Ukrainian Expectations From European Integration:

Based on SCORE 2021 Ukraine

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Acknowledgements

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The views, conclusions, and recommendations presented in this document do not necessarily reflect the position of USAID, UNDP, or their partners.

Disclaimer: *This analytical paper was written between December 2021 and February 2022, before the unprovoked and unjustified Russian military aggression against and invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. We believe the analysis presented in this paper is still relevant to understand and interpret the rapidly changing situation in Ukraine, and public perceptions in relation to certain foreign policy directions as well as civic attitudes and expectations.*

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About SCORE

Social COhesion and REconciliation Index (SCORE) is an analytical tool providing a solid evidence base for developing policies and programs that strengthen national unity, social cohesion, and resilience as well as for monitoring progress of their implementation.

SCORE Ukraine is implemented on an annual basis and designed to improve the understanding of societal dynamics in Ukraine. It is a joint initiative funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Union (EU) and implemented by the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD).

This policy brief is based on the SCORE Ukraine dataset collected between January – May 2021. All the indicators used in this brief are outlined in the glossary section, and the guidance on how to interpret the analysis is presented in the respective results and discussion sections.

For more information on how to read SCORE data, please read our handbook here: t.ly/yVCN - or visit our online data platform for more data, information, and analysis here: https://app.scoreforpeace.org.

About Partners

SeeD - Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development works with international development organizations, governments, and civil society leaders to design and implement evidence-based, people-centred strategies for the development of peaceful, inclusive, and sustainable societies. Working in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia, SeeD provides policy advice for social transformation that is based on citizen engagement strategies and empirical understanding of the behaviour of individuals, groups, and communities. The SeeD approach focuses on understanding the root causes of social problems by developing and empirically testing a science-based theory of change.

USAID (United States Agency for International Development) is the world's premier international development agency directly involved in numerous development projects. USAID has partnered with Ukraine since 1992, providing more than $3 billion in assistance. USAID's current strategic priorities include strengthening democracy and good governance, promoting economic development and energy security, improving healthcare systems, and mitigating the effects of the conflict in the East.

USAID's Democratic Governance East (DG East) is a five-year activity to improve trust and confidence between citizens and government in eastern Ukraine, building opportunities for

the region to lead Ukraine's democratic transformation. DG East aims to strengthen the connection and trust between citizens and their government in eastern Ukraine by promoting good governance and inclusive civic identity, increasing interaction between citizens and civil society, and increasing collaboration between government and citizens and citizen participation in community development and local decision-making.

USAID's Transformation Communications Activity (TCA) is a five-year activity of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which aims to strengthen Ukrainian democracy through comprehensive research, innovative communication initiatives, and the creation of socially meaningful content.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supports strategic capacity development initiatives to promote inclusive growth and sustainable human development. Through partnerships with national, regional, and local governments, civil society, and the private sector, UNDP strives to support Ukraine in its efforts to eliminate poverty, develop people's capacity, achieve equitable results, sustain the environment, and advance democratic governance. UNDP through its flagship UN Recovery and Peacebuilding Programme (UN RPP) is also helping to restore critically important social and economic infrastructure and effective work of local governments in eastern Ukraine, create jobs and spur entrepreneurship among IDPs and host communities, and promote peace and reconciliation.

SCORE partners above have calibrated and conducted multiple waves of SCORE under different collaborative consortiums with different allies and stakeholders to assess, understand and track socio-economic, political, psychosocial and civic attitudes and dynamics on multiple levels from nation-wide to regionally focused studies, as well as city level and adolescent studies. Over the years, SCORE has become a common robust, responsive and independent evidence source that helped convene peace and development actors in Ukraine around a common research framework and indicator vocabulary, bridging inter-agency coordination and multiplier effects, while reducing duplication of efforts. Since 2019, the four main SCORE partners further consolidated their collaboration with a SCORE Steering Committee, which guides the overall scope and objectives of SCORE in Ukraine including how best it can serve programme and policy design as well as monitoring, evaluation and learning needs of the key partners and stakeholders.

Introduction: "European Identity of Ukrainian People"

"The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (parliament), on behalf of the Ukrainian people - citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities, - confirm(s) the European identity of the Ukrainian people and the irreversibility of the European and Euro-Atlantic course of Ukraine". These are the words with which the Constitution of Ukraine starts after the amendments of 2019.[1] Earlier in 2013-2014, Ukrainians of all ages voiced their wish for democratic governance by the thousands; and closer relations with the European Union was part of the protesters' demands. The Revolution of Dignity ousted the former president Yanukovich. It was followed by the military aggression of Russia[2] which resulted in the temporary occupation of the autonomous republic of Crimea and the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Subsequently, a European foreign policy direction was consolidated after decades of purgatory balancing between Russia and the EU-U.S.

In the following months, Ukraine and the European Union signed the association agreement (AA) in 2014, the integral part of which is the deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA). The DCFTA was applied provisionally from January 1, 2016, and on September 1, 2017, the association agreement entered into force in full. Moreover, the first Ukrainian citizen with a biometric passport entered the EU without a visa on June 11, 2017 after Ukraine-EU visa-free regime took effect.

As we have seen from the preamble of the Ukrainian Constitution, membership in the EU is an explicit goal of Ukraine. While "the European Union acknowledges the European aspirations of Ukraine and welcomes its European choice;"[3] it does not provide any

[1] Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Закон України "Про внесення змін до Конституції України (щодо стратегічного курсу держави на набуття повноправного членства України в Європейському Союзі та в Організації Північноатлантичного договору)" [Law of Ukraine on Amending Constitution of Ukraine (regarding the State Strategic Course on Membership of Ukraine in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation)], in force on February 21, 2019, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2680-19#n7.
The English text from: Constitutional Court of Ukraine, Constitution of Ukraine, 2019, https://ccu.gov.ua/en/publikaciya/constitution-ukraine.

[2] Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, "Resolution on the Russian Military Aggression Against Ukraine and the Urgent Need for a Peaceful Resolution to the Conflict," *Official Journal of the European Union* C 315/24, September 23, 2015, shorturl.at/eBEP0; Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Закон України "Про особливості державної політики із забезпечення державного суверенітету України на тимчасово окупованих територіях у Донецькій та Луганській областях" [Law of Ukraine On the Peculiarities of State Policy on Ensuring Ukraine's State Sovereignty Over Temporarily Occupied Territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions], no. 2268-VIII, January 18, 2018; https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2268-19#Text.

[3] Association Agreement Between the European Union and its Member States, of the One Part, and Ukraine, of the Other Part, *Official Journal of the European Union* 57, L 161, May 29, 2014, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2014:161:TOC.

prospects of such a membership.[4] As of the end of February 2022, eight EU member states - Poland, Baltic states, Slovakia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria - have signed declarations supporting Ukraine's European perspective in writing at the bilateral level.[5] With or without accession negotiations in full swing, Ukraine's and Ukrainians' socio-political and economic direction of the past eight years has been in the course of building closer relations with European countries, deeper integration with European Union's aims and values. As we will see in the next sections, the EU is the most preferred foreign policy option for Ukrainians, though there are some regional differences and fluctuations throughout the time.

Undoubtedly, the implementation of the association agreement and steps towards harmonisation with *acquis communautaire*[6] renders Ukraine's European direction as much about domestic affairs as one of foreign policy. The association agreement and closer integration is both a mandate and an implementation effort for Ukrainian authorities at different levels, from central to local.

Against this background, we aim to look at foreign policy preferences of Ukrainians, their foreign policy attitudes and preferences about political alliances, namely, the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). More specifically, we focus on regional and demographic differences as well as the motives why citizens desire Ukraine to join the European Union and what they expect from it in general to better understand the drivers of civic and political orientations that support and facilitate Ukraine's European direction. The key research questions that guide this paper are:

1. What are the foreign policy preferences and how do they vary in time and between various demographic groups?

[4] This has changed after Russian aggression against Ukraine when European Parliament called for the EU institutions to work towards granting EU candidate status to Ukraine. European Parliament, Resolution on the Russian aggression against Ukraine (2022/2564(RSP)), March 1, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0052_EN.html.

[5] "Головуюча держава в ЄС зобов'язалася підтримати вступ України" [Country Holding Presidency of the Council of the EU Committed to Support Ukraine's Accession], *European Pravda*, December 15, 2021, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2021/12/15/7131605/; "Болгарія зобов'язалася підтримати вступ України в ЄС" [Bulgaria Committed to Support Ukraine's Accession to EU], *European Pravda*, February 19, 2022, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2022/02/19/7134269/.

[6] Cabinet of Minister of Ukraine, Постанова Кабінету Міністрів України "Про виконання Угоди про асоціацію між Україною, з однієї сторони, та Європейським Союзом, Європейським співтовариством з атомної енергії і їхніми державами-членами, з іншої сторони" [Decree on Implementation of Association Agreement Between Ukraine, of the one part, and the European Union, European Atomic Energy Community, and Their Member States, of the other part], revision on September 18, 2020, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1106-2017-%D0%BF?lang=en#Text.

2. What are the drivers of support for EU membership? What do Ukrainians expect from European integration? Why do they support or disapprove the country's direction towards closer relations with the EU?
3. What is the best way to communicate European integration changes and ensure that citizens use the opportunities from it to the full extent?

The methodology of our analysis is described in the Methodology section while the list of SCORE indicators used for this analysis and their definitions are in the Glossary section.

This analytical paper was produced before the yet another illegal, unprovoked, unjustified, and unconscionable Russian military aggression against and invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and it is based on the survey conducted in January-May 2021. While it would be invaluable to revise and repeat the study once Ukraine experiences some stability and starts its post-war recovery, the key findings and recommendations presented in this paper are still relevant. They can inform our understanding and interpretation of the rapidly changing situation in Ukraine, and public perceptions in relation to certain foreign policy directions as well as civic attitudes and expectations.

Key Findings and Policy Recommendations

The EU is the most preferred foreign policy option among SCORE Ukraine's respondents across the whole country excluding the non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and Crimea.[7] Overall, 59% of respondents strongly or somewhat agree that Ukraine should join the EU.

Yet, **the support for EU has not fully recovered after the drop by 11% in 2018 compared to 2016**, which can be explained by growing sense of fatigue regarding the armed conflict waged by Russia, as well as beliefs that the benefits of EU membership will disproportionately favor the social and political elite, without trickling down to the general population.

The support for NATO has increased by 9% in 2021 compared to 2018 after an 8% decrease between 2016 and 2018. Ukrainians' support for NATO after the Russian aggression, which started in 2014, is related to the sense of Ukraine's vulnerability to external threats and need for reliable external security guarantees. While support for NATO membership is slightly lower at 50%, nearly 80% of those who support EU accession also support NATO.

[7] SCORE 2021 dataset used for this analysis does not cover the non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and Crimea.

There are large and statistically significant regional differences in terms of foreign policy preferences. The majority of SCORE Ukraine 2021 respondents in the southern and eastern oblasts prefer non-aligned status or support the EU and non-aligned status equally. The oblasts with the highest support for non-aligned status are Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk oblasts, and lowest support for EU membership have Luhansk, Donetsk, Odesa, and Kharkiv oblasts.

Differences between demographic groups are small: higher income, education, older groups have slightly higher scores for support for EU membership. As such, support for the EU is less about one's demographic characteristics and more about their civic attitudes.

Among the EU supporters, almost **every third respondent on the national level backs the non-aligned status together with endorsing EU membership**. The highest share of respondents belonging to this group is in the following oblasts: every fourth respondent from Cherkasy oblast and about every fifth from Sumy, Rivne, Vinnytsia, and Chernivtsi oblasts belong to this group.

Respondents who support non-aligned status along with EU membership have the highest trust in local institutions, though their absolute score is only 5.0 out of 10. When compared to the respondents who support the EU only, they score relatively lower on civic optimism, pride in safety and security, political security, as well as active citizenship orientation, sense of civic duty, belief in human rights, and support for European values. They also have more tolerance to corruption and higher Soviet nostalgia.

Those respondents who support non-aligned status only have even lower trust in institutions, civic optimism, pride that one's locality is safe and secure, political security, active citizenship, civic duty, and belief in human rights scores and higher scores for Soviet nostalgia. Moreover, this group has a lower sense of pride in community bonds in one's locality and is less satisfied with the quality of roads.

We have tested various hypotheses present in the literature regarding the motives for pro-EU standing and the expectations from European integration. **The strongest driver of EU support is the perceived EU benefit for the country and its economic sectors.** Ukrainians expect the EU and European integration to play a significant role in fostering economic development, anti-corruption, and employment opportunities.

Compared to the socio-economic and political progress on the collective level, the role of individual tangible expectations is less pronounced but still statistically significant. People with higher income and education potentially see more personal advantages from market liberalization and open borders.

Human security plays an important role on multiple levels. We see that political, personal, and economic, including social welfare would not only directly contribute to the support for EU membership but also indirectly as it would have a positive impact on the sense of civic duty and self-expression values (e.g., social tolerance and pluralism, and gender equality) as well as trust in central institutions, which are among the other direct drivers for the EU support.

Findings also reveal an intricate relationship between support for reforms and support for the EU. Improved performance and accountability of the authorities as well as successful, participatory, and representative implementation of reforms would improve both people's prosperity and trust in central institutions, both of which are drivers of support for the EU as we see that more prosperous and trusting citizens see opportunities rather than risk in European integration.

Soviet nostalgia is the second strongest driver after perceived EU benefit, and it negatively affects European aspirations. Soviet nostalgia implies longing for the Soviet past and may indicate a greater attachment to the status-quo and resistance to change, or scepticism about the European project as being an individualistic capitalist agenda. The hindering role of Soviet nostalgia needs to be overcome to facilitate European integration with greater bottom-up consensus and conviction on its benefits among the citizenry.

Security concerns are yet another motive to long for the EU. The EU supporters are more likely to oppose political cooperation with Russia and endorse diplomatic and political resolution of the armed conflict between the countries, which is in line with the EU' official position and endeavours of some EU member states. The respondents might see the EU as a reliable security partner to counter the military aggression by Russia and protect Ukraine's integrity. They also see Russia as an obstacle to Ukraine's European future. Whatever the direction of reasoning is, deeper cooperation with the EU in the security sectors is likely to be among the actions Ukrainian citizens expect from EU. At the same time, it should not be viewed as a substitution for deeper relations with NATO in this realm but rather as an important additional vector of enhancing Ukraine's security.

The effect of the pluralistic Ukrainian identity on support for the EU is small but statistically significant. As such, European integration is seen as a recognition of "Europeanness." The European identity enhances rather than undermines Ukrainian civic identity, which is in line with European values of inclusion and diversity. Thus, Ukrainians have multiple identities ranging from local to national, regional, and to European. These identities co-exist and do not contradict each other.

Political security is yet another driver of support for EU membership. Pro-EU oriented citizens feel relatively more comfortable expressing their political views than those who are against this foreign policy direction. Better understanding the motives of those who are sceptical can help address concerns and insecurities around the Ukraine's national foreign policy direction for greater European integration. This will help prevent the public debate becoming polarising or latent with political insecurities, but instead will show a caring and inclusive national narrative that aims to build convergences around the national vision towards the EU.

When it comes to mainstream means of communication, television is the least trusted though the most frequently used source of information by the respondents to keep up with political affairs. Women watch TV more than men. Besides, it is a relevant channel to reach out to older, lower income and education groups from smaller settlements. Thus, it can be used to communicate the potential social welfare dimension of EU-Ukraine partnership and the potential risks if progress was not achieved since this audience is more likely to be resistant to change. While the low trust in TV in general may significantly undermine the effectiveness of such communication; this can be mitigated by delivering the messages via more trusted actors or channels. In terms of actors, local authorities and community representatives from the NGO are likely to be perceived as more trustworthy. In terms of TV channels, *1+1* is the most popular source of news, followed by *TRK Ukraina* and *ICTV*. *1+1* is also the most popular TV channel for entertainment, followed by *ICTV* and *STB*.

Undoubtedly, TV is not the only or the best source of communication for all demographic groups. **Social media's role is rising especially among younger age, higher income and education groups as well as urban residents.** Social media can be a good channel to communicate self-expression values of the EU; educational and financial opportunities from European integration; and EU's local community benefits as this group is more interested in collective socio-economic dividends that are more future and rights oriented than welfare oriented.

Radio has a much smaller audience than TV or social media but still sizable enough. Every tenth SCORE respondent listens to radio every day; and it is a relatively more trusted channel than both TV and social media. The listeners tend to belong to the older age, male gender, and primary education groups.

Based on these findings, we propose the following recommendations:

Entry points to strengthen support for the EU can be grouped based on the following dimensions:

Utilitarian dimension

- Enhance coordination and cooperation between **local authorities** and foster their ability to implement **tangible** steps towards European integration in various realms like economy, education, ecology, healthcare, infrastructure etc., especially for the benefits of those who support both the EU and non-aligned status since they have a relatively highest trust in local authorities.
- Continue to focus on mid- and long-term economic **benefits the EU partnership would bring for the country**; highlight greater economic development, less corruption, and employment opportunities.
- Strengthen the **welfare** dimension to the EU-Ukraine partnership by investing in development and human capital.
- Invest in **community cooperation** and **infrastructure** connecting communities for the benefits of those who prefer non-aligned status at the moment.

Values and identity dimension

- In addition to continued communication of European values, implement policies and programmes promoting **self-expression values** across the country, including a sense of civic duty, which may enhance the value-driven support for the EU, which should be less volatile to changes:
    - For this purpose, we can suggest policies and programmes that promote gender equality mindset, social tolerance, and other positive psychosocial skills like leadership, growth mindset, critical thinking, entrepreneurship mentality, and intolerance to corruption since they are the most likely features of people with higher sense of civic duty; though they are not enough; therefore,
    - Contribute to **economic development and livelihoods**, which may not only directly contribute to the stronger support for the EU as a direct entry point for the utilitarian dimension by improving the perceived EU benefit and income of citizens, but also indirectly by enhancing a sense of civic duty and the value-driven support since people with higher human security are likely to have higher sense of civic duty.

Hard security dimension

- Enhance cooperation between Ukraine and the EU in the **security realm** like joining and/or cooperating with EU security structures and initiatives.

Heuristic cues dimension

- Improve the **performance and accountability** of authorities, which could positively affect the level of trust, and, thus, improve the vertical cohesion in the society; build national consensus and **bottom-up support for the reform** process to improve performance.
- Further communicate the **link** between reforms and European integration since its relation to EU support is weak.

Political security dimension

- Make further efforts at developing an environment for **open and inclusive dialogue** to better understand the concerns of EU sceptics regarding the European direction of the country which should contribute to political security, help build common understanding convergences among the populace and, thus, to European integration. The lowest scores on political security are next to the contact line, in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.

Communication dimension

- **Better communicate dividends of European integration and build a constructive participatory dialogue around such dividends** via media or otherwise (e.g., via local authorities, citizens' assemblies, personal communication). This communication is not about persuasion, advertising, or propaganda but about reflective, inclusive, well-informed public debate. In general, we advocate for tailored communication considering the needs of the audiences of the specific media outlets. Not only communication needs to be tailored to the needs of the audiences of specific media channels, such as traditional or social media, since media communication is not sufficient in itself and should be complemented with more participatory public dialogue.
- **Improve communication** of the EU-related activities and endeavours, build trustworthy relationships with citizens, inform them about the opportunities they may participate in and benefits from the EU integration, and frame its self-expression value dimension.
- When possible, use more **trusted media** channels like radio and personal communication.

- **Communicate** that time is not neutral, and that slow progress in EU integration can lead to **potential losses** or reduced benefits to overcome some inertia and resistance to change which might be shared by people with high Soviet nostalgia;
- Adopt a **tailored** communication approach to address the information needs of the particular audience. For this purpose,
    - Use **social media popular** among Ukrainians to communicate self-expression values of the EU; educational and financial opportunities from European integration; benefits for communities from the integration; as well as implementing digital programmes related to the sense of civic duty;
    - Use **popular TV channels** to communicate the potential welfare dimension of EU-Ukraine partnership as well as the potential gains Ukraine is losing because of the slow progress of European integration since their audience is likely to be more resistant to change and with a lower income.

Exploring Ukrainians' Foreign Policy Preferences

EU is the Preferred Option

Support for EU membership is the most preferred foreign policy direction among the four proposed options (the score is 5.9), according to the 2021 SCORE, although it fluctuates among oblasts (regional trends are explored in a section below). It is followed by support for NATO membership (5.3) and non-aligned status (4.9), while the least preferred option is Ukraine joining the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia (2.5). **The EU and the EEU look like mutually exclusive options** since only about 5% of the respondents would like Kyiv to join both international organizations (they strongly or somewhat agree with these options).[8] **The EU and NATO are mutually enhancing options**, as people are likely to support both (47%) or disapprove both (31%). Also, only 3% support NATO but not the EU, and 8% support the EU but not NATO. These observations lead us to assume that the support for both the EU and NATO is security-related in terms of both socio-economic security and hard physical security. As the EU is a socio-economic integration project that offers a diplomatic alliance and political leverage, NATO responds to national security needs and acts as a military deterrence.

Meanwhile, there is some ambivalence about non-aligned status. 44% of the respondents strongly or somewhat agree that Ukraine should be non-aligned and not join either pro-

[8] This can have two possible explanations. One is that a marginal group of respondents simply want a choice and would tolerate any choice. The other is that some respondents are simply confused or unaware, and this selection is not too different from those who selected "I don't know", which is 7-9%. It is likely that both explanations partly explain this marginal 5% and the options of EU and EEU are mutually exclusive in perceptions.

Western or pro-Russian institutions. Among them, 28% of the respondents also say that Ukraine should join the EU while 13% say it should join the EEU.[9] In general, 59% of the SCORE respondents strongly or somewhat support the EU membership of Ukraine but nearly 3 out of 10 who support EU membership could also tolerate non-aligned status. **The fact that people can support both non-aligned status and EU membership reveals that some supporters are more ambivalent either because they are uncertain in their aspirations,** or because they can tolerate either option. The 26% of SCORE 2021 respondents in Cherkasy oblast belong to this ambivalent group; 21% in Sumy and Rivne oblasts; 20% in Vinnytsia oblast; 17% in Chernivtsi oblast. The share of this group in other oblasts is lower with the lowest one in Odesa (5%), Kyiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts (8% in each oblast).

There are some demographic differences between the groups of EU supporters only, those who support EU and non-aligned status at the same time, and those who opt for non-aligned status only; but these differences are small: The supporters for EU only group has slightly more male respondents and with slightly higher education than other two groups (i.e. non-aligned status only and non-aligned status with EU). The supporters of the non-aligned status only group are slightly older and more urban than the other two groups. The level of income slightly increases as we move from the group supporting non-aligned status only to those who opt for both options and then to the supporters of EU only. Please look at Figures 8-12 in Additional Figures and Tables section of this study for further details.

The scores on perception of EU benefit, confidence in EU stability, and support for European value dramatically surge for those who support both the EU and non-aligned status (6.7, 7.0, 6.5) compared to those who support only non-aligned status (3.6, 4.6, 4.7 respectively). At the same time, although less dramatically, the scores for mentioned indicators are even higher among those who support the EU only (7.7, 8.0, 7.1). The reverse is true regarding cooperation with Russia.[10]

[9] 39% think Ukraine should stay strictly non-aligned and the remaining choose all options or no options.
[10] The overall indicator of support for cooperation with Russia as well as its components - Support for political cooperation with Russia, Support for cultural cooperation with Russia, Support for economic cooperation with Russia, Support for civil society cooperation with Russia, and Support for maintaining family ties with Russia - decrease as we move from supporters of non-aligned status to both EU and non-aligned status and to EU only.

Table 1. Foreign policy preferences of three groups based on their support for EU and/or non-aligned status (N=8,023; 2021)[11]

	National average	Support for non-aligned status only (no EU)	Support for EU and non-aligned status	Support for EU only (no non-aligned status)
Support for EU membership	5.9	1.6	8.0	8.8
Support for NATO membership	5.3	2.0	6.4	8.3
Support for non-aligned status	4.9	9.0	8.0	1.3
Support for EEU membership	2.5	1.3	1.3	0.6
Perceived EU benefit	5.7	3.6	6.7	7.7
Confidence in EU stability	6.3	4.6	7.0	8.0
Support for European values	5.9	4.7	6.5	7.1
Cooperation with Russia	5.4	6.0	5.1	3.7
Pro-Russia orientation	3.1	3.0	2.5	1.3

EU and/or Non-Aligned Status

Following the findings of the previous section, this section investigates the differences between the groups: one that supports both the EU and non-aligned status simultaneously; one that supports the EU only; and the one that supports non-aligned status only. Let's start with the comparison of the first two groups: supporters of both EU and non-aligned status and the supporters of EU only direction. Firstly, the group that supports both foreign policy options trusts central institutions slightly more (2.9) than the group that supports the EU only. When it comes to local institutions, the trust is higher but the pattern is the same at 5.0 versus 4.5 respectively. Although this is still not higher than the middle point of 5.0 out

[11] These three subsamples belong to the national sample of 2021 SCORE with 12,482 respondents. The size of the group that supports only non-aligned status is 2,138; only EU membership - 4,343; both the EU and non-aligned status - 1,542.

of 10, it can partly support the heuristic hypothesis arguing that citizens use proxies or "shortcuts" when making decisions on issues about which they have little information. Thus, they may look at their authorities' position and assess their confidence in them when deciding whether to support European integration in addition to or instead of assessing the policy direction itself.[12] As trust in local institutions is higher than central institutions, local authorities can seize this opportunity to better communicate the dividends and concerns around European integration to local residents. Further, improving trust and accountability of institutions in general and better civic-authority dialogue across all issues will help strengthen the heuristic dimension (i.e. confidence in institutions translating into confidence in the direction set by those institutions and their mandate) that is one of the pathways that can strengthen support for European integration.

With the implementation of the EU-Ukraine association agreement and incorporating *acquis communautaire* into Ukrainian legislation, EU integration has become more than just a foreign policy direction for Ukraine; it became integral to country's domestic policy as well. As such, the role of local authorities in its implementation cannot be overstated. The analysts from the New Europe Center Tetiana Levoniuk and Marianna Fakhurdinova emphasize that the communication by the oblast state administrations is often very formal. It is verbose, full of clerical phrases, abbreviations, and words of foreign origin, rarely used in everyday communication.[13] Thus, making the communication less technocratic and more accessible to the audience is imperative. Besides, **more coordination and cooperation between local authorities could enhance their ability to implement tangible European integration**.

SCORE 2021 respondents who support both the EU and non-aligned status have also relatively lower civic optimism - belief that the present generation is in a better position than the past and that the future generation will be in a better position compared to the current one - than those who support the EU only (4.9 v 6.2). SCORE Ukraine 2018 wave has established a significant relationship between human security and civic optimism.[14] Also, human security, which consists of economic, political, personal (or physical), health,

[12] Cosmina Tanasoiu and Constantin Colonescu, "Determinants of Support for European Integration: The case of Bulgaria," *European Union Politics*, 9(3) (2008): 365-366, https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116508093489.
[13] Tetiana Levoniuk and Marianna Fakhurdinova, "Євроуспіхи регіонів. Як їх бачать місцеві можновладці?" [Eurosuccesses in Ukrainian Regions. How Do Local Authorities See Them?], paper, New Europe Center, 2021, p. 6, http://neweurope.org.ua/en/analytics/yevrouspihy-ukrayinskyh-regioniv-yak-yih-bachat-mistsevi-mozhnovladtsi/.
[14] Ilke Dagli-Hustings (Dr), Christopher Louise, Oksana Lemishka, Benjamin Long, Shane Perkinson, Dr Alexandros Lordos, and Meltem Ikinci, "SCORE Ukraine Phase Two (2018): Evidence-based Policy Brief," policy brief, 2018, p.19, https://api.scoreforpeace.org/storage/pdfs/PB_UKR17_PolicyBookletFinalDraftID_Clean_20180814.pdf.

and environmental security, is among the strongest correlates of civic optimism (Peason's correlation is .30 with p-value < .001), according to SCORE Ukraine 2021.

Combined with a relatively lower scores on sense of pride in safety and security (4.8 v 5.5)[15] and political security (6.8 v 7.3) that is feeling free to speak out without fearing consequences among those who support both the EU and non-aligned status, **we can assume that a safe environment for inclusive and open dialogue is needed to better understand people's concerns regarding EU integration. Besides, those who opt for both non-aligned status and the EU may need more assurances in safety of livelihoods and welfare (i.e. improved human security dimensions) for future generations as outcomes of the integration**.

Table 2. Details about EU and non-aligned status supporters (N=8,023; 2021)

	National average	Support for non-aligned status only (no EU)	Support for EU and non-aligned status	Support for EU only (no non-aligned status)
Trust in central institutions	2.4	1.9	2.9	2.5
Trust in local institutions	4.4	3.8	5.0	4.5
Civic optimism	4.7	3.7	4.9	6.2
Pride in local safety	4.8	4.2	4.8	5.5
Political security	6.5	6.1	6.8	7.3
Sense of civic duty	5.4	5.1	5.6	6.0
Active citizenship tendency	4.1	3.5	4.4	4.9
Belief in human rights	7.2	6.9	7.2	7.7
Support for European values	5.9	4.7	6.5	7.1

[15] In the parentheses, we compare scores of those who support both the EU and non-aligned status (the first score) versus those who would like Ukraine to join the EU only (the second score).

Tolerance to corruption	3.7	3.7	3.9	3.3
Soviet nostalgia	5.7	6.8	5.3	3.6
Pride in local community bonds	5.6	4.9	5.8	6.1
Quality of roads	5.4	4.9	5.4	5.6

At the same time, there is space to add self-expression value-dimension to deepening integration with the EU. In particular, the members of the group supporting both the EU and non-aligned status have a lower sense of civic duty (5.6 v 6.0) than those who support the EU only, which is the responsibility for the country's future and agency of people to change things in their community. The score on active citizenship orientation, i.e. willingness to change things in community and society via nonviolent means, is also lower (4.4 v 4.9). The belief in human rights (7.2 v 7.7) and support for European values (6.5 v 7.1) is generally high but still lower than in people opting only for the EU. They are also more tolerant towards corruption (3.9 v 3.3). **Thus, interventions promoting self-expression values that are linked to European integration would be beneficial in helping the ambivalent group affirm their EU aspirations. Moreover, the higher score for Soviet nostalgia (5.3 v 3.6), which is longing for the Soviet past, may indicate the greater attachment to the status-quo and resistance to change**.

Let's now look at the difference between those who support both the EU and the non-aligned status and those who support non-aligned status only. The differences identified between the group supporting both the EU and non-aligned status and the group supporting EU integration only is true for these two groups as well, i.e., those who support both and those who support non-aligned status only. People opting for non-aligned status only have lower scores on the sense of civic duty (5.1 v 5.6),[16] active citizenship tendency (3.5 v 4.4), support for European values (4.7 v 6.5), beliefs in human rights (6.9 v 7.2), political security (6.1 v 6.8), pride in local safety (4.2 v 4.8), civic optimism (3.7 v 4.9), and higher score for Soviet nostalgia (6.8 v 5.3). In other words, values and human security indicators decrease when we move from "EU only" group to "both EU and non-aligned," and decrease further when we move to "non-aligned only."

[16] In the parentheses, we compare scores of those who support non-aligned status only (the first score) versus those who support both the EU and non-aligned status (the second score).

However, there are two more observations to add to this comparison. "Non-aligned status only" group has a lower sense of pride in community bonds (4.9 v 5.8) and is less satisfied with the quality of roads (4.9 v 5.4) compared to the "both EU and non-aligned status" group. **Thus, more investment in community cooperation and infrastructure connecting communities can be positively received by the people supporting non-aligned status.** Besides, as established by the SCORE in 2018, community cooperation and social connectedness, - which comprises empathy, social interaction, and communication skills, positive feelings about one's future, and family coherence, - can boost pluralistic Ukrainian identity[17] which, as we will show later, is a driver for EU support.

In sum, while all groups would benefit from self-expression value driven interventions along with those that focus on livelihoods and human security; the non-aligned group would benefit from interventions aimed at community cooperation and social connectedness which calls for infrastructural investments as well.

National Trends: Support for NATO Is Up

The 2021 ranking of the foreign policy preferences is similar to the one in the 2016 SCORE - EU first, followed by NATO and non-aligned status, and the last one with the lowest score, the EEU; however, it is quite different from the 2018 SCORE. The level of support for EU and non-aligned status became almost the same in 2018 (5.7 for EU and 5.5 for non-aligned status) when the support for the non-aligned status increased and the support for the EU decreased compared to 2016. The changes in scores for the EEU and NATO are within the margin of error. As noted in SCORE 2018 publications, the decrease in the support for the EU can be attributed to a "growing sense of fatigue and disappointment regarding the

Figure 1. Foreign policy preferences: Trends



[17] Ilke Dagli-Hustings (Dr) et al, "SCORE Ukraine Phase Two (2018)," p.35.

conflict in the East, as well as wavering confidence in EU stability. It is also underpinned by widespread cynicism about the benefits of EU membership, which many believe will disproportionately favor the social and political elites, without trickling down to the general population."[18]

While the fluctuations in support for the EU and the EEU between 2018 and 2021 are not significant (within the margin of error), the 0.5 point or 9% increase in support for NATO and 0.6 points or 11% decrease in support for non-aligned status between 2018 and 2021 is notable. The significant — albeit not abrupt — increase in the support for NATO after 2014 is noted in the study conducted by the Razumkov Centre in 2021.[19] The main rational factors for this are a sense of Ukraine's vulnerability to external threats, understanding lack of reliable external security guarantees, and search for an optimal national security model, according to the centre's experts.

Although security concerns are far from being the main motives for the support for EU membership, security threats and anxieties in relation to Russia are certainly among the factors that shape citizens' foreign policy preferences. We will further explore other motives for EU support in the following sections of this report.

Regional Preferences Differ Across Oblasts

While the EU is the most preferred foreign policy option for the majority of 2021 SCORE respondents, there are large (η^2=0.17)[20] and statistically significant regional differences between oblasts in terms of the support for EU membership. Prior to the 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity, Russian temporary occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and certain areas of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, people from eastern and southern oblasts used to prioritise relations with Russia while western oblasts explicitly opted for the EU direction.[21] The central regions used to swing between the two options: some years the EU was their first choice while other times it was Russia.[22] However, this pattern has since changed.

[18] Ibid., p.15.
[19] Razumkov Centre, "Public Support for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic Course: Assessments and Recommendations," sociological study, Kyiv, 2021, pp.8, 11, https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2021-nato-eng.pdf.
[20] Eta-squared (η^2) is a statistical measure of effect size which describes the amount of variation in the support of EU membership that can be explained by living in a particular oblast.
[21] Razumkov Centre, "Відносини України з ЄС і РФ: позиції та оцінки громадян" [Ukraine's Relations with EU and Russia: People's Position and Evaluation], *Національна безпека і оборона - National Security and Defence*, no. 4-5 (133-134) (2012):107.
[22] Ibid.

As we see through 2016-2021 SCORE, the support for the EEU including Russia and pro-Russia orientation has reached its lowest point. However, this does not imply automatic re-orientation towards the EU. The support for the EU has increased but the non-aligned status is also popular in eastern and southern oblasts. "The political orientation to Russia significantly dropped, first, after annexation of Crimea and especially after Russian military aggression in Donbas. However, those who had hoped to join Russia's unions now think that Ukraine should refrain from joining either European or Eurasian Unions,"[23] experts from the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation point out. It seems that these people are no longer willing to join the Russia-dominated alliance because of its occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts; at the same time, they are uncertain about alternatives, including the EU. This helps to explain the prevalence of non-aligned status in Cherkasy, Kerson, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Donetsk, Luhansk oblasts or the largely equal support for both EU and non-aligned status in Chernihiv, Symy, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk oblasts which are predominantly southern and eastern oblasts (and some central-northern ones).

Map 1. Support for non-aligned status by oblasts (N=12,482; 2021)



[23] Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, "Європейська інтеграція України: динаміка громадської думки" [European Integration of Ukraine: Public Opinion Dynamics], survey conducted on November 4-19, 2019, https://dif.org.ua/en/article/evropeyska-integratsiya-ukraini-dinamika-gromadskoi-dumki.

The EU and often NATO is the most preferred option for Ternopil, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Rivne, Volyn, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Zakarpattia, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Poltava oblasts, Kyiv oblast and city which are largely western and some part of central microregions.

Map 2. Support for EU membership by oblasts (N=12,482; 2021)



Differences Are Small Between Demographic Groups

According to the SCORE 2021 data, differences between various demographic groups in terms of their support for different foreign policy options are small but statistically significant. Male respondents are more supportive of NATO than female ones (5.6 v 5.0) in 2021, and their support has increased by 0.6 since 2018 while the support for non-aligned status has dropped from 5.4 in 2018 to 4.7 in 2021.

FIGURE 2. SUPPORT FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP BY GENDER (N=12,482; 2021)



The 60+ age group has relatively higher scores for pro-Western indicators (support for EU membership, support for NATO membership, confidence in EU stability, perceived EU benefit) than for pro-Russian ones (support for the EEU membership, pro-Russia

orientation, cooperation with Russia) in 2021. However, when compared to younger age groups, their support for pro-Western indicators is lower and for pro-Russian ones is a bit higher.

FIGURE 3. AGE GROUPS (N=12,482; 2021)



SCORE 2021 data also shows that respondents from higher education groups are more likely to support the EU and NATO than the EEU or express pro-Russia orientations. The latter includes a desire to join the EEU but is extended with beliefs that Ukrainians and Russians are one people and that Ukraine cannot thrive without Russia. Further, we observe an increase in the support for NATO from 5.1 in 2018 to 5.7 in 2021 while the support for non-aligned status decreases from 5.3 to 4.7 during the same period among respondents with high education. At the same time, respondents with primary and secondary education have become slightly more supportive of political and economic cooperation with Russia.

FIGURE 4. EDUCATION (N=12,482; 2021)



FIGURE 5. TYPE OF SETTLEMENT (N=12,482; 2021)



In terms of settlement type, overall support for cooperation with Russia including maintaining family ties as well as civic society, economic, cultural, and political cooperation is higher in large cities (5.9/10) than in rural areas (4.9/10).

Respondents from higher income groups are more likely to support EU and NATO; have higher confidence in EU's stability and perceived EU benefit than people from lower income groups. At the same time, those from higher income groups are less likely to support EEU, cooperation with Russia, and to have pro-Russia orientation. They are also less likely to support non-aligned status.

Moreover, there are some pronounced changes from 2018 to 2021 in foreign policy orientations among the lowest (no money for food) and the highest (money for household electronics, cars, and goods of similar cost) income groups. The support for the EU among the respondents with no money for food has dropped from 5.0 in 2018 to 4.2 in 2021 while their support for the EEU has increased from 2.9 to 3.7. On the contrary, more people with money for household electronics, cars, and goods of similar cost support the EU and NATO; and less of them support EEU or non-aligned status. Therefore, we can assume that higher income groups see opportunities in Ukraine joining the EU while the lower income groups might not see the benefits of EU integration trickling down to them and fear potential losses from joining the EU, instead. These fears are not completely unfounded. This observation let us suggest elaborating the welfare dimension of EU-Ukraine cooperation to address potential pitfalls from deeper EU integration of Ukraine for low-income groups, which we discuss in the following sections of this report.

FIGURE 6. INCOME (N=12,482; 2021)



What Does Drive the Support for EU membership?

In order to investigate people's expectations from European integration and the reasons why they support Ukraine's EU membership, we have applied a polynomial regression model because of nonlinearity in the relationship between some variables and the support for EU membership. The model takes into account the oblasts' effects since the difference between oblasts in terms of foreign policy orientations is large and statistically significant. Therefore, there are irreducible contextual differences between oblasts that interact with individual attributes to produce political effects. Ignoring this would have resulted in biased estimates of beta-coefficients. The model is controlled for demographic characteristics like age and gender to ensure that the relationships were not artifacts of demographic differences. Type of settlement is dropped from the models since it is not statistically significant. The drivers of this model that are discussed in the following sections explain 51% of the variance in the support for EU membership, which is a very good value for explaining social phenomena. It's virtually impossible to get 100% fit due to the complexity of social phenomena that are usually driven by myriads of drivers, all of which are practically impossible to take into account. The results are presented in Table 3.

Beta coefficients reported in the table 3 denote the degree of change in the outcome variable - that is support for EU membership in our case - for every unit of change in the driver while controlling for the influence of all other drivers in the model. At the same time, we do not claim causal relations. Beta coefficients can be positive or negative. Positive beta coefficients indicate that for every unit of increase in the driver variable, the outcome variable - support for EU membership - will also increase by the beta coefficient value. Conversely, negative beta coefficients suggest that for every unit of increase in the driver variable, the outcome variable will decrease by the beta coefficient value. For the sake of the example, let's take the beta coefficient of 0.39 between Perceived EU benefit as a driver and Support for EU membership as the outcome of interest. In this case, an individual who has a higher score of Perceived EU benefit by one point and the same values for all the other drivers, has a higher support for EU membership by 0.39 points.

With the help of the mentioned models, we test different hypotheses regarding the motives that drive people's support for EU membership. We base these hypotheses on existing literature and narratives reported by other polling companies and research centres investigating this issue in Ukraine. We can group these hypotheses into four blocks: (1) utilitarian or political economic factors; (2) attitudes around values and identities; (3) political proxies or heuristic indicators; (4) security concerns.

Table 3. Drivers of the support for EU membership (N=12,482; 2021)

	Beta-coefficient	Standard errors	Sig.
Utilitarian factors			
Sociotropic factors			
Perceived EU benefit	.39	.01	<.001
Egocentric factors			
Income	.03	.01	<.001
Education	.02	.01	<.001
Identity and values			
Soviet nostalgia	-.12	.01	<.001
Pluralistic Ukrainian identity	.04	.01	<.001
Sense of civic duty	.02	.01	<.001
Security and politics			
Political cooperation with Russia	-.11	.01	<.001
Endorsement of military operation	.04	.01	<.001
Heuristic factors			
Trust in central institutions	.06	.01	<.001
Support for reforms (health, decentralisation, land reform)	.05	.01	<.001
Other factors			
Political security	.04	.01	<.001

*The R^2 of the model is .51.

**The model controls for age and gender. Type of settlement is dropped since it is not statistically significant. Only statistically significant indicators are shown.

Utilitarian Factors

European integration is largely about removing trade barriers, capital and labour mobility, and single monetary authority. Not only of course, but the freedom of goods, services, people, and capital are the four fundamental freedoms within the EU. The EU-Ukraine association agreement contains political as well as trade and economic sections: the latter is the biggest and most detailed one, and the factors related to it can partly explain public support for Ukraine's integration with the EU. Here we consider two types of such factors: One is sociotropic evaluations regarding the benefits from European integration for the entire country. Others are egocentric assessments regarding the effect of deeper

partnership with the EU on an individual's ability to adapt to and benefit from market liberalisation.

First, let's consider the benefits from the integration for the entire country, namely the sociotropic evaluations. In SCORE, we measure this with the help of the perceived EU benefit indicator that assesses the extent to which the EU benefits its member states and would also benefit different sectors in Ukraine. With all other variables being equal, a unit increase in the value of the perceived EU benefits yields the highest beta-coefficient (marginal effect) on the support for EU membership (.39) among all the drivers tested in the national model presented in the Table 3. Therefore, the considerable motive for supporting EU membership is the expectation that different sectors of Ukraine like manufacturing, farming, education, services will benefit from deeper integration with the EU. The more people feel confident in this benefit and the size of this benefit, the more they would support the EU. This is in line with the motives why the EU is supporting Ukraine as its final goal is long-term endeavour, i.e. consolidation of a democratic, independent, united, and *prosperous* Ukraine.[24] Thus, the EU's goals in supporting Ukraine match people's expectations from this support: people expect tangible benefits for the country while EU's aim is prosperous Ukraine.

According to a survey within the *EU Neighbours east* project, conducted in March 2020, the impacts of the association agreement and the visa-free regime are more appreciated by citizens with each passing year. Most Ukrainians reckoned the benefits of EU integration and support are greater access to products and services, improved trade, and more tourism.[25] **According to the same project, the most important areas where Ukrainians would like to see the EU to play a bigger role are greater economic development especially including employment opportunities and less corruption.[26]**

However, there is a large statistically significant difference between oblasts in terms of the perceived EU benefit (ANOVA; F=87, p<.001; η^2=.14). The eastern and southern oblasts have relatively lower scores on the perception of the EU benefit. On the one hand, citizens in these areas may be less convinced about or less exposed to this benefit on the regional as well as sectoral level, or the benefits even if experienced are not as noticeable or attributable to the European partnership in perceptions.

[24] European Commission, "How the EU is Supporting Ukraine," factsheet, May 22, 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/MEMO_15_5035.
[25] EU Neighbours East, "Annual Survey Report: Fifth Wave," survey conducted by ACT LLC and their network partners within the EU-funded *OPEN Neighbourhood — Communicating for a stronger partnership: connecting with citizens across the Eastern Neighbourhood* (*EU NEIGHBOURS east*) project, March 2020 (before COVID-19 crisis), p.16, https://euneighbourseast.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/euneighbours-east_as2020report_ukraine.pdf.
[26] Ibid.

Map 3. Perceived EU benefit by oblasts (N=12,482; 2021)



Considering these observations, there is a need to improve communication with citizens both by the EU Delegation in Ukraine and the Ukrainian central and local authorities. They should communicate the medium and long-term goals and benefits clearly and reflectively to the public to ensure that expectations are realistic and to avoid potential disillusionment. At the same time, immediate outcome and progress should also be communicated clearly and reflectively without turning this into mere advertising.

Since 2014, the EU has invested "yearly funds of up to € 200 million [...] for a stronger economy, stronger governance and stronger society in Ukraine."[27] For instance, while the perceived EU benefit in Donetsk oblast is only 3.9; according to Serhii Solodkyi, Tetiana Levoniuk, and Marianna Fakhurdinova, the oblast is leading in the number of projects funded by the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in the fields of education, social protection, healthcare, culture, public transport, and street lighting. Thus, locals are probably not aware about these projects, or they may not relate them to European integration. Thus, the authors emphasise the need

[27] Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, "Ukraine and the EU," factsheet, accessed December 9, 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/1937/ukraine-and-eu_en.

to enhance information campaigns in the regions.[28] Besides, according to the survey of December 2020 by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 43% have not seen any information about European integration from the state.[29] This does not mean that communication should try to persuade or push people to support the EU. That kind of advertising communication can be perceived as propaganda or patronising. **It is important to provide citizens with relevant, reflective, and sincere information about European integration and tangible benefits from it, talk about lessons learned and challenges in progress, build trustworthy relationships, and let them engage critically to come to informed conclusions while feeling included, respected, and secure**. **Besides, more information targeting potential beneficiaries regarding the concrete opportunities the EU provides in Ukraine can help them seize the opportunities and use them to the full extent.**

The role of individual utilitarian factors measured by income (beta-coefficient is .03) and education (.02) is much lower than perceived EU benefit but still statistically significant (see Table 3). This finding corroborates the previous observation that higher income groups have higher scores on support for EU membership and the scores are increasing in 2021 compared to 2018 for the group that can afford household electronics, cars, and goods of similar cost and decreasing among those who have no money even for food (see Figure 6). Besides, we have seen in the previous sections that people with higher education are more supportive of the EU (see Figure 4). As Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe write, market liberalisation favours those with high levels of human capital and penalises those with lower levels of human capital; intensifies job insecurities for less skilled employees; puts pressure on the welfare system.[30] This can explain a higher support of the EU by the groups with higher income and education as they have more social and sectoral mobility, and not only expect but can seize more opportunities from the market liberalisation as part of European integration of Ukraine.

The fears from the lower income and lower education groups can be addressed by enhancing the welfare dimension to the EU-Ukraine partnership, as proposed by Taras Kachka and Volodymyr Yermolenko and **also by investing in retraining programmes to**

[28] Serhii Solodkyi, Tetiana Levoniuk, and Marianna Fakhurdinova, "Євромапа України-3. Рейтинг європейської інтеграції областей" [Euromap of Ukraine - 3. Rating of European Integration by Oblasts], New Europe Centre, report, October 19, 2021, p.93, http://neweurope.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Euromap-3_ukr_web-2.pdf.
[29] Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, "Opinions and Views of Ukraine's Population on European Integration: December 2020," analytical report, December 2020, p.8, https://association4u.in.ua/docs/EUK_Omnibus_Report_ENG.pdf.
[30] Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe, "National Identity and Support for European Integration," WZB Discussion Paper, No. SP IV 2003-202, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin, p.2, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49727.

improve human capital and support sectoral mobility.[31] Besides, while the market liberalisation suggests less state involvement, according to the research by Tymofii Brik and Oleksii Krymeniuk, "the majority of Ukrainians tend to believe that the state should have a strong influence on the economy and on personal freedoms."[32] Although the biggest share of the Ukraine-EU association agreement is about a deep and comprehensive free trade area and its main focus is on liberal economic agenda, the history of contemporary Europe demonstrates that it is not enough. Open societies and economies are important, so is the welfare of citizens. **Thus, the perception that EU integration would bring both the country level collective benefits as well as individual tangible benefits are two utilitarian reasons why respondents support the EU. We should emphasise the importance of economic development, which is an expected collective goal, because of the relatively strong influence of perceived EU benefit on the desire to join the Union we see in Table 3. This is a mid- or long-term goal. At the same time, lower income and education groups should experience individual benefits which are short-term targets as they seek to secure public goods and services from the state under conditions of resource scarcity**.

Values & Identity

The hypothesis on values and identity as well as on security concerns are equally strong in explaining the desire to join the EU, except for the perceived EU benefit indicator which by far has the strongest influence. Under this category, Soviet nostalgia has a relatively strong negative impact (-.12) on support for EU membership (see Table 3). It measures the degree to which one regrets the collapse of the Soviet Union and believes that life was better before 1991. People with higher Soviet nostalgia are likely to have lower income and civic optimism which can be due to their higher age.[33] This feeling is rather an emotive longing for the past than the political orientation as SCORE 2018 has shown.[34] It can also be about the strong attachment to the status quo, Newton's law of inertia in action, and a greater resistance to change. They may think that keeping the status quo is costless, but it is not. **People with Soviet nostalgia may benefit from more information regarding the cost of slow progress in the direction of European integration as well as from hearing human and community interest success stories that can restore optimism in the future especially when it comes to sense of community, solidarity, and welfare**. These efforts

[31] Taras Kachka and Volodymyr Yermolenko, "What Might Be Next in EU-Ukraine Relations?" *EU Observer*, February 28, 2018, https://euobserver.com/opinion/141133.
[32] Tymofii Brik and Oleksii Krymeniuk, "What Do the Majority of Ukrainians Think About State Control Over Economics and Personal Freedoms?" *Vox Ukraine*, June 10, 2019, https://voxukraine.org/en/what-do-the-majority-of-ukrainians-think-about-state-control-over-economics-and-personal-freedoms/.
[33] ANOVA on Soviet nostalgia by age and income groups; F>20; p<.001; η^2=.08-.09 (medium)
[34] Ilke Dagli-Hustings (Dr) et al, "SCORE Ukraine Phase Two (2018)," p. 20.

should be geographically focused as there is a large statistically significant difference between oblasts regarding the Soviet nostalgia (ANOVA; F=103; p<.001; η^2=.17). The eastern and southern oblasts are more likely to have higher scores on Soviet nostalgia.

Map 4. Soviet nostalgia by oblasts (N=12,482; 2021)



Although the size of the beta-coefficient (marginal effect) is smaller (.02) than for the Soviet nostalgia, people with a higher sense of civic duty[35] have higher support for the EU. Another survey from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, conducted in December 2020, shows that 27% of people relate European integration to increased personal responsibility of the citizens.[36] Also, the research by New Europe Center and InfoSapiens demonstrates that 12% think that when citizens step up efforts to tackle issues without waiting for the authorities to do it, this is an indication of progress in European integration in Ukraine.[37]

[35] Civic duty is composed of civic responsibility and a sense of agency. It measures the degree to which one feels responsible for the future and well-being of their society and country and feels that ordinary people can change things in their community.
[36] Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, "Opinions and Views of Ukraine's Population on European Integration: December 2020," p.6.
[37] New Europe Center, "Diplomacy-2022: Foreign Policy Expectations of Ukrainian Society," survey conducted by InfoSapience in November 8-29, 2021, p.22, http://neweurope.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Diplomatia2022_eng_web.pdf.

Similarly, SCORE 2021 data shows that people with a higher sense of civic duty are more likely to be well-rounded constructive citizens. They are more likely to be active citizens engaging in civic life with higher scores in critical thinking, leadership skills, social tolerance, and gender equality mindset and lower support for traditional gender stereotypes. They have a stronger entrepreneurship mentality, civic optimism, and less tolerance to corruption. Soviet nostalgia is typically lower among people with a higher sense of civic duty. Besides, they consume online media including social media more frequently, support NATO membership to a higher extent, and express less pro-Russia orientations.

At the same time, the significant but relatively weak effect of civic duty on European integration demonstrates that there is a need but also a mostly untapped opportunity to enhance the value-dimension of EU support. The support based on self-expression values can be more enduring and less volatile to changes contrary to the one based on utilitarian factors and security concerns (or survival values as opposed to the self-expression values).[38] While utilitarian factors can fluctuate depending on the direct benefits from the integration and global economic conditions and security concerns can escalate due to hostilities from Russia, military confrontation, or due to other real-politic dynamics; self-expression values can become more stable and normative anchors. The link between European integration and fostering the values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, human rights[39] are also more existentially fundamental to the commitments and *raison d'etre* of the EU.

The EU and Ukrainian government promote these self-expression values in Ukraine via different communication channels. One illustrative example is the second phase of the *EUkraine* communication campaign, which was conducted in November 2021, reaching out to 15 million people.[40] Values were a central part of this communication, and it seems that Ukrainians are aware of and recognise this value-based link underpinning European integration. When asked which values are associated with the EU during the survey conducted in March 2020 within *EU-Neighbours east* project, over 63% of respondents link the EU with all of the proposed values – and particularly with "economic prosperity," and

[38] Here we applied the classification of values by political scientists Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. They distinguish two dimensions: 1) Traditional values versus Secular-rational values and 2) Survival values versus Self-expression values. Survival values place emphasis on economic and physical security. It is linked with a relatively ethnocentric outlook and low levels of trust and tolerance. Self-expression values give high priority to environmental protection, growing tolerance of foreigners, LGBTQI+, and gender equality, and rising demands for participation in decision-making in economic and political life. Source: World Value Survey, "Findings and Insights," accessed December 17, 2021, https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp.

[39] European Commission, "The EU Values," accessed on December 20, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/component-library/eu/about/eu-values/.

[40] EU-UA: European integration portal, "Євроінтеграційний дайджест" [Digest of European Integration], issue no. 208, December 13, 2021, https://eu-ua.kmu.gov.ua/node/4344.

"human rights" (81%, both).[41] This confirms our finding about the strong role of the perceived EU benefit for those who have higher support for the EU, and why we see those who support the EU score stronger on their belief in human rights (see Table 2) which constitute an instance of self-expression values. However, when asked about the most important values personal to them, 73% of respondents named peace, security, and stability.[42] Thus, while respondents associate the EU with its self-expression values like human rights, the values they consider most personal are closer to survival values.

This is potentially why value-related indicators like sense of civic duty do not have a strong influence (i.e., beta-coefficient) on support for EU membership. The World Value Survey conducted in 2020 also reveals that Ukraine is still farther from the EU member states along the survival v self-expression nexus of values.[43] Though it has moved closer to the self-expression values side of the nexus during the recent years.[44] When people's focus shifts from survival to self-expression, they acquire more freedom in action, their priorities change from subsistence and survival to agency, individual and community development. As a result, the level of well-being increases.[45] However, for this shift to occur the basic needs of *safety and livelihood* should be resolved.[46]

Thus, communication about values alone would not be sufficient to create a positive effect without enhancing the personal relevance of self-expression values. In addition to continued information campaigns and awareness raising about how and why self-expression values and norms are essential to community and individual well-being, sustainable development, peace and stability, and EU's *raison d'être*; more specific and tailored policies and programmes are needed to promote self-expression values

[41] EU Neighbours East, "Annual Survey Report: Fifth Wave," March 2020 (before COVID-19 crisis), p.9.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Survival values place emphasis on economic and physical security. It is linked with a relatively ethnocentric outlook and low levels of trust and tolerance. Self-expression values give high priority to environmental protection, growing tolerance of foreigners, gays and lesbians and gender equality, and rising demands for participation in decision-making in economic and political life. World Value Survey, "Findings and Insights," accessed December 17, 2021, https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp.
[44] Liubov Akulenko, Olha Balakirieva, Inna Volosyvych, Dmytro Dmytruk, Tetiana Kostiuchenko, Inna Latsyba, Daryna Pavlova, and Anastasia Shurenkova, "Світове дослідження цінностей 2020 в Україні" [2020 World Value Survey in Ukraine], Ukrainian Centre of European Politics, 2020, http://ucep.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/WVS_UA_2020_report_WEB.pdf.
[45] World Value Survey, "Findings and Insights," accessed December 17, 2021, https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp.
[46] Dr. E. O. Aruma and Dr. Melvins Enwuvesi Hanachor, "Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs and Assessment of Needs in Community Development," *International Journal of Development and Economic Sustainability* 5, no.7 (December 2017): 19, https://www.eajournals.org/journals/international-journal-of-development-and-economic-sustainability-ijdes/vol-5-issue-7-december-2017/abraham-maslows-hierarchy-needs-assessment-needs-community-development/.

including a sense of civic duty which may enhance a value-driven support for the EU that stretches beyond volatile utilitarian benefits.

Combined with the previous profile of people with a high sense of civic duty, in addition to communication strategies that highlight what EU stands for and how, we recommend policies and programmes that promote gender equality mindset, social tolerance, entrepreneurship mentality, intolerance to corruption, and other psychosocial skills like leadership, growth mindset, and critical thinking. Even more, as suggested by the SCORE 2018, "policies and programs that promote community cooperation, entrepreneurship, social tolerance, and a safe environment for open and inclusive dialogue that can foster political security are the key entry points to promote value-driven citizens who can become agents of change, and hence improve progressive, pluralistic, and harmonious society in Ukraine."[47] The SCORE 2018 also demonstrates that human security, which goes far beyond the narrow understanding of physical survival and comprises personal, political, and economic security, positively affects a sense of agency that makes up the civic duty indicator, and hence has a positive impact on progressive EU orientation.[48] With higher human security, people may worry less about securing a decent subsistence level and focus more on enhancing human agency. **Therefore, efforts directed at economic development and livelihoods may not only directly contribute to stronger support for the EU by improving perceived EU benefits and the income level of citizens, but also indirectly by enhancing a sense of civic duty and the value-driven support which is less volatile and more sustainable**.

In terms of identity, pluralistic Ukrainian identity,[49] which relates to a sense of civic political nation, has a positive effect on EU support (.04). **As such, we see that European integration is perceived as enhancing civic national identity rather than undermining it.** As stated by Cosmina Tanasoiu and Constantin Colonescu, "Whereas for average West Europeans concerns over the loss of national identity may lead to Euroscepticism, for Central and East Europeans, European integration is seen as a recognition of their "Europeanness" and, as such, it carries a certainty of "belonging."[50]

[47] Ilke Dagli-Hustings (Dr) et al, "SCORE Ukraine Phase Two (2018)," p.19.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Pluralistic Ukrainian identity indicator measures the degree to which one believes that everyone despite their ethnic and cultural background who lives in Ukraine are an integral part of Ukrainian society.
[50] Cosmina Tanasoiu and Constantin Colonescu, "Determinants of Support for European Integration," 365.

Security Concerns

Although much lower than perceived EU benefit, but similar to the negative effect of Soviet nostalgia, the effect of support for *political* cooperation with Russia[51] on support for EU membership is relatively strong and negative (see Table 3; the beta-coefficient/ marginal effect is -.11). There are large regional differences in terms of support for political cooperation with Russia (ANOVA; F=125; p<.001; η^2=.19): eastern and southern oblasts (and western Ternopil oblast) have relatively higher scores that the rest of the country and the national average.

Map 5. Support for political cooperation with Russia by oblasts (N=12,482; 2021)



[51] SCORE measures support for cooperation with Russia in different realms including political, economic, socio-cultural, and familial. This effect is specific only to the political realm.

Besides, we see a nonlinear relationship between the endorsement of military operation and the support for the EU: The EU support is increasing up to the score 5.0 for the endorsement of military operation; at this point, it starts to decrease (see Figure 7). Endorsement of military operation is measured on the 10-point scale where 0 means that a respondent prefers exclusively dialogue and negotiations when speaking about armed conflict in the eastern Ukraine and 10 means that the one prefers exclusively military operations. In other words, the scale has two opposite poles rather than indicating 0-to-10 support for one preference. While a score of 5 is neutrality between two exclusive preferences, below a score of 5 respondents express growing preference for dialogue and negotiations, and above a score of 5 they express growing preference for military operations.

Figure 7. Nonlinear endorsement of military operations (N=12,482; 2021)



Map 6. Endorsement of military operations by oblasts (N=12,482; 2021)



Support for EU membership is higher when people's preferences are neither exclusively dialogue nor exclusively military solutions, but somewhere in between.- which means that respondents with higher EU support express preference for dialogue and negotiations over military solutions but this is not an increasingly exclusive preference. It is worth noting that this position is in line with the EU's standing on peaceful resolution to the armed conflict waged by Russia, which does not discount the need for military support for deterrence and defence. Beyond the score of 5.0 respondents express an increasing preference on military solutions, while the support for joining the EU decreases. The differences between oblasts in terms of the endorsement of military operations are medium (ANOVA; F=52; p<.001; η^2=.09): The lowest scores have contact line (1.1-1.2), Luhanks (1.0), Donetsk (1.5), Odessa (1.5) oblasts while the highest ones - Sumy (3.9), Vinnytsia (3.7), Volyn (3.7), Kyiv (3.6), Rivne (3.6) oblasts. It is natural that oblasts closer to the contact line have lower support for military operations.

On the basis of these observations, we can conclude that the security dimension of cooperation with the EU is valuable for Ukrainians. According to the survey conducted by InfoSapiens in November 2021 for the New Europe Center, the top expectations from the EU beyond the prospects of membership (23%) in 2021 are "strengthened role in negotiations with Russia to end the war in Donbas and return Crimea" (20%), "new sanctions against Russia" (19%), and "more committed support for Ukraine in defence and security spheres" (19%).[52] **Thus, we see that enhancing cooperation with the EU in the security field is already one of the motives and expectations of citizens who currently support Ukraine to join the EU.**

This conclusion is also supported by the fact that people who support the EU are also likely to support NATO, which provides a collective defence umbrella for its member states. According to other surveys, the biggest share of Ukrainians (51%) reports that joining NATO is the optimal national security model for Ukraine[53] while 90% among those who support admission to NATO says that NATO will defend Ukraine and help it to increase its defence system standards.[54] Thus, they are likely to be perceived as complementary to each other under the motives and expectations that relate to security.

[52] New Europe Center, "Diplomacy-2022," survey conducted on November 8-29, 2021.
[53] Razumkov Centre, "Public Support for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic Course," p. 18.
[54] Rating Group Ukraine, "Public Opinion Survey of Residents of Ukraine," survey conducted in June 13-23, 2019 on behalf of the International Republican Institute's Center for Insights in Survey Research, p. 64, https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/july_2019_ukraine_poll.pdf.

Considering that changing the foreign policy orientation of Ukraine from Euro-Atlantic to Eurasian is an explicit ambition behind the Russian aggression,[55] the relationship between security threats from Russia and the desire to join the EU can be mutually enhancing and work in a feedback loop. Not only is the military aggression by Russia among the reasons to support deeper European integration but also support for EU integration creates an urgency to bring an end to the armed conflict, which is seen as an obstacle in front of deeper integration and potential membership.[56]

The current EU initiatives in the security field, such as the practical results of the efforts of the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine and the cyber dialogue launched in 2021, should be better communicated to the public, which can help address security anxieties and expectations. Security enhancing potential of proposals such as those made by Marianna Fakhurdinova that include the deepening relations with the European Defence Agency (EDA), joining Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), appointing Special Representative for Crimea and/or the temporary Russian-occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, fielding military advisory and training mission to Ukraine, establishing Eastern Partnership Security Compact, deepening cooperation with cybersecurity agencies, and study exchanges within the Military Erasmus should be further evaluated.[57]

Heuristic Factors or "Shortcuts"

The role of heuristic factors is relatively small when compared to others. According to this hypothesis, citizens use proxies or "shortcuts" when making decisions on issues about which they have little information on. In order to measure this hypothesis we applied the variables on trust in central institutions (president, parliament, government, and courts) and support for three reforms: land, health, and decentralization. The beta-coefficient (marginal effect) of trust in central institutions on support for EU membership is .06, and the effect of support for the reforms is .05 (see Table 3). Though they are smaller than some other drivers, they are neither the smallest nor statistically insignificant.

The role of trust in central institutions shows that for some people, general trust in central institutions transfers to endorsement of a specific policy, be it a foreign policy direction or a reform package. SCORE 2021 on land reform corroborates this relationship and shows

[55] Razumkov Centre, "Деякі аспекти євроінтеграції очима громадян" [Some Aspects of European Integration as Viewed by Citizens], *Національна безпека і оборона - National Security and Defence*, no. 1-2 (185-186) (2021): 86.
[56] Ibid, pp. 86-88.
[57] Marianna Fakhurdinova, "From the Civil to Military: How Can Ukraine Enhance Security Cooperation with the EU?"], New Europe Center, December 14, 2021, http://neweurope.org.ua/analytics/vid-tsyvilnoyi-do-vijskovoyi-yak-ukrayini-poglybyty-bezpekovu-spivpratsyu-z-yes/.

that trust in central institutions is the strongest predictor for the said reform support.[58] EU and NATO membership has been an explicit foreign policy goal for Ukrainian authorities, which is also mentioned in the Constitution since 2019. Thus, if one trusts authorities and have confidence in their integrity (e.g. accountability, representativeness, care for the public good), they are more likely to support the direction authorities are taking because they are more likely to believe that this is the most appropriate, beneficial, and right. According to the SCORE 2021 study, trust in central institutions is particularly low, the score is 2.4 out of 10 (the trust in local authorities is 4.4, in NGOs - 5.0, in Ukrainian army - 6.0, for instance). Therefore, efforts aimed at building vertical social cohesion that fosters good governance underpinned by trust, accountability, access to information, and inclusive civic participation along the citizens-state nexus can increase support for policies and initiatives taken by the state institutions, be they reforms or foreign policy directions.

Increasing trust in authorities calls for holistic, critical, and tailored action. There might be many various reasons why people trust or distrust authorities. Geert Bouckaert and Steven Van de Walle, for instance, evaluate the performance hypothesis - that quality of public service provision can contribute to the trust - and conclude that the performance is only valid when people care about performance.[59] In addition, they quote Arthur Ringeling who distinguishes four criteria people can use for judging their government:

- Instrumental: effectiveness, efficiency (which is in line with the performance theory)
- Bureaucratic: legality, justice, possibilities for discretion in policy
- Contingency: representativity, receptiveness
- Symbols/values: political order, distribution of values[60]

The SCORE 2021 shows that people who have a relatively higher trust in central institutions are more likely to think that Ukrainian authorities care about the people and all parts of Ukraine (Pearson's correlation[61] is .43 and $p < .001$) and that they are accountable (.37; <.001). They also perceive the level of corruption to be lower (-.34) and have higher support for reforms (.38). Besides, they are more likely to express higher satisfaction with public services (.31) as well as personal (.27), economic (.25), and health (.23) security. **Therefore, we can assume that improvement of institutional performance along with accountability**

[58] Ruslan Minich, Orestis Panayiotou, Christoforos Pissarides, and Dr. Ilke Dagli-Hustings, "Land Reform in Ukraine: Attitudes & Expectations. Based on SCORE 2021 Ukraine," December 2021, https://api.scoreforpeace.org/storage/pdfs/PB_UKRTCA20_Land-reform_FINAL_27122021.pdf.
[59] Geert Bouckaert and Steven Van de Walle, "Government Performance and Trust in Government," paper for the Permanent Study Group on Productivity and Quality in the Public Sector at the EGPA Annual Conference, Vaasa, Finland, 2001: *Trust Building Networks - how the government meets citizen in the post-bureaucratic era: Citizen directed government through Quality, Satisfaction and Trust in Government*, p. 35.
[60] Ibid, p. 23.
[61] The Pearson's correlation coefficients with the trust in central institutions are presented in the parentheses. All correlations are statistically significant at .001 level.

would positively influence trust, and, in turn, foster the vertical cohesion in the society.[62] However, more research is needed to confirm this hypothesis. At the same time, we should underscore that the heuristic deliberations are weak in shaping people's support for European integration on the national level as they are valid only for a particular segment of the population.

Along the same line of argument as the trust in central institutions, we also see support for reforms (land, health, and decentralisation reforms) as a driver for the support for EU membership (Table 3). Reforms are part of the policy journey to building closer relations with the EU. Reforms and foreign policy towards the EU are both underpinned by related policy narratives and packages, and thus the former shows itself as a "shortcut" in citizens' assessment of the support for the EU as well. The survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in December 2020 shows that 49% of respondents make the link of European integration with one or more reforms, but when it comes to reform by reform, no single reform exceeds 19% linkage in citizens' minds: 19% of respondents link both anti-corruption and healthcare reforms with the EU membership aspirations, 18% name the police reform, 14% - decentralization reform, 12.5% - education reform, 11% - reform of electronic services, including administrative services, and 9% - improved environment.[63] Thus, the linkage should become more encompassing, and **we see the need to further communicate the link between reforms and European integration. At the same time, these reforms should bring positive results for the country and positive personal experiences for the citizens to be successful. Otherwise, the communication of success stories without the matching experience may result in stronger rejection of the reforms.**

The score for support for decentralization in 2021 is 4.3 out of 10; it is 3.7 for health reform; and 3.2 for land reform. There is a medium statistically significant difference between oblasts in terms of support for the three reforms (ANOVA; F=40; p<.001; η^2=.07): The highest average score for three reforms (land, health, decentralization) is in Sumy oblast (5.1) followed by Volyn oblast (4.8) and Rivne oblast (4.5); the lowest scores are in Luhansk oblast's contact line (2.2), Donetsk oblast's contact line (2.8), Odesa (2.9) and Chernihiv (2.9) oblasts. Studies that investigate why people support reforms and why they may be sceptical are vital in representative democracies to ensure consensus building, inclusive policy making, and greater representation, and not for populist end goals and slogans. Better understanding people's concerns and fears that drive their scepticism and what

[62] More on SeeD's conceptual framework for social cohesion please look at: Alexander Guest and Orestis Panayiotou, "Social Cohesion in Ukraine Part I: Defining and Measuring Social Cohesion Using the SCORE," 2021, https://api.scoreforpeace.org/storage/pdfs/PUB_SCOREUkr21_Social_Cohesion_Volume1.pdf.
[63] Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, "Opinions and Views of Ukraine's Population on European Integration: December 2020," p.11.

works and what does not work would help maximize the beneficiaries of reform as well as the benefits of the reform. **Thus, it is absolutely critical to build national consensus regarding the goals and contents of reforms and, as a result, a bottom-up support for the reform process to ensure the reforms' smooth implementation and maximal impact**.

Map 7. Support for reforms (land, health, decentralization) by oblasts (N=12,482; 2021)



The relationship between reforms and EU support can be in a feedback loop. On the one hand, according to the survey conducted by Razumkov Centre in 2020, 52% think that low level of economic development and slow reforms are obstacles to European integration.[64] As such, people see reforms as an instrument to deepen integration with the EU. On the other hand, according to another survey conducted by InfoSapience in 2021, 37% think that Ukraine should continue reforms even without the prospects of EU membership.[65] Thus, people might see European integration even without full membership as a motivation to implement successful reforms and improve the quality of life or see reforms as worthy policy packages in themselves.

[64] Razumkov Centre, "Деякі аспекти євроінтеграції очима громадян" [Some Aspects of European Integration as Viewed by Citizens], 88.
[65] New Europe Center, "Diplomacy-2022," survey conducted on November 8-29, 2021, p.21.

Political Security

People with higher levels of political security[66] also have slightly higher support for EU membership (the beta-coefficient is .04, see Table 3). This indicates that the European direction of Ukraine is widely acceptable in the society and confirms that the majority of Ukrainians see no alternative to the EU.[67] This can also mean that people who are against the EU direction of Ukraine feel less politically secure to voice their opinions. According to SCORE 2021, the score for political security is moderately high at 6.5. Here, a score of 10 may not be achievable or even undesirable, but a score of 6.5 definitely has room for improvement. Political security concerns freedom of expression about any political issue beyond foreign policy preferences but it is not an absolute right where scores of 10 may be achievable or desirable. For instance, the European Convention on Human Rights in its article 10 envisions some possible restrictions to the freedom of expression "in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."[68] These "formalities, conditions, restrictions, or penalties [have to be] prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society."[69] As such, it is permissible not to offer or extend political security to narratives that are explicitly hateful, extremist, or inciting violence.

Political security in Ukraine decreases as we move from western to eastern oblasts. The lowest scores are on the contact line (4.1), Luhansk (4.5), Donetsk (4.8) oblasts, and even lower along the contact line. There are medium level statistically significant differences between oblasts regarding political security (ANOVA; F=80; p<.001; η^2=.13): **Given that there is room for improvement not only on the national level but specifically in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts followed by Kirovohrad, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts, efforts aimed at developing an environment for critical, constructive, and inclusive dialogue would contribute to political security, which would help better understand why some people are sceptical about European aspirations, and, in turn, improve the room for building convergences around the foreign policy direction of Ukraine.**

[66] Political security measures the degree to which one feels comfortable expressing their political views both collectively and individually without fearing consequences.
[67] According to the 2021 survey by New Europe Centre and InfoSapiens, in the hypothetical case if the EU continues to refuse to provide a membership prospect, 24% of respondents believe Ukraine should not join any other union at all while 18% are convinced that Ukraine should still pursue EU membership. New Europe Center, "Diplomacy-2022" survey conducted on November 8-29, 2021, pp.9-10, 23.
[68] European Convention on Human Rights, in force on September 3, 1953, article 10.2, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
[69] Ibid.

Map 8. Political security by oblasts (N=12,482; 2021)



Media and Communication: Tailored Approach

Generally, people make their mind about some phenomena based on personal experience or on information they receive from trusted sources, be it friends and family or media outlets. In the case of partnership with the EU, there is room for both pathways. With the association agreement, numerous EU-funded projects, and visa-free regime; Ukrainians can experience the benefits from the EU integration to different extents. As mentioned previously, the impacts of the association agreement and the visa-free regime are more appreciated by citizens with each passing year. Also, as the survey from March 2020 within the *EU Neighbours east* project shows, nearly 70% strongly or somewhat agree that the EU provides tangible benefits to citizens in their everyday lives.[70] Besides, we see the importance of the perceived EU benefit for the country as a factor for supporting the EU membership in our model.

At the same time, communication of benefits is not less important than personal experience and exposure to such benefits, especially in terms of linking various activities

[70] EU Neighbours East, "Annual Survey Report: Fifth Wave," March 2020 (before COVID-19 crisis), p.15.

to the EU integration, building trustworthy relationships with citizens, informing them about the opportunities they may participate in, and framing its self-expression value dimension. Media itself, in this regard, is not the most trusted source of information: According to the media literacy index of the Detector Media, Ukrainians treat most media with suspicion. Unquestionable trust in different sources range from 10 to 24%. Messengers such as Telegram, WhatsApp, Viber (24%) are trusted the most.[71] The trust in messengers indicates that personal online communication may be more effective than the one via media outlets. We can extend this argument to personal offline communication as well.

In terms of media, radio (23%) and print media (11%) are trusted the most.[72] While the SCORE 2021 shows that the consumption of print media is not high: only 3% of respondents read newspapers every day. However, 10% of the 2021 SCORE respondents listen to radio every day. This is much higher in Kyiv oblast - 20%, 18% in Chernihiv and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts, 16% in Cherkasy, Lviv, and Vinnytsia oblasts, and 15% in Khmelnytskyi oblast. Radio listeners tend to belong to the older age and male gender groups as well as primary education group. The listeners have a higher sense of civic duty (5.8 v 5.3) and lower support for political cooperation with Russia (3.8 v 4.4). Thus, they may be interested in EU values and the EU's role in countering Russian aggression. The least trusted type of media is television (10% of respondents trust it while 18% don't), according to Detector Media's index.[73] **Therefore, personal communication via messengers or with friends and family as well as radio can be potential channels to start with. In terms of state officials as communicators, local authorities have a relatively higher trust (4.4) than the central institutions (2.4); though its absolute value is not high**.

According to SCORE 2021, about 70% of people receive information about political affairs from TV daily or at least once a week while 55% use social media to consume information on current affairs. TV remains the main media in terms of the frequency of information consumption, especially for pensioners, residents of smaller settlements, lower income groups, people with primary or secondary education, and women. Western oblasts have largely higher scores than others. These oblasts also have higher scores for political talk shows which might indicate a higher interest in Ukrainian politics among the residents.

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[71] Marta Naumova, "Media Literacy Index of Ukrainians," The report based on the data of the quantitative research conducted by the research agency "Info Sapiens" and compiled at the request of NGO "Media Detector," March 2021, p.52, https://detector.media/doc/images/news/archive/2021/186437/REPORT_MEDIALITERA%D0%A1Y_INDEX-DM_EN.pdf.

[72] Marta Naumova, "Media Literacy Index of Ukrainians," The report based on the data of the quantitative research conducted by the research agency "Info Sapiens" and compiled at the request of NGO "Media Detector," March 2021, p.52, https://detector.media/doc/images/news/archive/2021/186437/REPORT_MEDIALITERA%D0%A1Y_INDEX-DM_EN.pdf.

[73] Ibid.

Considering information consumption patterns, TV can be used to communicate the potential welfare dimension of EU-Ukraine partnership as they are likely to belong to lower income groups as well as the cost of slow progress in Ukraine's European integration journey since TV audience profile overlaps with those who are likely to express more hesitancy and scepticism as well as resistance to change as identified in the previous sections. Although low trust in mainstream media and TV may undermine the effectiveness of such communication, this can be mitigated by delivering the messages via trusted speakers and actors in a reflective and digestible way.

Online media (social media and news websites) are less popular among rural residents. However, their access to the Internet (7.5) is not significantly worse than the national average (7.8). At the same time, online media consumption is more frequent among younger, higher income and education groups, thus, the latter can be interested in the information regarding personal benefits and prospects of European integration as well as education opportunities and exchanges. Besides, they should be more favourable about market liberalization. In terms of consumption of particular social media outlets, we see that the users of *Facebook* (the score for support for EU membership among *Facebook*'s users is 6.4 while for nonusers it is 5.2), *Instagram* (6.5 v 5.7), *Twitter* (6.5 v 5.8), and *Telegram* (6.5 v 5.8) have a higher support for EU membership than nonusers. They have higher scores on perceived EU benefit and lower Soviet nostalgia. Thus, their audiences can be relatively less resistant to change and welcome sociotropic utilitarian factors of European integration.

Moreover, users of *Facebook* (5.8 v 5.0), *Telegram* (6.1. v 5.3), *Viber* (5.8 v 5.3), *Youtube* (5.8 v 5.2) have relatively higher sense of civic duty than nonusers, thus, they may welcome more self-expression value-driven communication. The users of *Instagram* (2.8 v 2.3) and *Telegram* (3.0 v 2.3) have higher trust in central institutions; though its score value is still low. Nevertheless, they may be more positive about the initiatives of authorities including the foreign policy endeavours. The users of *Telegram* (4.3 v 3.6) and *Viber* (4.1 v 3.6) are relatively more supportive of reforms, thus, they may see the EU as a tool to ensure the continuation and successful implementation of reforms or see successful reforms as a crucial condition for European integration. Following the earlier suggested bottom-up approach to reforms we should better understand the criticism and the pitfalls of the reforms. Social media can be one of the ways to do that. What's more, the users of *Facebook* (3.9 v 4.7) and *Twitter* (3.7 v 4.3) have a lower support for political cooperation with Russia, and, thus, the security concerns and motives can be relatively more willingly accepted by these users. Meanwhile, the users of *VKontakte* (4.7.v 5.9) and *Odnoklassniki* (3.9 v 5.9) have much lower support for the EU and higher support for the EEU and non-aligned status. They have lower political security and higher support for political cooperation with Russia. The number of users of Russian social media like *VKontakte* and

Odnoklassniki is very low, 1.5-2%, though. In general, *Facebook* (score of 5.1) and *Youtube* (4.0) are the most popular sources to keep up with political affairs. *Facebook* and *Youtube* are more popular among younger, higher income, higher education groups. **Combined with the above profile of their users, they can be platforms to communicate self-expression values of the EU; educational and financial opportunities from European integration; benefits for communities from the integration; as well as implementing digital programmes related to the sense of civic duty**. At the same time, *Youtube* is popular not only among the youngest age group (4.7) but also among the 36-59 years old group (4.7); more among males (4.5) than females (3.7); however, it is less consumed in rural areas (3.5). *Facebook* is more popular when moving from eastern to western oblasts.

Table 4. Support for EU membership, its drivers by social media users (N=12,482, 2021)[74]

	Facebook		Youtube		Viber		Instagram		Telegram		Twitter		Odnoklassniki		VKontakte	
	non users	users	non users	users	non users	users	non users	users	non users	users	non users	users	non users	users	non users	users
Support for EU membership	5.2	6.4	5.7	6.1	5.8	6.0	5.7	6.5	5.8	6.5	5.8	6.5	5.9	3.9	5.9	4.7
Perceived EU benefit	5.3	6.1	5.7	5.8	5.7	5.8	5.6	6.2	5.7	6.2	5.7	6.6	5.8	4.4	5.7	4.9
Income level	3.7	4.8	4.0	4.7	4.1	4.6	4.1	4.9	4.1	5.2	4.2	5.2	4.3	4.0	4.3	4.4
Education level	5.0	5.7	5.1	5.7	5.3	5.7	5.3	5.6	5.3	5.9	5.3	6.0	5.4	5.2	5.4	5.2
Soviet nostalgia	6.4	5.0	5.9	5.4	5.8	5.4	6.0	4.8	5.8	4.7	5.7	4.3	5.7	8.0	5.7	6.4
Pluralistic Ukrainian identity	7.4	7.3	7.3	7.4	7.4	7.3	7.4	7.3	7.4	7.2	7.3	7.1	7.3	6.9	7.3	6.8
Political security	6.4	6.7	6.4	6.7	6.5	6.6	6.5	6.7	6.5	6.7	6.5	6.9	6.6	5.4	6.6	5.6
Sense of civic duty	5.0	5.8	5.2	5.8	5.3	5.8	5.4	5.6	5.3	6.1	5.4	5.5	5.4	5.2	5.4	5.2

[74] The highlighted cells contain the differences among social media users and nonusers on support for EU membership and its drivers that are at least 0.5 or more.



In terms of TV channels, the SCORE respondents who watch *ICTV* (6.2 v 5.7) and *1+1* (6.1 v 5.6) for news and *ICTV* (6.2 v 5.7) and *Novyi Kanal* (6.4 v 5.7) for entertainment have higher support for EU membership than those who do not watch these TV channels. Instead, the viewers of *Inter* (4.9 v 6.1) and Russian TV channels like *Rossiya 1*, *Rossiya 24*, *NTV Mir* for news and for entertainment have lower support for the EU. Besides, they have lower income, political security, trust in central institutions, support for reforms, endorsement of military operations, and higher support for political cooperation with Russia and Soviet nostalgia. However, the sample size of Russian TV channels' viewers is small, from 1 to 2%. The viewers of Ukrainian *TRK Ukraina* have higher Soviet nostalgia (6.3 v 5.4) and lower income (3.8 v 4.5) as well. Those who watch news at *ICTV* (3.9 v 4.5) have lower support for political cooperation with Russia and, thus, might welcome the security-related narratives about EU integration. Those who watch entertainment programmes at *1+1* have higher perceived EU benefit (6.0 v 5.5). They may positively receive information about the benefits from the partnership with the EU. In general, *1+1* (4.8), *TRK Ukraina* (3.5), and *ICTV* (3.4) are the most popular source of news and political information while *1+1* (4.4), *ICTV* (3.6), and *STB* (3.4) are the most popular TV channels for entertainment, according to the 2021 SCORE.

Table 5. Support for EU membership and its drivers by TV viewership (N=12,482; 2021)

New consumption	1+1		TRK Ukraina		ICTV		STB		Inter		Novyi Kanal		Rossiya 1		Rossiya 24		NTV (Mir)	
	non viewer	viewer	non viewer	viewer	non viewer	viewer	non viewer	viewer	non viewer	viewer	non viewer	viewer	non viewer	viewer	non viewer	viewer	non viewer	viewer
Support for EU membership	5.6	6.1	6.0	5.7	5.7	6.2	5.8	6.1	6.1	4.9	5.8	6.2	5.9	2.5	5.9	2.8	5.9	3.5
Perceived EU benefit	5.5	6.0	5.8	5.6	5.6	5.9	5.7	6.0	5.9	5.0	5.7	6.1	5.8	3.0	5.8	2.9	5.8	3.8
Income level	4.3	4.2	4.5	3.8	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.2	4.4	3.7	4.2	4.3	4.3	3.2	4.3	3.3	4.3	3.7
Education level	5.4	5.3	5.4	5.2	5.4	5.2	5.4	5.3	5.4	5.2	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.1	5.4	5.3	5.4	5.5
Soviet nostalgia	5.8	5.6	5.4	6.3	5.8	5.5	5.7	5.7	5.3	7.1	5.7	5.4	5.7	8.8	5.7	8.6	5.7	7.7
Pluralistic Ukrainian identity	7.3	7.4	7.3	7.5	7.3	7.4	7.3	7.5	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.1	7.3	7.3
Political security	6.4	6.7	6.6	6.4	6.5	6.7	6.5	6.6	6.6	6.2	6.5	6.5	6.6	5.3	6.6	5.3	6.5	5.7
Sense of civic duty	5.4	5.4	5.5	5.3	5.3	5.5	5.4	5.4	5.5	5.1	5.4	5.5	5.4	5.1	5.4	4.9	5.4	5.2
Trust in central institutions (overall)	2.2	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.4	1.4	2.4	1.3	2.4	1.8
Support for reforms	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.3	3.7	4.1	3.7	2.5	3.7	2.6	3.7	3.2
Support for political cooperation with Russia	4.4	4.1	4.2	4.4	4.5	3.9	4.3	4.1	4.0	5.0	4.3	4.1	4.2	7.5	4.2	7.3	4.2	6.0
Endorsement of military operation	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.5	2.6	2.9	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.3	2.6	3.0	2.7	1.5	2.7	1.5	2.7	1.8

TV channel consumption	4.8	3.5	3.4	2.3	2.2	0.8	0.2	0.2	0.1

Entertainment	1+1		ICTV		STB		TRK Ukraina		Novyi Kanal		Inter		NTV (Mir)		Rossiya 1		Rossiya 24	
	non viewer	viewer	non viewer	viewer	non viewer	viewer	non viewer	viewer	non viewer	viewer	non viewer	viewer	non viewer	viewer	non viewer	viewer	non viewer	viewer
Support for EU membership	5.7	6.1	5.7	6.2	5.7	6.1	5.9	5.7	5.7	6.4	6.1	4.9	5.9	3.8	5.9	2.8	5.9	3.4
Perceived EU benefit	5.5	6.0	5.6	6.0	5.7	5.9	5.8	5.6	5.7	6.0	5.9	4.9	5.8	3.8	5.8	3.0	5.8	3.3
Income level	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.2	4.4	3.8	4.2	4.5	4.4	3.5	4.3	3.6	4.3	3.0	4.3	2.9
Education level	5.4	5.3	5.4	5.3	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.2	5.3	5.5	5.4	5.2	5.4	5.3	5.4	5.1	5.4	5.1
Soviet nostalgia	5.8	5.6	5.8	5.5	5.7	5.8	5.5	6.3	5.8	5.3	5.4	7.2	5.7	8.0	5.7	8.7	5.7	8.2
Pluralistic Ukrainian identity	7.4	7.3	7.3	7.4	7.3	7.5	7.3	7.4	7.3	7.5	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.5	7.3	7.4	7.3	7.4
Political security	6.4	6.8	6.5	6.6	6.5	6.6	6.6	6.3	6.5	6.6	6.6	6.1	6.6	5.4	6.6	5.4	6.5	5.8
Sense of civic duty	5.5	5.3	5.4	5.5	5.4	5.4	5.5	5.2	5.4	5.6	5.5	5.0	5.4	5.1	5.4	4.9	5.4	5.0
Trust in central institutions (overall)	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.7	2.4	2.2	2.4	1.7	2.4	1.2	2.4	1.5
Support for reforms	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.5	3.7	4.0	3.8	3.3	3.7	3.2	3.7	2.6	3.7	2.8
Support for political cooperation with Russia	4.4	4.1	4.4	4.0	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.4	4.3	4.1	4.1	5.0	4.2	6.4	4.2	7.3	4.2	7.3



Thus, the outlined differences between the users of social media outlets and viewers of TV channels should inform tailoring of the communication strategies considering the needs of their audiences. We can empower them with better understanding of EU integration and satisfy their need for the relevant information. The general communication without a tailored approach may result in greater polarization and an enhanced resistance to change and rejection of the official EU direction of Ukraine among those who oppose it, though this group constitutes a minority, because of the confirmation bias.[75] Hearing information about some important issue that contradicts one's opinion may backfire and result in the reinforcement of one's beliefs than changing them in the desired direction. Besides, such bold communication may repel the hesitant and unsure group.

Final Reflections

We see multi-dimensionality in the support for EU membership among SCORE 2021 respondents who represent the entire country. 59% support it as the preferred direction for Ukraine, while 27% of this group can also tolerate non-aligned status. People can support the EU because of collective or individual benefits from European integration; or because their value system matches the self-expression values which are at the heart of the European integration project. People with pluralistic Ukrainian identity are likely to see the integration as a recognition of their Europeanness. Besides, the EU is an ally in alleviating anxieties and insecurities around Russian aggression. Last but not least, trust in central institutions and the reform process is linked with the endorsement of European integration; though it is weak and can be further enhanced.

There is no one reason why a person may want Ukraine to join the EU. Citizens' support or scepticism is based on an interplay of various motivations, expectations, and assessment of social, political, and economic factors. Those who experience tangible benefits from the integration are more likely to feel civic duty and agency as an example of self-expression values and, thus, endorse the Union's value system (as discussed in section on values and

[75] Christopher A. Baila, Lisa P. Argyle, Taylor W. Brown, John P. Bumpus, Haohan Chen, M. B. Fallin Hunzaker, Jaemin Lee, Marcus Mann, Friedolin Merhout, and Alexander Volfovsky, "Exposure to Opposing Views on Social Media Can Increase Political Polarization," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS)* 115(37): 9216–9221, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1804840115.

identity); trust public institutions; and follow the foreign policy direction adopted by the authorities. We need to further enhance the value dimension based on human agency and emancipation since support based on this intrinsic motivation is more resistant to change while the one based on extrinsic motives can fluctuate depending on the level of tangible outcomes or security threats. Besides, pluralistic Ukrainian identity is positively related with EU support; thus, European integration is likely to be perceived as enhancing Ukrainian identity. People's expectations as well as perceptions about the EU should be understood through these multidimensional lenses. As a result, a further analysis to better understand the interplay between the mentioned drivers and how they work in combination with each other is recommended.

In terms of communication, it is vital to avoid blanket one-size-fit-all targeting the general population since it may further polarize those who are sceptical of the EU. People tend to reject information contradicting one's view on the issues which they have strong opinions on. Such information only reinforces their previous beliefs. Thus, tailored and reflective communication that widens the room for critical and inclusive dialogue would be more empathetic and responsive to the needs and concerns of the audience in particular and citizens across Ukraine in general.

Methodology

Survey Design and Data Details

Data collection was carried out from January 2021 to May 2021. The national sample consists of 12,482 face-to-face interviews from 24 oblasts and Kyiv city. The sampling was based on estimations of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine as of January 1, 2019. The sample is representative of the adult population of Ukraine (18 years old and above). The national sampling error is not exceeding 1.1%.

The following categories of the adult population and geographical areas are excluded from the sample: Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Sevastopol city, non-government controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

At the same time, we use data from previous national waves of SCORE to capture trends in foreign policy preferences.

SCORE Ukraine 2018 was implemented by SeeD in partnership with the USAID/OTI supported program UCBI. The data was collected in the summer of 2018. The general population results used in this report are based on 9,018 face-to-face household interviews in 24 oblasts and Kyiv city were conducted via stratified random sampling.

SCORE Ukraine 2016 was implemented by SeeD in partnership with the USAID/OTI supported program "Ukraine Confidence Building Initiative" (UCBI) to address the issues underpinning community tensions and cohesion. The data was collected in the summer of 2016. The general population results used in this report is based on a nation-wide sample of over 7,700 respondents, equivalent to over 300 face-to-face household interviews per oblast plus Kyiv city.

For more details on the data collection strategy and SCORE methodology used in the report, please go to the link: https://app.scoreforpeace.org/en/ukraine/methodology.

How to Read SCORE Indicators

Indicators are what we use to accurately capture various different social phenomena, such as support for EU membership, perceived EU benefit, pro-Russia orientation, or Soviet nostalgia. Indicators are SCORE's building blocks. They are presented in the form of heatmaps on the SCORE web platform, comparison tables, and used for modelling. Indicator value is **from 0 to 10**, where 0 is the absence of the phenomenon in society and 10 its maximum presence. Each indicator is measured through a range of questions, which in SeeD we call questionnaire items. The responses to each questionnaire item are added

together to obtain a total score for the indicator. Multiple questionnaire items are used to look at the same phenomenon from different angles, this way we get an accurate picture of that phenomenon in society. For example, feeling responsible for the future of the country and the ability to change things we measure with a sense of agency indicator. It consists of four questions asking to what extent these statements describe respondents:

- I believe that ordinary people like me cannot change anything in this community, even if they try.
- What happens to Ukraine in the future is not my problem. I let others worry about this kind of thing.
- I believe politics is for politicians; it is not something I can understand and contribute
- There is no point in voting in elections; my vote would not make a difference anyway.

Each respondent receives a score for every indicator from zero to ten, depending on their answers to each of the indicator's item. Then we combine all scores together to have one score for the indicator. Sometimes, we can have single-item indicators as well as, for example, support for EU membership which is measured with the question: Regarding the future of Ukraine, how do you evaluate the statement that Ukraine should join the European Union? However, we mostly avoid single-item indicators where possible.

Some indicators may be composites, we sometimes call these meta-indicators or composite indicators. This means that the indicator is made-up of two or more sub-indicators such as, for example, support for reforms that consists of support for health reform, support for decentralization, and support for land reform; or human security indicator consists of personal, political, economic, health, and environmental security.

The next example shows how it is calculated for a sense of civic duty. Here the higher score for those who disagree with the statements which are more about the absence of any sense of civic duty.

- **Lavrin** strongly disagrees that what happens to Ukraine in the future is not his problem but agrees with the other three items. Because he strongly disagrees with 1 item, he gets the score 1 out of 4, or 25%. We convert this to a score out of ten and get Lavrin's score of 2.5 for sense of civic duty.
- **Motria** and **Karpo** think that people cannot change anything, there is no point in voting because politics is for politicians, and the future of Ukraine is not their problem. That's 0 out of 4, or 0%. This gives Motria and Karpo a score of 0 for sense of civic duty.
- **Melashka** cares extremely about the future of the country and thinks that there is a point in voting and she can understand politics. She answered yes to 3 items and

no to 1. That's 3 out of 4, or 75%. This is a score of 7.5 out of 10 for sense of civic duty.

For this indicator, a score of 10 means that they feel extremely responsible for the future and well-being of their society and country and that ordinary people can change things in their community. A score of 0 means they don't feel any sense of civic duty, and they believe that people cannot change anything, only politicians can understand politics, there is no point to vote in elections, and the future of the country is not their problem. Thus, if this Kaidash family - Lavrin, Melashka, Motria, and Karpo - is our community, the sense of civic duty for it would be (2.5 + 7.5 + 0 +0): 4 = 2.5.

Each indicator then can be disaggregated based on different age groups, settlement type (rural or urban areas), gender, income, education, oblast. This information can potentially help stakeholders to identify the target audience for their policies and interventions. For example, if we review these figures for perceived EU benefit, we see that interventions should target residents of eastern and southern oblasts where the scores are lower.

Foreign Policy Indicators

This study estimates respondents foreign policy preferences in particular the support for EU membership but not only. For this reason, we use the measures listed below. At the same time, some of the indicators are fully or partly comparable which allows time comparison between 2016, 2018, and 2021 national waves of the SCORE. In other cases, when the indicators are not comparable or absent, we do not compare them across the years.

General foreign policy preferences – a group of questions that asks whether the respondent supports Ukraine joining EU, NATO, EEU (Eurasian Economic Union), or remaining non-aligned. The questionnaire items for these indicators remained the same across years, while the response scales were changed slightly. In 2016 and 2018, the response scale was a 4-point Likert type scale ranging from “Entirely unacceptable” to “Highly desirable”; in 2021, the response scale was a 4-point Likert type scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”. Thus, we consider them as comparable across years.

Confidence in EU’s stability - The degree to which one believes that the EU is thriving and growing stronger. This indicator is comparable across the 2018-2021 national SCORE.

Perceived EU benefit - The degree to which one believes EU membership brings benefits to all countries who join and will benefit different sectors in Ukraine.

Pro-Russia orientation - The degree to which one supports Eurasian Economic Union with Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, and believes that Ukrainians and Russians are one people and that Ukraine cannot thrive without Russia.

Support for political cooperation with Russia - The degree to which one finds maintaining and developing political cooperation with Russia necessary.

Support for cultural cooperation with Russia - The degree to which one finds maintaining and developing cultural cooperation with Russia necessary.

Support for economic cooperation with Russia - The degree to which one finds maintaining and developing economic cooperation with Russia necessary.

Support for civil society cooperation with Russia - The degree to which one finds maintaining and developing cooperation ties with civil society in Russia necessary.

Support for maintaining family ties with Russia - The degree to which one finds maintaining and developing family ties with Russia necessary.

Support for cooperation with Russia (overall) - The combined level of support for necessity to maintain and develop economic, civic, political, cultural and family ties with Russia.

Data Analysis

In writing this paper we have used a wide variety of methods, ranging from descriptive analysis (frequency analysis, intergroup comparisons, and comparisons of different SCORE indicators as well as tracking national trends with score), to advanced analyses as ANCOVA analysis (intergroup analysis method with the main goal of determining whether two groups are significantly different from each other while controlling for gender and age), and regression analysis.

We have applied a weighted least squares regression and polynomial specification of some of the regressors to account for the heteroskedasticity of the model's errors and non-linearity of the relationships respectively. The model was implemented to determine the exact nature of the relationship between our dependent variable (Support for EU membership) and our independent variables. While estimating this model we've controlled for age, gender, respondent's oblast of residence, education, and income.

The results of the model are presented in Table 3, where standardized beta coefficients stand for the marginal effect that the independent variable has on the dependent one at the sample mean holding all other factors constant. Yellow coefficients indicate that for every unit of increase in the independent variable, the dependent variable decreases by the

beta coefficient. Blue coefficients indicate that for every unit of increase in the independent variable, the dependent variable increases by the beta coefficient. For example, if the beta coefficient of the variable G were -0.1, that would entail that for every 1-unit increase of G, the dependent variable would drop by 0.1 points; if the coefficient on G were 0.1, that would entail 0.1-point growth of dependent variable for every 1-unit increase in G. The values of all the other variables should remain constant.

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Additional Figures and Tables

Figures 8-12. Demographic characteristics of three groups based on their support for EU and/or non-aligned status (N=8,023; 2021)











Table 6. Trends in foreign policy preferences by oblasts in 2016-2021

	2021				2018				2016			
	EU	NATO	Non-aligned status	EEU	EU	NATO	Non-aligned status	EEU	EU	NATO	Non-aligned status	EEU
Ternopil oblast	8.7	8.2	2.8	0.8	7.6	7.0	2.7	0.4	9.1	8.6	3.1	0.6
Lviv oblast	8.4	8.1	2.8	0.7	7.7	7.2	4.7	1.0	8.0	7.3	4.2	1.0
Ivano-Frankivsk oblast	8.3	7.9	2.4	1.0	5.5	5.1	3.8	2.2	8.7	7.7	3.7	0.3
Chernivtsi oblast	7.7	7.5	3.2	1.7	5.5	4.1	6.6	1.9	6.2	3.6	5.6	1.2
Rivne oblast	7.2	6.8	4.9	1.1	7.4	5.8	4.0	2.5	7.7	6.9	4.6	1.4
Volyn oblast	6.8	6.4	4.2	0.8	8.8	8.3	3.4	0.6	8.1	7.9	3.9	1.5
Vinnytsia oblast	6.8	6.4	4.6	1.4	6.2	5.3	5.7	2.3	7.2	6.3	3.7	1.6
Khmelnytskyi oblast	6.8	6.6	4.5	2.0	6.9	4.9	5.1	2.1	6.7	5.6	5.3	2.0
Kyiv oblast	6.6	6.6	4.1	2.3	6.8	6.1	5.3	2.4	7.7	6.2	4.2	1.5
Kyiv City	6.5	6.4	4.6	2.1	5.5	5.0	5.8	2.8	6.5	5.4	4.9	2.7
Zakarpattia oblast	6.4	5.4	3.5	1.4	5.1	3.7	6.3	1.8	8.1	6.2	1.8	1.3
Zhytomyr oblast	6.2	6.1	4.7	1.7	4.5	4.2	5.7	2.6	6.4	5.1	3.8	2.0
Cherkasy oblast	6.0	5.9	6.6	1.8	6.4	6.2	4.6	1.3	6.7	6.0	4.8	2.0
Kirovograd oblast	6.0	5.5	4.9	2.2	5.6	5.0	3.9	4.1	7.0	6.0	3.5	2.4
Chernihiv oblast	5.9	5.5	5.7	2.4	5.7	4.7	5.3	2.9	5.6	4.9	5.4	2.2
Poltava	5.8	5.7	4.7	2.8	4.9	4.5	4.7	2.4	5.4	4.2	6.4	2.3

oblast												
Sumy oblast	5.5	4.7	5.6	2.8	6.3	6.2	4.9	1.5	6.7	5.7	3.2	2.4
Zaporizhzhia oblast	5.4	4.2	5.4	3.4	5.1	4.3	6.4	2.9	5.0	4.2	6.8	2.6
Kherson oblast	5.3	4.5	5.8	3.0	5.2	4.1	7.1	2.9	5.1	2.8	7.0	2.7
Dnipropetrovsk oblast	5.0	4.4	5.4	3.4	5.4	4.5	6.0	2.9	5.3	4.1	5.5	2.7
Mykolaiv oblast	4.9	3.9	5.9	3.3	5.0	3.8	6.8	3.8	4.8	4.0	6.7	3.3
Kharkiv oblast	4.0	2.7	6.5	3.5	5.1	3.4	6.1	2.6	4.9	3.5	5.8	3.5
Odesa oblast	3.9	2.9	5.6	3.9	4.5	3.3	6.4	3.8	4.7	3.4	6.4	2.3
Donetsk oblast	3.6	2.5	6.1	4.2	3.9	2.2	6.2	4.1	5.0	3.3	5.6	3.2
Luhansk oblast	3.5	2.6	6.2	4.8	4.8	3.6	6.4	4.0	5.5	4.2	4.7	3.0

Table 7. Change in scores for foreign policy preferences by oblasts in 2016-2021

	2018 to 2021				2016 to 2018			
	EU	NATO	Non-aligned status	EEU	EU	NATO	Non-aligned status	EEU
Ternopil oblast	1.1	1.2	0.2	0.4	-1.5	-1.6	-0.4	-0.3
Lviv oblast	0.8	0.9	-1.8	-0.3	-0.3	-0.1	0.5	0.0
Ivano-Frankivsk oblast	2.8	2.8	-1.4	-1.1	-3.3	-2.6	0.1	1.9
Chernivtsi oblast	2.3	3.3	-3.4	-0.1	-0.8	0.5	1.0	0.7
Rivne oblast	-0.1	1.0	0.9	-1.5	-0.3	-1.1	-0.6	1.1

Volyn oblast	-2.0	-1.9	0.9	0.2	0.8	0.4	-0.5	-0.8
Vinnytsia oblast	0.6	1.1	-1.1	-1.0	-1.1	-1.0	2.0	0.8
Khmelnytskyi oblast	-0.1	1.7	-0.6	0.0	0.2	-0.7	-0.2	0.1
Kyiv oblast	-0.2	0.6	-1.2	-0.1	-0.9	-0.2	1.1	0.8
Kyiv City	1.0	1.4	-1.2	-0.8	-1.0	-0.4	0.9	0.1
Zakarpattia oblast	1.3	1.7	-2.8	-0.3	-3.0	-2.5	4.5	0.5
Zhytomyr oblast	1.7	1.9	-1.0	-0.9	-1.8	-0.9	1.9	0.6
Cherkasy oblast	-0.4	-0.3	2.0	0.6	-0.3	0.2	-0.2	-0.7
Kirovograd oblast	0.4	0.5	1.0	-1.9	-1.5	-1.0	0.4	1.8
Chernihiv oblast	0.1	0.7	0.4	-0.5	0.1	-0.2	-0.1	0.7
Poltava oblast	0.9	1.1	0.0	0.4	-0.6	0.4	-1.7	0.1
Sumy oblast	-0.8	-1.5	0.7	1.3	-0.4	0.5	1.7	-0.9
Zaporizhzhia oblast	0.3	-0.1	-1.0	0.5	0.1	0.1	-0.4	0.3
Kherson oblast	0.1	0.4	-1.3	0.2	0.1	1.3	0.1	0.2
Dnipropetrovsk oblast	-0.4	-0.2	-0.6	0.5	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.2
Mykolaiv oblast	-0.2	0.1	-1.0	-0.6	0.2	-0.2	0.1	0.5
Kharkiv oblast	-1.1	-0.7	0.4	0.9	0.2	-0.1	0.4	-0.8
Odesa oblast	-0.6	-0.3	-0.8	0.1	-0.2	-0.2	0.1	1.5

Donetsk oblast	-0.3	0.2	-0.1	0.1	-1.1	-1.1	0.6	1.0
Luhansk oblast	-1.4	-1.0	-0.2	0.9	-0.7	-0.6	1.7	1.0

Maps 9-20. TV consumption by oblasts (N=12,482; 2021)



MEDIA CONSUMPTION FOR NEWS: TRK UKRAINA

SCORE
UKRAINE / 2021



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SCORE
UKRAINE / 2021



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SCORE
UKRAINE / 2021



MEDIA CONSUMPTION FOR NEWS: INTER

SCORE
UKRAINE / 2021



MEDIA CONSUMPTION FOR NEWS: NOVY KANAL

SCORE
UKRAINE / 2021



MEDIA CONSUMPTION FOR ENTERTAINMENT: 1+1

SCORE
UKRAINE / 2021



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

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

MEDIA CONSUMPTION FOR ENTERTAINMENT: TRK UKRAINA

SCORE
UKRAINE / 2021



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SCORE
UKRAINE / 2021



MEDIA CONSUMPTION FOR ENTERTAINMENT: INTER

SCORE
UKRAINE / 2021



Glossary

Term	Description
Accountability of authorities	The degree to which one feels that authorities' representatives are and can be held accountable.
Active citizenship orientation / tendency	The degree to which one is willing to change things in their community and society, using political and social means of action.
Belief in human rights	The degree to which one recognizes human and civil rights are essential for Ukrainian society.
Civic optimism	The degree to which one believes that the present generation is in a better position than the past and that the future generation will be in a better position compared to the current one.
Confidence in EU stability	The degree to which one believes that the EU is thriving and growing stronger.
Critical thinking	The ability to critically engage with information by corroborating, questioning and identifying potential biases.
Economic security	The degree to which one has a stable source of income, capacity to provide for nutritional needs, and can rely on social welfare payments if they needed them.
Education level	The level of one's education based on the highest level of education completed from primary / unfinished secondary education to postgraduate degree or higher.
Endorsement of military operations	The degree to which one thinks that the emphasis should be placed exclusively on military operations addressing the conflict in eastern Ukraine instead of dialogue and negotiations.
Entrepreneurship mentality	The extent to which one possess a set of skills necessary for entrepreneurship such as risks taking, motivation, success orientation, innovative thinking, and financial literacy.

Environmental security	The degree to which one is satisfied with the quality of air and overall environmental health in their locality.
Gender equality mindset	The extent to which respondents acknowledge that men and women share equal responsibilities, rights, and capabilities to contribute to society and do not support traditional gender stereotypes.
Gender stereotypes	The degree to which someone supports traditional roles and responsibilities assigned to women and men such as believing that men should not cry, and women are too emotional to think rationally.
Health security	The level of access to and affordability of both basic and specialized medical services.
Human security (overall)	A composite indicator made up of economic, environmental, health, personal and political security indicators.
Income level	The level of household income based on one's purchasing power, where 0 means it does not have enough money for food, and 10 means it has enough for expensive items.
Leadership skills	The ability to understand the strengths of group members and motivate them to work together towards achieving a common goal.
Media consumption: Daily news on TV	The degree to which one keeps up with current affairs primarily from daily news on TV.
Media consumption: Political shows online or on TV	The degree to which one keeps up with current affairs primarily from political shows online or on TV.
Online media consumption	The degree to which one uses online media sources of information such as social media to keep up with current affairs.

Perceived EU benefit	The degree to which one believes EU membership brings benefits to all countries who join and will benefit different sectors in Ukraine (e.g. manufacturing, farming, education, services).
Personal security	The degree to which one feels safe from violence in daily life and that the police can protect them.
Pluralistic Ukrainian identity	The degree to which one believes that everyone despite their ethnic and cultural background who lives in Ukraine are an integral part of Ukrainian society.
Political security	The degree to which one feels comfortable expressing their political views both collectively and individually without fearing consequences.
Pride in local community bonds	The degree to which one feels proud of community bonds in their locality.
Pride in local safety	The degree to which one feels proud that their locality is safe and secure.
Pro-Russia orientation	The degree to which one supports Eurasian Economic Union with Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, and believes that Ukrainians and Russians are one people, and that Ukraine cannot thrive without Russia.
Provision of infrastructure	The degree to which one is satisfied with the provision of utilities (e.g., water, electricity), quality of road network and public transportation services in their locality.
Provision of public services	The degree to which a person is satisfied with the provision of public services, such as education, healthcare, and social welfare payments.
Quality of roads	The degree to which one is satisfied with the quality of roads in their locality.

Scepticism about reforms	The degree to which one feels sceptical about the reform process and believes that they will only benefit the elite.
Sense of civic duty	The degree to which one feels responsible for the future and well-being of their society and country.
Social tolerance (Overall)	The combined level of social tolerance towards different minority and marginalized groups (e.g., immigrants, Roma) in terms of personal interaction and/or acceptance in the community.
Soviet nostalgia	The degree to which one regrets the collapse of the Soviet Union and believes that life was better before 1991.
Support for civil society cooperation with Russia	The degree to which one finds maintaining and developing cooperation ties with civil society in Russia necessary.
Support for cooperation with Russia (overall)	The combined level of support for necessity to maintain and develop economic, civic, political, cultural, and family ties with Russia.
Support for cultural cooperation with Russia	The degree to which one finds maintaining and developing cultural cooperation with Russia necessary.
Support for decentralization reform	The degree to which one believes that decentralization reform will increase accountability of authorities, lead to positive changes in society and can be implemented effectively under current conditions.
Support for economic cooperation with Russia	The degree to which one finds maintaining and developing economic cooperation with Russia necessary.
Support for EEU membership	The level of support for Ukraine to become a member of the Eurasian Economic Union with Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.

Support for EU membership	The level of support for Ukraine to become a member of the EU.
Support for European values	The degree to which one believes that European values enrich their society and culture.
Support for health reform	The degree to which one believes that health reform will increase the quality of medical services, gradually improve healthcare in Ukraine and can be implemented effectively under current conditions.
Support for land reform	The degree to which one believes that land reform will improve the quality of life in their country, will have a positive impact on landowners in their locality, and can be implemented.
Support for maintaining family ties with Russia	The degree to which one finds maintaining and developing family ties with Russia necessary.
Support for NATO membership	The level of support for Ukraine to become a member of NATO.
Support for non-aligned status	The degree to which one thinks that Ukraine should be strictly non-aligned and not join either pro-Western or pro-Russian entities.
Support for political cooperation with Russia	The degree to which one finds maintaining and developing political cooperation with Russia necessary.
Support for reforms Overall	A composite indicator that combines support for decentralization, health, and land reform.
Tolerance to corruption	The degree to which one feels that corruption is part of daily life and cannot be avoided.
Traditional media consumption	The degree to which one uses traditional media sources of information such as radio, TV and newspapers to keep up with current affairs.

Trust in central institutions (overall)	The combined level of trust in national institutions such as the President, Parliament, Cabinet of Ministers, and courts.
Trust in local institutions (overall)	The combined level of trust in local administrations and village or town heads.
Ukrainian authorities care	The degree to which one feels that Ukrainian authorities represent their concerns and views, equally care about all parts of Ukraine and are ready to listen.