

SHARP WAVE 3

Resilience during the Full-Scale War

Data from 2022, 2023 & 2024

June 2024

Wave 3 Analysis Findings





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- Methodology and sampling
- Social cohesion
- Governance & trust
- Provision of services & necessities
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Methodology

Wave 3 4,981 January-March 2024

Wave 2 4,995 June-August 2023

Wave 1 4,327 September-November 2022

Nationwide random sample, representative of gender and age in government-controlled areas

CATI, random digit dialing (mobile)

Margin of error at national level ± 1.4%

10 oblasts with booster samples Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

Funded by PFRU, implemented in partnership with SeeD, USAID DG East, TCA and the UNDP

Collected by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS)





2022

2023


2024

Sample





Current type of Settlement




Income groups

^{*}The data are weighted by age, gender, and oblast to ensure that it proportionally reflects the demographic structure of Ukrainian population according to available data of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine on the distribution of the population of each oblast by gender and age as of January 1, 2022.



Social cohesion



Elements of social cohesion

Identification **Orientation for common good Action for common good**

Social cohesion is consistent across the country.



Elements of social cohesion

6.2/10

Social cohesion aggregate 2024

6.3/10


2023

6.6 20

2022

Social cohesion has not experienced major changes since 2023 except for the downward trend in *Confidence in institutions*. However, this drop is not as drastic as it was between 2022 and 2023.

Identification remains the strongest domain, followed by *Orientation for common good*.





Trust in institutions




Trust in the Army, the State Emergency Service, and non-governmental organisations remains consistently high.

Over 9 in 10 respondents trust the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the State Emergency Services.

Although stable, *Trust in the police* is moderate.

Trust in these institutions did not experience a decrease over the years that we observe for central and local institutions.

Institutions with highest trust





The President is trusted by 63% of respondents. Despite the 15% decrease since 2023, this remains the most trusted central institution.


Trust in all other central institutions is very low. The lowest levels of trust are felt towards Courts and the Verkhovna Rada who are trusted by just 23% and 28% of respondents, respectively.

Trust in all central institutions declined compared to 2022. The biggest decrease is observed towards the Cabinet of Ministers, followed by the Verkhovna Rada.

There are no oblast-level differences in Trust in central institutions.

Trust in central institutions







Trust in local institutions is moderate. Just over half of respondents trust local institutions.


The decline which was observed between 2022 - 2023 has stabilised between 2023 - 2024.


Rural respondents trust local institutions more than urban respondents, despite lower service provision in rural areas.

In Mykolaiv and Donetsk oblasts, *Trust in the oblast administration* in particular is significantly higher than the national average.

Trust in local institutions


5.1Trust in local institutions







Drivers of trust in institutions



and of services on Trust remains constant over time.




Impact of service provision

Trust in central institutions
R Square = 0.425

std. beta

For most services, the biggest increase in trust occurs when service ratings improve from "not very efficient" to "somewhat efficient", i.e., from a mean score of 5 out of 10, to 7.5 out of 10. Thus, investments in improving justice services are more likely to create positive impact on trust in institutions on the national level. Investments in administrative and utility services would need to be very surgical and targeted.



Trust in local institutions

R Square = 0.404




Provision of services and necessities



Provision of public services


6.3/10

Provision of public services



Respondents are least satisfied with higher education and justice.

Accessibility of administrative and health services for rural communities needs more attention.





Provision of infrastructure & access to information


How efficient is the provision of the following in your

■ Provided efficiently ■ Provided inefficiently ■ Not provided at all

locality...

The services providing access to information are rated quite highly. They remain stable over time.

The quality of infrastructure services is rated as moderate, and the quality of roads is deteriorating over time.







Basic necessities

Availability of electricity, food and medicine is high nationally.

Although availability has increased slightly, the majority of respondents evaluate bomb shelters as absent or hard to come by particularly in frontline oblasts.

Availability of mental health and psychological support services remain an issue.









Basic necessities

Availability of cash, fuel, and waste disposal are highly rated.


Availability of cultural centres and leisure facilities, and childcare remain moderate.






























International assistance



There are certain gaps in the provision of assistance to persons with disabilities, with 27% reporting that they didn't receive international assistance despite needing it.



International assistance



received assistance disabilities

27% did not receive but

needed

37%
received
assistance Women
N=2,731

19%
did not
receive but
needed



International assistance

		No, didn't need	Yes, received	No, but needed
7	Trust in central institutions	4.1	4.0	3.4
	Trust in local institutions	5.2	5.3	4.6
	Authorities care	4.3	4.1	3.3
	Perceived local corruption	6.4	6.4	7.1
Provision of welfare payments		7.2	7.3	6.5
Provision of administrative services		7.1	7.0	6.4
	Provision of health care	7.0	6.9	6.4
	Availability of psychological counselling	4.6	4.4	3.9
	Availability of civic engagement mechanisms	6.5	6.3	5.7
255				

5.6


5.6

Community cooperation

Fair distribution of assistance is linked to confidence in institutions. This forms an entry point for managing distribution transparently, through local authorities or actors.

Respondents who needed aid but did not receive it also report lower provision of key services, and feel somewhat excluded from community and civic life.

highest score





IDP and host community relations



West

North

Centre

South-East





N=1,156

26%

SEA OF AZOV

Stayers


IDPs

N=326

N=300

16% IDPs

The feeling of tensions is slightly higher among IDPs.





ZAKARPATTIA OBLAST

NO DATA, AREAS CONTROLLED BY UKRAINE AS OF JANUARY 26, 2024

VOLYN OBLAST

18%

N=992

25%

Stayers

KHMELNYTSK' OBLAST

IDPs

N=128

21%

N=134

IDPs

N=466

13%

14%

Stayers

IDPs

N=86

NO DATA, AREAS OCCUPIED BY RUSSIA AS OF JANUARY 26, 2024

NO DATA, AREAS OCCUPIED BY RUSSIA BEFORE FEBRUARY 2022



Among those who feel there are tensions...

In your view, what are the sources of tension between IDP and host communities in your current settlement?

% "yes"

- **2024**
- 2023 Draft evasion by men
- **2022**

Access to essential items, jobs, and income


Political, cultural, language differences and stereotypes

Anti-social or criminal behavior

Accommodation and overcrowdedness

Stress on overstretched public services

Sources of tension between IDP & host community



The most frequently cited sources of tension are draft evasion, access to essentials, and political or cultural differences and stereotypes.

An increase in tensions due to draft evasion is observed between 2022 and 2024. This increase is more visible in young people.

Accommodation is perceived as a source of tension for almost half of the sample.

There has been a decrease in perceived tensions for low-income respondents.

IDPs are less likely to think anti-social behaviour is a source of tensions.




Sources of tension between IDP & host community

In the West and Centre, tensions due to draft evasion remain the most common perceived source of tension.

In western oblasts, political and cultural differences and stereotypes are more prevalent than elsewhere.

In the South-East, people are more concerned about access to essential items, jobs and sources of income.


There are no marked differences in sources of tension by macroregion over time.









Feel very attached to my village, town or city



Differences in sense of belonging






Attachment to their settlement and region is consistently lower for IDPs compared to returnees and stayers, and has been decreasing over time. Sense of belonging to the region is higher for IDPs whose home has been damaged.





Differences in availability of housing






Differences in household income

Mean scores for household income





The difference in income between IDPs and other groups has decreased in 2024.

2022 2023 2024




Differences in household income

% Unemployed



The difference in levels of unemployment between IDPs and other groups has decreased in 2024.





Civic participation





The most common forms of engagement are voting and charitable efforts.

Participation in the events of local authorities is the least common activity, with almost three quarters saying they have never taken part in such events.

Engagement is lower in respondents with lower income and education.

Civic engagement

3.5 /10

Only 74% of low-income


respondents

vote often or very often.

2024

3.5 2023






online



Civic resistance

There are no significant differences in *Civic* resistance over time.


8 in 10 respondents have donated in the last six months, and 60% have volunteered. Both are higher in younger respondents.





Civic mechanisms





4 in 10 respondents rate civil society initiatives, community centres and public consultation mechanisms as accessible, 4 in 10 say they are difficult to access or do not exist at all. 2 in 10 could not answer.

Given the relatively high DK responses, visibility and communication around these mechanisms can be improved.

Access to civic mechanisms is linked to income level, provision of services and necessities, and to trust in local authorities and lower perceptions of local corruption.





Sense of responsibility is high, with 73% feeling responsibility for the future of the country.

People are uncertain about their ability to contribute to politics meaningfully, with one third feeling ambiguous about their contribution to politics.


Agency is lower, and although most people believe that their vote counts, 36% think that ordinary people like them cannot change anything.

Civic duty is lower in older respondents, and in those with low education and income, pointing towards the disenfranchisement they may feel, particularly when considering their lower levels of trust in authorities.

Sense of civic duty







2023

What happens to Ukraine There is no point in voting in the future is not my problem. I let others worry about this kind of thing

in elections; my vote would not make a difference anyway

I believe politics is for politicians; it is not something I can understand and contribute

I believe that ordinary people like me cannot change anything in this community, even if they try



Conclusions

Social cohesion

• Remains strong despite declining trust in central institutions. *Identification* is the strongest domain, while *Orientation for common good* is relatively high, and *Action for common good* and *Confidence in institutions* are at moderate levels. The steep dip observed in Confidence in Institutions between 2022 and 2023, is not observed between 2023 and 2024.

Trust in institutions

- Local institutions receive stable and moderate levels of trust
- The **President** is **trusted** but this is declining, and other central institutions consistently experience low trust
- Trust relies on high levels of **accountability** among authorities and an absence of corruption, followed by service provision (particularly, justice, administrative services and utilities)

Services and necessities

- Service coverage is satisfactory, but gaps in access to bomb shelters and mental health and psychosocial support persist.
- Satisfaction with justice services, which is a driver of trust in central institutions, is low at 31%.
- Satisfaction with quality of road networks experienced a consistent and steep drop over the 3 waves from 56% in 2022 to 35% in 2024.



Conclusions

International assistance

- International **assistance** reaches more **IDP**s and respondents in **south-eastern** oblasts, although one in five of these groups report that they needed assistance but did not receive it, and there is an unmet need among persons with disabilities.
- Notably, those who report that they needed assistance but didn't receive it report more dissatisfaction and grievances towards public institutions and feel more excluded.

IDP and host relations

• **Economic indicators** of IDPs appear to be **improving**, though sense of **belonging** at the local level displays a **downward** trend. There are slight increases in feelings of tension reported by IDPs in the North and South-East.

Civic participation

- Civic engagement is stable, citizens continue to donate and volunteer frequently but participation in local decision making is low.
- While civic responsibility remains high, respondents have low agency and confidence in their ability to make a change, and parts of the population have fewer platforms enabling them to do so.

Overall demographics

Older, rural, and low-income residents report disparities in all dimensions, as do residents of Donetsk, Kherson, Kharkiv,
 Zaporizhzhia and Mykolaiv oblasts



Key social cohesion take aways

1. Good governance pathway:

- Services entry point: Administrative, justice and utility services are the strongest drivers of trust in institutions. Analysis shows prioritising localities with scores below 6 and aiming to bring them to a score of 7-7.5 would maximise impact creation. Justice services should be a top nation-wide priority as it is among the lowest across all oblasts, with a mean score of 5.4 out of 10. For administrative and utility services, all oblasts score higher than 6 out of 10, thus interventions should be surgical, tailored to specific hromadas that may be lagging behind.
- Aid distribution entry point: Fair distribution of assistance is linked to perceived level of corruption, sense of care and trust particularly towards local authorities. As such, managing aid distribution effectively and fairly via inclusive and consultative mechanisms through local authorities is, in itself, a social cohesion intervention that would foster confidence in institutions.

2. Civic participation pathway:

Devising mechanisms for meaningful civic participation in local decision making would pay dividends for social cohesion by
a. reinforcing confidence in institutions as a direct driver of trust in local institutions via improving accountability and sense of
care; and b. enriching civic engagement and community cooperation beyond charitable and volunteer-based action. These could
include structured and accessible mechanisms for community visioning, emergency response planning, recovery roadmapping
and participatory budgeting for memorialisation or for returnee integration.
















SHARP WAVE 3 Resilience during War

Data from 2022, 2023 & 2024

Thank you

