

SCORE-inspired Holistic Assessment of Resilience of Population (SHARP)

Wave 2 Findings

December 6, 2023



CONTENTS

- Methodology
- State of social cohesion
- Trust in institutions and public figures
- Service delivery & availability to basic necessities
- IDP-Host community relations
- Civic engagement and civic resistance
- Main conclusions for PFRU



METHODOLOGY

Sampling Method: CATI, Random Digit Dialing (through mobile phones) with quota restriction (oblast sample sizes in proportion to the number of adult population as of 2021).

Wave 1: 4,327 respondents collected September-November 2022

Wave 2: 4,995 respondents collected June-August 2023

Margin of error on the national level: \sim +/-1.4%

11 Oblasts and cities of priority with booster samples: Kyiv city, Kyiv oblast, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts


Coverage: nationwide, government-controlled areas of Ukraine.


Polling company: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS).

^{*}Comparability between two waves is only possible on the national level findings.



METHODOLOGY






^{*}The data are weighted by age, gender, and oblast to ensure that it proportionally reflects the demographic structure of Ukrainian population according to available data of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine on the distribution of the population of each oblast by gender and age as of January 1, 2022.



METHODOLOGY

Some results in the following slides are presented in scores. A score is calculated for each indicator. The scores range from 0 to 10, where 0 means that the phenomenon the indicator is measuring is not observed in the context at all, and 10 means that it is observed very strongly and prevalently. 10 does not always mean good, and 0 does not always mean bad. This depends on whether the phenomena indicator is measuring is desirable or undesirable. 10 in personal security is very good, while 10 in aggression is very bad.

Personal security: the degree to which one feels safe from violence in daily life, that they can walk alone in the street at night and that the police can protect them.





ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL COHESION

Research Question #1: What is the **state of social cohesion** across Ukraine since the full-scale invasion by Russia for the selected elements of the concept? How has it changed?

Key finding #1:


- State of **social cohesion is high** across Ukraine, but it experienced some decline on the vertical relationships linked to the confidence in institutions domain of social cohesion.
- Other than Confidence in Institutions, all other elements of **social cohesion are relatively stable** since SHARP Wave 1 conducted in Autumn 2022. Confidence in Institutions experienced a marked decline.
- Identification domain of social cohesion that is about belonging to the country and pluralism are the strongest elements, followed by orientation for common good.



ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL COHESION

Wave 1 Autumn 2022, N = 4,327 Wave 2 Summer 2023 N = 4,995

■ 2023 **■** 2022






Research Question #2a: What is the level of trust in different state and non-state institutions? How has it changed?

Key finding #2a:

- Trust in most institutions faltered between wave 1 and wave 2 as the strong rally around the flag effect that was experienced during the early days of the war started to dissipate. However, trust in the Army, State Emergency Services and NGOs remain the same.
- Institutions responsible for national security and emergency response enjoy the highest level
 of trust. Nearly 10 out of 10 trust the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the State Emergency Services.
- Local institutions continue to be more trusted than the central ones and they experienced smaller decreases between the two waves.
- **Trust in courts is the lowest**, followed by the parliament and the prosecutor's office. This highlights the need to focus on building confidence in the justice and legislative system.



Wave 1 Autumn 2022, N = 4,327 Wave 2 Summer 2023 N = 4,995





Correlation between trust in different institutions: Trust is diffused and highly correlated.

Trust in:	The President		The Cabinet of Ministers	Courts	The Prosecutor General`s Office	Police	Oblast state/military admin.	Town/village admin.	Head of village/ town/ military civic admin.
The President	0.00	0.39	0.47	0.21	0.33	0.21	0.28	0.16	0.16
The Parliament of Ukraine	0.39	0.00	0.76	0.48	0.50	0.38	0.40	0.30	0.26
The Cabinet of Ministers	0.47	0.76	0.00	0.48	0.52	0.40	0.42	0.32	0.29
Courts	0.21	0.48	0.48	0.00	0.57	0.46	0.36	0.32	0.29
The Prosecutor General`s Office	0.33	0.50	0.52	0.57	0.00	0.51	0.44	0.34	0.30
Police	0.21	0.38	0.40	0.46	0.51	0.00	0.43	0.36	0.31
Oblast state/military admin.	0.28	0.40	0.42	0.36	0.44	0.43	0.00	0.54	0.48
Town/ village admin.	0.16	0.30	0.32	0.32	0.34	0.36	0.54	0.00	0.76
Head of village/ town/ military civic admin.	0.16	0.26	0.29	0.29	0.30	0.31	0.48	0.76	0.00




Wave 1 Autumn 2022, N = 4,327 Wave 2 Summer 2023 N = 4,995

There are no meaningful oblast or demographic group differences observed when it comes to trust in central institutions. The national average for Trust in Central Institutions dropped markedly since 2022.

SHARP 2022

TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS





Wave 1 Autumn 2022, N = 4,327 Wave 2 Summer 2023 N = 4,995

Kharkiv oblast stands out with high level of trust in local authorities.


Zaporizhzhia oblast reports the lowest level of trust in local institutions.

In Mykolaiv Oblast, trust in oblast administration is significantly higher than other local authorities measured. Such differences are not as stark in other PFRU-priority oblasts. The national average for Trust in Local

Institutions dropped notably since 2022.

SHARP 2022 6.3

TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS





Research Question #2b: What are the linkages between trust in institutions and other indicators, including service delivery and media?

Key finding #2b:

- The **strongest correlates** of Trust in Institutions include Perceived Level of Local **Corruption**, Authorities **Care** and **Accountability** of Authorities.
- There are also medium correlations between Trust in Traditional Media and Trust in Central Institutions, but
 Online Media is not meaningfully correlated with the level of trust in institutions.
- Only services that have meaningful correlations with Trust in Institutions are Provision of Justice Services and Provision of Administrative Services. Other services such as roads, schooling, healthcare, utilities, welfare have relatively weaker correlations.
- Indicators that are not correlated or correlated weakly with Trust in Institutions include the following: usage
 of services, availability and access to basic needs and necessities, civic duty, media consumption
 preferences, and exposure to adversities among others.



The strongest correlates of Trust in Institutions across all indicators measured by SHARP:

	Perceived <u>Local</u> Corruption	Authorities Care	Accountability of Authorities	Provision of justice services	Provision of administrative services
Trust in the President	-0.15	0.45	0.40	0.14	0.11
Trust in Parliament of Ukraine	-0.30	0.48	0.47	0.24	0.19
Trust in the Cabinet of Ministers	-0.31	0.52	0.49	0.24	0.21
Trust in courts	-0.33	0.35	0.39	0.37	0.19
Trust in police	-0.29	0.37	0.31	0.31	0.24
Trust in Prosecutor General`s Office	-0.33	0.41	0.42	0.30	0.20
Trust in oblast state/military administration	-0.36	0.42	0.35	0.22	0.23
Trust in town or village administration	-0.46	0.39	0.30	0.22	0.31
Trust in head of the town/village	-0.44	0.37	0.29	0.18	0.27
Trust in Ukrainian Armed Forces	-0.06	0.19	0.12	0.06	0.09
Trust in non-governmental organisations	-0.16	0.24	0.17	0.14	0.16
Trust in State Emergency Service of Ukraine	-0.14	0.25	0.19	0.13	0.16

Trust in town or village administration and Trust in head of the town/village are also linked to increased availability of civic engagement mechanisms



Confidence in political institutions and figures

Correlations between the Trust in Institutions and Trust in Media:

	Trust in daily news on TV	Trust in news on radio	Trust in newspapers	Trust in news websites	Trust in social media
Trust in the President	0.41	0.28	0.27	0.18	0.13
Trust in the Cabinet of Ministers	0.37	0.29	0.29	0.19	0.14
Trust in Parliament of Ukraine	0.31	0.25	0.26	0.17	0.13
Trust in Prosecutor General`s Office	0.27	0.24	0.24	0.15	0.10
Trust in oblast state/military administration	0.26	0.23	0.23	0.16	0.10
Trust in police	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.19	0.10
Trust in town or village administration	0.21	0.20	0.23	0.12	0.09
Trust in courts	0.22	0.17	0.17	0.13	0.09
Trust in NGOs	0.21	0.16	0.19	0.16	0.15
Trust in State Emergency Service	0.21	0.19	0.19	0.14	0.10
Trust in head of the town/village	0.18	0.16	0.20	0.11	0.08
Trust in Ukrainian Armed Forces	0.17	0.15	0.14	0.14	0.13



PROVISION OF SERVICES & BASIC NECESSITIES

Research Question #3: What is the state of service delivery and access to basic necessities across Ukraine? Has satisfaction with services changed?

Key finding #3:


- Overall evaluation of **service delivery is moderate to high** across the country despite the severe consequences of the full-scale invasion.
- Respondents are least satisfied with road networks, followed by justice services, and their satisfaction has decreased compared to Wave 1. Satisfaction with other services generally remained stable, except for a decline in satisfaction with Administrative Services.
- Road networks, justice services and administrative services can be identified as the top three
 investments that should be prioritized.
- Additionally, bomb shelters and mental health and psychological services are the two main necessities that are hard to come by.
- Overall, there are no significant differences between wave 1 and wave 2 when it comes to evaluations of the availability of basic necessities.
- Still, targeted, localized investments are essential to ensure services and basic necessities reach rural communities effectively, as the data shows their availability is lower in rural areas.



Wave 2 N = 4995 Wave 1 N = 4327

experienced in your locality?

PROVISION OF SERVICES & BASIC NECESSITIES






Wave 2 N = 4,995Wave 1 N = 4,327

Administrative Services need improvement particularly in Donetsk and Kherson oblasts.

SHARP 2022 7

PROVISION OF SERVICES & BASIC NECESSITIES






Wave 2 N = 4,995Wave 1 N = 4,327

PROVISION OF SERVICES & BASIC NECESSITIES







DISPLACEMENT & TENSIONS

Research Question #4: What are the sources of tension between the host communities and the displaced? Has the sources of tension changed?

Key finding #4:

- The **feeling of tensions** between IDPs and host communities **is not high on the national level** (only 14% of all respondents say they feel tensions) but is higher in the western oblasts.
- Approximately 2 in 10 IDPs across Ukraine state that they have experienced or witnessed tensions
 with host communities. In PFRU-priority oblasts, tensions are slightly higher in Zaporizhzhia and
 Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.
- Overall, there are no major changes in the proportion of respondents reporting tensions between IDP and host communities between wave 1 and wave 2.
- Those who feel tensions list draft evasion and anti-social or criminal behaviour, followed by political, cultural or linguistic stereotypes and access to jobs and essential items as the main sources of such tensions. Accommodation and service-related tensions are reported slightly less frequently.
- Compared to the previous wave, there is a slight increase in the mentions of draft evasion, while less people list accommodation and over-crowdedness as a source of tension.




Wave 1 Autumn 2022, N = 4,327 Wave 2 Summer 2023 N = 4,995

The national average score for <u>Feelings</u> of Tensions Between IDPs and Host Communities has not changed since 2022 (wave 1). Although the national average is not very high, tensions are substantially higher in the western oblasts.

SHARP 2022 2.4

Feelings of tensions are different than experience of tensions. Former asks about if the respondent thinks there are tensions, while the latter asks about whether the respondent experienced or witnessed any tensions themselves.

DISPLACEMENT & TENSIONS






Wave 1 Autumn 2022, N = 4,327 Wave 2 Summer 2023 N = 4,995

DISPLACEMENT & TENSIONS

According to those who feel tensions in their locality, the sources of tensions are*:



^{*}Question 21 "In your view, what are the sources of tensions between the internally displaced and the host community in your current settle ment?" was only administered to respondents who somewhat or strongly agree that there is a feeling of tensions in their locality. **N** = 703, 14% of the total



CIVIC ENGAGEMENT & RESISTANCE

Research Question #5: How do people engage in civic life and in resistance? Has this changed since 2022?


Key finding #5:

- The most common forms of Civic Engagement are voting in elections and charitable efforts followed by neighbourhood work and signing petitions. Over 7 out of 10 people engage in such activities across Ukraine.
- When it comes to participation in decision making and interactions with local authorities, civic engagement is noticeably lower. Nearly 8 in 10 people never participate in events organized by local authorities.
- Civic engagement has not experienced any marked change since Wave 1, indicating relative stability without noticeable decline or improvement over the past year.
- Still, **lower income and lower education groups continue to engage less**, thus it is important to ensure that they do not feel marginalised from civic life.
- Civic resistance has not experienced a large change since Wave 1. The most popular form of civic resistance remains to be donating, followed by helping the people in need and the Ukrainian army.



CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

Wave 1 Autumn 2022, N = 4,327 Wave 2 Summer 2023, N = 4,995



If/where the sum of percentages are not adding up to a perfect 100%, this is due to rounding up decimals or not showing DK responses =< 1%.




Wave 2 N = 4,995Wave 1 N = 4,327

The national average score for Civic Engagement has not changed since 2022. Although a score of 10 is neither attainable nor desirable for this indicator, and an average score of 3.5 is respectable, there is room for improvement especially when it comes to engagement in local decision making. Donetsk oblast scores lower than the rest of the country.

SHARP 2022

CIVIC ENGAGEMENT







CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

N = 4,995

Civic engagement tends to be somewhat higher among individuals with higher income and education levels.








CIVIC RESISTANCE

Wave 1 Autumn 2022, N = 4,327 Wave 2 Summer 2023 N = 4,995



Q18. Which of the following actions did you take or are you already taking during the last six months?



CONCLUSIONS

- To maintain and nurture social cohesion, the focus should be on cultivating confidence in institutions, as other elements of cohesion are mostly strong and have not experienced a decrease between Wave 1 and Wave 2.
- Looking at the correlates of trust in institutions, as well as the regression analysis, cultivating confidence in institutions is
 first and foremost about ensuring accountability, transparency and participatory decision making, and then, about effective
 service delivery, especially justice and administrative services.
- Local initiatives that tap into citizens' strong sense of agency and involve them meaningfully in local decision-making, could bolster social cohesion by building confidence in institutions..
- Investments that wish to prioritize service delivery for cultivating confidence in institutions should focus on Provision of Justice Services and Provision of Administrative Services in the first place, as these are more strongly correlated.
- It is important to study SHARP findings on the oblast level also via the oblast profiles to inform targeted programming in the respective oblasts.