

Displacement and Life in Ukraine During Russia's Full-Scale Military Aggression: Analysis of GeoPoll's Survey Results, April-May 2022



Acknowledgements

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About SeeD

SeeD — Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development works with international development organisations, governments, and civil society leaders to design and implement evidence-based, people-centred strategies for the development of peaceful, inclusive, and sustainable societies. Working in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, SeeD provides policy advice for social transformation that is based on citizen engagement strategies and empirical understanding of the behaviour of individuals, groups, and communities. The SeeD approach focuses on understanding the root causes of social problems by developing and empirically testing a science-based theory of change.

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Acronyms

CSO	Civil Society Organisation
EU	European Union
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IT	Information Technology
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SeeD	Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development
SME	Small- and Medium-sized Enterprise
SSSU	State Statistical Service of Ukraine
TDF	Territorial Defence Forces
U.S.	United States
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

Executive summary and key findings

The first war-time online survey was conducted in April-May 2022. The main focus of this analysis is the displacement caused by the Russia's unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine since February 24, 2022. This analysis also covers other important aspects of people's lives and perceptions that have been affected by the war, including human security, intergroup relations, media, and geopolitical orientations.

The key takeaways from this analysis are outlined below.

The feeling of **unsafety** is relatively high among all groups of respondents. It is the highest among those who witnessed conflict or violence personally, among not displaced (people who stay in their locality during the war) and internally displaced persons (IDPs) within the same oblast, and among inhabitants of the east of Ukraine.

Around one-third of all surveyed respondents are currently **displaced**. The majority of displaced people are women, people older than 25, and respondents with children. Most movements occur within the east macro-region and from the east to west macro-region. Most respondents plan to stay in their current locality within Ukraine in the near future.

The Ukrainian **economy** is going through a tumultuous period caused by the war. Economic downturn is likely to push a substantial proportion of the population into poverty. GeoPoll findings show that IDPs, unemployed people, and parents with small children are most vulnerable to the negative economic consequences of the war. These population segments use humanitarian aid as a source of survival.

Most respondents report harmonious or satisfactory co-existence between the displaced and host population. At the same time, there are some **sources of tensions**, reported more frequently by IDPs. As the main sources of tensions, IDPs name accommodation, overcrowded public spaces, and access to jobs and economic benefits, while non-IDPs report anti-social or criminal behaviour of the displaced. Younger respondents (18-34 years old) more frequently report that political and cultural differences and access to resources, such as food and basic needs, create tensions, the 25-34 age cohort more frequently reports accommodation and over-crowdedness as the main triggers of tensions.

A strong negative opinion of the Russian Federation and critical attitudes about Ukraine's relations with the Russian Federation are a widespread trend. On the contrary, attitudes towards Western states and alliances (the United States, European Union, and NATO) are predominantly positive, indicating that respondents widely support a **pro-Western geopolitical vector**. There is still room to further enhance support, especially by the uncertain ("somewhat" support vs. "very" support) groups and especially in the case of NATO and by residents of the south and east of Ukraine.

Social media is the most efficient channel to reach out to various age groups, the displaced, and the so-called "ambivalent" respondents (those who share the view that a closer

relationship with the European Union or the Russian Federation, or joining NATO, is neither good nor bad). Television and websites can be used to target the 35+ age group.

Most respondents are able to identify **Russian misinformation** messages and do not take for granted the reasons for the war claimed by Russian propaganda. Those who claim to have not seen Russian misinformation more frequently believe that Russian security concerns are the primary reason for the war and share pro-Russian attitudes. Respondents from the east and south of Ukraine are more frequently uncertain when there is a need to identify Russian misinformation. More active communication messaging should be delivered to that target group to increase their awareness and critical thinking.

Most respondents provide support to the **Territorial Defence Forces** (TDF). Men as well as people with young children are more likely to be a member of the TDF or plan to join it. Similarly, witnessing war-related violence is associated with a willingness to join the TDF.

Research methodology

The survey was conducted by GeoPoll between April 15 and May 17, 2022, through a mobile web platform. Overall, 1,528 people were surveyed. The distribution of respondents by age, gender, and oblast of original settlement had certain disproportions compared to the State Statistical Service of Ukraine (SSSU) reference values.¹ Specifically, the oldest age group was underrepresented (with 311 respondents aged 45+ and only 51 respondents aged 60+). Women were underrepresented, while men and the youngest age group were overrepresented. To mitigate the skew, a weighted variable was created in the dataset. With the weights applied, the survey national dataset reflects the pre-war demographic composition of Ukrainian society by age, gender, and macro-regions.²

Some oblasts are significantly underrepresented in the sample, meaning that the number of respondents representing some locations as a permanent place of living is insufficient to extrapolate conclusions drawn from the analysis of these subsamples to the general population of these oblasts. Therefore, we do not consider disaggregations by oblasts but take macro-regional distributions to provide for statistically valid subsample sizes. The same issue applies to the oldest age group (60+): even considering that the weights approximate the structure of the data to SSSU's reference values at a national level, the sample size of the 60+ respondents subsample is insufficient to make overarching conclusions about this age group.

Reaching out to respondents from the besieged locations in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts was impossible.³ While respondents currently located in each of these occupied oblasts are present in the final GeoPoll sample, it is important to note that the data do not help to identify if the respondent(s) reside(s) in occupied or non-occupied areas of these oblasts.

To sum up, during war when millions of people are displaced, the possibilities to attain a sample fully representative of the target population are limited. However, various methods used in this analysis, including weighting, are applied to ensure that subsamples are as representative of the target population as possible, and the pronounced disproportions in age, gender, and regional distributions are mitigated, at least to some extent. Although the GeoPoll sample cannot be treated as a representative one, it reflects the major pre-war socio-demographic characteristics of Ukraine's population at the national level and, with a

¹ The SSSU open data as of 2021 was used as a reference: <u>shorturl.ae/JYNA9</u>.

² The International Organization for Migration (IOM) macro-regional disaggregation was applied to the GeoPoll dataset (to both variables for respondents' original and current location). West macro-region: Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Zakarpattiya, and Chernivtsi oblasts. East macroregion: Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. North macro-region: Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, Kyiv, and Sumy oblasts. South macro-region: Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson oblasts. Central macro-region: Vinnytsia, Cherkasy, Poltava, and Kirovohrad oblasts.

³ Data on occupied areas as of June 1, 2022, from: <u>liveuamap.com</u>.

certain degree of generalization, can be used as a reliable source for analysis of public attitudes.

Safety and violence

One out of five respondents from the GeoPoll sample personally witnessed violence or conflict within the past few weeks (see Exhibit 1). Almost half of the respondents (47%) feel "somewhat" or "very unsafe" in their everyday life, while 46% feel somewhat or very safe (see Exhibit 2). The association between these two variables is statistically significant.⁴

Some differences between macroregions are observed: those located in the east feel most unsafe (60%), and those in the west (39%) and





Exhibit 1. Witness to violence or conflict

centre (40%) experience unsafety the least. Roughly half of the respondents in the north (48%) and south (52%) macro-regions feel unsafe. The association between respondents' current place of residence / macro-regions and their experiences of witnessing conflict or violence is also statistically significant: 28% (roughly every fourth person) of those located



in the east and 23% of those in the south witnessed conflict or violence. This figure, reflecting the unsecure situation in the areas of active combat, is lower in the centre (19%) and north (16%) and lowest in the west (14%).This observation could be linked to the fact that these macro-regions did not experience active fightings and were not occupied by Russian Federation troops during the period of data collection, but suffered from

⁴ The strength of this association is moderate (Cramer's V 0.14). Those who witnessed violence or conflict personally tend to feel unsafe in everyday life (62% feel unsafe and 33% feel safe), while those who have not feel safer (43% feel unsafe and 50% feel safe).

Russian airstrikes, while the north of Ukraine was liberated from Russian occupation at the beginning of April.⁵

The respondents displaced to other oblasts report feeling unsafe less frequently (41%) than those displaced within the same oblast (53%) or those not displaced (49%).

The data suggest that feeling (un)safe in everyday life is linked significantly to the respondents' experiences of witnessing conflict or violence, displacement status, and macro-region of current location. While feeling unsafe is relatively high among all groups of respondents, it is the highest among those who witnessed conflict or violence personally, among not displaced or IDPs within the same oblast, and among those located in the east.

Displacement


The Russian Federation's invasion caused a large humanitarian crisis, resulting in millions of people being displaced and becoming either internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees. IOM reports that, as of May 23, 2022, 16.2% of the general population are currently internally displaced within Ukraine, equivalent to more than 7 million individuals.⁶

According to the GeoPoll survey, around 30% are displaced: 17% to another oblast and 13% within the same oblast (see Exhibit 3). 35% of displaced respondents have children aged 0-4 years, and 53% have children aged 5-17 years living in their household.⁷ Women are a majority of the displaced (59%).

⁵ <u>www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates</u>

⁶ <u>displacement.iom.int/reports/ukraine-internal-displacement-report-general-population-survey-round-5-17-</u> may-2022-23-may

⁷ Both variables have statistically significant associations with displacement status. In both cases of having children aged 0-4 years and children aged 5-17 years, the strength of association is moderate (Cramer's V is 0.13 in the former and 0.17 in the latter).



Roughly half of the displaced are aged 25-44 years (45% are displaced within the oblast and 55% are displaced to another oblast). Only one in ten respondents (10%) in each category is aged 18-24, and the rest are aged 45+. While these figures reflect the age composition of Ukrainian the society, with lowest proportion of the youngest age group and higher proportions of older groups, the findings also suggest that people aged 25-44

are most likely to be displaced both within one oblast and across oblasts, with people aged 45+ coming in a close second. At the same time, the small sample size of the 60+ group does not allow extrapolating the displacement patterns among the elderly.⁸

		Displaced (total)	Displaced within oblast	Displaced to another oblast	Not displaced
Gender	Male	41%	46%	37%	52%
	Female	59%	54%	63%	48%
Age	18-24	10%	10%	10%	7%
	25-34	25%	20%	29%	14%
	35-44	25%	25%	26%	17%
	45+	40%	45%	35%	62%

Flows of displacement movements. Exhibit 4 illustrates how the movements between and within different macro-regions of Ukraine are reflected in the GeoPoll sample. Respondents from the east constitute the majority of those fleeing because of the war (45% of the full sample). They are displaced mostly within the same east macro-region (29% of the full sample). Those who move to other macro-regions are mostly moving to the west (11% of the full sample). The west and east macro-regions host the largest numbers of IDPs (29% of the full sample each). A large proportion of movement occurs not between different macro-regions, but within different locations of the same macro-region. This tendency is

⁸ Pearson Chi-Square tests, the associations between displacement status (displaced or non-displaced) and gender and age are statistically significant (at 0.05 alpha). The strength of this association is moderate for age (0.2 Cramer's V) and weak for gender (0.09).

most pronounced in the east and north macro-regions. These results are consistent with previous IOM findings.⁹




Exhibit 4. Internal migration flows


Mobility intentions. As IOM reports, a decrease of displacement tendencies of nearly 900,000 IDPs (11%) occurred between May 3 and May 23, which is the first estimated reduction in the number of IDPs in Ukraine since February 24, 2022. The estimated number of returnees increased from nearly 2.7 million (as of May 3) to almost 4.5 million (as of May 23). The majority of returnees (77%) do not intend to leave their places of habitual residence again in the future.¹⁰

According to earlier Gradus research, as of April 12, 53% of people surveyed would stay in their localities even if the situation escalates, 16% would move within Ukraine, and only 6% would move abroad.¹¹

⁹ According to the IOM report, the most massive internal displacement flows occur within the east macroregion and from the east to the central and west macro-regions. The west macro-region receives the largest incoming flows of displaced people, mostly coming from the east and Kyiv: <u>displacement.iom.int/reports/ukraine-internal-displacement-report-general-population-survey-round-5-17-</u> may-2022-23-may

¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹ gradus.app/documents/203/GradusResearch_Report_KSE_citizens_13042022.pdf



Coming close to IOM's estimates. 3 out of 4 (75%) people in the GeoPoll sample plan to stay in their current locality in the near future, while 8% plan to return to the locality where they lived before the

invasion, and another 8% plan to move within the same oblast, to another oblast, or abroad (see Exhibit 5).

To conclude, around one-third of all respondents are currently displaced. Among the displaced, the majority are women, 25-45+ years old, and people with children.¹² Most movements occur within the east macro-region and from the east to the west macro-region. Most respondents plan to stay in their current locality within Ukraine, while staying or moving abroad is a less preferred option.

Economic security and international aid

The Russian Federation's invasion has had severe effects on the Ukrainian economy, destroying national infrastructure and creating economic hardship for the vast majority of Ukrainians. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that, if the war is protracted, under the worst-case scenario, 9 in 10 Ukrainians will be living in or be vulnerable to income poverty, returning to a poverty level observed in 2004.¹³

According to the *Damaged.in.ua* project, documented infrastructural losses have reached \$105 billion, with indirect harm reaching \$560-600 billion as of May 25, 2022.¹⁴ These losses include almost 24,000 kilometres of roads, 6,000 kilometres of railway, up to 300 bridges, and airports, seaports, storehouses, and enterprises. Infrastructure damage, issues with petrol, and the curfew preventing the night transit of goods have caused a breakdown of logistic networks in the country, thus impairing the economy even further.¹⁵

¹² These figures are very similar both among people displaced within the same oblast and people displaced to another oblast.

¹³<u>www.undp.org/press-releases/every-day-delayed-peace-will-accelerate-freefall-poverty-ukraine-warns-</u>

<u>undp</u>. This forecast was published in March 2022 when active fighting was still ongoing in northern Ukraine. ¹⁴ minfin.com.ua/ua/2022/05/27/86125512

¹⁵ <u>delo.ua/uk/transport/bude-skladno-ale-zrestoyu-galuz-rozkvitne-logistika-pid-cas-viini-reformi-ta-maibutnje-industriyi-397214</u>

These infrastructural damage caused a great deal of hardship to the civilian population in Ukraine: 26% of the GeoPoll respondents indicated at least weekly disruptions in access to necessities such as fuel, water, or electricity, and 28% report at least weekly telephone or internet outages. Respondents from the south macro-region report the highest weekly disruptions in necessities (34% of respondents) followed by the north macro-region of Ukraine (29%) and the east macro-region (25%). Respondents in the east macro-region also report the highest percentage of weekly communication outages (36%) followed by the south (29%) and the north (24%).

Respondents who have personally witnessed violence and conflict (directly affected by the war) in the weeks prior to the survey are 26% more likely to have experienced at least weekly communication outages and 37% experienced weekly disruptions accessing necessities.

Against the backdrop of the war and the subsequent economic downturn, Ukrainian enterprises have been struggling to continue working. According to a recent Advanter Group survey, only 14% of Ukrainian small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) continue to work as usual, while 49% have stopped or almost stopped doing business.¹⁶

All these factors are highly detrimental to the Ukrainian job market and economic security. The International Labour Organization (ILO) assesses that the war has caused a loss of 4.8 million jobs, which adds up to 30% of pre-war employment.¹⁷ According to a Rating Group survey, as of April 26, 2022, 39% of people who were employed before the war had lost their jobs, with the labour market in the east and south of Ukraine the most vulnerable.¹⁸




Exhibit 6. Sectors in which employment is sought

(e.g., engineering, legal practice, accounting), education, IT, and services (see Exhibit 6).

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¹⁶ drive.aooale.com/file/d/1abTXvuK3YWnmiBIPtv8lbGr8JTLfBmvc/view

¹⁷ www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/documents/briefingnote/wcms_844295.pdf ¹⁸ ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/devvatvy_obschenacionalnvy_opros_socialno-

The data show that men and women are equally active job seekers. In-demand jobs among men are in professional work (19% of the sample of job-seeking men), manual work (15%), the IT sector (13%), and technician work (12%). Among women, the most in-demand jobs are in services (19% of job-seeking women respondents), education (14%), clerical work (12%), and professional work (11%). Of the 4% of respondents who listed other jobs, "Security guard", "Home-based work", and "Any work" were among the most popular.

Unemployment is linked with IDP status. The GeoPoll data indicate that IDPs are twice as likely to search for a job than non-IDPs. The situation among IDPs who were forced to flee outside of their oblast of residence is the most drastic, with up to 64% of them looking for a job. The most in-demand sectors are service (17% of the sample of job-seeking IDPs), professional (16%), and IT (13%).

Unemployment has had a negative effect on food consumption among respondents. The survey showed that unemployment has the biggest impact on the consumption of proteins (e.g. meat, eggs, and seafood) and fruits. The households of employed respondents consume these products 15% and 16% more often than the households of unemployed respondents. On average, unemployed adult Ukrainians restricted their own food consumption so that children could eat 43% more often than employed Ukrainians (see Exhibit 7).




Exhibit 7. Food consumption in Ukrainian households, by job-seeking status

Food consumption issues in the unemployed population are exacerbated among unemployed IDPs who report a reduced daily consumption of vegetables, pulses, seeds, sugar, and sweets as compared to other subsamples. Among the widespread survival strategies to avoid food insecurity are reduction of number of meals eaten in a day (12.5%) more often among unemployed non-IDPs) and borrowing food or money for food (31% more often among unemployed non-IDPs) (see Exhibit 8).

Parents with small children (under 4 years) are another vulnerable IDP subgroup. GeoPoll data show that this group is more likely to resort to borrowing food or money for food (25% more often than IDPs without small children) and reducing the number of meals eaten by adults so




Exhibit 8. Food consumption in Ukrainian households, by

that children can eat (20% more often). It is worth noting that IDP status exacerbates the nutrition issues already present in parents with small children. Parents with children younger than 4 years old are relying on borrowing food or money for food 50% more often than respondents without young children.

International and humanitarian aid helps vulnerable Ukrainians to wrestle with the turmoil of war. 84% of the GeoPoll sample reported the presence of aid organisations in their locality, and 32% received aid from these organisations. 49% of IDP respondents had received aid. GeoPoll data show that recipients of aid restrict food consumption as a coping strategy more often than other groups. The Ukrainian economy is going through a tumultuous period caused by the war and economic downturn. High unemployment, inflation, and the budget deficit push a substantial proportion of the population into poverty.¹⁹ GeoPoll findings show that IDPs, unemployed people, and parents with small children are most vulnerable to the negative economic consequences of the war.

¹⁹ <u>www.economist.com/europe/it-will-be-hard-for-ukraines-economy-to-sustain-a-long-war/21809222</u>

Despite these circumstances, GeoPoll respondents are trying to increase their resilience by searching for new jobs, adapting to their host communities (see the next section), and using available humanitarian aid.

Intergroup relations and social tensions

IDPs are often found in a vulnerable position, facing various challenges when settling in their new communities. Problems occur when they try to find housing and earn an income to become self-sufficient.²⁰ Further, the influx of IDPs can become a growing concern for host communities. The increased demand for resources and services can also negatively impact the livelihood of host community members. This, in turn, can strain the relations between IDPs and non-IDP members of the community. In the current section, we aim to understand how harmonious relations are between IDPs and non-IDPs and identify the most prevalent sources of tension between the two groups.

The overwhelming majority of both IDPs and non-IDPs report harmonious or satisfactory co-existence between the displaced and host populations: only 5% of IDPs and non-IDPs report tensions between the two groups (see Exhibit 9). Levels of reported intergroup tension do not vary between males and females. The difference among age groups are also small.²¹




Exhibit 9. Relations between IDPs and host communities

At the same time, the respondents who reported harmonious or satisfactory co-existence indicated different sources of tensions. This can mean that most respondents do not consider them as acute problems; however, all indicted situations require attention so that they do not provoke serious conflicts in the future. Moreover, 42% of respondents have

²⁰ <u>www.un.org/internal-displacement-panel/sites/www.un.org.internal-displacement-panel/files/idp_consultation_external_summary.pdf</u>

²¹ Kendall's tau c is -.04 with p-value .047.

reported that no tensions occur between the IDPs and the host population (among those, 45% are non-IDPs and 35% are IDPs) (see Exhibit 10).





Exhibit 10. Sources of tension between IDPs and host communities

On average, the most prevalent sources of tensions respondents reported are accommodation and general crowdedness (23%), anti-social or criminal behaviour (19%), accessibility to jobs and economic benefits (19%), accessibility to public services (17%),and cultural or political differences and stereotypes (15%). The younger age cohorts (18-24 and 25-34 age groups)


Exhibit 11. Sources of tension between IDPs and host communities, by age




more frequently report cultural and political differences and stereotypes, especially the youngest age group of 18-24 years old, than older age cohorts (see Exhibit 11). These two age groups more frequently report access to resources, as well. Meanwhile, the most acute issue for the 25-34 age cohort is accommodation and over-crowdedness.

IDPs more frequently accommodation report overcrowdedness. and access to jobs and economic benefits as the sources of tensions, while non-IDPs mention anticriminal social or behaviour (see Exhibit 13).


United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Ukraine programmes (for example, "Where you are welcome") and eregistration procedures






for IDPs (i.e., Diia/«Дія» application) try to address key concerns including housing availability in each oblast and IDP monitoring and support to ensure that the displaced are registered and financially supported by the state.²² Such policy measures should also include assessing employment needs and skills to help IDPs better integrate into host communities (see also <u>Economic security and international aid</u> section).

Programmes that aim to integrate IDPs should rely civil society on organisations (CSOs) to develop platforms that contact increase and positive interaction between IDPs and host community members. This should help to dispel prejudices that impede harmonious coexistence. smooth cultural and political differences (reported by young adults), and minimise or






²² <u>www.unhcr.org/ua/en/internally-displaced-persons</u>

eliminate anti-social behaviour (reported by non-IDPs).

Media consumption

The most popular news sources among GeoPoll respondents are social media (Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, etc.) followed by TV and websites (see Exhibit 14). Social media can be an appropriate communication channel to reach out to all age groups, while TV and websites are more targeted at people over 35 years old. The 60+ age group is underrepresented in GeoPoll's sample, thus, we refrain from extrapolating survey results to the whole age group. Moreover, the youngest age group reports other sources more frequently compared to other age groups (18% among 18-24 year olds, 12% among 25-34 year-olds, 9% among 35-44year olds, and 5% among 45+). Based on a survey conducted by *Rating*, one can speculate that "other sources" are messengers or friends and relatives.²³ Male respondents more frequently report using websites and radio while female respondents report using social media more.



No significant differences in the most popular sources of information are observed between respondents residing in different macro-regions, except for TV, which is less popular in the east and south comparatively (67% in the west, 65% in the north, 61% in the centre, 58% in the south, and 50% in the east).

²³

ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/shestoy_obschenacionalnyy_opros_adaptaciya_ukraincev_k_usloviyam_v_oyny_19_marta_2022.html




Exhibit 15. Sources of news used, by displacement

The respondents displaced to another oblast learn news from social media more frequently than other groups (see Exhibit 15). Social media is also the major source of news for those displaced within oblasts. Meanwhile, TV and websites are less popular among the displaced (both within one oblast and to another oblast). Thus, social media can be an appropriate tool to deliver information to IDPs about access to public services, financial assistance,

etc.

Overall, social media remains the most efficient media channel to reach out to various groups, including the displaced. TV and websites can be used more efficiently to target the 35+ age group.

Russian misinformation

Russian misinformation is identified by most respondents (80%), especially TV viewers, radio listeners, social media users, and website readers. The issue of Russian propaganda and disinformation is a top agenda item in current public discourse in Ukraine.²⁴ Many respondents indicate that "everything Russian media or officials say is a lie." When it comes to concrete messages and narratives, the most frequently mentioned messages or focus of misinformation are:

- News "about Russian military successes and advances";
- "Ukrainians are Nazi and fascist";
- "Ukrainian forces attack its population and commit war crimes";
- "Russian forces do not target civilians, civilian infrastructure, and do not commit war crimes".

²⁴ suspilne.media/224927-ak-rozvivalasa-rosijska-propaganda/; https://detector.media/shchodennitelenovini/article/199221/2022-05-14-monitoryng-spilnogo-marafonu-iedyni-novyny-za-9-travnya-2022roku

Exhibit 16. Focus of Russian misinformation seen



Respondents who report seeing Russian misinformation less frequently report Russian security concerns to be a reason for the invasion, as often claimed by Russian propaganda. Instead, they more often report "no reason" or "other reasons" than respondents who report they did not see Russian misinformation.

In general, "other reasons" or "no reason" is the most commonly cited primary reason for the war. Other options proposed to the respondents – namely, demilitarization of Ukraine, change of the Government, and Russian security concerns – reflect some of the most popular pseudo-reasons for the invasion claimed by Russian propaganda and officials.²⁵ Respondents from the east and south more frequently report being unsure if they have seen Russian misinformation, or that Russian security concerns are the primary reason behind the war (see Exhibit 17 and 18). At the same time, they less frequently report not seeing misinformation.

²⁵ www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-24/full-transcript-vladimir-putin-s-televised-address-torussia-on-ukraine-feb-24





Exhibit 17. Reported seeing Russian propaganda, by macro-region





Male respondents report seeing Russian disinformation more frequently and name Russian security concerns as the reason of the invasion less frequently compared to women. There are no statistically significant differences among age groups regarding the recognition of Russian disinformation, and there are only small differences regarding the reasons for the war claimed by Russia.

Thus, most respondents identify Russian misinformation and do not believe that the reasons for the war frequently claimed by Russia are the true and primary reasons. Those who report they have not seen Russian misinformation more frequently believe that

Russian security concerns are the primary reason as voiced by Russian propaganda. The respondents from the east and south of Ukraine are more frequently unsure whether they have seen Russian misinformation. This group should be targeted with more active communication messages to increase their awareness and critical thinking.

Geopolitical orientations

Foreign policy preferences. Most respondents have strong negative attitudes towards Russia: 79% report a very unfavourable opinion about Russia, while 60% indicates that a closer relationship with Russia would be a very bad thing (see Table 2). Attitudes towards the United States (U.S.), the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are largely positive. At the same time, sizable shares of uncertain ("somewhat") positive opinions make the attitudes towards the U.S., EU, and NATO volatile, thus providing a space for actors to cement positive attitudes, which does not undermine the fact that the majority of respondents prefer a pro-Western vector.

		Opir	nion of			A closer	A closer	Joining
	U.S.	EU	Russia	China		relationship with EU would be	relationship with Russia would be	NATO would be
Very favourable	49%	40%	3%	6%	Very good	49%	3%	36.5%
Somewhat favourable	37%	48%	5%	51.5%	Somewhat good	35%	5%	30.5%
					Neither good nor bad	9%	16%	19%
Somewhat unfavourable	9%	9%	13%	38%	Somewhat bad	3%	16%	8%
Very unfavourable	5%	3%	79%	4.5%	Very bad	4%	60%	6%

Table 2. Foreign policy orientations

Support for the U.S. and the EU tends to be mutually enhancing: 81% of respondents report a very or somewhat favourable opinion of both (see Table 3). Meanwhile, the options of the U.S. and the EU, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other hand, are rather mutually exclusive: 82% of respondents have a very or somewhat unfavourable opinion of Russia and a very or somewhat favourable opinion of the U.S. and the EU.

Opinion o	of		EU	Ru	ssia	C	china
		Very or somewhat favourable	Very or somewhat unfavourable	Very or somewhat favourable	Very or somewhat unfavourable	Very or somewhat favourable	Very or somewhat unfavourable
U.S.	Very or somewhat favourable	81%	5.5%	4%	82%	51%	36%
	Very or somewhat unfavourable	6.5%	7%	3%	11%	7%	6%
EU	Very or somewhat favourable			5%	82%	51.5%	36%
	Very or somewhat unfavourable			2%	11%	6%	6.5%
Russia	Very or					6%	1%
NUSSId	somewhat favourable					0 %	1 /0
	Very or somewhat unfavourable					52%	41%

Table 3. Foreign policy orientations: cross-classification

Table 4. Relationship with Russia, EU, and NATO: cross-classification

		A closer relationship with Russia would be		Joining NATO	would be		
		Very or somewh at good	Neither good nor bad	Very or somewhat bad	Very or somewhat good	Neither good nor bad	Very or somewhat bad
A closer relation ship	Very or somewhat good	4%	10%	69%	63%	12%	9%
with the EU would	Neither good nor bad	1%	5%	4%	2%	5%	3%
be	Very or somewhat bad	3%	1%	3%	2%	1%	3%
		1				10	
A closer relation ship	Very or somewhat good				3%	1%	4%
with Russia would	Neither good nor bad				6%	5%	4%
be	Very or somewhat bad				58%	13%	6%

Support for NATO is lower than support for the EU. Respondents have somewhat more ambivalent views about NATO than about the EU: for 19%, joining NATO is neither good nor bad, while a closer relationship with the EU is neither good nor bad for 9%. According to the *Rating* surveys, at the beginning of the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, support for both NATO and the EU increased (from 62% to 76% for NATO and 68% to 86% for the EU); support for NATO has decreased gradually since then (from 76% to 68% at the end of March), while support for the EU continued to increase (from 86% to 91% at the end of March).²⁶ Lower support for NATO than for the EU is a traditional trend for Ukrainian society since its independence.²⁷ Moreover, Ukrainian authorities criticized NATO for its weak response to the Russian Federation's invasion, and respondents can share this disappointment.²⁸ The difference can be explained also by the fact that, in the case of the EU, respondents were asked about a closer relationship, while they were explicitly about NATO membership. Nevertheless, most respondents still support NATO membership.

Attitudes towards China are ambivalent and hesitant (a hefty share of the "somewhat" options), which can be explained by the less active presence of China in the public discourse before the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion in February and now. It is more favourable than unfavourable, though: 51.5% are somewhat favourable, while 38% are somewhat unfavourable (see Table 2). However, it is likely to be volatile and reactive to China's actions and potential change of its position towards Russia's invasion.

Macro-regional differences. There are some weak-to-moderate differences between macro-regions in terms of their geopolitical orientations. In general, pro-Western attitudes are stronger and less uncertain ("somewhat" options) or ambivalent ("neither good nor bad" options) among respondents from the west, centre, and north compared to the east and south. Similarly, negative attitudes towards the Russian Federation and to cooperation with the Russian Federation are more uncertain in east and south, but this uncertainty does not transform into pro-Russian attitudes. Surprisingly, 20% of respondents in the west macro-region report that joining NATO would be neither good nor bad.

²⁶ <u>www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2022/04/5/7137269</u>

²⁷ razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2021-nato-eng.pdf

²⁸ <u>www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2022/03/8/7135538</u>

Opinion of		West	North	Centre	South	East
U.S.	Very favourable	59%	54%	60%	40%	36%
	Somewhat favourable	29%	34%	31%	45%	48%
	Somewhat unfavourable	8%	7%	7%	9%	11%
	Very unfavourable	4%	5%	2%	6%	5%
EU	Very favourable	45%	43%	43%	32%	31%
	Somewhat favourable	46%	43%	48%	52%	55%
	Somewhat unfavourable	7%	11%	8%	12%	10%
	Very unfavourable	2%	3%	1%	4%	4%
Russia	Very favourable	1%	4%	2%	4%	3%
	Somewhat favourable	3%	4%	3%	10%	4%
	Somewhat unfavourable	8%	6%	7%	10%	22%
	Very unfavourable	88%	86%	88%	76%	71%
China	Very favourable	3%	4%	9%	9%	5%
	Somewhat favourable	47%	54%	54%	54%	53%
	Somewhat unfavourable	45%	38%	34%	34%	37%
	Very unfavourable	5%	4%	3%	3%	5%
				-		
A closer	Very good	50%	55%	64%	40%	40%
relationship with the EU	Somewhat good	36%	34%	26%	42%	38%
would be	Neither good nor bad	9%	5%	6%	10%	14%
	Somewhat bad	1%	2%	3%	5%	5%
	Very bad	4%	4%	1%	3%	3%
A closer	Very good	3%	3%	2%	5%	2%
relationship	Somewhat good	4%	6%	3%	7%	7%
with Russia would be	Neither good nor bad	10%	7%	14%	16%	23%
	Somewhat bad	15%	15%	13%	14%	20%
	Very bad	68%	69%	68%	58%	48%
Joining NATO	Very good	43%	39%	45%	33%	25%
would be	Somewhat good	27%	36%	32%	31%	29%
	Neither good nor bad	20%	13%	15%	18%	25%
	Somewhat bad	3%	6%	4%	8%	14%
	Very bad	7%	6%	4%	10%	7%

Table 5. Foreign policy orientation by macro-regions of origin

Demographic groups' attitudes. The differences among age groups are not significant except regarding attitudes toward a closer relationship with the EU: older age groups tend to have a more favourable opinion.²⁹ At the same time, due to the small number of respondents from the 60+ age group, we cannot make representative conclusions for the

²⁹ Kendall's tau-c is .08, p=.000.

whole group of 60+. Male respondents have a bit stronger and more favourable opinion about the $\rm U.S.^{30}$

News sources. Some weak-to-moderate associations are observed between media consumption and geopolitical orientations (see Table 6). TV viewers have stronger support for a Western orientation (U.S., EU, NATO) and disapproval of a pro-Russian one. Since the Russian Federation invasion, major media groups joined to produce *United News*, which is broadcast by most TV channels. The content covers Russia's invasion and Russian war crimes and cruelty, and pays tribute to the truly heroic Ukrainian military armed forces and civic resistance.³¹ Those who do not view it express a more ambivalent position that closer cooperation with the EU or Russia or joining NATO is neither good nor bad. At the same time, the ambivalent respondents can be reached via social media. Pro-Western and anti-Russia respondents can be found both among the readers and non-readers of websites. Notably, stronger support is observed among website readers than non-readers. Social media users more frequently report pro-Western and anti-Russian attitudes, while non-users more frequently report anti-Western and pro-Russian opinions. At the same time, most non-users still support a Western orientation and disapprove of a pro-Russian vector.

³⁰ Cramer's V is .16, p=.000

³¹ <u>detector.media/informatsiini-kanali/article/199298/2022-05-17-zvychaynyy-rashyzm-telebachennya-voiennogo-travnya; detector.media/informatsiini-kanali/article/197799/2022-03-24-dominatsiya-v-efiri-informatsiyni-kanaly-voiennogo-chasu</u>

		Social	media	Т	V	Web	sites	Ra	dio
		Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Opinion of	Very favourable	50%	47%	54%	44%	56%	42%	57%	48%
U.S.	Somewhat favourable	39%	31%	35%	39%	33%	41%	29%	38%
	Somewhat unfavourable	7%	14%	9%	9%	7%	11%	11%	8%
	Very unfavourable	4%	8%	2%	8%	4%	6%	3%	6%
Opinion of	Very favourable	40%	39%	42%	35%	43%	35%	46%	38%
EU	Somewhat favourable	50%	40%	46%	50%	44%	52%	43%	49%
	Somewhat unfavourable	7%	16%	9%	11%	10%	9%	9%	10%
	Very unfavourable	3%	5%	3%	4%	3%	4%	2%	3%
Opinion of	Very favourable	2%	6%	3%	3%	2%	3%	4%	3%
Russia	Somewhat favourable	3%	10%	4%	6%	5%	5%	4%	5%
	Somewhat unfavourable	12%	17%	10%	16%	12%	14%	10%	13%
	Very unfavourable	83%	67%	83%	75%	81%	78%	82%	79%
Opinion of	Very favourable	5%	10%	4%	9%	4%	8%	6%	6%
China	Somewhat favourable	52%	49%	54%	49%	53%	50%	45%	53%
	Somewhat unfavourable	40%	33%	38%	37%	40%	36%	47%	36%
	Very unfavourable	3%	8%	4%	5%	3%	6%	2%	5%
A closer	Very good	52%	40%	53%	44%	53%	45%	52%	49%
relationship	Somewhat good	36%	31%	34%	35%	31%	38%	33%	35%
with EU would be	Neither good nor bad	9%	13%	7%	14%	9%	11%	9%	9%
would be	Somewhat bad	1%	7%	2%	4%	3%	2%	2%	3%
	Very bad	2%	9%	4%	3%	4%	4%	4%	4%
A closer	Very good	1%	6%	3%	3%	3%	2%	1%	3%
relationship	Somewhat good	5%	8%	4%	7%	5%	5%	5%	6%
with Russia would be	Neither good nor bad	15%	17%	12%	20%	15%	17%	13%	16%
would be	Somewhat bad	17%	15%	16%	16%	14%	19%	12%	17%
	Very bad	62%	54%	64%	54%	63%	57%	70%	58%
Joining	Very good	38%	32%	38%	34%	40%	33%	37%	36%
NATO	Somewhat good	31%	28%	33%	28%	28%	34%	34%	30%
would be	Neither good nor bad	18%	21%	16%	23%	18%	20%	15%	20%
	Somewhat bad	8%	7%	7%	8%	8%	7%	7%	8%
	Very bad	5%	12%	6%	7%	6%	6%	7%	6%

 Table 6. Foreign policy preferences by news sources

Russian misinformation. Respondents who reported having seen any Russian misinformation campaigns or news are more likely to have a more favourable opinion of the U.S. and the EU, as well as of a closer relationship with the EU and of joining NATO. They also have a more unfavourable opinion of the Russian Federation as well as of a closer relationship with Russia. Thus, the ability to recognize Russian disinformation and

label it as such is positively associated with pro-Western views and negatively with pro-Russian views (see Table 7).

			ormation c s?	ny Russian campaigns	Cramer's V (sig.)
		Yes	No	Don't know	
Opinion of U.S.	Very favourable	56%	38%	22%	.21(.000)
	Somewhat favourable	35%	34%	48%	
	Somewhat unfavourable	6%	15%	23%	
	Very unfavourable	3%	13%	7%	
Opinion of EU	Very favourable	43%	32.5%	24%	.15(.000)
	Somewhat favourable	48%	42.5%	53%	
	Somewhat unfavourable	7%	17.5%	17%	1
	Very unfavourable	2%	7.5%	6%	
Opinion of	Very favourable	2%	6%	5%	.30(.000)
Russia	Somewhat favourable	2%	13%	14%	
	Somewhat unfavourable	8%	14%	43%	
	Very unfavourable	88%	67%	38%	
Opinion of	Very favourable	5%	12%	11%	.12(.000)
China	Somewhat favourable	51%	41%	61%	
	Somewhat unfavourable	40%	38%	24%	
	Very unfavourable	4%	9%	4%	
					•
A closer	Very good	55%	37%	22%	.21(.000)
relationship	Somewhat good	34%	30%	47%	
with EU would	Neither good nor bad	7%	18%	20%	
be	Somewhat bad	1%	6%	8%	
	Very bad	3%	9%	3%	
A closer	Very good	2%	5%	3%	.32(.000)
relationship	Somewhat good	3%	14%	13%	
with Russia	Neither good nor bad	10%	16%	50%	_
would be	Somewhat bad	16%	26%	12%	_
	Very bad	69%	39%	22%	
Joining NATO	Very good	41%	29%	16%	.21(.000)
would be	Somewhat good	32%	27%	22%	4
	Neither good nor bad	16%	23%	32%	4
	Somewhat bad	6%	6%	23%	4
	Very bad	5%	15%	7%	

Table 7. Foreign policy orientation and exposure/recognition of Russianmisinformation

In particular, the respondents who said the primary reason for the war is Russian security concerns are less likely to have pro-Western and more likely to have pro-Russian orientations (see Table 8). Security concerns as a reason for the war reflect disinformation and propaganda frequently voiced by the Russian Federation and blaming Ukraine for a desire to forcibly liberate the occupied areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts or even

attack Russia and Belarus. Besides, many of the Russian Federation's justifications for the war still lean on general tropes about NATO threats and Ukrainian Nazis.³²

		What do	o you think is th	e primary reasc	on behind this	s war?
		No reason	Demilitarize Ukraine	Change of government	Russian security concerns	Other
Opinion of	Very favourable	60%	51%	47%	34%	50%
U.S.	Somewhat favourable	34%	37%	37%	40%	37%
	Somewhat unfavourable	5%	7%	9%	17%	8%
	Very unfavourable	1%	5%	7%	9%	5%
Opinion of	Very favourable	43%	47%	43%	31%	38%
EU	Somewhat favourable	48%	39%	46%	50%	50%
	Somewhat unfavourable	8%	10%	7%	12%	9%
	Very unfavourable	1%	4%	4%	7%	3%
Opinion of	Very favourable	5%	6%	1%	4%	1%
Russia	Somewhat favourable	1%	2%	6%	15%	3%
	Somewhat unfavourable	11%	11%	17%	18%	12%
	Very unfavourable	83%	81%	76%	63%	84%
Opinion of	Very favourable	5%	9%	4%	8%	6%
China	Somewhat favourable	52%	48%	53%	67%	45%
	Somewhat unfavourable	40%	41%	39%	20%	43%
	Very unfavourable	3%	2%	4%	5%	6%
A closer	Very good thing	61%	53%	45%	35%	48%
relationship	Somewhat good thing	29%	28%	34%	37%	40%
with EU	Neither good nor bad thing	6%	13%	10%	15%	8%
	Somewhat bad thing	2%	1%	4%	6%	2%
	Very bad thing	2%	5%	7%	7%	2%
A closer	Very good thing	2%	6%	4%	5%	1%
relationship	Somewhat good thing	4%	4%	7%	13%	3%
with Russia	Neither good nor bad thing	9%	12%	21%	17%	19%
	Somewhat bad thing	14%	10%	22%	27%	13.5%
	Very bad thing	71%	68%	46%	38%	63.5%
Joining	Very good thing	44%	41%	30%	24%	37%
NATO	Somewhat good thing	34%	27%	32%	23%	32%
	Neither good nor bad thing	15%	19%	23%	24%	18%
	Somewhat bad thing	3%	4%	6%	18%	8%
	Very bad thing	4%	9%	9%	11%	5%

Table 8. Foreign policy orientations by the reasons behind the war

In conclusion, a strong negative opinion of and attitudes about relations with the Russian Federation is a widespread trend. On the contrary, attitudes towards the Western states and alliances (the U.S., EU, and NATO) are predominantly positive, indicating that a pro-Western vector is widely supported by respondents. There is still room to enhance support,

³² texty.org.ua/fragments/105644/prokremlivska-dezinformaciya-v-ukrayini-pyat-osnovnyh-mesedzhiv; www.stopfake.org/en/russian-propagandists-regain-footing-on-ukraine

especially among the uncertain ("somewhat") groups and especially in the case of NATO and by residents of the south and east of Ukraine. Respondents with pro-Western attitudes are more likely to recognize and label Russian misinformation, contrary to the handful of those with pro-Russian attitudes. The latter more frequently report Russian security concerns as the primary reason behind the war, as frequently voiced by Russian propaganda. Social media can be used to reach out to ambivalent respondents who say that a closer relationship with the EU or Russia or joining NATO is neither good nor bad.

Willingness to join the Territorial Defence Forces

The Territorial Defence Forces (TDF), or Territorial Armed Forces per GeoPoll, is a standalone branch of Ukraine's Armed Forces that functions as an important actor in the national defence process. The TDF is comprised of part-time reservists and volunteers and reinforces the local and national resilience. This section intends to identify the profile of respondents willing to join the TDF.

8% of respondents are already TDF members (the share of TDF members are nearly equal among displaced and non-displaced respondents), of which 69% are men (see Exhibit 19 and Table 9). While 17% of respondents plan to join the TDF (including 11% among IDPs and 20% among non-displaced), a little more than a half provide support in other ways without joining the TDF (57% among IDPs and 50% among non-displaced). Considering only those respondents who plan to join the TDF, they are mostly men (69%) above the age of 35 years (66%).







Table 9. Willingness to join TDF, by demographics	. Willingness to join TDF, by demogra	phics
---	---------------------------------------	-------

Would you consider joining the Territorial Armed	Gender		Age group		
Forces?	Male	Female	18-35	36-59	60+
Yes, I am already a member	69%	31%	34%	60%	5%
Yes, I plan to join	69%	31%	26%	66%	8%
No, but I provide support in other ways	40%	60%	29%	60%	10%
No, they are not necessary	34%	66%	21%	68%	11%
Don't Know	52%	48%	38%	58%	4%

GeoPoll data showed clear inter-regional differences in terms of willingness to join the TDF depending on the respondent's original macro-region. Central and Western macro-


regions show the highest percentage of people willing to join or already are TDF members.





There is also a connection between willingness to join the TDF and having witnessed warrelated violence. Respondents who had witnessed armed conflict are twice as likely to already be members of the TDF. Witnessing violence is associated with the respondent being less likely to have doubts about joining the TDF or choosing other ways of supporting the TDF.

Exhibit 21. Willingness to join the TDF, cross-referenced with witnessing war-related violence



People who have young children also show a higher level of readiness to join the TDF. 34% of the sample of parents of young children expressed readiness to join the TDF or have already joined.

Thus, most respondents provide support to the TDF. Men as well as people with young children are more likely to be a TDF member or plan to join it. Similarly, witnessing war-related violence is associated with the willingness to join the TDF.