most lacking, and aiding the development of contingency and response strategies in advance of territorial loss. In-depth data collection across the country could enable the development of a more precise metric to predict the fall of certain areas, taking into account sociological phenomena and sentiment, as well as topography and demographics.
- Keep providing aid to mitigate against the severe challenges that residents of Taliban controlled areas are facing. These include economic shocks, conflict exposure, service disruption and closing of schools.
- Given the warmer feelings towards the Taliban and the higher involvement of the Taliban in certain services in non government controlled areas, programmatic interventions may need to liaise with mediators proximal to the local Taliban to achieve their goals.

Contested areas and areas under Taliban control have endured high levels of conflict and service disruption.

- There is a need to continue building resilience in and prioritising the stabilisation of at-risk communities despite sensitivities which arise from the status of their control. This includes emergency shelter, and immediate basic needs assistance (e.g., food and cash). This is

particularly important as the conflict intensifies, alongside the increasing number of IDPs (244,000 between May and August, a three-fold increase (“Huge Rise in Afghanistan IDPs as Thousands Flee Taliban Advance,” 2021)), and high risk of food shortages given the compounding effects of the drought (IFRC, 2021; Kapoor, 2021). Further resilience strategies include the short term approaches given in Resilient Community Security.

Social and attitudinal factors differ outside government controlled areas. Citizens are less inclusive of women, and supportive of a greater role for religion in politics.

- These results can assist program design by outlining the sensitivities in key areas, such as gender programming in contested or Taliban controlled locations, which could face challenges in implementation. Work with civil society to identify male allies in Taliban controlled areas who support women’s rights and inclusion. Empower them to contribute to the protection of women’s rights in their areas.
- Interventions relating to promoting democratic governance, need to be framed in a context-sensitive manner in certain communities. Ensure that these are grounded in an adequately Islamic political framework. Interventions should build upon relatively high levels of support for collegiate and inclusive governance (see Future Visions for Afghanistan: Building Consensus and Tracking Priorities for levels of support for collective governance in an Islamic political system).
- Government controlled areas lack ethnic harmony and citizens’ participation. Interventions must address inclusive governance, civic empowerment, and interethnic harmony.

This analysis outlines the key characteristics of areas under government control, Taliban control or contested status. Based on pilot data from six provinces, the analysis also illustrates the potential for the SCORE to be used as a monitoring or early warning toolkit to predict the locations most at risk of falling from government control. In doing so, the results seek to provide preliminary information on the sensitivities, challenges and realities of programming across Afghanistan. These insights will become all the more useful in coming cycles of donors’ programming.

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Rights and Inclusion of Women and Girls

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Analysis Glossary

ANOVA	A statistical test to determine whether the mean scores of two or more groups are indistinguishable or if they are significantly different. In the present report, significant differences are only measured where F is larger than 20 and/or Cohen's D effect size between two groups is above medium.
Correlation Analysis	A measure of the statistically significant association between two variables. In the present report, significant associations are those where p is less than 0.01 and the Pearson correlation coefficient is above 0.2.
Cronbach's alpha	A measure assessing the internal consistency of a variable, that is, how closely related a set of items are as a group. It is a common test of scale reliability. A Cronbach's alpha of .70 and above is good , while alphas between .61 and .70 are considered acceptable.
Heatmap	Displays the mean score of an indicator across different geographical areas, illustrating regional differences.
Predictive Modelling	Predictive statistical modelling techniques (such as linear regressions or structural equation modelling) investigate the relationships between dependent variables (the outcome) and one or more independent variables (the drivers, or predictors). Predictive analyses are used to infer directional relationships between a predictor and an outcome.
Residuals	These quantify the difference between the actual scores and the predicted scores as estimated by the fitted regression line (or model) of individual cases which comprise the sample.
Resilience Analysis	These analyses identify which personal assets and community resources will most effectively interrupt pathways from risk exposure to detrimental outcomes.
Standardised beta (β) coefficients	Betas denote the degree of change in the outcome variable for every 1-unit (1 standard deviation) of change in the predictor, while controlling for the influence of all other predictors in the model. Beta coefficients can be positive or negative. Positive beta coefficients indicate that for every 1-unit of increase in the predictor variable, the outcome variable will also increase by the beta coefficient value. Conversely, negative beta coefficients suggest that for every 1-unit of increase in the predictor variable, the outcome variable will decrease by the beta coefficient value.
Unstandardised (B) coefficients	Unstandardised coefficients are 'raw' coefficients produced by regression analysis when the analysis is performed on original, unstandardised variables. An unstandardised coefficient represents the amount of change in a dependent variable Y due to a change of 1 unit of a predictor variable while controlling for the influence of all other predictors in the model.

Indicator Glossary

The following indicators are those which appear in the present report and are not exhaustive of the indicators in the full study. Each respondent achieved a score of 0 to 10 on each of the indicators, and regional and demographic averages can be found on www.scoreforpeace.org.

Active Citizenship	The extent to which respondents would attempt to solve challenges in their community through non-violent means.
Activity of Foreign Forces	The extent to which people have seen or heard about the actions of foreign forces in their community in their everyday life over the 12 months prior to surveying.
Activity of the Government	The extent to which people have seen or heard about the actions of ANA soldiers or commanders, ANP or ALP officers, or government officials, in their community in their everyday life over the 12 months prior to surveying.
Activity of the Taliban	The extent to which people have seen or heard about the actions of Taliban commanders or soldiers, Taliban judges or courts or Taliban supporters, in their community in their everyday life over the 12 months prior to surveying.
Disruption of Services due to Conflict	The average extent to which respondents report that services have been disrupted due to the conflict over the 24 months prior to surveying (covers all services in Efficiency of Services indicator).
Civic Engagement	The extent to which respondents participate or engage in formal and informal civic initiatives (e.g., public demonstrations, meetings of CDC or local council, campaigning for public awareness, volunteering, voting).
Civic Empowerment	The extent to which respondents feel that they can positively influence local government and whether they are willing to give up their personal time for the benefit of their community.
Community Asset: Women's Shura or Council	Presence of a women's shura or women's council in their community, as reported by locals.
Community Security	A composite indicator of the average extent to which respondents report that certain disputes (e.g., over land, resources, water, traffic accidents, family problems, commercial issues) occurred in their community in the 12 months prior to sampling, and the extent to which these disputes usually turn violent.
Divisive (Traditionalist) Narratives	The extent to which respondents agree with certain narratives identified as divisive or traditionalist. For more details of this instrument please contact the research team.
Economic Security	The extent to which respondents feel that they have a safe and predictable income to meet their basic needs and sufficient assets or savings to fall back on in case something unforeseen occurs.
Efficiency of Services	The extent to which respondents have efficient access to all services in their district (composite measure including roads, electricity, drinking water and irrigation, education, healthcare, justice and security services, administrative services and informal dispute resolution).
Exposure to Conflict	The extent to which, in the 12 months prior to surveying, respondents, someone in their household, or someone in their community have witnessed bombings or shootings, fighting between the government and

	the Taliban, experienced destruction of property, food shortages, permanent disability, injury or death due to conflict.
Exposure to Covid - 19	A single-item indicator asking respondents whether they have experienced any symptoms associated with Covid-19 (e.g., fever, cough, difficulty in breathing)
Exposure to Economic Shocks	The extent to which respondents, their household or their community experienced a reduced income or loss of employment, an increase in food prices, a reduced business output or destruction of crops and harvest, over the 12 months prior to surveying.
Exposure to Environmental Shocks	The extent to which respondents, their household or their community were exposed to floods, droughts, damaging snow or late frost, or other natural disasters, over the 12 months prior to surveying.
Exposure to Violence	The extent to which respondents, their household or their community were exposed to violent incidences including, burglary, sexual abuse, physical violence, human trafficking, and murder, over the 12 months prior to surveying.
Food Security	The extent to which respondents have not had to resort to consumption coping strategies in order to provide enough food for their household, over the 7 days prior to surveying, and over the 12 months prior to surveying. Food consumption strategies include limiting portion sizes, restricting consumption of some members or skipping entire days without eating (World Food Programme Vulnerability Analysis & Mapping Unit, 2012).
Future Visions: Islamic Political System	The average extent to which respondents feel that having an Amir chosen by the ulema, having a council of ulema and elders making important decisions about the country, having a supreme leader with the only say on legislature and governance, having a religious council to ensure all legislature is based on Islamic law and changing Afghanistan from an Islamic Republic to an Emirate, are important for the future of Afghanistan.
Future Visions: Progressive Political System	The extent to which respondents feel that voting for the president, having a parliament of elected officials and having a collective leadership with many voices from different political and social groups are important for the future of Afghanistan.
Household Asset: Internet	The extent to which the respondent has access to the internet in their household and whether they can use it personally.
Household Asset: Phone	The extent to which the respondent has access to a telephone in their household and whether they can use it personally.
Household Asset: Radio	The extent to which the respondent has access to a radio in their household and whether they can use it personally.
Household Asset: Television	The extent to which the respondent has access to a television in their household and whether they can use it personally.
Impact of Covid-19	The average extent to which the Covid-19 pandemic affected the respondent and their household, with regard to their economic situation, physical and mental health, relations with other households and access to services.

Importance of Religion in Politics	The extent to which respondents feel that religion should play an absolute role in politics, deciding all aspects of laws, governance, economic and civic life.
Inclusive Identity	The extent to which respondents believe that there are more things that unite than separate people from different ethnic or political groups, whether they believe in finding a common identity for all ethnic, religious and political groups, and whether they believe in ethnic pluralism in the political system.
Inclusivity of Local Shura or Jirga	The extent to which respondents report that there is a local shura or jirga in their community, which takes into account their views.
Intergroup Harmony	A composite measure of the average extent to which respondents feel social proximity, positive feelings, social tolerance and trust in ethnic groups different to their own.
Level of Taliban Responsibility for Service Provision	The average extent to which the Taliban are responsible for providing and maintaining drinking water, roads, electricity, irrigation, education, healthcare, security, formal justice and informal dispute resolution, in the respondent's local area.
Marginalisation	The extent to which respondents have felt socially excluded or discriminated against on the basis of certain social features (including gender, religion, ethnicity, age, political views or health status).
Post-Traumatic Wellbeing	The extent to which respondents have been bothered by stressful experiences related to past trauma. Higher scores suggest less frequent post-traumatic stress experiences
Overall Inclusivity of Local Decision-Making Structures	The average extent to which decision-making structures exist in the respondents' communities and whether they take into account the respondents' views. The decision-making structures refer to shuras, jirgas or councils of elders; arbab, maliks or community leaders; women's shuras or councils; youth shuras or councils; or community development councils (CDCs)
Overall Schooling Rate	The average proportion of school-age children that attend school in a household.
Presence of the Taliban	The extent to which respondents report the presence of Taliban in their community.
Presence of Vulnerable Groups	The extent to which respondents report the presence of the following groups in their community: IDPs or refugees, returnees, nomads, migrants, victims of war, Taliban, drug users.
Resilience for Community Security	An indicator calculated from resilience analysis. It characterises individuals and communities who are doing better than predicted in Community Security despite serious adversities which were found to disrupt Community Security.
Support for Gender Rights	The extent to which respondents accept equal rights for women, including access to work, education, inheritance, leadership positions and personal rights and liberties, and their opposition to gender-based violence at home.
Support for Taliban Reintegration and Amnesty	The average extent to which respondents agree with certain reintegration scenarios after the end of the conflict. These include, at the local level, fighters receiving reintegration assistance, reintegrating into society, integrating into the national security forces; at the political level, Taliban

	leaders integrating into the government, becoming a political party; and scenarios for amnesty.
Social Tolerance towards the Taliban	The extent to which respondents would accept to personally interact with members of the Taliban.
Sympathy for the Taliban	The extent to which agree that they have sympathy towards the Taliban's cause.
Trust in Central Government	The average extent to which respondents have confidence in the President, members of the government, the government justice system, the Huquq department and the IAN negotiating team of the Government of Afghanistan, to do their job.
Trust in National and International NGOs	The average extent to which respondents have confidence in national and international NGOs to do their job.
Trust in Outgroups	The average extent to which respondents trust people from other ethnic groups different to their own.
Trust in Security Services	The average extent to which respondents trust the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.
Willing to Accept Taliban Dominance	A composite indicator of the average extent to which respondents are willing to compromise on the following in order to reach a peace settlement: loss of territory to the Taliban, the Taliban controlling the Ministry of Education, a Taliban leader becoming vice president.

Technical and Statistical Information

Statistical Testing

To examine the direction and magnitude of an association between two indicators, correlations were calculated. All correlations mentioned in this report are statistically significant at a p-value of .01 or below.

To assess whether group means are different at a statistically significant level Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests were conducted. All group comparisons reported have an F-value over 20 and are statistically significant at a p-value of .01 or below.

For all predictive models the indicators used have good to excellent reliability with Cronbach's alphas ranging between 0.7 and 0.9. The only indicator in our predictive models with a questionable internal consistency is Exposure to Economic Shocks with a Cronbach's alpha of .58.

Further, to demonstrate the magnitude and direction (i.e., effect) of each predictor variable on the outcome variable in our predictive models, standardised beta coefficients are reported. Standardised beta coefficients denote the degree of change in the outcome variable for every 1-unit (standard deviation) of change in the predictor, while controlling for the influence of all other predictors in the model (for more see Analysis Glossary). For example, as shown in the table below, the standardised beta coefficient of Marginalisation on Food Security is -.22, which means that with every increase of one standard deviation in Marginalisation, Food security decreases by .22 standard deviations.

What is Resilience Analysis?

Resilience analysis can identify the characteristics of individuals that display an unexpected positive adaptation in the face of adversities. These individuals have positive results on outcome indicators despite their extreme level of exposure to challenges and adversities. Resilience analysis has been used in developmental psychology (Masten, 2014; 2015; see also Masten & Obradovic, 2006) and conflict studies (Lordos et al., 2021, see also Lordos & Hyslop, 2021) is an analytic strategy allowing researchers to test two key hypotheses:

1. *Which adversities and to what extent each of these negatively impact a positive life outcome of interest?*

To test this, multivariate regression or structural equation modelling is used to examine the effects of various adversities (e.g., Exposure to Violence, Environmental Shocks, etc.) on a positive life outcome (e.g., Food Security). This provides insight to which adversities impact the outcome of interest, and the strength with which they do so.

2. *Which resilience/fragility factors and to what extent each of these bolster/undermine the positive life outcome of interest in the face of adversity?*

Positive values of residuals are assigned to individual cases in the sample that perform better on the outcome than predicted by the fitted line, after taking into account all adversities. Negative residuals correspond to individual cases in the sample that perform worse on the outcome than predicted by the fitted line.

Accordingly, a positive correlation between an asset and the residuals suggest that that asset is a resilience factor, since it characterises individuals who are coping in the face of adversities. By the same token, a negative correlation between an asset and the residuals suggests that this asset is a fragility factor. To test which factors were resilience factors or fragility factors, the residuals extracted from the predicted model were correlated with a series of SCORE indicators which measure individual

competencies, communal or household assets, resources, services and infrastructure, social and political factors, and characteristics of the local area. Those SCORE indicators which had a positive relationship to the residuals is then said to be associated with individuals who are coping in the face of adversities and is therefore a resilience factor.

Supplementary Statistics

Regression Analysis: Food Security & Post-Traumatic Wellbeing

A multivariate multiple linear regression on Food Security and Post-Traumatic Wellbeing was performed with Exposure to Covid-19, Exposure to Violence, Marginalisation, and Exposure to Environmental Shocks as predictors. For this analysis, the effects of Urbanity, Control (government controlled, Taliban controlled, contested), and Gender (male vs. female) were accounted for. This analysis was performed on R (R Core Team, 2021). The fitted model accounted for 15% of the variance in Post-Traumatic Wellbeing and was statistically significant ($F(8, 1191) = 26.37, p < .001$). For Food Security, the fitted accounted for 17% of its variance and was also statistically significant ($F(8, 1191) = 29.75, p < .001$). Prior to this analysis, the model was fitted on a latent level revealing a good fit of the I model to the data CFI = 0.957; TLI = 0.926; RMSEA = 0.050 [0.041, 0.072].

The tables below report the standardised coefficients, p-values and 95% Confidence Intervals of each predictor on Food Security and Post-Traumatic Wellbeing. The effects of predictors on the outcomes are considered statistically significant when p-value is 0.05 or lower. Confidence intervals (95%CI) give the estimated range of values which we expect each predictor's effect to fall within with 95% certainty.

<i>Predictors</i>	Post-Traumatic Wellbeing			Food Security		
	β	B	95%CI	β	B	95%CI
Exposure to Violence	-.09***	-0.096	[-0.16, -0.03]	-.19***	-0.22	[-0.30, -0.15]
Marginalisation	-.22***	-0.194	[-0.25, -0.14]	-.14***	-0.14	[-0.20, -0.08]
Exposure to Covid-19	-.08***	-0.035	[-0.06, -0.01]	-.09***	-0.05	[-0.08, -0.02]
Environmental Shocks	-.04	-0.032	[-0.08, 0.02]	-.13***	-0.13	[-0.19, -0.07]
<i>Controls</i>						
Urbanity	.05	0.022	[-0.01, 0.05]	.17***	0.09	[0.06, 0.12]
Gender	-.04	-0.147	[-0.35, 0.06]	.08	0.36	[0.12, 0.59]
Control of Area	.30***	1.067	[0.85, 1.29]	.06	0.23	[-0.02, 0.48]

Note. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Regression Analysis: Community Security

A multiple linear regression on Community Security was performed with Exposure to Violence, Exposure to Conflict, Exposure to Economic Shocks, Presence of Vulnerable Groups, Negative Impact of Covid-19, Marginalisation, Activity of Taliban, Activity of Foreign Forces, and Activity of Government, and Disruption of Services due to Conflict as predictors. For this analysis the effects of Urbanity, Control, and Gender were accounted for. This analysis was performed on AMOS module of SPSS Version 23.0 (Arbuckle, 2014). The fitted model accounted for 38% of the variance of Community Security and was statistically significant ($F(13, 1186) = 55.75, p < .001$). We also generated model fit indices that revealed an acceptable fit of the model ($CFI = 0.958, TLI = 0.843, RMSEA = 0.071$).

<i>Predictors</i>	Community Security		
	β	B	95%CI
Exposure to Violence	-.11***	-0.11	[-0.18, -0.05]
Exposure to Conflict	-.21***	-0.16	[-0.20, -0.11]
Exposure to Economic Shocks	-.06*	-0.05	[-0.09, -0.01]
Presence of Vulnerable Groups	-.16***	-0.19	[-0.25, -0.12]
Negative Impact of Covid-19	.11***	0.09	[0.05, 0.13]
Marginalisation	-.17***	-0.16	[-0.21, -0.10]
Activity of the Taliban	-.07*	-0.04	[-0.08, -0.01]
Activity of Foreign Forces	-.02	-0.01	[-0.05, 0.02]
Activity of Foreign Forces	-.01	-0.01	[-0.04, 0.03]
Disruption of Services due to Conflict	-.13***	-0.10	[-0.13, -0.06]
<i>Controls</i>			
Urbanity	.10***	0.34	[0.16, 0.53]
Gender	-.11***	-0.05	[-0.07, -0.02]
Control of Area	-.03	-0.01	[-0.03, 0.01]

Note. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Views of Afghans in Taliban Controlled and Contested Districts

The table below shows the results for the ANOVA comparing the characteristics of districts that were government controlled, contested or Taliban controlled in April 2021 (see Views of Afghans in Taliban Controlled and Contested Districts). A blue background indicates that this group scores the statistically highest score, and an orange background indicates that it scores the statistically lowest score, out of the three groups. Only indicators for which F is larger than 20 are considered to have statistically different mean scores between the three groups. All indicators are measured on a scale from 0 to 10. F is a statistical metric which quantifies how different the responses of participants within each group are.

Indicator Name	Mean Score Government Controlled	Mean Score Contested	Mean Score Taliban Controlled	F
Activity of Government Locally	5.5	4.9	5.2	4
Activity of Taliban Locally	2.1	3.7	3.3	32
Community Asset: Women's Shura or Council	4.1	2.6	1.1	21
Divisive Narratives (Support for)	4.5	6.0	6.3	65
Efficiency of Infrastructure Services	5.8	5.1	3.4	25
Efficiency of Government Administrative Services	6.5	5.1	4.3	31
Efficiency of Government Justice Services	5.8	4.8	3.2	24
Efficiency of Security Services	7.1	5.4	6.4	29
Exposure to Conflict	2.8	4.6	4.1	50
Exposure to Economic Shocks	6.2	7.1	7.7	21
Frequency of Land Disputes	2.6	3.2	4.7	22
Household Asset: Radio	5.0	7.5	7.0	29
Household Asset: Television	8.1	4.7	3.1	110
Household Asset: Internet	5.2	1.8	1.9	65
Importance of Religion in Politics	7.0	8.4	8.7	33
Inclusivity of Community Leader	3.4	4.9	5.7	31
Inclusivity of Shura or Jirga	2.7	4.0	5.4	34
Intergroup Harmony with Outgroups	5.4	6.2	6.8	22
Level of Central Government Responsibility for Service Provision	3.6	2.7	3.3	8
Level of Local Government Responsibility for Service Provision	3.6	3.8	3.5	4
Level of Taliban Responsibility for Service Provision	0.2	0.8	0.5	43
Number of Girls Not in School (per household)	1.2	1.7	2.3	29
Number of Children Not in School (per household)	2.5	3.3	4.0	26
Presence of the Taliban in Community	1.1	3.2	2.3	79
Provision of Justice by the Government	4.7	2.4	3.6	21
Provision of Security by the Government	4.6	2.4	3.6	20
Provision of Informal Dispute Resolution by the Taliban	0.7	2.4	1.2	31
Provision of Justice by the Taliban	0.2	1.8	1.2	57
Provision of Security by the Taliban	0.2	2.0	1.1	61
Service Disruption due to Conflict	2.0	4.3	4.1	110
Support for Gender Rights	7.4	6.5	6.3	44
Support for Taliban Reintegration and Amnesty	4.3	5.6	5.4	41
Sympathy for the Taliban	1.5	3.4	3.4	48
Trust in Security Services	7.0	5.6	6.5	22
Trust in the Taliban	1.9	4.4	3.1	133
Willingness to Accept Taliban Dominance	2.2	4.0	3.8	72

Incorporation of External Data Streams

Afghanistan is rich in high quality research and data centred around peacebuilding and development. The SCORE analyses in this report were enriched using such data from the World Bank's Afghanistan Spatial Database ((World Bank, 2019)¹⁷, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (*Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)*, 2021)¹⁸ and the Survey of the Afghan People (The Asia Foundation, 2019)¹⁹.

World Bank indicators at the district level were imported into SCORE analyses in order to determine the relationships between these indicators and the SCORE data. Crucial variables included the presence or absence of a World Bank intervention per district, as well as various demographic and geographic factors characteristics of the districts. Several of these were identified as resilience factors in the chapters Resilient Community Security and Building Resilience for Food Security and Post-Traumatic Wellbeing.

ACLED data on the frequency of violent events and the number of fatalities in each event were used to create a district-level metric of atrocities against citizens. Only events which were classed by ACLED as violence against civilians or explosions/remote violence were included in this metric, and only if they were directed by an armed actor against civilians, not other combatants. Events tracked included remote explosives/IEDs, suicide bombings, shelling or bombings, attacks, abductions, and sexual violence. Data covering late May to late July 2021 was used. This metric of atrocities against citizens was used in the chapter Atrocity Prevention, where it was correlated with other SCORE indicators to identify what phenomena were associated with a subsequent higher level of violence directed at citizens.

The Survey of the Afghan People data was used to track changes in perceptions over time, particularly sentiments about the peace negotiations (see Future Visions for Afghanistan: Building Consensus and Tracking Priorities). The invaluable work of the Survey of Afghan People informed the design of certain questions in the SCORE survey.

¹⁷ Data downloaded from <https://www.worldbank.org/en/data/interactive/2019/08/01/afghanistan-district-level-visualization>

¹⁸ Publicly available from www.acleddata.com

¹⁹ Data downloaded from <https://asiafoundation.org/where-we-work/afghanistan/survey/data/>

SCORE Indicators and Heatmaps


SCORE quantifies the levels of societal phenomena using indicators based on questions from the SCORE survey. Using several questions to create one indicator allows us to reliably measure that phenomenon from different perspectives.

Scores for each indicator are given a value from **0 to 10**, where 0 corresponds to the total absence of a phenomenon in an individual, region or in society and 10 corresponds to its strong presence.

Heatmaps, such as that shown here, give the score achieved by each district and province in that indicator. The big circles on the map with the numbers labelled indicate the province average. The colour of the small circles corresponds to the district average. The larger the district circle, the bigger the sample size in that district. A white outline around the circle indicates that the district was controlled by the government at the time of sampling, and a black outline indicates that the district was not under government control. A thick outline indicates that the district has one of the top three scores in this indicator.


For example, the indicator **Political Security** shown here, is measured using three questions:

1. Do you feel comfortable talking about the IAN, the future of Afghanistan, or other political issues in public?
2. Do you feel safe to express your opinions about the government in public?
3. Do you feel safe to express your opinions about the Taliban in public?




Active Citizenship

SCORE
Social Cohesion and
Reconciliation Index
Afghanistan 2021




Activity of Foreign Forces Locally

SCORE
Social Cohesion and
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
Activity of Government Locally

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Activity of Taliban Locally

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
Disruption of Services due to Conflict



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
Civic Engagement



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
Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index

Afghanistan 2021




Civic Empowerment

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
Community Asset: Womens Shura or Council

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
Community Security

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
Divisive Narratives

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
Economic Security

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
Efficiency of All Services

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
Exposure to Conflict

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
Exposure to Economic Shocks

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
Exposure to Environmental Shocks

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
Exposure to Violence

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
Food Security: Recent (CCSI)

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
Food Security: Long Term (CCSI)

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
Future Vision: Islamic Political System


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
Future Vision: Progressive Political System


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
Household Asset: Internet

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
Household Asset: Phone

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
Household Asset: Radio

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
Household Asset: TV

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
Impact of Covid 19 on Access to Services

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
Impact of Covid 19 on Economic Situation of Household

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
Impact of Covid 19 on Mental Health of Household

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
Impact of Covid 19 on Physical Health of Household

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
Impact of Covid 19 on Relations with Other Households

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
Importance of Religion in Politics

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
Inclusive Identity

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
Inclusivity of Shura or Jirga

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
Intergroup Harmony with Outgroups

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
Level of Taliban Responsibility for Service Provision

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
Marginalisation

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
Overall Inclusivity of Local
Decision Making Structures in
Community

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
Overall Schooling Rate

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Presence of Taliban in Community

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
Presence of Vulnerable Groups in Community



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
Resilience for Community Security



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
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
Social Tolerance towards Taliban Members


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
Support for Gender Rights


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
Support Reintegration and Amnesty for Taliban

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
Sympathy for the Taliban

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
Sympathy for the Taliban (SAP)

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
Trust in Central Government

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
Trust in National and International
NGOs

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
Trust in Outgroups

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
Trust in Security Services

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Willing to Accept Taliban Dominance

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Willing to Compromise on Human
Rights and Liberties

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