



SCORE Ukraine 2021 Trends Report

An investigation of socio-political, civic and economic trends between 2016 and 2021 based on the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index

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Acknowledgements

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The views, conclusions and recommendations presented in this document do not necessarily reflect the position of USAID, UNDP or their partners.

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Abbreviations

ATO/JFO	Anti-terrorist Operation / Joint Forces Operation
ASC	Administrative Service Centre (a.k.a. TSNaP)
DG East	USAID's Democratic Governance East Activity
EU	European Union
EEU	Eurasian Economic Union
HEI	High Educational Institutions (universities, institutes)
IDP	Internally displaced person
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
GCA	Government-controlled areas of Ukraine
GoU	Government of Ukraine
MEL	Monitoring, evaluation and learning
MSME	Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises
NGCA	Non-government-controlled areas of Ukraine
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
RASA	Greater Resilience in Azov Sea Region
SCORE	Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index
SeeD	Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SPC	US-Ukraine Strategic Partnership Commission
TCA	Transformation Communications Activity
UCBI	Ukraine Confidence Building Initiative
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UN RPP	United Nations Recovery and Peacebuilding Programme
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
USAID	The United States Agency for International Development
USAID/OTI	USAID Office of Transition Initiatives

About SCORE Ukraine

The Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE) Ukraine 2021 is a joint initiative funded by USAID, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the European Union, implemented by the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD). The SCORE initiative aims to assist national and international stakeholders in their peacebuilding efforts. It provides a solid evidence base for developing policies and programs that strengthen national unity and social cohesion, as well as for monitoring the progress of their implementation. SCORE is an analytical tool implemented on an annual basis and designed to improve the understanding of societal dynamics in Ukraine. For more details on the data collection strategy, see the Methodology [here](#).

About Partners

The Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development works with international development organisations, governments and civil society leaders to design and implement evidence-based, people-centred strategies for the development of peaceful, inclusive and sustainable societies. Working in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia, SeeD provides policy advice for social transformation that is based on citizen engagement strategies and empirical understanding of the behaviour of individuals, groups and communities. SeeD's approach focuses on understanding the root causes of social problems by developing and empirically testing a science-based theory of change.

USAID is the world's premier international development agency directly involved in numerous development projects. USAID has partnered with Ukraine since 1992, providing more than \$3 billion in assistance. USAID's current strategic priorities include strengthening democracy and good governance, promoting economic development and energy security, improving healthcare systems, and mitigating the effects of the conflict in the east.

USAID's Democratic Governance East (DG East) is a five-year activity to improve trust and confidence between citizens and government in eastern Ukraine, building opportunities for the region to lead Ukraine's democratic transformation. DG East aims to strengthen the connection and trust between citizens and their government in eastern Ukraine by promoting good governance and inclusive civic identity, increasing interaction between citizens and civil society, and increasing collaboration between government and citizens and citizen participation in community development and local decision-making.

USAID's Transformation Communications Activity (TCA) is a five-year activity of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which aims to strengthen Ukrainian democracy through comprehensive research, innovative communication initiatives, and the creation of socially meaningful content.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supports strategic capacity development initiatives to promote inclusive growth and sustainable human development. Through partnerships with national, regional, and local governments, civil society, and the private sector, UNDP strives to support Ukraine in its efforts to eliminate poverty, develop people's capacity, achieve equitable results, sustain the environment, and advance democratic governance. UNDP, through its flagship UN Recovery and Peacebuilding Programme (UN RPP), is helping to restore critically important social and economic infrastructure and effective work of local governments in eastern Ukraine, create jobs and spur entrepreneurship among IDPs and host communities, and promote peace and reconciliation.

Executive Summary

Key Findings & Recommendations on Governance & Services

Confidence in institutions is generally low across the country at a score of 2.4 out of 10¹. Trust in central institutions, the feeling that authorities care equally about and are ready to listen to different opinions from all parts of Ukraine, are low, and have decreased in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts since 2019. Although scoring above central institutions, confidence in local institutions is not high either, at 4.4 out of 10². Still, trust in local institutions has increased since 2018 at the national level, while in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts trust towards newly elected heads of cities or towns is higher or at the same level compared to 2019.

Satisfaction with public services is mediocre at 5.8 out of 10 at the national level, with some western oblasts faring slightly above the national average and some eastern and southern slightly below³. Justice services are considered inefficient across the country at 4.7 out of 10, while the provision of administrative services and welfare payments are perceived as the most efficient, at 6.8 and 6.6 respectively. Interventions aimed at improving rule of law and justice services should prioritise Cherkasy, Odesa and Poltava oblasts, while welfare payments lag behind the national average in Kirovohrad and Zakarpattia oblasts.

Scepticism towards reforms stood at 6.5 out of 10 in 2021, experiencing an increase since 2018. Support for reforms is locked in a vicious cycle with trust in institutions and feeling that authorities care. Combined support for decentralisation, land and health reforms is low (3.7 out of 10), with land reform being the least and decentralisation reform the most supported (3.2 and 4.3, respectively). Support for reforms dropped compared to previous years, and is lower in Kharkiv, Odesa, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and along the 'contact line'.

Interventions should focus on building visibility of anticorruption measures and reforms and on strengthening good governance via transparency, access to information and constructive dialogue between citizens and local authorities to improve confidence in the reforms process and in decision makers. Transparency and dialogue should be coupled with improved service delivery, with a particular focus on justice and law enforcement to increase a sense of security and safety, in order to nurture the social contract between citizens and the state.

Notably, service provision is closely linked to human security and these should be interpreted in tandem, particularly given the burden of the COVID-19 pandemic on service delivery and the impact of the latter on citizens' confidence in institutions. Be it infrastructure, justice or health and social services, their delivery should be well targeted and tailored to ensure that these are accessible to disadvantaged communities, older and more rural demographics, as well as to those with specific needs, such as women and people with disabilities. In addition to digitalisation and reduction of red tape, accessibility of all governance services can be improved via expanding mobile service units such as mobile health centres for groups who are not internet savvy to buttress the success that digital services⁴ and ASCs (and newly established Diia.Centres) have had thus far.

Key Findings & Recommendations on Human Security

Economic, health, environmental and personal security have moderate scores between 4.5 and 5.0 out of 10 at the national level, indicating that respondents are midway between feeling completely insecure and unprotected, and feeling absolutely safe and secure. Compared to the national averages, human security scores are lower along the 'contact line' in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

Political security scores are comparatively higher than other human security dimensions at 6.5, but have yet to reach a level corresponding to complete freedom of expression for all groups without

¹This is the weighted national average score for the combined level of trust in national institutions such as the President, Parliament, Cabinet of Ministers and courts.

²This is the weighted national average score for the combined level of trust in local administrations and village or town heads.

³This is the weighted national average score for the combined level satisfaction with the provision of education, healthcare and social welfare payments.

⁴The online public services are available via the Diia Portal: <https://guide.diia.gov.ua>

fear of negative repercussions. Political security is also the only human security dimension that shows a clear upward trend, particularly between 2017 and 2019 in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

Economic and health security experienced a downturn at the national level since 2018, predated but also exacerbated by COVID-19. There is an urgent need to design tailored interventions across the country, but certain oblasts are identified as vulnerable high priority locations, in dire need of recovery programmes to reverse the steep downward trends.

Interventions should focus principally on the oblasts that demonstrated the lowest economic security⁵ scores across the country in 2021: Luhansk 'contact line' (3.3), Kirovohrad (3.3) and Zakarpattia (3.8), as well as those with the lowest health security⁶ scores: Kirovohrad (2.8), Luhansk 'contact line' (3.0) and Donetsk 'contact line' (3.4). Kirovohrad Oblast emerges as a high priority area, scoring among the lowest in provision of healthcare and infrastructure services as well. Further, interventions should particularly focus on citizens above the age of 60, who are likely to have reduced mobility and income due to their pensioner status, and on those who live in small towns and villages, who find it harder to access specialised medical care and other public services and welfare benefits.

Public service delivery in general, specifically infrastructure and administrative services, appear to be the principal entry points for fostering human security in general, and economic security in particular. Although administrative services score relatively high at the national level (6.8), locations that score lower than the national average, such as the 'contact line' of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (5.6 and 4.9 respectively), Zakarpattia (5.9), Kirovohrad (6.1), Poltava (6.1), Sumy (6.1) and Odesa (6.3) oblasts should be prioritised.

Investments that improve administrative services, including their bureaucratic streamlining and digitalisation, and those that can improve accessibility and affordability of these services, including public transport, could go a long way in cultivating economic and health security, especially because these insecurities are often linked to older age groups, deteriorating health and mobility conditions. Providing mobile administrative and health services, and expanding the scope of existing TsNAPs could also go a long way to improve human security, by making these services more immediately accessible to citizens. Increasing health security also calls for clear communication around the reform and improved access to healthcare, especially coupled with anti-corruption measures in the healthcare sector. Public transport investments, mobile service units or home visits, and mainstreaming bookings and appointments would also help improve access for remote, older and rural patients. Interventions that support local entrepreneurs, participatory budgeting efforts, energy subsidies to deprived households and welfare benefits for childcare and unemployment, would further assist post-COVID economic recovery in the country.

Key Findings & Recommendations on Civic Behaviour & Intergroup Harmony

Ukrainian society has become more progressive, tolerant and inclusive towards minority groups, and citizens are more active and engaged, especially when it comes to local level community cooperation. Further, support for gender equality and for the equal role of women in society has increased. Still, tolerance towards drug addicts, LGBTQI+, and Roma remains low and there is an increase in passive citizenship orientation at the national level. In addition to social tolerance and community cooperation, one of the most notable improvements, particularly in some central and western oblasts, is observed for the pluralistic Ukrainian identity indicator⁷, except for the negative trends in Kherson and Kyiv oblasts.

⁵A score of 0 indicates absolute economic insecurity – meaning that people do not believe that they have a stable source income or meet the nutritional needs of their family members, nor can they rely on social payments when in need. A score of 10 signifies very high economic security, where people believe they can have and do all those things easily and adequately.

⁶A score of 0 in 2021 indicates absolute health insecurity – meaning that people have no access to basic and emergency services, or to specialised medical services in their locality, and that buying medicine is always a problem for them. A score of 10 signifies very high health security, where people can access basic and specialised services, and can purchase the medicines they need easily and adequately.

⁷The degree to which one believes that everyone living in Ukraine, despite their ethnic or cultural background, is an integral part of Ukrainian society.

However, regional and political cleavages continue to persist, between people from the East and the West of the country, and between people who support EU membership and those who support closer cooperation with Russia, respectively. Notably, certain downward trends are observed in Donetsk Oblast, such as a lack of improvement in pluralistic identity, a drop in local pride and increasing levels of perceived social threat from different socio-political groups (specifically, people living in NGCA, IDPs, people from western Ukraine, ATO/JFO personnel, people who support closer ties with Russia, people who support the EU, and Ukrainian nationalists).

Sense of belonging to the country, region and settlement is high, hovering around a score of 7 to 8 out of 10. Pride and agency are a trinity linked to services, locality satisfaction and migration. In other words, a decrease in pride in locality is linked to decreased locality satisfaction and public service provision, and to increased migration tendency. Interventions to build pride in localities and increase locality satisfaction could strengthen certain services (e.g., infrastructure, utilities, green spaces) as an immediate entry-point, and are also expected to reduce migration tendency.

Interventions should also focus on building tolerance, with particular focus on Donetsk Oblast, and strategies to combat perceived threat from specific socio-political groups, including cultivating a belief in dialogue and communicating the dividends of dialogue, which can mitigate the perceived social threat from different socio-political groups. Beyond socio-political groups, initiatives aimed at increasing spontaneous and organic interactions with marginalised groups (festivals, socio-cultural activities, multi-cultural youth events), with a focus on LGBTQI and Roma would help foster horizontal cohesion and harmony.

Key Findings & Recommendations on Geopolitical Aspirations, Reintegration and Reconciliation

The majority of Ukrainians see the NGCA's future as an integral part of Ukraine with the same legal status as other oblasts of Ukraine (supported by 79% of respondents). Moreover, becoming part of Russia (9%), maintaining the status quo (11%) or becoming independent countries (11%) are not acceptable options for the future of NGCA for the majority of Ukrainians at national level.

Support for EU membership is the first choice among Ukrainians, and people in western Ukraine are notably more positive about the benefits and stability of the EU. Support for EU and NATO membership are low in eastern Ukraine and have decreased in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts compared to 2019. At the national level, people do not prefer joining the EEU or political cooperation with Russia, while in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, respondents prefer joining the EEU or having non-aligned status to EU membership.

Broadcasting to improve access to Ukrainian media sources in the detached communities is the most supported confidence building measure (CBE) as a reintegration effort for the NGCA and Crimea, while support for simplified admission to HEIs of students from the NGCA and Crimea as an integration effort is moderate. Although residents of Donetsk and Luhansk GCA express much stronger support for the integration of students compared to the rest of the country, they support admission of students from NGCA more than they do students from Crimea.

Overall, decreases in readiness for dialogue demonstrate a need for reconciliation and CBEs. The strong support for broadcasting reintegration efforts (7.3 for NGCA and 6.9 for Crimea) demonstrates the citizens' belief in the role and value of media in reconciliation⁸, while the moderate support for educational reintegration efforts (5.2 for NGCA and 4.9 for Crimea) indicate the need to emphasise the benefits and modalities of educational CBEs measures to the wider public. It is critical to broaden the options and mechanisms for CBEs and not to reduce them to media and information campaigns.

⁸Results show that of respondents in the NGCA, just 33% have full access to Ukrainian TV channels, 18% to Ukrainian radio and 6% to Ukrainian print media, 14% watch the Dom channel, and 45% report full access to Ukrainian internet sites.

Introduction

The SCORE Ukraine 2021 Trends Report

The SCORE Ukraine 2021 Trends Report is a key product of SCORE Ukraine 2021, investigating the principal national, regional (e.g. eastern, southern, central, western) and oblast level socio-political, civic and economic trends between 2016 and 2021. Although the report does not investigate how these trends disaggregate at the group level, it investigates the influences on these trends, making it possible to draw evidence-based interpretations for reinforcing or replicating the positive trends and weakening or reversing the negative ones. More details on the SCORE methodology and sampling approaches from different years and data streams are provided below.

We truly hope that this research will:

- Illustrate citizens' perspectives on governance, services and the institutions that represent them, how these have changed since 2016, and the reciprocal relationships between perceptions of governance and services.
- Broaden the understanding of human security in Ukraine and how this has shifted from 2016 to 2021, lending focus to the influence of the armed conflict, and to variations between regional and demographic subgroups
- Complement previous work to identify tendencies in civic attitudes and the course these have taken over time, in the context of the political, social and economic changes that have occurred in Ukraine especially considering the local, regional and global determinants as elaborated further below from 2016 to 2021
- Support and inform public discourse on potential options for reintegration and reconciliation efforts, taking into consideration any changes in citizens' preferences over time
- Provide high-level conclusions and recommendations based on the interpretation of the trends to be investigated further with advanced analyses in the in-depth thematic reports mentioned in the conclusions of this document.

To this end, the report is divided into four chapters, each of which identifies national trends, followed by oblast level and regional (i.e. eastern) trends over the years. Chapter 1 on governance and services focuses on changes in key indicators such as trust in institutions, support for reforms and satisfaction with service provision. Chapter 2 on human security investigates the five main dimensions of economic, environmental, health, personal and political security. Chapter 3 examines tendencies in civic behaviour and intergroup harmony, and Chapter 4 looks at citizens' geopolitical aspirations and preferences for reintegration and reconciliation. The findings are outlined at the end of the report, alongside the relevant recommendations.

The 2021 Trends report is uniquely placed to provide a picture that pre-dates the COVID-19 pandemic, which has fundamentally reshaped the way policy-makers, practitioners, researchers and citizens perceive and relate to the world. The pandemic has reconfigured the operational environment of almost all areas and industries, from triggering ubiquitous economic and public health crises to boosting digitalisation efforts, while deepening societal inequalities, all of which become evident in the results of this report.

SCORE Efforts in Ukraine

Effective, efficient and strategic use of limited resources, be them material or immaterial, to influence change towards sustainable development and sustaining peace agendas calls for a robust understanding of socio-economic and political trends on local, regional and national levels. This would help design appropriately targeted and cost-effective interventions, and accurately monitor and evaluate efforts.

While the research on socio-economic and political dynamics in Ukraine is undeniably abundant, new challenges regarding disinformation, misinformation, and scepticism towards scientific evidence obstruct the identification of the most appropriate and accurate evidence, making it difficult for peace and development architects to consolidate and translate data into meaningful and

actionable policies and programs. As such, the SCORE Index responds to the evidence needs and concerns of national and international peacebuilding and development actors who are uncertain about prioritising and assessing the efficacy of their investments. It offers a scientific, contextual and systematic way for designing and testing theories of change before sponsoring and endorsing new policies and programs.

Since 2015, SeeD has implemented several waves of SCORE in Ukraine in partnership with UNDP and USAID, assessing, understanding and tracking socio-economic, political, psychosocial and civic attitudes and dynamics. These have been conducted on multiple levels, from nation-wide to regionally focused studies, complemented by city level and adolescent studies. Each SCORE wave has been conducted in close collaboration and consultation with a range of international and national stakeholders, including but not limited to USAID, UNDP, UNICEF, the EU, the Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories, and the Ministry of Education and Science.

Notably, the methodology and SCORE findings have been integrated into national and regional policy documents, such as the adoption of SCORE indicators into the State Strategy for Regional Development for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts 2021-2030 MEL framework. SCORE is also cited as a key evidence source for the Government of Ukraine – United Nations Partnership Framework 2018-2022 and for the national SDG monitoring framework. Over the years, SCORE has become an essential and independent evidence source and convenor of peace and development actors in Ukraine, providing a common research framework and indicator vocabulary, facilitating collaboration, bridging inter-agency coordination and multiplier effects, while reducing duplication of efforts.

SCORE Methodology in Ukraine

The SCORE methodology was first implemented in Cyprus in 2009 in partnership with UNDP and with USAID funding. In Ukraine, the SCORE approach has been evolving since 2015 to respond to different societal challenges and the evidence needs of key national and international stakeholders. This evolution has occurred on multiple, interlinked levels: conceptually on research questions and frameworks (e.g., scope of the SCORE study and its dimensions), methodologically on measurement metrics (e.g., indicators and scales used in the questionnaire), empirically on sampling approaches (e.g., sample sizes, locations and demographic boosters) and analytically in terms of statistical approaches used (e.g., different types of predictive modelling).

SCORE favours contextuality, policy and programmatic relevance over comparability across countries and within countries over time. While certain indicators may be altered to become more appropriate to current realities, SCORE continuously strives to maintain comparability and consistency in its indicators, enabling stakeholders to track and monitor trends over time.

Society is not static, social cohesion is not a state of being but a state of becoming, and reconciliation and resilience are not activities or skills but learning processes. Thus, SCORE research is committed to its own evolution and adaptation with each new wave, while remaining committed to providing evidence to contribute to positive social change, through evidence-based policy and program design, towards greater social cohesion and sustainable development. To that end, each SCORE data collection wave since 2016 has grown in its partnership, scope and sampling, affecting the comparability of certain indicators across years and sampled regions. This report combines previous SCORE waves to investigate trends over time across locations to the extent that is possible and meaningful without sacrificing the integrity of the data.

SCORE Ukraine 2016 was implemented by SeeD in partnership with the USAID/OTI supported program Ukraine Confidence Building Initiative (UCBI) to address the issues underpinning community tensions and cohesion. The data was collected in the summer of 2016. The general population results used in this trends report are based on a nation-wide sample of over 7,700 respondents, equivalent to over 300 face-to-face household interviews per oblast plus Kyiv city, as well as additional sampling of 1,600 Internally Displaced People, excluded from the present analysis.

SCORE Eastern Ukraine 2017 was implemented in partnership with SeeD, UNDP, UNICEF and IOM. The data was collected in the autumn of 2017. The general population results used in this trends

report are based on 5,429 face-to-face interviews with residents of the five oblasts in the east of Ukraine (1,441 in Luhansk and 2,156 in Donetsk oblasts, 612 in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, 613 in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and 606 in Kharkiv Oblast). The study also included an expert scoring component of 72 face-to-face in-depth interviews with local experts from each of the raions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, as well as 3,300 children aged 13-17 from 48 educational facilities in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (GCA), not used in the present report.

SCORE Ukraine 2018 was implemented by SeeD in partnership with the USAID/OTI supported program UCBI. The data was collected in January 2018. The general population results used in this trends report are based on 9,018 face-to-face household interviews in 24 oblasts and Kyiv city. 6,102 respondents from SCORE Ukraine 2016 also participated in SCORE Ukraine 2018 as part of a panel sample, enabling more robust and causal analysis.

SCORE Eastern Ukraine 2018 was implemented in partnership with SeeD, UNDP, UNICEF and IOM. The data was collected in January 2018. It was based on a survey of 5,344 face-to-face interviews with residents of the five oblasts in the east of Ukraine (1,407 in Luhansk and 2,127 in Donetsk oblasts, with additional 600 interviews in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, 610 in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and 600 in Kharkiv Oblast). It also included a booster sample for the 'contact line' in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, comprised of an additional 700 interviews with respondents in these locations.

SCORE Eastern Ukraine 2019 is funded by USAID and implemented by SeeD in partnership with the UN Recovery and Peacebuilding Programme. The data was collected in October-November 2019. The general population results used in this trends report are based on 3,325 face-to-face interviews from GCA of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Booster samples included 1,810 respondents along the contact line as well as urban boosters totalling 3,000 respondents from 15 selected cities (Bakhmut, Berdiansk, Druzhkivka, Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk, Lysychansk, Mariupol, Mariinka, Melitopol, Pokrovsk, Popasna, Sievierodonetsk, Sloviansk, Stanytsia Luhanska, Starobilsk). Further, although not referred to in the present report, the study included face-to-face interviews with 300 ATO veterans and face-to-face interviews with 619 respondents from the NGCA.

SCORE Ukraine 2021 is a joint initiative funded by USAID, UNDP and the EU, implemented by SeeD. The data was collected from January to May 2021, comprising the biggest SCORE sample in Ukraine yet. The general population results used in this trends report are based on a nationally representative sample of 7,280 face-to-face interviews from 22 oblasts plus Kyiv city, 4,325 interviews from Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (GCA), including the 'contact line', and 3,600 interviews from 18 urban centres (15 cities as in 2019 and three additional cities of Odesa, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia). Although not referred to in the present report, 2021 data collection also included face-to-face interviews with 500 ATO/JFO veterans and ex-combatants in 5 oblasts, 500 youth and children in 5 oblasts, 300 persons with disabilities from 3 oblasts, a further 1,500 respondents in the Azov and Black Sea Areas, as well as 638 CATI interviews from the NGCA.

SCORE in 2022 will focus on eastern Ukraine and the next national SCORE study will be implemented in 2023.

Research & Methodological Limitations

Neither this report nor SCORE seek to address the origins of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine nor to assign political responsibility. The authors recognise the complex local, historical and international dimensions that are far beyond the scope of the SCORE indicators. Findings should consistently be interpreted in light of the contextual realities that govern the views and perceptions of citizens surveyed in this study, as these guide citizens' choices, preferences and reactions, and mould their behaviours and relations, be it their voting patterns or investment choices.

The data presented in this report encompasses six different data streams collected across five years between 2016 and 2021 either at a full national or regional level in Ukraine⁹. The SCORE research team has maintained consistency in random representative sample design, in data collection methodologies and in the sub-contracted polling companies to the best of their abilities, given the

⁹These include SCORE Ukraine nation-wide 2016, 2018 and 2021, and SCORE Eastern Ukraine 2017, 2018 and 2019.

national statistics available and realities on the ground at the time of each respective round of data collection.

Nevertheless, the study authors and research team recognise the natural variation that may be introduced between different waves of survey data collection. Where relevant, the research team has used weighting to ensure that comparable samples accurately reflect reality regarding demographic distributions. For cases in which survey questionnaire items differ between waves of data collection, affecting comparability, the results presented herein are annotated appropriately.

Finally, the present analysis also utilises a longitudinal panel sample of participants who responded to the survey at three distinct time points (i.e., same participants responding to the survey each of the three times). The panel sample used in this report is limited to the residents of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The research team acknowledges that a small demographic bias is introduced into this panel sample (e.g., more likely to be retired or work from/at home) due to different attrition rates of different demographic groups, and this panel sample is weighted appropriately where relevant (annotated in results where applicable).

For more details on the SCORE methodology in Ukraine, see the following section or visit <https://app.scoreforpeace.org/>.

Local, Regional and Global Determinants Since 2018

This section presents an overview of the global, regional and national social and political events that the authors view as most impactful on the perceptions of citizens surveyed in the most recent waves of SCORE in Ukraine. The information in this summary was collated from several secondary data sources, including situational and thematic reports by international organisations, online and print articles from local and international news sources, government websites and international databases. The focus is on two major determinants of public perceptions in Ukraine, the COVID-19 pandemic and the conflict, due to their potential to have influenced several periods of data collection and based on their relevance in secondary data sources.

The COVID-19 pandemic that erupted in the news in January 2020 and led to strict lockdown measures globally by the spring of the same year has divided perceptions and realities into pre-COVID and post-COVID lenses. Although 2021 began with a race to vaccinate that instilled hope in many, vaccine rollout is uneven, vaccine uptake has been low, and new viral variants remain a threat.

Despite a decline in the number of cases globally in the summer of 2021, these started rising steeply again by September 2021 and as of late October 2021 there were over 243 million confirmed cases of COVID-19, including nearly 5 million deaths, reported to the WHO.¹⁰ The pandemic has triggered a multitude of new challenges and exacerbated many existing ones¹¹, including multi-layered human insecurities from food to economic insecurity¹², a significant deterioration in mental wellbeing¹³, a disconcerting increase in domestic violence¹⁴, and a rise in anti-vaccination movements beyond COVID-19 vaccines¹⁵.

¹⁰World Health Organization. 2021b. "WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard." 2021. <https://covid19.who.int/>.

¹¹See World Health Organization. 2020. "Impact of COVID-19 on People's Livelihoods, Their Health and Our Food Systems: Joint Statement by ILO, FAO, IFAD and WHO." October 13, 2020. <https://www.who.int/news/item/13-10-2020-impact-of-covid-19-on-people's-livelihoods-their-health-and-our-food-systems>.

¹²United Nations Sustainable Development Group. 2020. "Policy Brief: The Impact of COVID-19 on Food Security and Nutrition." <https://unsdg.un.org/resources/policy-brief-impact-covid-19-food-security-and-nutrition>
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¹³United Nations. 2021. "COVID-19 and Mental Health and Wellbeing." 2021. <https://www.un.org/en/coronavirus/mental-health-and-wellbeing>.

¹⁴UN Women. 2021. "The Shadow Pandemic: Violence against Women during COVID-19." 2021. <https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/in-focus-gender-equality-in-covid-19-response/violence-against-women-during-covid-19>.

¹⁵Pullan S., and Dey M.. 2021. "Vaccine Hesitancy and Anti-Vaccination in the Time of COVID-19: A Google Trends Analysis." Vaccine 39 (14). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2021.03.019>.

As the world moves towards the third year of life with COVID-19, there is increasing acceptance that this is not a fleeting incident but a long-term epoch. The socio-economic assessment of COVID-19's impact on businesses and households in Ukraine, led by UNDP in collaboration with UN Women and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, found that 84% of households have lost income and 43% have at least one family member who has lost a job¹⁶. This realisation calls for substantial and holistic reconfiguration of socio-economic strategies and reinvigorated commitments to global human rights, peace and security, and sustainable development agendas.

In Ukraine, from 3rd January 2020 to 26th October 2021, there were 2,784,039 confirmed cases and 64,202 direct deaths¹⁷ due to COVID-19, with excess mortality estimates exceeding 81,000 in April 2021¹⁸. On 23 October 2021 the Ukrainian Ministry of Health announced that 6.96 million Ukrainians had been fully vaccinated since the launch of the vaccination program on 24th February¹⁹, and the proportion of fully vaccinated people in Ukraine increased from 16% at the end of October 2021²⁰ to 32% in the first week of January 2022²¹. The proportion of people vaccinated in Ukraine continues to be lower than the European average (62%), and previous research found that over 60% of survey respondents who had not been vaccinated in August 2021 said they would not get a vaccine²². Further, certain regions (Donetsk, Kirovohrad, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Rivne, Ternopil and Zakarpattia oblasts) reported much higher intentions to receive the vaccines than actual vaccination rates suggest²³. Meanwhile, research has attributed a 17% increase in Ukrainians' personal stress to the pandemic alone²⁴, and over half of respondents in a recent survey said they are financially worse off since the first COVID-19 outbreak in Ukraine, ranking COVID-19 as the fourth biggest threat to their way of life behind Russian military aggression, and economic and political uncertainty respectively²⁵.

Beyond the pandemic, several influential events merit specific attention based on their potential to affect the interpretation of the trends presented in this report. These include the Kerch Strait incident in November 2018 and the recent build-up of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border since the spring of 2021 that potentially influenced public perceptions and insecurities locally (i.e. Mariupol and Berdiansk cities) and regionally (i.e. Azov Sea region, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts)²⁶; presidential elections in the summer of 2019 and parliamentary elections during autumn of the same year, followed by local elections in 2020 and transformation of certain ministries that influenced citizens' assessment of trust and confidence in the authorities.

¹⁶UNDP. 2020a. "UN Study Documents Devastating Impact of COVID-19 in Ukraine." September 28, 2020. <https://www.undp.org/press-releases/un-study-documents-devastating-impact-covid-19-ukraine>.

¹⁷World Health Organization. 2021a. "Ukraine: WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard." 2021. <https://covid19.who.int/region/euro/country/ua>.

¹⁸Karlinsky A, and Kobak D.. "The World Mortality Dataset: Tracking excess mortality across countries during the COVID-19 pandemic." medRxiv: the preprint server for health sciences 2021.01.27.21250604. 4 Jun. 2021, doi:10.1101/2021.01.27.21250604. Preprint.

¹⁹Ministry of Health Ukraine. 2020. "COVID-19 Pandemic in Ukraine." <https://covid19.gov.ua/en/>.

²⁰Vilcu I., and Kateryna C. 2021. "Eastern European Vaccine Skeptics Embrace Shots as Cases Soar." Bloomberg, October 22, 2021. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-22/east-europe-vaccine-skeptics-finally-embrace-jabs-as-cases-soar>.

²¹Mathieu E, Ritchie H., Ortiz-Ospina E, Roser M., Hasell J., Appel C, Giattino C, and Rodés-Guirao L. 2021. "A Global Database of COVID-19 Vaccinations." *Nature Human Behaviour* 5 (7): 947–53. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01122-8>.

²²Reinhart, R.J. 2021. "Ukraine: Few Takers for Vaccine Ahead of Surge." GALLUP. October 26, 2021. <https://news.gallup.com/poll/356609/ukraine-few-takers-vaccine-ahead-surge.aspx>.

²³Dryga A., Rudenky V., Cheryba N., Dagli-Hustings I., 2021, "COVID-19 Vaccine Support and Hesitation in Ukraine", available at: <https://bit.ly/3J4pCq6>

²⁴Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). 2021a. "Stress Situations in the Lives of Ukrainians, 2020." <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=998&page=1&t=6>.

²⁵National Democratic Institute. 2021. "NDI Poll: Opportunities and Challenges Facing Ukraine's Democratic Transition." October 27, 2021. <https://www.ndi.org/publications/ndi-poll-opportunities-and-challenges-facing-ukraine-s-democratic-transition-2>.

²⁶IMPACT, and SeeD. 2021a. "Azov Sea Area Regional Recovery Review: Historic Trends and Recovery from Shocks." ——. 2021b. "Azov Sea Area Regional Recovery Review: Situation Overview and Profile of the ASA Region"; Amiel S. 2021. "Russia's Military Build-up near Ukraine Is Different This Time, Say Experts." Euronews, December 6, 2021. <https://www.euronews.com/2021/11/24/russia-s-military-build-up-near-ukraine-is-different-this-time-say-experts>;

Bertrand, Natasha, Jim Sciutto, and Katie Bo Lillis. 2021. "Russia Continues to Amass New Troops near Ukraine's Border despite Biden Urging Putin to de-Escalate Tensions." CNN, December 17, 2021. <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/12/17/politics/russia-troops-ukraine-border-biden/index.html>.

Following a tense end to 2018, 2019 saw a renewal of hopes and expectations stemming from the presidential and parliamentary elections, along with the launch and roll-out of multiple new national and international peace and development investments. In July 2019, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, a political newcomer, and his newly formed “Servant of the People” party won both the presidential and parliamentary elections based on three key promises: to restore peace, to combat corruption and to create an economic revival. This unprecedented electoral victory, in which President Zelenskyy won 73% of the vote, while his party won 43% of the vote and was able to form the first-ever single-party²⁷ majority, created a new window of opportunity for advancing both the national reform and peace agendas.

Since coming to power, the new President has repeatedly articulated his desire to “end the war” and advance peace through national unity, including the residents of the non-government-controlled areas (NGCA). In October 2019, he convened a National Unity Forum in eastern Ukraine, and in his 2020 New Year’s address to the nation, called for national unity based on dialogue and mutual respect between all Ukrainians. The subsequent re-establishment of a Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories (MRTOT), and the elevation of its Minister to the level of Deputy Prime Minister to strengthen the government’s coordination on this critical issue, has further underscored the Government’s commitment to the peace agenda²⁸.

In line with this, the Government of Ukraine (GoU) has developed several strategic policy documents that are guiding the response to the security and development issues in the eastern part of the country. These include the State Targeted Programme for Recovery (STP) in the Eastern Oblasts of Ukraine²⁹, the 2030 Economic Development Strategy for Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts³⁰ and a draft law on a Period of Transition³¹. These policies reinforce the GoU’s development priorities and commitment to assuring the security of every citizen and effectively protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

On the other hand, various of multi-donor initiatives in partnership with national stakeholders were launched and continued their efforts throughout 2019 and 2020, adapting to the new COVID realities to alleviate challenges and address the needs and contribute to social cohesion and development in Ukraine. Although direct change attribution is difficult to establish and beyond the scope of this report, these long-term and significant investments had the potential to impact citizens’ civic attitudes, human security, assessment of services and locality satisfaction. A non-exhaustive list of initiatives that are worth mentioning include:

- USAID funded programmes: Democratic Governance in the East programme improving trust and confidence between citizens and government in eastern Ukraine; Economic Resilience Activity supporting entrepreneurs and SMEs to mitigate the impacts of the conflict and reduce the region’s reliance on oligarch-backed big businesses and trade with Russia; Transforming Communications Activity providing innovative communications initiatives about democratic transformation and European integration; Ukraine National Identity Through Youth Activity mobilising youth leadership around a values-based Ukrainian identity grounded in innovation and pluralism;
- UNDP funded projects: Social Cohesion through Youth Participation promoting national unity dialogue and civic participation and engagement; Digital, Inclusive, Accessible supporting digitalisation of public services including administrative service reform; Human Rights for Ukraine supporting democratisation processes with a focus on justice and human rights especially for vulnerable groups; Sustainable Development via SymbioCity approach fostering multi-stakeholder partnerships for ecological and sustainable development;
- UNRPP investments: Economic Recovery and Restoration of Critical Infrastructure (e.g., supporting start-ups and MSMEs, generating employment, training, holding business expos, rehabilitation of infrastructure), Local Governance and Decentralisation Reform (e.g., launching 14 new Administrative Service Centres (TsNAP), rule of law and gender equality,

²⁷Minakov, M. 2019. “One-Party Majority: Just Another Victory for Zelenskyy.” Wilson Center. July 24, 2019. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/one-party-majority-just-another-victory-for-zelenskyy>.

²⁸OCHA. 2021a. “Ukraine Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021.”

²⁹<https://minre.gov.ua/project/derzhavna-cilova-programa-vidnovlennya-ta-rozbudovy-myru-v-shidnyh-regionah-ukrayiny>

³⁰<https://minre.gov.ua/project/strategiya-ekonomichnogo-rozvytku-doneckoyi-ta-luganskoyi-oblastey-do-2030-roku>

³¹<https://minre.gov.ua/project/derzhavna-polityka-perehidnogo-periodu>

- provision of legal and psychological assistance, advocacy on legal aid services, building capacity of community security working groups, and mine action);
- Multi-donor EU actions: U-LEAD Programme supporting decentralisation and improved administrative service delivery; EU4Business initiative and micro-finance assistance; European Investment Bank loan to finance improvements along the most important highway connections in Ukraine.

While the new elections and strategic policy documents along with the continued investments created fresh hope and a sense of renewal in 2019, in the face of longstanding and worsening political fissures, tensions and erupting or escalating scandals, implementing essential governance, decentralisation and health reforms, tackling deep rooted corruption while attempting to deliver on the promise of a peaceful settlement to the conflict in eastern Ukraine, and dealing with a global pandemic, undeniably caused a level of disenchantment. Two years after the electoral victory of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the “Servant of the People” party, the prospect of rapid progress towards a political settlement of the conflict in eastern Ukraine has all but faded away. Negotiations in the established international formats – the Normandy Quartet and Trilateral Contact Group – have come to a virtual standstill; COVID-19 restrictions deepened the divide by reducing crossings and, subsequently, intergroup contact across the check-points by over 90%³². Although the pandemic initially led to a reduction in hostilities and ceasefire violations on the ground, this did not last³³. Tensions further increased between the spring and winter of 2021 when the Russian Federation deployed an estimated 100,000 troops along Ukraine’s borders and in the Black Sea area during a series of military exercises³⁴.

Currently in its eighth year, the continuing conflict in eastern Ukraine and the prevailing absence of a political solution, exacerbated by the pandemic, have taken a heavy toll on the lives of millions of ordinary Ukrainians living on both sides of the 420 km-long-long ‘contact line’, 3.4 million of whom required humanitarian assistance and protection services in 2021³⁵. These realities persist against the backdrop of the continued annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation³⁶. As such, as the optimism of 2019 has dissolved, nurturing hope about the future direction of the country in the face of multi-layered adversities, anxieties and conflict has become increasingly difficult. Despite the challenges, as evidenced in this SCORE 2021 trends report, many positive signs of progress and capacities of resilience persist across Ukraine.

³²OCHA. 2021b. “Ukraine Situation Report.” <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ocha-ukraine-situation-report-22-october-2021-enruuk.1>

³³OCHA. 2021c. “Ukraine Humanitarian Context.” <https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/ukraine/card/58W3XR0zQQ/>.

³⁴Amiel S.. 2021. “Russia’s Military Build-up near Ukraine Is Different This Time, Say Experts.” Euronews, December 6, 2021. <https://www.euronews.com/2021/11/24/russia-s-military-build-up-near-ukraine-is-different-this-time-say-experts>

Bertrand, Natasha, Jim Sciutto, and Katie Bo Lillis. 2021. “Russia Continues to Amass New Troops near Ukraine’s Border despite Biden Urging Putin to de-Escalate Tensions.” CNN, December 17, 2021. <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/12/17/politics/russia-troops-ukraine-border-biden/index.html>

Conley, Heather A, Matthew P Funaiolo, Joseph S Jr Bermudez, and Cyrus Newlin. 2021. “Unpacking the Russian Troop Buildup along Ukraine’s Border.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. April 22, 2021. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-russian-troop-buildup-along-ukraines-border>.

³⁵OCHA. 2021b. “Ukraine Humanitarian Context.” <https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/ukraine/card/58W3XR0zQQ/>.

³⁶Mirolavel, M.. 2021. “What’s behind the Conflict between Russia and Ukraine?” Al Jazeera, December 16, 2021.

1. Governance & Services

The local, regional and global determinants mentioned above arguably had the most direct and complex influence on indicators that measure perceptions of governance institutions, reform policies and services. The outbreak of COVID-19 had a significant impact on the political context and vertical cohesion (i.e., citizen-institution relations). The way central and local institutions responded to the pandemic, adapted their strategies and service delivery, showed compassion and decisiveness, proved preparedness and competence, and how clearly and consistently they communicated with the public shaped and reconfigured perceptions and trust, possibly at an unprecedented rate. In Ukraine, the contrasting views of central and regional authorities on the pandemic and quarantine measures, and subsequent high-profile confrontations³⁷, are also expected to have influenced public perceptions.

The Trust Barometer 2021 reveals the impact of the pandemic and the pervasiveness of misinformation and mistrust among all societal institutions and leaders around the world. Yet, trust in government varied extensively between countries, and while the Trust Barometer registered a marked decline in trust in some countries and an improvement in others³⁸, the Eurobarometer did not report major changes in trust in government across the EU 27 between autumn 2019 and spring 2021, where average trust in national parliaments remained at around 34-35%³⁹. As such, trust in governance institutions and perceived accountability are not only highly contextual and volatile, but also very hard to pin down.

Trust in institutions in many contexts is linked to more than service provision and the performance of the institutions themselves, as is also evidenced in this chapter. The Trust Barometer Global Report asserts that income inequality affects trust more than economic growth, and higher inequality is linked to lesser trust in government⁴⁰. Trust is also closely linked to the personalities and political affiliations of the representatives leading those institutions as well as the media coverage and public relations of those institutions. Moreover, it is linked to critical thinking, civic engagement, perceptions of the shared values between institutions and citizens, and in some cases, high trust may even translate into uncritical civic compliance. In fact, the Trust Barometer presents two different trust realities between the informed public and the uninformed masses, with the latter expressing a more widespread mistrust in institutions, including government, media, NGOs and businesses, than the former⁴¹.

In Ukraine, the socio-economic effect of the pandemic itself, along with the decrease in mental wellbeing due to quarantine measures, combined with the escalation in tensions with Russia, prompted further increases in unemployment and poverty rates, and deepened inequalities. In the face of these adversities, feelings of disappointment and neglect prevail over the optimism and hope ushered in by the 2019 national election cycle. Beyond the local and global determinants, Russia's use of disinformation to polarise, demoralise and destabilise Ukraine, and the eroding influence that this has had on trust and other governance indicators cannot be underestimated⁴². Although the general audience does not accept the disinformation as the truth, flooding the public discourse with contradictory alternative truths undermines the credibility of information from all sources. For instance, a SCORE 2018 crossed-lagged model that revealed causal pathways using a longitudinal

³⁷Ozymok, I. 2021. "Ukraine's Local Authorities and the Covid-19 Pandemic." Atlantic Council UkraineAlert. April 1, 2021. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-local-authorities-and-the-covid-19-pandemic/>.

³⁸"Edelman Trust Barometer." 2021. 2021. <https://www.edelman.com/trust/2021-trust-barometer>.

³⁹European Commission. 2019. "Standard Eurobarometer 92 - Autumn 2019." December 2019. <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2255>.

———. 2021. "Standard Eurobarometer 95 - Spring 2021," September. <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2532>.

⁴⁰Edelman Trust Barometer." 2020. 2020. https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2020-01/2020%20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20Global%20Report_LIVE.pdf.

⁴¹Edelman Trust Barometer." 2020. 2020. https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2020-01/2020%20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20Global%20Report_LIVE.pdf.

⁴²Pomerantsev, Peter, and Michael Weiss. 2014. "The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money."

https://imrussia.org/media/pdf/Research/Michael_Weiss_and_Peter_Pomerantsev__The_Menace_of_Unreality.pdf

Haines, J. R. 2015. "Russia's Use of Disinformation in the Ukraine Conflict." Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 17, 2015. <https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/02/russias-use-of-disinformation-in-the-ukraine-conflict/>.

panel sample of over 6,000 respondents showed that trust in institutions is driven by service delivery and human security⁴³, but undermined by exposure to pro-Russian media⁴⁴.

Within Ukraine, misinformation was observed during the confrontations between central and regional authorities over COVID-19 measures, and during 2019 election campaigning⁴⁵, while a recent study identified that widespread disinformation surrounding COVID-19 poses a risk to Ukrainians' health⁴⁶. As scepticism, disenfranchisement and mistrust towards governance institutions become a global malady, misinformation is also commonly used by certain governments and public representatives to excuse incompetent, corrupt, or populist behaviour. As such, trust in institutions necessitates understanding in relation to other variables, such as accountability, corruption, service delivery, support for policies, followed by interpretation that considers the realities of human security and civic behaviours.

Trust & Accountability Indicators

Accountability of authorities: The degree to which one feels that authorities are and can be held accountable.

Trust in central institutions: The combined level of trust in national institutions such as the President, Parliament, Cabinet of Ministers and courts.

Trust in local institutions: The combined level of trust in local administrations and village or town heads.

Perceived level of corruption: Perceived level of corruption as measured by the frequency of informal payments in various sectors. It combines perception of *systemic corruption*, which is measured by the frequency of informal payments to Parliamentarians, Judges, and local authority workers as well as *petty corruption*, which is measured by the frequency of informal payments to doctors, teachers, police officers and local civil servants.

Ukrainian authorities care: The degree to which one feels that Ukrainian authorities represent their concerns and views, equally care about and are ready to listen people in all parts of Ukraine.

Service Provision Indicators

Provision of administrative services: The degree to which one is satisfied with administrative services in their locality (e.g., obtaining official documents).

Provision of basic schooling: The degree to which one is satisfied with provision of basic schooling in their locality.

Provision of healthcare: The degree to which one is satisfied with the health services in their locality.

Provision of infrastructure: The degree to which one is satisfied with the provision of utilities (e.g., water, electricity), quality of road networks and public transportation services in their locality.

Provision of justice services: The degree to which one is satisfied with the provision of justice services (e.g., courts) in their locality.

Provision of public services: The degree to which a person is satisfied with the provision of public services, such as education, healthcare and social welfare payments.

Provision of utilities: The degree to which one is satisfied with the provision of utility services (e.g., water, heating, electricity and waste disposal) in their locality.

⁴³This relationship is also observed in the panel sample in eastern Ukraine, see Regional Level Trends below.

⁴⁴SeeD. 2018. "Exposure to Pro-Russia Media: SCORE 2016-2018."

https://api.scoreforpeace.org/storage/pdfs/PRE_UKR18_ProRussiaMediaENG.pdf.

⁴⁵Jankowicz, N. 2019. "Ukraine's Election Is an All-Out Disinformation Battle." The Atlantic, April 17, 2019.

⁴⁶United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 2021. "'Infodemic' of COVID-19 Disinformation Bad for Ukrainians Health, Study for UN Finds," March 3, 2021. <https://ukraine.un.org/en/114528-infodemic-covid-19-disinformation-bad-ukrainians-health-study-un-finds>.

Provision of welfare payments: The degree to which one is satisfied with the welfare payments to those who are in need (e.g., disabled, unemployed, pensioners, scholarships).

Support for & Scepticism about Reforms Indicators

Scepticism about reforms: The degree to which one feels sceptical about the reform process and believes that they will only benefit the elite.

Support for reforms: A composite indicator that combines support for decentralisation, health, and land reform.

National Level Trends

The table below presents the scores for trust, accountability, service provision and reform indicators for three time points since 2016. Positive changes are marked in shades of blue, while negative changes are marked in shades of yellow. Non-significant changes (less than 0.5) are marked grey.

Table 1. National level change for governance & services

	National SCORE			Overall Change
	2016	2018	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Trust & accountability indicators	Sample: 7,737	Sample: 9,018	Sample: 12,482	
Accountability of authorities	N/A	N/A	2.7	N/A
Trust in the President	2.8	2.6	3.3	+0.5
Trust in the Cabinet of Ministers	2.2	2.2	2.1	-0.1 ^o
Trust in the Parliament	2.2	2.0	2.1	-0.1 ^o
Trust in courts	2.0	2.1	2.0	0.0
Trust in police	4.1	3.2	3.0	-1.1
Trust in the Ministry of Health	N/A	N/A	3.0	N/A
Trust in head of town/village	N/A	N/A	5.1	N/A
Trust in town/village administration ⁴⁷	3.5	4.1 ^{ooo}	4.6	+1.1 ^{oo}
Trust in oblast state administration	3.1	N/A	3.5	+0.4 ^o
Perceived level of corruption ⁴⁸	7.6	7.2	7.0	-0.6
Ukrainian authorities care	N/A	N/A	2.6	N/A
Service provision indicators	2016	2018	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Provision of administrative services	N/A	6.5	6.8	+0.3 ^o
Provision of basic schooling	6.0	6.7	6.6	+0.6
Provision of healthcare	4.3	5.6	5.6	+1.3
Provision of road networks	3.4	4.7	5.4	+2.0
Provision of public transport	5.5	6.1	6.5	+1.0
Provision of justice services	N/A	N/A	4.7	N/A
Provision of utilities	5.2	6.1	6.5	+1.3
Provision of welfare payments	N/A	6.4	6.6	+0.2 ^o
Support for & scepticism about reforms indicators	2016	2018	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Scepticism about reforms	N/A	6.8	6.5	-0.3 ^o
Support for decentralisation reform	N/A	5.0	4.3	-0.7
Support for health reform	N/A	N/A	3.7	N/A
Support for land reform	N/A	N/A	3.2	N/A

^oChanges smaller than 0.5 points should not be interpreted and could be considered within the margin of error due to small changes in sampling.

⁴⁷In 2018, the questionnaire item refers to local administrations in general, giving an example of "(mayor, council, etc.)" to the respondent. In 2016 and in 2021, the questionnaire item refers specifically to the town or village administration without combining it with the mayor or head of village/town.

⁴⁸Please note that this indicator is rescaled to ensure comparability across years. Thus, there may be differences between what is reported here and other publications.

∅∅ Scores are not meaningfully comparable across years, please read the clarifications in the footnotes.


∅∅∅ These indicators were worded slightly differently in these timepoints compared to 2021. Thus, the scores are not always fully comparable. Please read the clarifications in the footnotes for further details.

Trust & Accountability

As seen in the table above, accountability of authorities is low at 2.7, and a sense of neglect (the opposite of feeling that authorities care) is high. Citizens do not think that authorities are held accountable for their actions, nor that they care for their needs and concerns. Further, four main trends appear to emerge over time. The perceived level of corruption is high at 7.0. In line with the implementation of anti-corruption reforms, a noteworthy 0.6 point decrease in the perceived level of corruption is observed, a trend that is also corroborated by Ukraine's Corruption Perceptions Index which has increased by 4 points between 2016 and 2020 (3 points since 2019)⁴⁹. Still, the latest European Court of Auditors report states that grand corruption and state capture remain widespread in Ukraine despite the funds and efforts spent over the past decade⁵⁰.

Trust in local authorities is higher than other institutions as illustrated in the figure below. The most striking trend is the steep incline in trust in town or village administrations, which is encouraging for decentralisation reform but should be interpreted in line with the local elections in the autumn of 2020. There is also an increase in trust in the President, which is unsurprising given the elections that took place between 2018 and 2019, further evidenced in the regional trends below, where data exists for 2018, 2019 and 2021. While trust in courts, the Cabinet of Ministers and the Parliament remained low with no meaningful change across years, the most disconcerting trend is the steep decline in trust in the police since 2016, which is investigated further below.

Figure 1. National level change in trust indicators



∅∅ Scores are not meaningfully comparable across years, please read the clarifications in the footnotes.

While there is a notable decline in trust in the police between 2016 and 2018, the change between 2018 and 2021 is small. It can therefore be deduced that this trend reflects the implementation stages of the police reform that first started in 2015 with high hopes and expectations, but came to be perceived as the reform that went wrong. Many sources argue that the police reform failed to address greater systemic issues within the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the criminal justice system, plans about the patrol police have remained 'decorative', and 93% of those police officers

⁴⁹Transparency International. 2016. "Corruption Perceptions Index." 2016.


<https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2016/index/nzl>.

⁵⁰European Court of Auditors. 2021. "EU Support for Reforms in Ukraine Ineffective in Fighting Grand Corruption." Luxembourg. https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/INSR21_23/INSR_fight-against-grand-corruption-in-Ukraine_EN.pdf.

who were dismissed after the recertification process in 2016, which aimed to clean the system from corrupt and dishonest police officers were reinstated through the courts⁵¹.

At the oblast level, the highest scoring is Ternopil, with a meagre score of 4.2, while Chernihiv Oblast is the lowest, scoring even lower than the areas along the 'contact line' in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, at 2.0. The decreases over time indicate that trust in the police, which is not as susceptible to political and election volatility as trust in central authorities, is a big concern for all of Ukraine. Interventions working on transparency, accountability and anti-corruption within the police force are of utmost importance to instil confidence in justice services and the rule of law, and are ultimately expected to improve personal security.

Figure 2: Change in trust in police between 2018 and 2021.



⁰ Changes smaller than 0.5 points should not be interpreted and could be considered within the margin of error due to small changes in sampling.
 + White boxes show 2021 score. Donetsk & Luhansk data for 2018 comes from Eastern Ukraine data collection, N = 3,534, 'contact line' N = 701.


Service Provision

Satisfaction with service delivery improved between 2016 and 2018 at the national level, from infrastructure services such as roads, public transport and utilities to basic schooling and healthcare. Based on the regional trends observed in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (see following section), it is hypothesised that this steep improvement continued into 2019 and then dropped back to 2018 levels in 2021.

Satisfaction with the quality of road networks showed a persistent upward trend over the past five years, but remains at 5.4 out of 10, lower than other service indicators. Citizens are most satisfied with administrative services, with a score of 6.8, followed by basic schooling and welfare at 6.6 and public transport and utilities at 6.5 out of 10.


⁵¹"Police Violence and Impunity In Ukraine: What's Gone Wrong With Police Reform." 2020. Ukraine World. June 19, 2020. <https://ukraineworld.org/articles/ukraine-explained/police-violence-and-impunity-ukraine-whats-gone-wrong-police-reform>.

Figure 3. National level change in service provision indicators



These observations differ at oblast level, as the majority of services are delivered locally. In general, public service provision overall declines as one moves closer to the ‘contact line’ (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts score on average 5.7 out of 10, but close to the ‘contact line’ in Luhansk Oblast this decreases to 4.8 and in Donetsk Oblast to 5.3). Administrative services and basic schooling improve more visibly moving from East to West. Notably, Kirovohrad Oblast scores among the lowest when it comes to utilities (5.5 out of 10), healthcare (4.8), public transport (5.6), welfare (5.6) and administrative services (6.1), and Odesa Oblast scores among the lowest when it comes to basic schooling (6.0), road networks (4.6) as well as welfare (6.0) and healthcare (4.9).

Figure 4. Change in administrative services from 2018 to 2021.




◊ Changes smaller than 0.5 points should not be interpreted and could be considered within the margin of error due to small changes in sampling.
 + White boxes show 2021 score. Donetsk & Luhansk data for 2018 comes from Eastern Ukraine data collection, N = 3,534, ‘contact line’ N = 701.

Support for & Scepticism about Reforms

In 2013-2014 Ukrainians expressed their desire for lasting change and reform in the country's economy, politics, and society. Although many important policy and legal changes have been implemented, the reform agenda is far from complete. Ukraine has committed to prioritising reforms that strengthen its democratic institutions, bolster human rights, and deliver justice, and many of Ukraine's international partners from the U.S. and the EU have committed billions of dollars in development assistance to support the implementation of reform packages ranging from decentralisation, education and health reforms to privatisation, land and judicial reforms⁵².

Ukraine's reform journey has been difficult, and many experts voice deep concerns about Ukraine's reform trajectory, with certain reforms, such as judiciary and anti-corruption reform, at risk of stagnation⁵³. It is therefore critical to build national consensus and bottom-up support for the reform process and for the reforms' smooth implementation. At the national level, scepticism towards reforms remains high at a score of 6.5, despite a slight decrease since 2018. At oblast level, three stand out with steep upward curves, namely Chernivtsi, Kirovohrad and Zakarpattia. The figure below illustrates these changes between 2018 and 2021.

Figure 5: Change in scepticism about reforms from 2018 to 2021.



◊ Changes smaller than 0.5 points should not be interpreted and could be considered within the margin of error due to small changes in sampling.

+ White boxes show 2021 score. Donetsk & Luhansk data for 2018 comes from Eastern Ukraine data collection, N = 3,534, 'contact line' N = 701.

⁵² "Joint Statement on the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership." 2021. US Embassy in Ukraine. September 1, 2021. <https://ua.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-ukraine-strategic-partnership/>.

⁵³ Reanimation Package of Reforms. 2020. "Reforms in Ukraine Are Increasingly Stagnant," July 9, 2020. <https://rpr.org.ua/en/news/reforms-in-ukraine-are-increasingly-stagnant/>

Dickinson P. 2020. "Ukraine's Anti-Corruption Efforts Go up in Smoke." Atlantic Council. July 24, 2020. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-anti-corruption-efforts-go-up-in-smoke/>.

Regional Level Trends: Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts

The table below presents the scores for trust, accountability, service provision and reform indicators for four time points since 2017 for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

Table 2. Regional level change for governance & services

	Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts SCORE				Overall Change ^o
	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Trust & accountability indicators	Sample: 3,598	Sample: 3,534	Sample: 3,325	Sample: 3,490	
Accountability of authorities	N/A	N/A	2.8	2.6	-0.2 ^o
Trust in the President	1.8	1.6	5.7	2.7	+0.9
Trust in the Cabinet of Ministers	1.7	1.5	3.8	1.7	0.0
Trust in the Parliament	1.5	1.4	3.9	1.6	+0.1 ^o
Trust in courts	2.1	2.2	3.3	2.4	+0.3 ^o
Trust in police	3.4	3.2	3.8	3.2	-0.2 ^o
Trust in the Ministry of Health	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.8	N/A
Trust in head of town/village	N/A	N/A	4.3	4.4	+0.1 ^o
Trust in town/village administration	4.7	4.6	4.3	4.2	-0.5
Trust in oblast state administration	3.8	3.4	3.8	3.1	-0.7
Perceived level of corruption	N/A	6.6	6.9	7.2	+0.6
Ukrainian authorities care	N/A	N/A	2.8	2.1	-0.7
Service provision indicators⁵⁴	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Provision of administrative services	N/A	6.2 ^{ooo}	6.4	6.6	+0.4 ^o
Provision of basic schooling	5.8 ^{ooo}	5.6 ^{ooo}	6.7	6.4	+0.6 ^{oo}
Provision of healthcare	4.3 ^{ooo}	4.3 ^{ooo}	5.4	5.3	+1.0 ^{oo}
Provision of road networks	2.6 ^{ooo}	3.2 ^{ooo}	4.5	5.0	+3.4 ^{oo}
Provision of public transport	5.6 ^{ooo}	5.4 ^{ooo}	6.0	5.8	+0.2 ^o
Provision of justice services	4.0 ^{ooo}	4.4 ^{ooo}	5.2	5.0	+1.0 ^{oo}
Provision of utilities	5.8 ^{ooo}	5.7 ^{ooo}	6.1	6.2	+0.4 ^o
Provision of welfare payments	N/A	N/A	6.8	7.0	+0.2 ^o
Support for & scepticism about reforms indicators	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Scepticism about reforms	N/A	N/A	5.9	7.1	+1.2
Support for decentralisation reform	N/A	N/A	4.6	3.7	-0.9
Support for health reform	N/A	N/A	3.9	3.0	-0.9
Support for land reform	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.5	N/A

	Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts 'Contact Line' SCORE				Overall Change ^o
	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Trust & accountability indicators	Sample: 1,505	Sample: 701	Sample: 1,810	Sample: 1,010	
Accountability of authorities	N/A	N/A	2.5	2.3	-0.2 ^o
Trust in the President	N/A	1.3	5.2	2.4	+1.1
Trust in the Cabinet of Ministers	N/A	1.3	3.3	1.7	+0.4 ^o
Trust in the Parliament	N/A	1.2	3.4	1.7	+0.5
Trust in courts	N/A	1.7	2.9	2.0	+0.3 ^o
Trust in police	N/A	3.0	3.3	2.5	-0.5
Trust in the Ministry of Health	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.8	N/A
Trust in head of town/village	N/A	N/A	4.4	3.7	-0.7
Trust in town/village administration	N/A	3.9	4.3	3.6	-0.3 ^o
Trust in oblast state administration	N/A	2.7	3.6	2.8	+0.1 ^o

⁵⁴In 2017 and 2018, the questionnaire referred to provision of services in the country overall. In 2019 and 2021, the questionnaire asks respondents to assess the services in their locality.

Perceived level of corruption	N/A	6.7	6.9	6.9	+0.2 [◊]
Ukrainian authorities care	N/A	N/A	2.2	1.5	-0.7
Service provision indicators⁵⁵	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Provision of administrative services	N/A	5.9 ^{◊◊◊}	5.0	5.4	-0.5
Provision of basic schooling	7.2 ^{◊◊◊}	5.9 ^{◊◊◊}	6.5	6.5	+0.6 ^{◊◊}
Provision of healthcare	6.8 ^{◊◊◊}	4.6 ^{◊◊◊}	4.8	5.4	+0.8 ^{◊◊}
Provision of road networks	5.9 ^{◊◊◊}	2.8 ^{◊◊◊}	4.0	4.7	+1.9 ^{◊◊}
Provision of public transport	7.3 ^{◊◊◊}	5.0 ^{◊◊◊}	5.5	5.6	+0.6 ^{◊◊}
Provision of justice services	5.1 ^{◊◊◊}	4.2 ^{◊◊◊}	3.6	4.7	+0.5 ^{◊◊}
Provision of utilities	5.7 ^{◊◊◊}	5.2 ^{◊◊◊}	6.0	5.9	+0.7 ^{◊◊}
Provision of welfare payments	N/A	N/A	6.5	6.8	+0.3 [◊]
Support for & scepticism about reforms indicators	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Scepticism about reforms	N/A	N/A	6.1	7.5	+1.4
Support for decentralisation reform	N/A	N/A	4.2	3.0	-1.2
Support for health reform	N/A	N/A	3.5	2.6	-0.9
Support for land reform	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.3	N/A

[◊] Changes smaller than 0.5 points should not be interpreted and could be considered within the margin of error due to small changes in sampling.

^{◊◊} Scores are not meaningfully comparable across years, please read the clarifications in the footnotes.

^{◊◊◊} These indicators were worded slightly differently in 2017-18, and were updated in 2021. Thus, the scores are not always fully comparable. Please read the clarifications in the footnotes for further details.

Positive changes are marked in shades of blue, negative changes in shades of yellow, and non-significant (less than 0.5) changes in grey.

Trust & Accountability

Citizens' assessment of authorities' accountability in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts is similar to the national average, although their sense of neglect is higher and is increasing. While the authorities care indicator is 2.6 at the national level and 2.1 at the regional level, scores drop even further closer to the 'contact line', where Luhansk Oblast 'contact line' scores a meagre 1.3 and Donetsk Oblast 'contact line' 1.6. This could, in part, be linked to postponing of the 2020 local elections in these areas due to security reasons, alongside the formation of new civil-military administrations.

Perceived corruption is as high in the conflict-affected oblasts as the national level but rather than a decrease an upward trend is emerging, with corruption perceived to be higher in Donetsk Oblast at 7.2 than in Luhansk Oblast at 6.6. These higher scores are mainly driven by the perceptions of systemic corruption among the political elite (8.1) and key public service providers, such as judges (7.9), doctors (7.6) and police officers (7.3). The perceived level of corruption among local authorities is lower, averaging at 4.5 out of 10. This may be attributed to decentralisation of power and resources from the central to the local level, which provides more opportunities for public participation in defining local budget priorities, monitoring and evaluating the efficiency of their implementation.


Although Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast trust scores in 2021 do not differ from the national average, regional trust trends only mirror the national trends in part. Omitting the optimism and hope surrounding the 2019 elections, trust in courts, the Parliament and the Cabinet of Ministers remain low with little to no change since 2017, in line with the national trends (Figure 6). However, unlike the trends at national level, an upward trend in trust in town/village administrations is not observed, although they remain one of the most trusted institutions (preceded only by trust in non-governmental organisations at 4.7), nor is a steep decline in trust in the police.

From 2019 to 2021 the combined level of trust among the residents of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts towards the President, the Parliament and Cabinet of Ministers has decreased by at least half, and levels of trust appear to be lower in the older residents of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

⁵⁵In 2017 and 2018, the questionnaire referred to provision of services in the country overall. In 2019 and 2021, the questionnaire asks respondents to assess the services in their locality.

The turbulence in the scores of trust towards central government institutions, likely a result of political factors, becomes increasingly visible in this data from Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, measured at closer time intervals. In light of the waning optimism after the elections, this indicates that institutions tend to be trusted in the context of election and media campaigns, and that processes of reform and accountability, that are less visible to the public, may have a smaller influence on public opinions about trust.


Figure 6. Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts changes in trust indicators



Service Provision

Satisfaction with the efficiency of services is improving Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, with all services showing an upward trend since 2017. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019, perceptions of service provision plateaued but did not show a steep decline, demonstrating a level of resilience. The most remarkable changes since 2017, include the improvement in the quality of road networks, justice and healthcare services. Notably, although the provision of justice has reportedly improved, trust in courts remained low, and neither trust in courts nor trust in the police experienced any improvements (see Trust & Accountability), further demonstrating that trust in institutions is not solely a result of service provision, and that improvements in service provision need to prove their consistency and longevity to translate into trust and confidence in public perceptions. Despite these improvements, residents of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts assess welfare payments as the most efficient service at 7.0 out of 10, which is slightly higher than the national average of 6.6. Administrative services follow closely at 6.6. Both welfare and administrative services, along with provision of utilities, have enjoyed an increase at the regional level, although most services score lower in areas along the 'contact line'.

Figure 7. Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts changes in service provision



These indicators were worded slightly differently in 2018, and were updated in 2021. Thus, the scores are not always fully comparable. Please read the clarifications in the footnotes for further details.

Support for & Scepticism about Reforms

SCORE data shows that support for reforms is low and faltering as scepticism is on the rise. Land reform scores the lowest (2.5), followed by health (3.0) and decentralisation reform (3.7). It is likely that people are growing fatigued of the overall 'reform narrative', confusing messages and slow progress, exacerbated by citizens' low trust in the institutions implementing the reforms⁵⁶. Scepticism about the effective implementation of reforms has increased significantly⁵⁷ to an average score of 7.1 in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, exceeding the national average score of 6.5. This indicates that increasing numbers of conflict-affected citizens do not perceive reforms as beneficial to ordinary people or that these transformations are gradually improving the situation in the country.

Interpreting the Trends in Governance in Eastern Ukraine

The table below investigates the correlations from the panel data in 2019 and 2021, to determine which indicators are influenced by trust, and to provide explanatory factors to the changes in governance indicators across the two time points. The results reveal that when citizens do not trust institutions, their optimism about the future of the country decreases. A decrease in trust in the President has a large knock-on effect on all other institutions, while a decrease in trust in the Cabinet of Ministers has the strongest negative impact on citizens' confidence in reforms, and trust in the Parliament has the strongest impact on citizens' support for the EU and NATO. Notably, the perceived level of corruption and sense that authorities do not care about the people are influenced by trust more than service provision and institutional performance.

⁵⁶Trust in central institutions was found to be a driver of support for land reform at the national level (beta weight 0.17), while respondents who are sceptical about reform, who are weak supporters of reform and those who are ambivalent about reform had low levels of trust in central and local institutions.

⁵⁷ANOVA between 2019 and 2020, F = 382, p<0.01

Table 3. Influences on change based on regional longitudinal data

Change indicator based on the panel sample (Sample: 777)	Regional change in scores (2021 minus 2019)	Correlations with other indicators and respective R values ⁵⁸ that can help explain the change
Decreased in trust in President	-3.0	<p>...is linked to a decrease in levels of trust in all institutions</p> <p>...is linked to reduced perceptions that Ukrainian authorities care (0.29) and to reduced civic optimism (0.21)</p> <p>...is linked to decreased support for reforms (0.22) and EU membership (0.21)</p> <p>...is linked to increased perceptions of corruption (-0.25) and scepticism about reforms (0.28)</p>
Decreased trust in Parliament	-2.3	<p>...is linked to decreased levels of trust in all institutions</p> <p>...is linked to reduced perceptions that authorities care (0.36), that authorities are accountable (0.20) and to decreases in civic optimism (0.23)</p> <p>...is linked to decreased support for reforms (0.26)</p> <p>...is linked to decreased support for EU and NATO membership (0.21), as well as reduced perceptions of EU benefit (0.22)</p> <p>...is linked to increased scepticism about reforms (-0.29) and perceptions of corruption (-0.28)</p>
Decreased trust in Cabinet of Ministers	-2.2	<p>...is linked to decreased levels of trust in all institutions</p> <p>...is linked to decreased perceptions that authorities care (0.34) and civic optimism (0.20)</p> <p>...is linked to decreased support for reforms (0.26) and decreased perceptions of EU benefit (0.21)</p> <p>...is linked to increased scepticism about reforms (-0.31) and perceptions of corruption (-0.29)</p>
Decreased trust in courts	-0.9	<p>...is linked to decreased levels of trust in all institutions</p> <p>...is linked to decreased provision of justice services (0.26) and public services in general (0.24)</p> <p>...is linked to decreased perceptions that authorities care (0.20)</p> <p>...is linked to increased perceptions of corruption (-0.35)</p>

⁵⁸R values refer to Pearson correlation coefficients between the two variables. The stronger the association between two variables, the higher the R value. Correlations are calculated using the longitudinal panel sample. Only statistically significant correlation values higher than 0.20 are taken into consideration.

2. Human Security

A multitude of interconnected global challenges, be they violent conflicts, environmental degradation, natural disasters, pandemics, or economic downturns, undoubtedly and inescapably trigger cascading waves of human insecurity. As Dr. Bertrand Ramcharan asserted in 2004 as the former Acting UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), human rights define human security, and one cannot be achieved without the other. The UN General Assembly resolution 66/290 (2012) identifies 3 major components of human security⁵⁹:

- **Freedom from fear:** individual sense of safety, feeling protected from threats against one's physical integrity and security.
- **Freedom from want:** protection of individuals so that they might satisfy their basic needs and the economic, social and environmental aspects of life and livelihoods.
- **Freedom from indignity:** promotion of quality of life and human welfare which enables people to make choices and seek for opportunities that empower them (i.e., absence of discrimination and exclusion).

Human Security Indicators

To assess how these freedoms are met, the SCORE methodology in Ukraine approaches the overall human security concept by breaking it down to its most pertinent dimensions and developing indicators to measure each dimension, as presented below:

- **Economic security:** The degree to which one has a stable source of income, capacity to provide for nutritional needs, and can rely on social welfare payments if they needed them.
- **Health security:** The level of access to and affordability of both basic and specialised medical services.
- **Environmental security:** The degree to which one is satisfied with the quality of air and overall environmental health in their locality.
- **Personal security:** The degree to which one feels safe from violence in daily life and that the police can protect them.
- **Political security:** The degree to which one feels comfortable expressing their political views both collectively and individually without fearing consequences.

This section of the report captures people's perceived⁶⁰ levels and experiences of human security in everyday life in Ukraine between 2018 and 2021. The temporal change between years is presented, where meaningful comparison is possible, and there is a focus both on both the national and regional level, with particular detail on the eastern part of Ukraine.

National Level Trends

National Change in Human Security Dimensions

The following table captures the scores of multiple human security indicators measured between 2016 and 2021 at the national level⁶¹. On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is absolute insecurity and 10 is strong and prevalent security, scores across all five dimensions of human security in Ukraine are mediocre, between 4.4 to 5.0, with the exception of political security, which is above the median but is not as high as desired, i.e., it is not at a level where it can confidently be concluded that citizens can comfortably express their personal and collective views without fear of negative repercussions

⁵⁹United Nations General Assembly. 2012. "Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 10 September 2012." <https://undocs.org/A/RES/66/290>.

⁶⁰The subjective understanding of different human security indicators is enriched by demographic indicators such as income level, age and gender as well as location.

⁶¹Please note that the indicators have been rescaled retroactively to ensure utmost comparability across the years. Thus, it is possible to note differences between scores for the same indicators reported in different publications. Each value should be interpreted within its own publication based on the analysis method, weights, scales and sub-samples used. All SCORE Ukraine publications can be accessed here: <https://app.scoreforpeace.org/en/publications?cid=25&lid=1&tld>


or marginalisation. Economic and health security scores are the lowest compared to other dimensions, followed by personal security and environmental security.

Table 4. National level change in human security dimensions

	National SCORE			Overall Change 2021 minus earliest available year
	2016 Sample: 7,737	2018 Sample: 9,018	2021 Sample: 12,482	
Economic security	5.6	5.3	4.5	-1.1
Health security	6.0	4.6	4.4	-1.6
Environmental security ⁶²	N/A	N/A	5.0	N/A
Personal security	4.4	4.9	4.7	+0.3 [◊]
Political security ⁶³	6.0 ^{◊◊◊}	6.7 ^{◊◊◊}	6.5	+0.5 ^{◊◊}

Positive changes are marked in shades of blue, negative changes in shades of yellow, and non-significant (less than 0.5) changes in grey.

Figure 8. National level change in human security dimensions



[◊] Changes smaller than 0.5 points should not be interpreted and could be considered within the margin of error due to small changes in sampling.

^{◊◊} Scores are not meaningfully comparable across years, please read the clarifications in the footnotes.

^{◊◊◊} These indicators were worded slightly differently in 2016-18, and were updated in 2021. Thus, the scores are not always fully comparable. Please read the clarifications in the footnotes for further details.


Oblast Level Change in Economic Security

Beyond the small deterioration in economic security at the national level between 2016 and 2018, the steep downturn observed between 2018 and 2021 is disconcerting. Although it is not possible to determine whether economic security was in recovery between 2018 and 2019 at the national level, this downturn is not surprising given the COVID-19 pandemic and the global recession (See Figure 8 above). Taking a closer look at the oblast level, a large variation between oblasts becomes visible, although economic insecurity appears to remain a concern for all of Ukraine. The majority of oblasts score midway between 4 and 5, with Ternopil scoring the highest and Kirovohrad and Luhansk 'contact line' scoring the lowest. Taking a resilience lens, the absence of a significant negative change in certain oblasts such as Lviv, Rivne, Cherkasy, Sumy, Mykolaiv and Luhansk (i.e. change between 0.0 and -0.50) between 2018 and 2021 can be interpreted as resilience against the economic downturn triggered by the pandemic. Still, the figure illustrates that economic insecurity remains a concern for all of Ukraine.

⁶² Only measured in SCORE for eastern Ukraine 2018, 2019 and SCORE for Ukraine 2021.

⁶³ The political security indicator for SCORE Ukraine was revised between 2018 and 2021. Thus, scores can only be used for diagnostic purposes as statistically meaningful comparison is not possible across all time points. While scores between 2016 and 2018 are comparable, and scores between 2018 and 2021 are not.


Figure 9: Change in economic security from 2018 to 2021.



◊ Changes smaller than 0.5 points should not be interpreted and could be considered within the margin of error due to small changes in sampling.
 + White boxes show 2021 score. Donetsk & Luhansk data for 2018 comes from Eastern Ukraine data collection, N = 3,534, 'contact line' N = 701.

The SCORE's economic security indicator measures economic vulnerability on the individual and household level, while the income level indicator measures not the nominal income value but the purchasing power of a household, ranging from enough money for food to enough money for expensive items. Although distinct, the two indicators are strongly correlated and should be looked at in tandem.


Figure 10. National level change in estimated income



SCORE 2021 data shows that 30% of people in Ukraine say they have enough money for food but not always for clothes, while 7% lack money even for food. These values are notably higher in Luhansk Oblast near the 'contact line' where 28% lack money for food, while over 16% in Cherkasy and Kirovohrad oblasts report the same. However, while economic security, which is more open to

external and international shocks that may be financial (e.g., currency devaluation) or sectoral (e.g., loss of jobs in certain industries) has shown a steady decrease, income level across the country has shown a steady improvement across many oblasts, except for Zakarpattia (See Figure 11 below).

Figure 11: Change in estimated income from 2018 to 2021.



◊ Changes smaller than 0.5 points should not be interpreted and could be considered within the margin of error due to small changes in sampling.

+ White boxes show 2021 score. Donetsk & Luhansk data for 2018 comes from Eastern Ukraine data collection, N = 3,534, 'contact line' N = 701.

Oblast Level Change in Health Security

As seen in Figure 8, the downturn in health security is even steeper than economic security pre-2018. Notably, health insecurities at the national level pre-date COVID-19, with a 1.4 point drop from a score of 6.0 to 4.6 observed between 2016 and 2021, equivalent to just -0.2 between 2018 and 2021. Heightened health insecurities are likely to be linked to uncertainties and anxieties around the reform packages⁶⁴ and citizens' perception of corruption in the health sector, with 2021 SCORE data at the national level detecting a link between health insecurity and less support for health reform, less trust in the Ministry of Health, and higher perceptions that doctors are corrupt⁶⁵. According to WHO estimates from 2018, the proportion of informal payments made to receive health services was over 50%⁶⁶. Yet, the partnership between the Government of Ukraine and WHO has achieved a lot in improving national health policies, strategies and plans towards improving people-centred health services⁶⁷. This may indeed explain why the steep downward curve was flattened between 2018 and

⁶⁴Відомості Верховної Ради. 2017. Про Державні Фінансові Гарантії Медичного Обслуговування Населення Документ 2168-VIII. Ukraine. <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2168-19#Text>.

⁶⁵At the national level, health security is correlated to support for health reform (R=0.23), trust in the Ministry of Health (R=0.26), perception that doctors are corrupt (-0.11). In terms of reform, health insecurity is correlated to feeling that health reform will reduce the quality of medical services (0.20) that it will not improve healthcare in the country (0.24) and that health reform is currently impossible (0.16)


⁶⁶Goroshko A, Shapoval N, and Lai T. 2018. "Can People Afford to Pay for Healthcare? New Evidence on Financial Protection in Ukraine."

⁶⁷World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe. 2019a. "WHO Support for Health System Development in Ukraine, 2016–2019." Copenhagen. https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/413925/WHO_Health-Systems_support_Ukraine.pdf.

2021 despite the global pandemic. Multiple studies conducted by WHO and World Bank also assert that the level of trust between patients and doctors, patients and the healthcare system as well as doctors and the healthcare system, due to the prevalence of inefficiency borne by the legacy of the Soviet times, are among the lowest compared to other countries in continental Europe⁶⁸. In contrast to perceptions about health reforms, health security at the national level does not appear to be strongly linked to perceptions about the COVID pandemic⁶⁹. Alongside the absence of a marked change in the provision of healthcare (see Table 1), this may indicate that citizens are more critical of political authorities and their handling of the pandemic, rather than frontline medical staff.

At the oblast level, a decrease as large as -2.0 is observed in Kirovohrad Oblast, alongside other large drops in Volyn, Lviv, Poltava, Zakarpattia and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. On the other hand, Ternopil Oblast experiences a 1.3-point improvement during the same period, followed by a 1-point increase in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, while Chernihiv⁷⁰, Chernivtsi, Rivne, Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr oblasts report comparatively smaller but marked improvements. Importantly, not detecting any change in health security between 2018 and 2021 despite the COVID-19 pandemic creating anxieties and stress over the health system, health workers and patients alike, should be interpreted as a sign of resilience.

Figure 12: Change in health security from 2018 to 2021.



◊ Changes smaller than 0.5 points should not be interpreted and could be considered within the margin of error due to small changes in sampling.

⁶⁸World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe. 2019b. "WHO-World Bank Joint Report: Ukraine Review of Health Financing Reforms 2016-2019." https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/416681/WHO-WB-Joint-Report_Full-report_Web.pdf.

⁶⁹Health security is weakly and inversely correlated with scepticism towards vaccines (R=-0.1), very weakly correlated with thinking that COVID is a risk (R=0.04), very weakly linked to willingness to get vaccinated (R=0.05) and to household exposure to COVID (R=0.03) at the national level in 2021.


⁷⁰Ternopil and Chernihiv oblasts have previously had the highest levels of satisfaction with general practitioners' work and with inpatient care, see Ukraine Crisis Media Center. 2016. "Health Index. Ukraine 2016 - a New Tool to Assess How People Perceive the Healthcare Services." December 8, 2016. <https://uacrisis.org/en/50463-indeks-zdorovya>. Ternopil was also one of the pilot regions of the 2019 Ministry of Health EMS reforms (see WHO-World Bank. 2019. "Ukraine Review of Health Financing Reforms 2016-2019." https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/416681/WHO-WB-Joint-Report_Full-report_Web.pdf).

+ White boxes show 2021 score. Donetsk & Luhansk data for 2018 comes from Eastern Ukraine data collection, N = 3,534, 'contact line' N = 701.

Oblast Level Change in Personal Security

In contrast, personal security improved between 2016 and 2018 and remained somewhat stable between 2018 and 2021 (Figure 8), although this varies at the oblast level. While oblasts such as Lviv, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Odesa experience no significant change between 2018 and 2021, others like Sumy, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi and Mykolaiv oblasts show notable improvements, and others such as Poltava, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts experience marked drops in personal security. Unlike health security, it is hard to interpret 'no change' as a resilience capacity against COVID-19, as police protection and safety in the streets were, arguably, not affected by the pandemic. In fact, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime reports that robbery, theft and burglary declined by more than 50 per cent in most countries⁷¹, presumably due to people's confinement at home.

Figure 13: Change in personal security from 2018 to 2021.



◊ Changes smaller than 0.5 points should not be interpreted and could be considered within the margin of error due to small changes in sampling.

+ White boxes show 2021 score. Donetsk & Luhansk data for 2018 comes from Eastern Ukraine data collection, N = 3,534, 'contact line' N = 701.

Oblast Level Investigation of Environmental Security

Although temporal trends for environmental security are not available at the national level, the indicator and the differences between oblasts merit attention, in line with its crucial role in the peace and development frameworks of all stakeholders, such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the UN's Call to Action for Human Rights Report⁷², the US-Ukraine Strategic

⁷¹United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2020. "Research Brief: Effect of the COVID-19 Pandemic and Related Restrictions on Homicide and Property Crime." https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/covid/Property_Crime_Brief_2020.pdf.

⁷²António Guterres. 2020. "The Highest Aspiration A Call to Action for Human Rights." https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/2020_sg_call_to_action_for_hr_the_highest_aspiration.pdf.

Partnership Commission’s commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and promoting innovation, and Ukraine’s membership at the Agricultural Innovation Mission (AIM) for Climate.


Table 5. SCORE 2021 Environmental security questions (Ukraine, N=12,482)

To what extent are you...	Not at all	Not really	Yes, to some extent	Yes, very much	DK
Satisfied with the quality of the air you breathe in your locality?	12%	25%	44%	19%	1%
Are you satisfied with your access to clean water for household use in your locality?	14%	26%	43%	17%	1%
Concerned about environmental risks in your locality (e.g., toxic waste, loss of biodiversity)?	12%	26%	40%	21%	2%
Climate change is a threat to our society	6%	20%	39%	29%	5%

The table above shows that more than 3 in 10 people in Ukraine are neither satisfied with the air quality nor with their access to clean water, while 6 in 10 are concerned about environmental risks in their locality, and around 7 in 10 are sceptical about the risks that climate change poses to society. At the oblast level⁷³, environmental security is similar to the national average, although Ternopil, Chernihiv, Kherson and Sumy oblasts score higher than the national average, and Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk oblasts along with Kyiv city score lower, inevitably also affected by their high levels of industrialisation and higher population densities.

Figure 14. Environmental security in 2021

ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY



⁷³The environmental security indicator presented in the heatmap uses only the first two of the four questionnaire items presented in the table, namely the items about quality of air and concern about environmental risks to maintain comparability with 2019 scores as items 3 and 4 were added into the indicator in 2021.

Regional Level Trends: Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts

This section outlines the changes in human security perceptions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, measured across four time points between 2017 and 2021.

Table 6. Regional change in human security

	Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts SCORE				Overall change
	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
	Sample: 3,598	Sample: 3,534	Sample: 3,325	Sample: 3,490	
Economic security	5.7	4.3	4.9	4.4	-1.3
Health security	4.4	4.0	4.5	4.0	-0.4 [∅]
Environmental security	N/A	4.8	4.6	4.8	0.0
Personal security	4.9	4.5	4.3	4.5	-0.4 [∅]
Political security	3.7	4.0	4.7	4.6	+0.9


	Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts 'Contact Line' SCORE				Overall change
	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
	Sample: 1,505	Sample: 701	Sample: 1,810	Sample: 1,010	
Economic security	N/A	3.5	4.4	4.1	+0.6
Health security	N/A	3.9	3.7	3.3	-0.6
Environmental security	N/A	4.6	4.1	4.5	-0.1 [∅]
Personal security	N/A	3.2	3.6	3.8	+0.6
Political security	N/A	3.0	4.2	4.1	+1.1

[∅] Changes smaller than 0.5 points should not be interpreted and could be considered within the margin of error due to small changes in sampling or translation.

Positive changes are marked in shades of blue, negative changes in shades of yellow, and non-significant (less than 0.5) changes in grey.

The temporal trends presented in the table above are visualised in the line chart below, which illustrates the spikes in 2019, likely to reflect improvements in human security dimensions as well as the hope and optimism surrounding the presidential elections of that year. The line chart also illustrates a steep decline in 2021, following the COVID-19 pandemic. As previously observed at the national level, these trends specifically pertain to the decreases in economic and health security between 2017 and 2018 in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, followed by a spike in economic and health security in the period leading up to data collection in 2019, and then a drop in 2021. Political security in the two eastern oblasts increased steadily from 2017 to 2019, and appears to plateau by 2021. Unlike at the national level, personal security in the two eastern oblasts decreases by a small but consistent extent between 2017, 2018 and 2019, before recovering slightly in 2021, which may evidence a silver-lining of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Figure 15. Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts change in human security



Mirroring the positive trend observed at the national level, income level has been rising steadily in the two eastern oblasts. Though the rise between 2018 and 2019 was steeper, the pandemic has decelerated but not completely reversed the trends since 2019.

Table 7. Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts changes in income

	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Donetsk Oblast	3.0	3.2	3.8	3.9	+0.9
Donetsk Oblast 'contact line'	N/A	2.5	3.8	3.5	+1.0
Luhansk Oblast	2.9	2.9	3.5	3.5	+0.6
Luhansk Oblast 'contact line'	N/A	2.5	3.2	3.2	+0.7

Positive changes are marked in shades of blue, negative changes in shades of yellow, and non-significant (less than 0.5) changes in grey.

Interpreting the Human Security Trends in Eastern Ukraine

This section focuses on the largest step-wise changes in human security in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, using the panel sample (N=323, between 2018 and 2021) to add robustness and provide explanatory factors to the changes that are observed. The three most significant changes **between 2018 – 2019** are elaborated on by looking at their statistically significant correlations that can help explain the dynamics at play, and further explain the factors that may have led to their positive spike. It should be noted that as the correlations are calculated using a panel sample and focusing on significant temporal change, the relationships are not circumstantial and can be meaningfully and confidently interpreted. The two out three of significant changes that showed a spike in 2019 experienced a downturn in 2021, except for political security, which remained relatively stable. Looking at the statistically significant correlations can help explain the factors that led to their downturn beyond the effects of the global COVID-19 pandemic.

Table 8. Influences on change based on regional longitudinal data

Change indicator based on the panel sample (Sample: 323)	Regional change in scores (2019 minus 2018)	Correlations with other indicators from all three time points and respective R values ⁷⁴ that can help explain the change
Increase in economic security	+0.6	...is linked to an increase in income levels (0.32) and improved provision of administrative services (0.20). Regional interventions that especially focused on improving administrative services and established TSNAPs along with other investments are likely to have contributed to this increase.
Increase in health security	+0.5	...is linked to improved provision of healthcare (0.31), infrastructure (0.26) and administrative services (0.23), reduced scepticism about the willingness of doctors to provide higher quality assistance if they receive additional payments (-0.19) and increased levels of income (0.20). All these factors combined, from investments to improve service provision and reduce petty corruption among doctors, along with increased income levels have facilitated an increase in health security between 2018 and 2019. Notably however, service provision had the biggest influence on this increase.
Increase in political security	+0.7	...is linked with increased trust in central institutions (overall) (0.20), the Cabinet of Ministers (0.18) and the courts (0.18) respectively. It is very likely that this increase in political security is affected by the optimism following the presidential elections in 2019.
Change indicator based on the panel sample	Regional change in scores (2021 minus 2019)	Correlations and respective R values that can help explain the change
Decrease in economic security	-0.5	...is linked to reduced income levels (0.26) and reduced satisfaction in service provision, particularly of infrastructure services ⁷⁵ (0.32), healthcare (0.20) and administrative services (0.20). It is likely that these services have suffered during lockdown measures while citizens' access and affordability of them decreased concurrently. Frustration about access to water, sanitation, healthcare, public transport and roads on both sides of the 'contact line' was also echoed by the UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights ⁷⁶ in October 2021. Decreased economic security is also linked to increased fear of economic instability (-0.18), as the future of the global economy and the extent of the economic crisis becomes harder to predict. Lastly, a decrease in economic security is linked to increased support for EEU membership (-0.20), which may be linked to the perception that the EEU can alleviate economic security and instability concerns, and therefore support for membership increases as insecurity increases.
Decrease in health security	-0.5	...is mostly linked to reduced satisfaction with infrastructure services (0.35) followed by decreased levels of income (0.27), and reduced satisfaction with healthcare service provision (0.19). Although all three are significantly correlated, the decrease in health security seems to be more strongly related to physical access (roads, transport) to healthcare rather than to its affordability and efficiency. Decreased health security is also linked to lower levels of civic optimism (0.27), which shows that citizens are less likely to think the next generation will be better off, and hence may feel loss of social dignity, when they lack health security.

⁷⁴R values refer to Pearson correlation coefficients between the two variables. The stronger the association between two variables, the higher the R value. Correlations are calculated using the longitudinal panel sample. Only statistically significant correlation values higher than 0.18 are taken into consideration.

⁷⁵Infrastructure services is a composite indicator that measures the degree to which one is satisfied with the provision of utilities (e.g., water, electricity), quality of road network and public transportation services in their locality.

⁷⁶Nada Al-Nashif. 2021. "48th Session of the Human Rights Council. Agenda Item 10: Interactive Dialogue on Oral Update on Ukraine." October 5. <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=27600&LangID=E>.

3. Civic Behaviour & Intergroup Harmony

On the 75th anniversary of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, António Guterres, United Nations Secretary-General released a poignant paper, titled “The Highest Aspiration: A Call to Action for Human Rights”. In his Call to Action, highlighting the centrality of gender equality, public participation and civic space at the heart of overarching principles, he asserted that when a human rights-based approach to development is adopted, the outcomes are more sustainable, powerful and effective. Importantly, Guterres pointed to the well-documented correlation between a society’s enjoyment of and commitment to human rights, including social tolerance, gender equality and non-discrimination, and its resilience to crisis⁷⁷.

In line with the UNSG’s comments, global scholarly literature and SCORE evidence around the world confirms that cohesive societies are more stable, prosperous and more resilient to shocks, violence and instability⁷⁸. Harmonious relationships between groups and an active citizenry are among the main characteristics of such cohesive societies⁷⁹. SCORE results previously found that understanding civic behaviours is central to investigating intergroup harmony, which is one of the main dimensions of social cohesion (i.e., horizontal, citizen to citizen cohesion as opposed to vertical, citizen to institution cohesion). In other words, different civic behaviours can be both integral to social cohesion (elements that make up the concept itself), as well as external influences acting on social cohesion (enabling or disruptive factors). As such, analysing, measuring and tracking civic behaviours should be integral to any effort that seeks to investigate social cohesion or identify entry points to nurture it.

Civics is the study of the rights and obligations of citizens in society, and thus civic behaviour indicators include a wide category of measurement metrics relating to traits and attitudes that govern individuals’ behaviour in the public arena as citizens. In SCORE, the key civic behaviour indicators complement the indicators used to measure intergroup relations and intergroup harmony. The selected key indicators that can inform our understanding of civic behaviours and intergroup harmony in Ukraine are presented below, each of which was designed in line with the global literature, international best practices, and tailored to the Ukrainian context.

Civic Behaviour Indicators

Active citizenship orientation: The degree to which one is willing to change things in their community and in society, using peaceful political and social means of action.

⁷⁷António Guterres. 2020. “The Highest Aspiration A Call to Action for Human Rights.”

https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/2020_sg_call_to_action_for_hr_the_highest_aspiration.pdf.

⁷⁸Canadian Council on Social Development. 2000. “Social Cohesion in Canada: Possible Indicators.”

Chan, J, HP To, and E Chan. 2006. “Reconsidering Social Cohesion: Developing a Definition and Analytical Framework for Empirical Research.” *Soc Indic Res* 75

Delhey J., Boehnke K., Dragolov G., Ignác Z. S, Larsen M., Lorenz J., and Koch M.. 2018. “Social Cohesion and Its Correlates: A Comparison of Western and Asian Societies.” *Comparative Sociology* 17 (3–4): 426–55. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15691330-12341468>

Delhey J., and Dragolov G.. 2016. “Happier Together. Social Cohesion and Subjective Well-Being in Europe.” *International Journal of Psychology* 51 (3): 163–76. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ijop.12149>

Fiedler, C, and Rohles C. 2021. “Social Cohesion After Armed Conflict: A Literature Review.” Bonn

Friedkin NE. 2004. “Social Cohesion.” *Annu Rev Sociol*

Friggeri A, Chelius G., and Fleury E. 2011. “Triangles to Capture Social Cohesion.” In *IEEE International Conference on Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust, and IEEE International Conference on Social Computing*

Lordos A. and Hyslop D. 2021. “The Assessment of Multisystemic Resilience in Conflict-Affected Populations.” In *Multisystemic Resilience: Adaptation and Transformation in Contexts of Change*, edited by Michael Ungar. Oxford University Press

Louise, C, and Guest A. 2020. “Understanding Social Cohesion and Peace Capacities: SCORE South Sudan Policy Report.”

Lousie, C, Lordos A, Ioannou M, Filippou G, and Jarraud N. 2015. “Predicting Peace: The Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index as a Tool for Conflict Transformation.”

United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 2020b. “Strengthening Social Cohesion: Conceptual Framing and Programming Implications.”

⁷⁹Dagli-Hustings, I, and Ako E. E. 2018. “Fostering Constructive Citizenship in Liberia.”

Apathy: Apathy is a composite indicator made up of political disinterest, apathy about corruption and a lack of critical thinking or media literacy. It measures the extent to which one does not care about societal problems, through a disinterest about political changes and events affecting the future of Ukraine, a lack of interest about the prevalence of corruption, and a lack of motivation for thinking critically about media and information one consumes.

Civic engagement: The degree to which one participates in formal and informal civic, social and political activities such as voting in elections, attending events organized by local authorities, volunteering, participating in activities aimed at improving one's neighbourhood, etc.

Civic duty: Civic duty is a composite indicator made up of a **sense of agency** and **civic responsibility**. It measures the degree to which one feels responsible for the future and well-being of their society and country (civic responsibility) and to which one feels that ordinary people can change things in their community (sense of agency).

Gender equality mindset: The extent to which one acknowledges that men and women share equal responsibilities, rights and capabilities to contribute to society, and does not support traditional gender stereotypes assigned to women and men such as believing that men should not cry, or that women are too emotional to think rationally.

Belief in human rights: The degree to which one recognises human and civil rights are essential as opposed to optional for Ukrainian society, including the right to assembly, freedom of expression, freedom to express one's sexual orientation, freedom to practice and teach any religion and reproductive rights.

Passive citizenship orientation: The degree to which one is unwilling to engage in civic and political matters to improve the current conditions of their community and prefers to focus only on personal affairs.

Pride in locality: The combined degree to which one feels proud of various elements in their local area (e.g., heritage, landscape, community bonds, industry etc.).

Violent citizenship orientation: The degree to which one is willing to engage in civic and political matters to improve things in their community and society, using all means of change including violence if necessary.

Intergroup Harmony Indicators

Community cooperation: The degree to which one feels that people in their community care for each other and cooperate to solve common problems.

Pluralistic Ukrainian identity: The degree to which one believes that everyone living in Ukraine, despite their ethnic or cultural background, is an integral part of Ukrainian society.

Sense of belonging: The combined degree of attachment to one's place of living (country, region, settlement).

Social proximity and lack of social threat: The degree to which one accepts different socio-political and demographic groups, from different parts of Ukraine, as close friends and co-workers, and the extent to which one does not feel threatened by citizens from different regions or with different political ideologies and visions.

Social tolerance: The combined level of social tolerance towards different minority and marginalised groups (e.g., immigrants, Roma, LGBTQI+) in terms of personal interaction with and/or acceptance in the community.

National Level Trends

Table 9 contrasts the mean levels of civic behaviour indicators⁸⁰ in 2021 and 2018 at the national level.

Table 9. National level change for civic behaviour indicators

Civic behaviour indicators	National SCORE			Overall Change ^o
	2016 Sample: 7,737	2018 Sample: 9,018	2021 Sample: 12,482	2021 minus earliest available year
Active citizenship	4.2	3.9	4.8	+0.6
Apathy	N/A	N/A	4.1	N/A
Civic engagement ⁸¹	0.7 ^{ooo}	0.6 ^{ooo}	2.1	N/A
Civic responsibility ⁸²	N/A	6.2 ^{ooo}	5.3	N/A
Sense of agency ⁸³	N/A	4.6 ^{ooo}	5.5	+0.9
Gender equality mindset	N/A	N/A	6.0	N/A
Belief in human rights	N/A	N/A	7.2	N/A
Passive citizenship	5.0	3.1	4.9	-0.1 ^o
Pride in locality	N/A	N/A	6.5	N/A
Violent citizenship	0.7	0.7	0.4	-0.3 ^o
Intergroup harmony indicators	2016	2018	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Pluralistic Ukrainian identity	N/A	6.7	7.3	+0.6
Community cooperation	N/A	4.4	5.1	+0.7
Sense of belonging	N/A	N/A	7.7	N/A
Social proximity towards people from western Ukraine	7.4	7.3	6.3	-1.1
Social proximity towards people from eastern Ukraine	6.2	6.6	6.2	0.0
Social proximity towards pro-Russia oriented people	5.9	5.2	4.6	-1.3
Social proximity towards pro-EU oriented people	7.4	7.3	6.0	-1.4
Social proximity towards people living in NGCA	N/A	N/A	4.9	N/A
Social threat ⁸⁴ towards people from western Ukraine	3.3 ^{ooo}	2.6 ^{ooo}	2.1	-1.2
Social threat towards people from eastern Ukraine	4.4 ^{ooo}	3.6 ^{ooo}	2.1	-2.3
Social threat towards pro-Russia oriented people	3.9 ^{ooo}	4.1 ^{ooo}	3.7	-0.2 ^o

⁸⁰Please note that the indicators have been rescaled retroactively to ensure utmost comparability across the years. Thus, it is possible to note differences between scores for the same indicators reported in different publications. Each value should be interpreted within its own publication based on the analysis method, weights, scales and sub-samples used. All SCORE Ukraine publications can be accessed here: <https://app.scoreforpeace.org/en/publications?cld=25&lld=1&tld>

⁸¹The civic engagement indicator was significantly changed after 2018. Previously, the indicator only measured more formal and institutional civic engagement methods, such as political party events, NGO and charity membership. After 2018, the scale was improved to include additional, non-formal civic engagement mechanisms such as petitions, donations, town hall meetings or building/apartment improvement groups.

⁸²In 2018, the civic responsibility indicator was focused on respondents' general commitment to common good. It was later streamlined to measure sense of responsibility towards contributing and shaping the future of one's country. Only one of the three questionnaire items from 2018 was kept. Thus, the indicator is not meaningfully comparable between 2018 and 2021.

⁸³Although the core meaning of the sense of agency questionnaire items remained the same, the wording and the scale were slightly revised for less repetition and more clarity. The response changed from a 4-point Likert type scale of "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree" in 2018 to a 4-point Likert type scale of "Very much like me" to "Not at all like me" in 2021.

⁸⁴The wording for social threat towards all groups was revised after 2018. In 2018, the social threat question asked: Do you believe that increasing numbers of the following groups will destabilize society? In 2021, the social threat question asked: Do you believe that increasing numbers of the following groups will undermine the unity of your community? Another change in 2021 was the addition of loss of job opportunities as part of social threat perceptions if the numbers of different groups increased. Thus, 2018 indicator is only very tentatively and less than partly comparable to 2021.

Social threat towards pro-EU oriented people	2.9 ^{ooo}	2.6 ^{ooo}	2.1	-0.7
Social threat towards people living in NGCA	N/A	N/A	3.4	N/A
Social tolerance towards Muslims	5.4	6.0	6.8	+1.4
Social tolerance towards Jews	7.0	7.1	7.4	+0.4 ^o
Social tolerance towards Roma	3.5	4.1	4.9	+1.4
Social tolerance towards LGBTQI+	1.8	2.6	3.7	+1.9
Social tolerance towards people with a different colour of skin	4.6	4.8	6.9	+2.3
Social tolerance towards drug addicts	1.0	1.2	2.1	+1.1

^o Changes smaller than 0.5 points should not be interpreted and could be considered within the margin of error due to small method, translation and/or sampling effects.

^{oo} Scores are not meaningfully comparable across years, please read the clarifications in the footnotes.

^{ooo} These indicators were worded slightly differently in 2016-18, and were updated in 2021. Thus, the scores are not always fully comparable. Please read the clarifications in the footnotes for further details.

Positive changes are marked in shades of blue, negative changes in shades of yellow, and non-significant (less than 0.5) changes in grey.

Active citizenship and civic agency improved at national level from 2018 to 2021 as seen in Table 9 (increases of 0.9 units), although passive citizenship also increased by double this magnitude. Intergroup harmony presents a mixed but mostly positive picture, and while pluralism, social tolerance and community cooperation are on the rise, regional cleavages continue as illustrated by decreasing feelings of social proximity between different groups.

Yet, the drop in social proximity (accepting different socio-political groups as friends and co-workers) has not necessarily translated into increased perceived social threat (seeing these groups as destabilising influences). The local and global determinants described in the introduction can help explain why intergroup divides are not moving in the same positive direction as the growing social tolerance towards minority groups, a trend pre-dating COVID-19, pointing towards an interplay between multiple factors. Although increasing overall, tolerance towards drug addicts, the LGBTQI+ community, and Roma remains low. Encouraging public discussions around gender and sexuality while increasing the visibility and safety of the LGBTQI+ community remains important (e.g., through media campaigns or television shows and by creating spaces for public dialogue).

In addition to social tolerance and community cooperation, one of the most notable improvements, especially in certain central and western oblasts, is observed in pluralistic Ukrainian identity (see Figure 16), designated as one of the vital program monitoring indicators of the SCORE partnership and linked to enhancing unity and cohesion. Although the change heatmap for pluralistic Ukrainian identity presents a very promising picture, the negative trends in Kherson and Kyiv oblasts merit further investigation.


Overall, it can be concluded that promising civic progress has been shown in Ukraine from 2018 to 2021. Ukrainian society has become more tolerant and inclusive towards minority groups, and more active and engaged, particularly when it comes to improving daily life in local communities. These progressive civic trends are encouragingly in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (including but not limited to, SDG 10 reduced inequalities, SDG 5 on gender equality, SDG 11 on sustainable cities and communities⁸⁵), the reinvigorated US-Ukraine Strategic Partnership Commission goals⁸⁶, and the numerous human rights conventions to which Ukraine is a signatory and/or it has ratified⁸⁷.

⁸⁵For more see: <https://ukraine.un.org/en/sdgs>

⁸⁶These focus on human rights, civil liberties and fundamental freedoms, combatting racism and discrimination. For more see: "Joint Statement on the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership." 2021. US Embassy in Ukraine. September 1, 2021. <https://ua.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-ukraine-strategic-partnership/>.

⁸⁷Namely, the Convention against Torture (CAT) and its Optional Protocol (CAT-OP), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) and its Optional Protocol (CCPR-OP2-DP), the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED, CED, Art.32), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC, CRC-OP-AC, CRC-OP-SC) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).


Figure 16. Change in pluralistic Ukrainian identity between 2018 and 2021.



◊ Changes smaller than 0.5 points should not be interpreted and could be considered within the margin of error due to small changes in sampling.

+ White boxes show 2021 score. Donetsk & Luhansk data for 2018 comes from Eastern Ukraine data collection, N = 3,534. Indicator not measured in 'contact line' Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in 2018.

Figure 17. Change in community cooperation between 2018 and 2021.



◊ Changes smaller than 0.5 points should not be interpreted and could be considered within the margin of error due to small changes in sampling.

+ White boxes show 2021 score. Donetsk & Luhansk data for 2018 comes from Eastern Ukraine data collection, N = 3,534. Indicator not measured in 'contact line' Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in 2018.

Regional Level Trends: Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts

This section presents an overview of the changes in civic behaviour and intergroup relations in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, measured across four time points between 2017 and 2021.

Table 10. Regional level change for civic behaviour indicators

Civic behaviour indicators	Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts SCORE				Overall change ^o
	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Active citizenship	Sample: 3,598 3.9	Sample: 3,534 3.6	Sample: 3,325 4.1	Sample: 3,490 3.8	-0.1 ^o
Apathy	N/A	N/A	4.4	4.4	0.0
Civic engagement ⁸⁸	N/A	2.0 ^{ooo}	2.0	2.0	0.0
Civic responsibility ⁸⁹	N/A	5.6 ^{oo▲}	5.0	5.0	-0.6
Sense of agency ⁹⁰	N/A	4.4 ^{ooo}	5.5	5.1	+0.7
Gender equality mindset	N/A	N/A	5.8	6.4	+0.6
Belief in human rights	N/A	N/A	6.3	6.6	+0.3 ^o
Passive citizenship	5.9	6.2	5.6	5.9	0.0
Pride in locality	N/A	N/A	5.9	5.4	-0.5
Violent citizenship	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.0
Intergroup harmony indicators	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Pluralistic Ukrainian identity	N/A	7.0 [▲]	7.1	7.1	+0.1 ^o
Community cooperation ⁹¹	N/A	4.1 ^{ooo▲}	5.4	5.1	+1.0
Sense of belonging	N/A	N/A	7.8	7.4	-0.4 ^o
Social proximity towards people from western Ukraine	N/A	N/A	5.9	6.4	+0.5
Social proximity towards people from eastern Ukraine	N/A	N/A	7.1	7.4	+0.3 ^o
Social proximity towards pro-Russia oriented people	N/A	N/A	5.5	6.0	+0.5
Social proximity towards pro-EU oriented people	N/A	N/A	5.7	6.2	+0.5
Social proximity towards people living in NGCA	N/A	N/A	6.1	6.5	+0.4 ^o
Social threat ⁹² towards people from western Ukraine	2.5	1.9	2.4	2.5	0.0

⁸⁸Unlike the SCORE 2018 national survey, the civic engagement indicator has maintained more comparability between 2018 and the following years. The main difference between 2018 and following years was the addition of online civic engagement outlets, such as online forums.

⁸⁹Civic responsibility in 2018 was focused on commitment to common good. It was later streamlined in 2019 to measure sense of responsibility towards contributing and shaping the future of one's country. Only one of the three questionnaire items from 2018 was kept. Thus the indicator is not meaningfully comparable between 2018 and 2021.

⁹⁰Although the sense of agency questionnaire items remained the same at their core, the wording and the scale were slightly revised for less repetition and more clarity. The response changed from a 4-point Likert type scale of "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree" in 2018 to a 4-point Likert type scale of "Very much like me" to "Not at all like me" in 2021.

⁹¹The changes in the wording of the questionnaire items between 2018 and 2019 were very minor, and mostly limited to the examples of community cooperation, e.g., planting trees, helping a community member in need, cleaning the territory. The examples were kept the same between 2019 and 2020.

⁹²The wording for social threat towards all groups was revised after 2018. In 2018, the social threat question asked: Do you believe that increasing numbers of the following groups will destabilize society? In 2021, the social threat question asked: Do you believe that increasing numbers of the following groups will undermine the unity of your community? Another change

Social threat towards people from eastern Ukraine	N/A	N/A	1.6	1.5	-0.1 [◊]
Social threat towards pro-Russia oriented people	3.0	2.5	2.9	3.0	0.0
Social threat towards pro-EU oriented people	2.4	2.1	2.5	2.6	+0.2 [◊]
Social threat towards people living in NGCA	2.5	1.7	2.5	2.5	0.0
Social tolerance towards Muslims	6.5	6.9	7.1	7.5	+1.0
Social tolerance towards Jews	7.7	7.7	7.7	8.2	+0.5
Social tolerance towards Roma	5.0	4.9	5.7	6.3	+1.3
Social tolerance towards LGBTQI+	2.7	2.9	3.4	3.7	+1.0
Social tolerance towards people with a different colour of skin	7.3	7.2	7.8	7.8	+0.5
Social tolerance towards drug addicts	1.7	1.8	2.9	2.5	+0.8

	Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts 'Contact Line' SCORE				Overall change [◊]
	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Civic behaviour indicators	Sample: 1,505	Sample: 701	Sample: 1,810	Sample: 1,010	
Active citizenship	N/A	5.2	3.4	3.7	-1.5
Apathy	N/A	N/A	4.6	4.2	-0.4 [◊]
Civic engagement ⁹³	N/A	1.3 ^{◊◊◊}	1.8	1.8	0.5
Civic responsibility ⁹⁴	N/A	N/A	4.9	5.2	0.3 [◊]
Sense of agency ⁹⁵	N/A	4.1 ^{◊◊◊}	5.4	5.3	+1.2
Gender equality mindset	N/A	N/A	5.7	6.2	+0.5
Belief in human rights	N/A	N/A	7.6	7.0	-0.6
Passive citizenship	N/A	4.7	6.4	6.0	+1.3
Pride in locality	N/A	N/A	6.0	5.5	-0.5
Violent citizenship	N/A	0.0	0.3	0.2	-0.1 [◊]
Intergroup harmony indicators	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Pluralistic Ukrainian identity	N/A	N/A	7.4	7.8	+0.4 [◊]
Community cooperation ⁹⁶	N/A	N/A	6.0	5.3	-0.7
Sense of belonging	N/A	N/A	8.1	7.9	-0.2 [◊]
Social proximity towards people from western Ukraine	N/A	N/A	6.4	6.7	+0.3 [◊]
Social proximity towards people from eastern Ukraine	N/A	N/A	7.4	7.4	0.0

in 2021 was the addition of loss of job opportunities as part of social threat perceptions if the numbers of different groups increased. Thus, 2018 indicator is only very tentatively and less than partly comparable to 2021.

⁹³Unlike the SCORE 2018 national survey, the civic engagement indicator measured in the east has maintained more comparability between 2018 and the following years. The main difference between 2018 and following years was the addition of online civic engagement outlets, such as online forums.

⁹⁴Civic responsibility in 2018 was focused on commitment to common good. It was later streamlined in 2019 to measure sense of responsibility towards contributing and shaping the future of one's country. Only one of the three questionnaire items from 2018 was kept. Thus the indicator is not meaningfully comparable between 2018 and 2021.

⁹⁵Although the sense of agency questionnaire items remained the same at their core, the wording and the scale were slightly revised for less repetition and more clarity. The response changed from a 4-point Likert type scale of "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree" in 2018 to a 4-point Likert type scale of "Very much like me" to "Not at all like me" in 2021.

⁹⁶The changes in the wording of the questionnaire items between 2018 and 2019 were very minor, and mostly limited to the examples of community cooperation, e.g. planting trees, helping a community member in need, cleaning the territory. The examples were kept the same between 2019 and 2020.

Social proximity towards pro-Russia oriented people	N/A	N/A	5.7	6.4	+0.7
Social proximity towards pro-EU oriented people	N/A	N/A	6.1	6.4	+0.3 [◊]
Social proximity towards people living in NGCA	N/A	N/A	6.7	7.0	+0.3 [◊]
Social threat ⁹⁷ towards people from western Ukraine	N/A	1.3	2.8	2.0	+0.7
Social threat towards people from eastern Ukraine	N/A	N/A	1.8	1.3	-0.5
Social threat towards pro-Russia oriented people	N/A	2.1	3.2	2.3	+0.2 [◊]
Social threat towards pro-EU oriented people	N/A	1.6	2.6	2.1	+0.5
Social threat towards people living in NGCA	N/A	1.2	2.8	1.8	+0.6
Social tolerance towards Muslims	N/A	7.6	7.1	7.5	-0.1 [◊]
Social tolerance towards Jews	N/A	8.0	7.5	7.7	-0.3 [◊]
Social tolerance towards Roma	N/A	5.9	5.7	6.5	+0.6
Social tolerance towards LGBTQI+	N/A	3.7	3.0	3.3	-0.4 [◊]
Social tolerance towards people with a different colour of skin	N/A	7.7	7.8	7.6	-0.1 [◊]
Social tolerance towards drug addicts	N/A	2.5	3.0	2.2	-0.3 [◊]

[◊] Changes smaller than 0.5 points should not be interpreted and could be considered within the margin of error due to small method, translation and/or sampling effects.

^{◊◊} Scores are not meaningfully comparable across years, please read the clarifications in the footnotes.

^{◊◊◊} The wording of these indicators in the questionnaire were revised. Thus, the scores are not always fully comparable. Please read the clarifications in the footnotes for further details.

[▲] This data comes from the SCORE 2018 national data collection and has a different sample size of N = 1,493 for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

Positive changes are marked in shades of blue, negative changes in shades of yellow, and non-significant (less than 0.5) changes in grey.

The table above shows that many of the civic behaviour and intergroup harmony trends observed at the national level are mirrored at the regional level in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. A key difference is the absence of an increase in active citizenship at the regional level. While civil society played an essential role, especially during the first half of 2020 in supporting authorities in dealing with the shocks and adversities associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, active citizenship in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts remained low and passive citizenship remained high, compared to the national average. Although significant changes are not seen by 2021 in apathy and civic engagement, these are in line with the national averages.

More importantly, unlike at the national level, there is a lack of improvement in pluralistic identity in Donetsk Oblast (not shown, from 7.2 in 2018⁹⁸ to 6.9 in 2021) and, to a lesser extent, in Luhansk Oblast (not shown, from 6.6 in 2018⁹⁹ to 7.3 in 2021). Pride in locality is lower in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts than at the national level (5.4 compared to 6.5), and has decreased since 2019 (from 5.9). Further, Donetsk Oblast does not experience the same significant¹⁰⁰ increase in social proximity towards different socio-political groups that Luhansk Oblast experiences (an increase of 0.3 in Donetsk and an increase of 0.8 in Luhansk from 2019 to 2021). Despite these meagre changes, the levels of pluralistic identity in both Donetsk and Luhansk remain in line with the national average, and the increases in social tolerance towards minority groups, alongside improvements in

⁹⁷The wording for social threat towards all groups was revised after 2018. In 2018, the social threat question asked: Do you believe that increasing numbers of the following groups will destabilize society? In 2021, the social threat question asked: Do you believe that increasing numbers of the following groups will undermine the unity of your community? Another change in 2021 was the addition of loss of job opportunities as part of social threat perceptions if the numbers of different groups increased. Thus, 2018 indicator is only very tentatively and less than partly comparable to 2021.

⁹⁸This data comes from the SCORE 2018 national data collection and has a different sample size of N = 1493 for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

⁹⁹This data comes from the SCORE 2018 national data collection and has a different sample size of N = 1493 for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

¹⁰⁰ANOVA, F = 46, p<0.01 in Luhansk Oblast, F = 15, p<0.01 in Donetsk Oblast.

community cooperation, are mirrored in these oblasts. Notably, gender equality mindset significantly¹⁰¹ increased from 2019, especially in Luhansk Oblast. Respondents also report higher levels of acceptance and reliance on their neighbours for solving common problems in both Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

Interpreting the Civic Behaviour & Intergroup Harmony Trends in Eastern Ukraine

This section investigates the statistically significant correlations which help explain the significant changes **between 2018 – 2021** in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts using a longitudinal panel sample allowing for a more robust understanding of changes in civic behaviour and intergroup relations.

Table 11. Influences on change based on regional longitudinal data

Change indicator based on the panel sample (Sample: 232)	Regional change in scores (2021 minus 2018)	Correlations with other indicators from all three time points and respective R ¹⁰² values that can help explain the change
Increase in social tolerance towards Roma	+1.4	...is linked to increased social tolerance towards other marginalised groups, specifically and very strongly to Muslims (0.51), Jews (0.50), people with a different colour of skin (0.45), the LGBTQI+ community (0.31) and drug addicts (0.30). Not surprisingly, tolerant people tend to accept and interact with a diverse group of people. ...is linked with self-identification as citizen of Ukraine (i.e. civic identity) rather than an ethnic identity (i.e. Ukrainian). Expectedly, this indicates that civic identities are more inclusive of minority groups than ethnic identities.
Increase in social threat from people living in NGCA	+0.8	...is linked to decreased confidence that people living in the NGCA (-0.20) and pro-Russia people (-0.20) are willing to listen and engage in dialogue. In other words, the more people believe in the dividends of dialogue the less they perceive social threat from those groups. These correlations are stronger when it comes to increased social threat from pro-Russia oriented people (-0.27 and -0.30 respectively).
Increase in social tolerance towards LGBTQI+	+0.7	...similar to the above, is linked to increased social tolerance towards other marginalised groups but in a different order: drug addicts (0.48), people with a different colour of skin (0.32), Roma (0.31), Muslims (0.30) and Jews (0.27). Not surprisingly, tolerant people tend to accept and interact with a diverse group of people. ...dissimilar to the above, gender plays an important role, as it is strongly linked to decreased gender stereotypes (-0.25) and an increase in gender equality mindset (0.24), and linked to a reduction in Soviet nostalgia (-0.21). Unsurprisingly, social tolerance towards the LGBTQI+ community comes with progressive attitudes towards women and a more liberal world view in general. ...is also linked to the increased confidence that people from western oblasts of Ukraine will listen to the arguments and are ready to be engaged in the dialogue (0.25). In other words, those people who are more tolerant to LGBTQI+ groups in the eastern oblasts also see more dividends in dialogue with people from western Ukraine.
Increase in social threat from people from western Ukraine	+0.6	...is linked to a decrease in confidence that people from western Ukraine (-0.29), IDPs (-0.20) and people living in the NGCA (-0.18) are willing to listen and engage in dialogue. Similarly, the belief in the dividends of dialogue mitigates social threat from this group as well. These correlations are similar when it comes to increase in social threat from pro-EU oriented people as well (-0.26, -0.24 and -0.23 respectively).
SCORE indicator	Regional change in	Correlations and respective R values that can help explain the change

¹⁰¹ANOVA, F = 80, p<0.01

¹⁰²R values refer to Pearson correlation coefficients between the two variables. The stronger the association between two variables, the higher the R value. Correlations are calculated using the longitudinal panel sample. Only statistically significant correlation values higher than 0.18 are taken into consideration.

	scores (2021 minus 2019)	
Decrease in pride in locality	-0.5	<p>...is linked to decreased locality satisfaction (0.27) and public service provision (0.20), and also linked to increased migration tendency (-0.22).</p> <p>Tracing this back to 2018 revealed that people who had an increase in their locality satisfaction (0.23), health security (0.23) and provision of public service provision such as education and infrastructure (0.22) between 2018 and 2021 were more likely to have a higher sense of pride in their locality in 2021.</p> <p>Thus, fostering pride in locality via locality satisfaction (which in 2021 was 5.3 out of 10) and public service provision (5.7 out of 10) can help mitigate migration tendencies (although these are relatively low at 3.9 out of 10).</p>

4. Geopolitical Aspirations, Reintegration & Reconciliation

SCORE conceptualises reconciliation as an ongoing process of societal healing in a country, region or community that has been affected by conflict, to transform fractured social cohesion into harmonious co-existence. The extent to which citizens share a vision about the future direction of their country and build that vision on the values of solidarity and unity unquestionably relates to the state of cohesion in a society. In fact, in terms of reconciliation and reintegration, this does not only refer to regional and intergenerational chasms, but also to geopolitical orientations that have become mutually exclusive.

Although geopolitical orientations are easy to point to as root causes of societal fractures, or to be seen as fundamental cleavages in societal values, they are in fact more volatile than often assumed, and are more likely to be symptoms ready for exploitation by populist narratives, than deep-rooted societal maladies. Fluctuations in pro-EU or anti-EU attitudes are a good example of how public discourse and narratives as well as voter preferences can shift, by coming together in solidarity or growing in scepticism in the face of economic or security crises¹⁰³. Thus, geopolitical orientations do not define people in themselves, and preferences shift depending on insecurities and anxieties, adversities, levels of awareness and interpretations of current affairs, and on citizens' personal, current realities. Yet, in Ukraine, geopolitical orientations are valuable for understanding citizens' attitudes and preferences around reintegration and reconciliation of the non-government control areas (NGCA) and people living in those areas.

With the conflict in Ukraine now entering its eighth year, building national consensus on reintegration scenarios and reconciliation approaches are considered a top priority both for policy-makers and for peace and development actors in the country. Notably, since February 2019, the Constitution of Ukraine officially defines the country's future direction as moving towards joining the European Union and NATO¹⁰⁴, necessitating national convergence and inclusive dialogue in order to overcome cleavages and grievances experienced by those with different geopolitical preferences.

SCORE indicators have been refined across successive years of data collection to assess geopolitical aspirations, attitudes towards reintegration of the NGCA of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and of Crimea, and readiness for dialogue with different groups. Examining the changes in these indicators allows for a better understanding of societal fractures and dynamics that present opportunities for reconciliation and transformative peace.

Geopolitical Aspirations Indicators

Support for EU membership: The level of support for Ukraine to become a member of the EU.

Support for EEU membership: The level of support for Ukraine to become a member of the Eurasian Economic Union with Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

Support for NATO membership: The level of support for Ukraine to become a member of NATO.

Support for non-aligned status: The degree to which one thinks that Ukraine should be strictly non-aligned and not join either pro-Western or pro-Russian entities.

Reintegration Indicators

Future vision for the NGCA: part of Ukraine; part of Russia; independent countries; special status; status quo: The level of support for the future status of the non-government controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to remain part of Ukraine with the same legal status as all other oblasts in Ukraine; or to become part of the Russian Federation; or to become an internationally

¹⁰³Filip, Alexandru. 2021. "The Evolution and Trends of Eurosceptic Success." https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69036-6_3.

¹⁰⁴Відомості Верховної Ради. 2019. Про Внесення Змін До Конституції України (Щодо Стратегічного Курсу Держави На Набуття Повноправного Членства України в Європейському Союзі Та в Організації Північноатлантичного Договору). Ukraine. <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2680-19#Text>.

recognised independent country; or to remain part of Ukraine, but with special autonomy status; or to maintain the current status quo.

Support for efforts for Crimea reintegration: The extent to which one considers that the Government of Ukraine should spend public resources to reintegrate Crimea.

Support for efforts for NGCA reintegration: The extent to which one considers that the Government of Ukraine should spend public resources to reintegrate the NGCA.

Reconciliation Attitudes Indicators

Readiness for dialogue with different groups (overall): The belief that people from different groups would hear one’s arguments and be ready to discuss matters and also have a mutual benefit from engaging in dialogue (i.e., IDPs, ATO/JFO military personnel, people from western Ukraine, people from eastern Ukraine, pro-EU and pro-Russia oriented people, people living in NGCA, people living in Crimea, Ukrainian nationalists, people who support a separation of NGCA).

National Level Trends

The table below captures the geopolitical orientations, reintegration and reconciliation-related SCORE indicators measured in 2021 and presents the temporal trends from 2018 where applicable at the national level.

Table 12. National level change in geopolitical aspirations, reintegration and reconciliation.

	National SCORE			Overall Change ^o
	2016	2018	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Geopolitical aspirations indicators ¹⁰⁵	Sample: 7,737	Sample: 9,018	Sample: 12,482	
Support for EU membership	6.3 ^{ooo}	5.7 ^{ooo}	5.9	-0.4 ^o
Support for non-aligned status	5.0 ^{ooo}	5.5 ^{ooo}	5.7	+0.7 ^{oo}
Support for NATO membership	5.2 ^{ooo}	4.8 ^{ooo}	5.3	+0.1 ^o
Support for EEU membership	2.2 ^{ooo}	2.5 ^{ooo}	2.8	+0.6 ^{oo}
Reintegration indicators ¹⁰⁶	2016	2018	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Future vision for the NGCA: Part of Ukraine	5.6 ^{ooo}	5.7 ^{ooo}	7.9	+2.3 ^{oo}
Future vision for the NGCA: Special status	3.2 ^{ooo}	3.7 ^{ooo}	3.3	+0.1 ^o
Future vision for the NGCA: Independent countries	1.9 ^{ooo}	2.2 ^{ooo}	1.6	-0.3 ^{oo}
Future vision for the NGCA: Part of Russia	0.9 ^{ooo}	1.3 ^{ooo}	1.4	+0.5 ^{oo}
Future vision for the NGCA: Status quo	N/A	1.4 ^{ooo}	1.6	+0.2 ^o
Support for efforts for Crimea’s reintegration	N/A	N/A	5.9	N/A
Support for efforts for the NGCA’s reintegration	N/A	N/A	5.9	N/A

¹⁰⁵The questionnaire items for these indicators remained the same across years, while the response scales were changed slightly. In 2016 and 2018, the response scale was a 4-point Likert type scale ranging from “Entirely unacceptable” to “Highly desirable”; in 2021, the response scale was a 4-point Likert type scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

¹⁰⁶The questionnaire items for these indicators remained the same across years, while the response scales were changed slightly. In 2016 and 2018, the response scale was a 4-point Likert type scale ranging from “Entirely unacceptable” to “Highly desirable”; in 2021, the response scale was a 4-point Likert type scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Reconciliation indicators ¹⁰⁷	2016	2018	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Readiness for dialogue with people from western Ukraine	6.5 ^{∞∞}	6.4 ^{∞∞}	4.9	-1.6 ^{∞∞}
Readiness for dialogue with people from eastern Ukraine	5.4 ^{∞∞}	5.5 ^{∞∞}	4.8	-0.6 ^{∞∞}
Readiness for dialogue with pro-EU oriented people	6.5 ^{∞∞}	6.4 ^{∞∞}	4.7	-1.8 ^{∞∞}
Readiness for dialogue with pro-Russia oriented people	5.2 ^{∞∞}	5.1 ^{∞∞}	3.6	-1.6 ^{∞∞}
Readiness for dialogue with people living in the NGCA	N/A	4.1 ^{∞∞}	3.6	-0.5 ^{∞∞}
Readiness for dialogue with people from Crimea	N/A	N/A	4.0	N/A

[∞] Changes smaller than 0.5 points should not be interpreted and could be considered within the margin of error due to small method, translation and/or sampling effects.

^{∞∞} Scores are not meaningfully comparable across years, please read the clarifications in the footnotes.

^{∞∞∞} The wording of these indicators in the questionnaire was revised. Thus, the scores are not always fully comparable. Please read the clarifications in the footnotes for further details.

Positive changes are marked in shades of blue, negative changes in shades of yellow, and non-significant (less than 0.5) changes in grey.

Geopolitical Aspirations


At the national level, there have been no major shifts in preferences about Ukraine's membership of larger regional unions since 2018, with the exception of an increase in support for NATO, which may, in part, have been triggered by the Russian military build-up on Ukraine's borders and by the Kerch Strait incident. However, marked variation is seen at the oblast level (Figure 18). While Volyn, Kharkiv, Sumy and Odesa oblasts report a drop in their support for EU membership, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Zakarpattia, Ternopil, Poltava, Vinnytsia and Lviv oblasts, along with Kyiv city, report increases in their support. At a score of 5.9 across Ukraine, overall support for EU membership is notably stronger than that for other geopolitical aspirations, such as remaining non-aligned, joining the EEU or joining NATO (Table 12). Unsurprisingly, this support displays a clear pattern and increases going from East to West, where the lowest scores are observed in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts at 3.5 and 3.6, respectively, and the highest are observed in Ternopil and Lviv oblasts at 8.7 and 8.4, respectively. Similarly, support for EU membership increases in the centre and north of the country, compared to the south (i.e., Odesa Oblast scores lower at 3.9, while Mykolaiv Oblast is at 4.9 and Kherson Oblast at 5.3, while Cherkasy and Kirovohrad oblasts have a mean score of 6.0, Kyiv city of 6.5 and Kyiv Oblast of 6.6, while Chernihiv Oblast scores 5.9).

¹⁰⁷These indicators are rescaled in 2016 and 2018 in order to ensure comparability with 2021, and the mean scores presented are therefore different to those published previously or elsewhere. Between 2016-18, as opposed to 2021, the response scale for these questionnaire items was altered from "No", "Yes", "Don't Know" to "No", "Yes", "Maybe". These indicators are rescaled compared to previous publications to ensure comparability with 2021.

to Ukrainian TV channels, 18% to Ukrainian radio and 6% to Ukrainian print media, 14% watch the Dom channel, and 45% reporting full access to Ukrainian internet sites.

Students' enrolment via special quotas in Ukrainian schools received moderate support at an average score of 4.9 for Crimean students and 5.2 for students from the NGCA, but fluctuates across oblasts, with scores as low as 2.4 in Lviv Oblast. Oblasts neighbouring the NGCA and Crimea are generally more supportive of confidence building measures.

Figure 19. Change in future vision of the NGCA as part of Ukraine between 2021 and 2018.



◊ Changes smaller than 0.5 points should not be interpreted and could be considered within the margin of error due to small changes in sampling.


+ White boxes indicate 2021 score. Donetsk & Luhansk data for 2018 comes from Eastern Ukraine data collection, N = 3,534, 'contact line' N = 701.

Reconciliation Attitudes

Table 12 outlines a downward turn in readiness for dialogue, indicating that reconciliation efforts in Ukraine require consolidated actions to expand the space for constructive dialogue. While this decrease could be ascribed to COVID-19 lockdown measures, which resulted in decreases in contact and crossing between GCA and NGCA, and muted expectations of virtual dialogue, it is nonetheless a disconcertingly big decline. At the national level, readiness for dialogue is particularly low towards people with a pro-Russia orientation and towards people living in the NGCA, particularly according to respondents in Chernihiv, Volyn, Poltava, Mykolaiv and Cherkasy oblasts (see Figure 20).

Figure 20. Readiness for dialogue with people living in the NGCA in 2021

READINESS FOR DIALOGUE: PEOPLE LIVING IN NGCA



Regional Level Trends: Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts

In ensuring that peace is sustained through societal healing and transformation, national strategies and efforts require tailored adjustments to account for the local sensitivities and needs of the areas most exposed to and most affected by the conflict. Residents of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, especially those living along the ‘contact line’, are particularly vulnerable and naturally exposed to the conflict and to conflict related adversities, from infrastructural devastation to humanitarian crisis, and from familial separation to being caught in socio-political purgatory for almost a decade. As such, the need for peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts alongside humanitarian interventions is naturally more acute in these areas. The following section therefore tracks geopolitical aspirations, reintegration preferences and reconciliation attitudes at the regional level in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

Table 13. Regional level change for geopolitical aspirations, reintegration and reconciliation

	Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts SCORE				Overall Change ^o
	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Geopolitical aspirations indicators¹⁰⁸	Sample: 3,598	Sample: 3,534	Sample: 3,325	Sample: 3,490	2021 minus earliest available year
Support for non-aligned status ¹⁰⁹	5.8 ^{ooo}	6.1 ^{ooo}	5.6	6.2	+0.4 ^o
Support for EEU membership	5.2 ^{ooo}	5.1 ^{ooo}	5.0	4.6	-0.6 ^{oo}
Support for EU membership	3.8 ^{ooo}	3.7 ^{ooo}	4.3	3.5	-0.3 ^o

¹⁰⁸Please note that the indicators have been rescaled retroactively to ensure utmost comparability across the years. Thus, it is possible to note differences between scores for the same indicators reported in different publications. Each value should be interpreted within its own publication based on the analysis method, weights, scales and sub-samples used. All SCORE Ukraine publications can be accessed here: <https://app.scoreforpeace.org/en/publications?cld=25&lld=1&tld>

¹⁰⁹The questionnaire items for these indicators remained the same across years, while the response scales were changed slightly. In 2017 and 2018, the response scale was a 4-point Likert type scale ranging from “Entirely unacceptable” to “Highly desirable”; in 2021, the response scale was a 4-point Likert type scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

Support for NATO membership ¹¹⁰	2.4 ⁰⁰⁰	2.7 ⁰⁰⁰	3.1	2.5	+0.1 ⁰
Reintegration indicators	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Future vision for the NGCA: Part of Ukraine	7.8	7.8	7.2	7.4	-0.4 ⁰
Future vision for the NGCA: Special status	4.6	4.6	5.1	4.8	+0.2 ⁰
Future vision for the NGCA: Independent countries	2.6	2.2	2.2	2.6	0.0 ⁰
Future vision for the NGCA: Part of Russia	2.4	2.2	2.1	2.1	-0.3 ⁰
Future vision for the NGCA: Status quo	N/A	N/A	1.3	1.7	+0.4 ⁰
Support for efforts for Crimea's reintegration	N/A	N/A	N/A	6.4	N/A
Support for efforts for the NGCA's reintegration	N/A	N/A	N/A	7.0	N/A
Reconciliation indicators¹¹¹	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Readiness for dialogue with people from western Ukraine	6.1 ⁰⁰⁰	6.7 ⁰⁰⁰	N/A	4.3	-1.8 ⁰⁰
Readiness for dialogue with people from eastern Ukraine	N/A	N/A	N/A	5.7	N/A
Readiness for dialogue with pro-EU oriented people	6.2 ⁰⁰⁰	6.8 ⁰⁰⁰	N/A	4.3	-1.9 ⁰⁰
Readiness for dialogue with pro-Russia oriented people	5.8 ⁰⁰⁰	6.2 ⁰⁰⁰	N/A	4.2	-1.6 ⁰⁰
Readiness for dialogue with people living in the NGCA	6.3 ⁰⁰⁰	6.8 ⁰⁰⁰	N/A	4.5	-1.8 ⁰⁰
Readiness for dialogue with people from Crimea	N/A	N/A	N/A	4.0	N/A

	Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts 'Contact Line' SCORE				Overall Change ⁰
	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Geopolitical aspirations indicators¹¹²	Sample: 1,505	Sample: 701	Sample: 1,810	Sample: 1,010	
Support for non-aligned status ¹¹³	N/A	6.3 ⁰⁰⁰	5.4	6.0	-0.3 ⁰
Support for EEU membership	N/A	5.2 ⁰⁰⁰	5.2	4.5	-0.7 ⁰⁰
Support for EU membership	N/A	3.8 ⁰⁰⁰	4.0	3.4	-0.4 ⁰
Support for NATO membership ¹¹⁴	N/A	2.9 ⁰⁰⁰	2.8	2.5	-0.4 ⁰

¹¹⁰The questionnaire items for these indicators remained the same across years, while the response scales were changed slightly. In 2018, the response scale was a 4-point Likert type scale ranging from "Entirely unacceptable" to "Highly desirable"; in 2021, the response scale was a 4-point Likert type scale ranging from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree".

¹¹¹These indicators are rescaled in 2017 and 2018 in order to ensure comparability with 2021, and the mean scores presented are therefore different to those published previously or elsewhere. Between 2017-18, as opposed to 2021, the response scale for these questionnaire items was altered from "No", "Yes", "Don't Know" to "No", "Yes", "Maybe".

¹¹²Please note that the indicators have been rescaled retroactively to ensure utmost comparability across the years. Thus, it is possible to note differences between scores for the same indicators reported in different publications. Each value should be interpreted within its own publication based on the analysis method, weights, scales and sub-samples used. All SCORE Ukraine publications can be accessed here: <https://app.scoreforpeace.org/en/publications?cid=25&lid=1&tld>

¹¹³The questionnaire items for these indicators remained the same across years, while the response scales were changed slightly. In 2017 and 2018, the response scale was a 4-point Likert type scale ranging from "Entirely unacceptable" to "Highly desirable"; in 2021, the response scale was a 4-point Likert type scale ranging from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree".

¹¹⁴The questionnaire items for these indicators remained the same across years, while the response scales were changed slightly. In 2018, the response scale was a 4-point Likert type scale ranging from "Entirely unacceptable" to "Highly desirable"; in 2021, the response scale was a 4-point Likert type scale ranging from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree".

Reintegration indicators	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Future vision for the NGCA: Part of Ukraine	6.6	8.0	7.2	7.3	-0.7
Future vision for the NGCA: Special status	N/A	5.8	5.2	5.2	-0.6
Future vision for the NGCA: Independent countries	3.2	2.5	2.1	2.4	-0.1 [◊]
Future vision for the NGCA: Part of Russia	3.7	2.8	1.9	1.9	-0.9
Future vision for the NGCA: Status quo	N/A	N/A	1.2	1.6	+0.4 [◊]
Support for efforts for Crimea's reintegration	N/A	N/A	N/A	7.0	N/A
Support for efforts for the NGCA's reintegration	N/A	N/A	N/A	7.6	N/A
Reconciliation indicators ¹¹⁵	2017	2018	2019	2021	2021 minus earliest available year
Readiness for dialogue with people from western Ukraine	N/A	6.7 ^{◊◊}	N/A	4.5	-2.2 ^{◊◊}
Readiness for dialogue with people from eastern Ukraine	N/A	N/A	N/A	5.5	N/A
Readiness for dialogue with pro-EU oriented people	N/A	6.4 ^{◊◊}	N/A	4.4	-2.0 ^{◊◊}
Readiness for dialogue with pro-Russia oriented people	N/A	6.2 ^{◊◊}	N/A	4.5	-1.7 ^{◊◊}
Readiness for dialogue with people living in the NGCA	N/A	6.9 ^{◊◊}	N/A	4.8	-2.1 ^{◊◊}
Readiness for dialogue with people from Crimea	N/A	N/A	N/A	4.3	N/A

[◊] Changes smaller than 0.5 points should not be interpreted and could be considered within the margin of error due to small method, translation and/or sampling effects.

^{◊◊} Scores are not meaningfully comparable across years, please read the clarifications in the footnotes.

^{◊◊◊} The wording of these indicators in the questionnaire was revised. Thus, the scores are not always fully comparable. Please read the clarifications in the footnotes for further details.


Positive changes are marked in shades of blue, negative changes in shades of yellow, and non-significant (less than 0.5) changes in grey.

Geopolitical Aspirations

As evident from Table 13 and Figure 21, the geopolitical orientations of citizens in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts differ from the national trends. The optimism of 2019 and the reduction in hostilities can help explain, at least in part, the dip in the support for non-aligned status, where residents felt safer to take a pro-EU and pro-NATO stance. Yet, by 2021, support for non-aligned status peaked as the preferred option for Donetsk and Luhansk residents, as it is likely to be perceived as the safer option when tensions escalate, compared to pro-EU or pro-NATO options. Other explanations for the relative preference for this option include the limited progress on European integration, as well as fatigue due to conflict, economic instability and divisive narratives. The second ranking geopolitical orientation is support for joining the Eurasian Economic Union. Although the preference for EEU membership is not low, it has shown a steady decline over the past five years.

¹¹⁵These indicators are rescaled in 2017 and 2018 in order to ensure comparability with 2021, and the mean scores presented are therefore different to those published previously or elsewhere. Between 2017-18, as opposed to 2021, the response scale for these questionnaire items was altered from "No", "Yes", "Don't Know" to "No", "Yes", "Maybe".

Figure 21. Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts changes in geopolitical orientations




Moreover, New Europe Centre and SeeD’s joint 2020 study on European identity and attitudes in Donbas argued that low support for Ukraine’s EU membership did not necessarily indicate low support for the EU or Euro-scepticism in Donbas; it also reflects the extent to which citizens feel that Ukraine is ready to join and follow European values and abide by higher standards of rule of law¹¹⁶. The report also highlights the anxieties about the regions’ competitiveness with the European market and about being used as a bargaining chip in larger political plays between the EU and Russia. These findings corroborate the aforementioned interpretation of the trends, that in times of crisis, EU membership is assessed as riskier than remaining non-aligned, and in times of relative peace and optimism, EU membership is assessed as an opportunity.

Reintegration Preferences

Overall, preferences about the future of the NGCA have remained stable across time in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Support for scenarios of NGCA reintegration, either as part of Ukraine with similar status to other oblasts, or with special status, is higher in these eastern oblasts compared to the national level. Although the steep increase in support for unconditional reintegration observed at the national level is not observed at the regional level, there is a consistent, stronger desire for reintegration and a longing for unification. While unconditional reintegration is by far the most popular preference, special status receives moderate support from the residents of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. Although higher than the national scores, support for scenarios of independence and becoming part of Russia receive little support in the eastern oblasts as well. Maintaining the current status quo is the least supported scenario both at national and regional level.

¹¹⁶Zarembo, Kateryna. 2020. “European Donbas: How to Talk about European Integration in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions.” https://api.scoreforpeace.org/storage/pdfs/PUB_DGEUKR19_FES_NewEurope_European_Donbas_eng.pdf.

Figure 22. Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (GCA) changes in future visions for the NGCA:




Reconciliation Attitudes

Donetsk and Luhansk citizens' readiness for dialogue with other groups is moderate and generally in line with the readiness expressed by Ukrainians in other oblasts. The most striking difference is that people from eastern oblasts are much more open to dialogue with pro-Russia people and, more importantly, with their neighbours in the NGCA. Unfortunately, and in line with the national trends, there is an emerging decline in readiness for dialogue with all groups. Rather than reflecting an increase in tension (See the chapter on Civic Behaviours and Intergroup Harmony), this decline is likely due to the loss of faith in the dividends of dialogue as a process and its perception as a time and resource-heavy investment, suggesting that reconciliation actions (both policy and programmatic) should be instantaneously prioritised. Additional reasons that may explain the decline in readiness for dialogue compared to 2018 could include growing fatigue due to conflict, along with reduced possibilities for meaningful dialogue given the current COVID-19 realities, such as difficulties with crossings, anxieties around person-to-person contact and the challenges of virtual dialogue.

Still, other SCORE research focussing on the impact of COVID on intergroup relations using 2021 SCORE data from the NGCA¹¹⁷ revealed no variance between GCA and NGCA respondents of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts when it comes to openness to dialogue, which signals promising opportunities for peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts. To help inform such efforts more granularly, the heatmap below illustrates citizens' readiness for dialogue at the urban level in the two oblasts. Druzhkivka and Mariinka seem to have the most fertile environment for launching reconciliation initiatives, and potentially piloting new and innovative approaches that can help restore faith in the dividends of dialogue.

¹¹⁷Please see other SCORE Ukraine publications [here](#).

Figure 23. Readiness for dialogue with people living in the NGCA in 2021.



Conclusions

The SCORE findings presented in this report are limited to diagnostics and trends that do not dig deeper into each theme and demographic disaggregation. The data is analysed under the four main chapters of governance and services, human security, civic behaviours and intergroup harmony, and geopolitical aspirations, reintegration and reconciliation, the findings of which are presented in the Executive Summary. The key trends and next steps for the SCORE Ukraine research are reiterated below.

- Trust in central institutions is generally low across the country at a score 2.4 out of 10, and has decreased in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts since 2019.
- Although faring better than central institutions, confidence in local institutions is below the midpoint at 4.4 out of 10, but has increased since 2018 at the national level. In Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts trust towards newly elected heads of cities or towns is higher or at the same level compared to 2019.
- Satisfaction with public services is mediocre at 5.8 out of 10 at the national level, with some western oblasts faring slightly above the national average and some eastern and southern oblasts slightly below.
- Justice services are considered inefficient across the country at 4.7 out of 10, while the provision of administrative services and welfare payments are perceived as the most efficient, at 6.8 and 6.6 respectively.
- Scepticism towards reforms stood at 6.5 out of 10 in 2021, experiencing an increase since 2018. Support for reforms dropped compared to previous years, and is notably lower in Kharkiv, Odesa, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and along the 'contact line'.
- Trust is sensitive to cycles of election optimism and discontent, while support for reforms is waning, calling for increased visibility and transparency on governance and reform processes. Trust is not 'automatically' linked to service delivery and improvement in service delivery needs to prove its consistency and longevity to translate into trust and confidence in institutions.
- Economic, health, environmental and personal security, have moderate scores between 4.5 and 5.0 out of 10 at the national level, and are all lower along the 'contact line' in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
- Political security is comparatively higher than other human security dimensions at a score of 6.5, and is also the only human security dimension that shows a clear upward trend, particularly between 2017 and 2019 in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
- Economic and health security experienced a downturn at the national level since 2018, predated but also exacerbated by COVID-19.
- The sustained decline in economic and health security, both prior to and following the COVID-19 pandemic, demonstrate a need for renewed commitments to economic recovery and investments in service delivery.
- Social tolerance has consistently improved across the years, and citizens are growing more cooperative at the local level, more tolerant and inclusive of minority groups, and more supportive of an equal role for women in society
- Yet, tolerance towards drug addicts, LGBTQI+ people, and Roma remains low and there is a marked increase in passive citizenship orientation (i.e. apathy towards current affairs and withdrawal from civic life or engagement) at the national level.
- Support for EU membership is the first choice among Ukrainians at the national level, and people in western Ukraine are notably more positive about the benefits and stability of the EU.
- In Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, support for EU membership was the third most popular choice in 2021, preceded by non-aligned status and EEU membership, and has decreased since 2019, calling for consideration into the concerns of residents of Donetsk and Luhansk.
- Overall, there is a decrease in readiness for dialogue, which could signal conflict fatigue, civic apathy, loss of faith in the process as well as the pandemic's impact on peacebuilding. Yet, this decrease also demonstrates a strong need for investing in creative and localised reconciliation and confidence building measures.

- Certain groups remain vulnerable to exclusion and citizens are becoming increasingly passive, requiring sustained dedication to reconciliation and confidence building measures in order to combat conflict fatigue and apathy.
- The most preferred confidence building measures include broadcasting to improve access to Ukrainian media sources in the detached communities, followed by support for admission of students, which is much stronger in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts compared to the rest of the country.
- High priority oblasts that are experiencing low scores and hardship when it comes to human security and service delivery interventions:
 - Donetsk and Luhansk, especially closer to the 'contact line'
 - Kirovohrad and Zakarpattia,
 - Odesa and Poltava
- High priority oblasts requiring interventions to promote social tolerance, LGBTQI+ rights and active citizenship:
 - Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia
 - Sumy and Kharkiv
 - Zakarpattia
- High priority oblasts where reconciliation, dialogue and confidence building measures in relation to NGCA and Crimea can be piloted to build momentum due to strong openness for dialogue:
 - Donetsk
 - Odesa and Kherson
 - Kyiv

In addition to these diagnostic trends, one of SCORE's vices includes its advanced statistical toolkit that uses cluster analysis (population segmentation) and predictive analysis (regressions, structured equation models) to help identify more precise policy and programmatic recommendations and entry points with greater likelihood of impact. Such advanced analysis is better suited for in-depth thematic reports based on the rich SCORE dataset. As such, the SCORE team compliments this Trends Report with other publications, including but not limited to the below, many of which can be found online or will be released online in early 2022:

- COVID-19 Vaccine Support and Hesitation in Ukraine
- Land Reform in Ukraine: Attitudes & Expectations
- Social Cohesion in Ukraine Volume I: Defining and measuring social cohesion using the SCORE
- Social Cohesion in Ukraine Volume II: Entry points to improving social cohesion in Ukraine
- Empowering Persons with Disabilities in Eastern Ukraine: Identifying the pathways to economic, civic and social equality
- Reintegrating ATO & JFO Veterans: Identifying and overcoming challenges
- Understanding and fostering constructive citizenship in Ukraine
- Understanding media consumption patterns and preferences across Ukraine
- Drivers of migration tendencies
- 18 urban centre infographic profiles across in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Odesa and Zaporizhzhia oblasts that provide a specific focus on the needs and strengths of these urban centres.

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