




UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR CITIZEN-STATE UNITY:



BASED ON
RESCORE 2023
AND SCORE 2021
SURVEYS



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AND SCORE 2021 SURVEYS**

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The views, conclusions, and recommendations presented in this document do not necessarily reflect the position of USAID, UNDP, or their partners.

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ABOUT RESCORE

reSCORE Ukraine, which is a joint initiative funded by the USAID and UNDP, and implemented by SeeD, serves as an annual assessment tool of societal resilience and recovery aimed at informing the policies and programming of national, regional, and international partners. Like its predecessor, the Ukraine SCORE 2018 to 2021, it aims to identify pathways to meaningful change and respond to complex needs, geared at strengthening individual and collective coping mechanisms, and fostering a democratic, just, inclusive, and cohesive Ukraine.

ABOUT PARTNERS

Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD) works with international development organizations, governments, and civil society leaders to design and implement evidence-based, people-centered strategies for the development of peaceful, inclusive, and sustainable societies. Working in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, SeeD provides policy advice for social transformation that is based on citizen engagement strategies and empirical understanding of the behaviour of individuals, groups, and communities. SeeD's approach focuses on understanding the root causes of social problems by developing and empirically testing a science-based theory of change.

Democratic Governance East Activity (DG East) is an 8-year programme of The United States Agency for International Development (USAID). DG East works with civil society, local government entities, and independent media outlets in and from eastern and southern Ukraine to strengthen the connection and trust between citizens and their government. The overall objectives of DG East are to 1) support greater acceptance of a shared civic culture based on common values and understanding; and 2) promote participation to improve Ukraine's governance, reform processes, and help resolve community problems. The programme addresses immediate war-response needs, promotes good governance, and strengthens an inclusive civic identity.

USAID's Transformation Communications Activity (TCA) is a six-year activity of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which aims to strengthen Ukrainian democracy through comprehensive research, innovative com-

munication initiatives, and the creation of socially meaningful content.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supports strategic capacity development initiatives to promote inclusive growth and sustainable human development. Through partnerships with national, regional, and local governments, civil society, and the private sector, UNDP strives to support Ukraine in its efforts to eliminate poverty, develop the population's capacity, achieve equitable results, sustain the environment, and advance democratic governance.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Citizen-State Unity is a multi-dimensional normative framework that aims to capture the acceptance of state authority as legitimate and the existence of shared moral values and public motivations. This conceptual and analytical paper aims to do three things:

- a. evaluate the state of Citizen-State Unity in Ukraine in 2023 compared to 2021 by building a measurable and quantifiable concept based on relevant literature and international good practices, using the (re)SCORE Ukraine datasets to diagnose strengths, weaknesses, and trends;
- b. investigate the drivers of Citizen-State Unity and what they reveal about the nature of the Social Contract; and
- c. assess how the nature of the Social Contract has changed since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, offering a comparative evaluation using the reSCORE 2023 and the SCORE 2021 datasets to understand the impact of such far-reaching and traumatic events on citizen-state relations.

The paper builds the CSU concept based on seven dimensions drawn from SCORE Ukraine indicators, organised under three categories:

Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles Category

1. **Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity** embodies the notion of a shared political community.

2. **Election Efficacy** pertains to the perception of legality and conformity to rules, particularly regarding the democratic succession of power through elections, which is viewed as an effective mechanism for transferring power.
3. **Support for Political Rights** measures the fundamental backing for democratic principles, such as freedom of religion, expression, and peaceful protest, which manifest the people's role as the ultimate source of authority.

Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions Category

4. **Ukrainian Authorities Care** signifies the existence of a common interest between citizens and authorities, which is crucial for the perceived justifiability of the state's rules.
5. **Trust in Central Institutions** promotes the belief that the country's rules are justifiable, as they are established by trustworthy institutions.
6. **Trust in Hromada Institutions** reflects an object of legitimacy frequently encountered by citizens but usually overlooked in legitimacy studies.

Quasi-Behavioural Civic Category

7. **Sense of Civic Adherence** evaluates quasi-behavioural aspects of CSU by examining the perception that fellow citizens voluntarily adhere to state authority through ethical behaviour, such as conscientious tax payment.

The first three dimensions are diffuse and represent the nation- and system-de-

fining aspects of Citizen-State Unity, deeply entrenched in societal beliefs and values. They are collectively referred to as the dimension on Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles. The next three dimensions pertain to specific state entities and are grouped under the category of Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions. The seventh and the final dimension, Sense of Civic Adherence, extends beyond attitudes to encompass perceptions of behaviour at a specific level. This is labelled as the Quasi-Behavioural Civic Category. It is 'quasi' because it does not measure the actions of respondents *per se* but rather the perception of the actions of people in society.

The analysis presented in Chapter 1 of Citizen-State Unity in Ukraine reveals robust and consistent Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles category. However, certain dimensions related to Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions and the quasi-behavioural Sense of Civic Adherence exhibit volatility and indicate areas for improvement. The analysis shows that efforts to strengthen the Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions category should prioritise the sense that authorities care for citizens and common good, and shared interest, ensuring that citizens feel heard, and their views being represented.

The analysis presented in Chapter 2 looks at the drivers of Citizen-State Unity, in particular Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions. Comparing the effect size between the two time points, we observe that many expectations of citizens from the state remained the same between 2023 and 2021. These expectations include a. provision of personal security from violence in daily life and legal protection in the form of efficient justice services; b. effective service provision, health

and economic security, and c. access and participation in political decisions at the local level. At the same time, the importance and influence of some of the expectations on Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions have changed. Two changes are particularly noteworthy. Firstly, there is an increased desire for inclusiveness and anti-corruption, with an emphasised expectation that high-level officials should prioritise the common good over private gains. Secondly, there is an increased emphasis on pursuing the European path. These trends indicate evolving societal expectations and suggest areas where policy efforts can be focused to strengthen the social contract and enhance Citizen-State Unity. In other words, to cultivate positive Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions, anticorruption and inclusiveness together with reforms and efforts for EU integration should be at the forefront of policy making. It should be further supported by effective service delivery and physical safety.

The Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles category represents the perception of the state as a political entity characterized by shared community, principles, and values. The analysis revealed key drivers of this dimension that include a. an optimistic outlook on the future and the future of the Ukrainian political community within the EU, b. critical thinking and intolerance towards corruption, c. satisfactory experience with locality, and d. human security. Horizontal relations, particularly the belief in the necessity of constructive dialogue and the mutual benefits of engaging in such dialogue with various political and geographic groups, are critical for the Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles category. An important nuanced finding to add to our understanding of drivers is that while constructive dialogue with different groups became a more influential driver in 2023 compared

to 2021, the influence of individual's strong community relations and networks as a driver has diminished. This may be due to an increased harmonisation and prioritisation of seeing and relating to the whole nation rather than focusing on smaller settlement or community level networks and relations.

The Sense of Civic Adherence shares more common drivers with the Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions category than the Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles category. It is positively associated with a strong, protective, and inclusive state, as well as constructive horizontal relations and an optimistic outlook for the future. Furthermore, it tends to be more positive when individuals perceive fair treatment and do not heavily rely on traditional media sources like television.

Thus, we observe that the diffuse and specific dimensions of Citizen-State Unity have different sources (i.e., drivers). While the specific dimensions including Trust in Central Institutions, Ukrainian Authorities Care, and Trust in Hromada Institutions are more closely linked to immediate social outcomes, the diffuse dimensions including Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity, Election Efficacy, and Support for Political Rights are more deeply rooted in personal attributes, experiences, and horizontal relations.

The practical implications of the study's findings on Citizen-State Unity and the Social Contract suggest strategic approaches for programme design and implementation. The findings emphasise the necessity of tailored strategies to address specific sources within the multi-dimensional framework. The study highlights the importance of strengthening particular dimensions, such as Trust in Central Institutions and the perception that Ukrainian Authorities Care about their citizens.

The research advocates for coordinated efforts to foster trust through care, which can be achieved by effectively combating grand corruption, improving service provision, ensuring daily safety, and increasing citizen engagement in political decision-making at the local level. Additionally, the dimensions related to the Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles would benefit from fostering constructive horizontal relations between various political and geographical groups.

Furthermore, the study recommends embracing European integration, noting respondents' strong preference for Ukraine's future within the EU. Regional policies should be tailored to specific regions based on their scores and dynamics regarding key dimensions of Citizen-State Unity.

Strategic communication should focus on grounded, truthful messaging that reflects societal realities. The study also suggests using the operationalised dimensions as a tool for monitoring programme effects, thereby capturing this elusive social phenomenon of citizen-state unity and social contract. Future research avenues include exploring citizens' perceptions by public authorities and conducting multimodal discourse analysis.

INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR CITIZEN-STATE UNITY AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

What is Citizen-State Unity?

The concept of Citizen-State Unity emerges from centuries of discourse on legitimacy and political support. It is normative, suggesting the acceptance of state authority as inherently right or good, deserving of voluntary support (Lamb 2014, 15; McCullough 2015, 7). The Citizen-State Unity transcends mere cost-benefit calculations, reflecting a collective order in which individuals are embedded, rooted in notions of the common good or shared moral values (Haldenwang 2016, 6). In this framework, reasons for action are 'public' and shared within society, which can restrict or supersede certain forms of private motivation and interest-based reasoning (Marquez 2016, 24).

The importance of normative considerations for individuals' behaviour is illustrated by one experiment. In a study where day-care centers introduced fines on parents arriving late to collect their children, leading to teachers staying beyond official closing hours, the number of tardy parents not only failed to decrease as anticipated but actually increased (Gneezy and Rus-

tichini 2000, 5-8). The introduction of penalties (and similarly, the offer of rewards) altered the perception of the situation from one of a generous, non-market activity by kind-hearted teachers to one with a quantifiable price, diminishing feelings of guilt (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000, 13-14). This example highlights that people do respond to rewards and penalties, especially in the short run, but they are also motivated by what they believe is right. The punitive measure removes the relational and normative aspect and, instead, makes it based on the personal interests which are short-term and transactional. In this way this example aligns with the CSU concept, which emphasises that people are self-motivated to behave in ways consistent with their own views of what is right and wrong. The systems of rules and relationships that reflect these views tend to be less costly and more stable in the long run than the systems based on volatile private interests and (dis)incentives, highlighting the value and the rationale for the investigation of CSU and sustaining its high level.

Social Contract for Citizen-State Unity:

The social contract denotes the implicit agreement between the state and its citizens concerning their rights, duties, roles, and obligations (Loewe, Zintl, and Houdret 2021, 3; Mezzera, Sogge, and Lister 2016, 9). Given that CSU reflects the citizen-

ry's assessment of the state, our emphasis is on citizens' expectations from the state, which is one side of the social contract 'relationship coin'. The other side of the coin relates to the state's expectations from citizens. A healthy social contract calls for the

alignment of these expectations. However, this is not the focus of this paper, and it is subject to future research.

The state of Citizen-State Unity can be assessed and understood by looking at the diagnostic findings (i.e., scores and percentages) of its components making up its dimensions. Comparing these diagnostic findings across years also helps us understand how CSU has changed/is changing. However, it is also crucial to investigate the drivers of CSU, to be able to understand the shape and the contours of the social contract, and identify what citizens effectively expect from the state to cultivate their sense of unity, alignment, and acceptance of the state. Employing statistical modeling to identify CSU drivers provides us with

those factors that have statistically significant influence driving or undermining the state of CSU in Ukraine. We argue that these drivers mirror citizens' expectations from the state, thus providing a clear direction on how policies and programmes can be tailored to nurture current unity levels. Enriching the analysis further, we go beyond comparing diagnostics to understand trends and compare changes in drivers or in the influence of those drivers. This analysis that compares parameter changes of the models from 2021 to 2023 help us detect social contract shifts, especially in response to Russia's full-scale war, and prioritise investments and efforts with the greatest likelihood of positive impact of CSU.

Why should we care?

Weak citizen-state unity, akin to less legitimate states, can adversely affect **political stability**, potentially leading to citizen mobilisation and social, economic, and political turbulence (Blanco-González, Payne, and Prado-Román 2019, 124; McCullough 2015, 7). This can also impact **governance quality**, as state officials may prioritise maintaining power over effectively managing institutions, requiring more resources for self-preservation (Blanco-González, Payne, and Prado-Román 2019, 124; McCullough 2015, 7). Conversely, strong citizen-state unity should lead to better governance outcomes, as officials have trust to conduct reforms and even take unpopular measures for the better of the country (Blanco-González, Payne, and Prado-Román 2019, 124). This unity adds a moral or normative component to citizen-state relations, fostering more sustainable cooperation compared to relationships based on repression, coercion, or material incentives (Marquez 2016, 21). With a strong unity, states can rely on cit-

izens' consent to implement policies and reforms, even amidst disagreement from certain groups (McCullough 2015, 7). This creates a virtuous cycle, where improved governance strengthens the sense of vertical unity and legitimacy, further enhancing governance (McCloughlin 2015, 343).

Strong bonds between the state and citizens also contribute to **national resilience** (Kimhi and Eshel 2019, 519), crucial for withstanding external military aggression, such as the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This unity provides intangible assets motivating people to collaborate with the state for common purposes. Thus, nurturing citizen-state unity is vital not only for enhancing political stability in Ukraine, which is a target of Russia's disinformation campaigns, but also for promoting reforms, crucial for EU integration. It also plays a key role in sustaining effective **resistance** against Russia's military aggression.

Focus of this paper

This paper is both conceptual and analytical. It uses empirical evidence to test and validate the theories and hypotheses around citizen-state unity and social contract. As such, while investigating and diagnosing its state and drivers, the paper

also looks at how theoretical and conceptual foundations apply (or not) to the context of Ukraine. The paper focuses on the research questions and hypotheses presented below.

Research questions:

1. What is the state of Citizen-State Unity in Ukraine in 2023 compared to 2021?
2. What are the drivers of Citizen-State Unity and what do they tell us about the nature of Social Contract?
3. How has the nature of the Social Contract changed since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine?

Theoretical and analytical hypotheses:

► *Citizen-State Unity*

1. *Multi-dimensionality hypothesis:* Citizen-State Unity is a multi-dimensional concept encompassing various levels (Beetham 1991, 15-25; Booth and Seligson 2009, 8-14; Dalton 2004, 22-25; Lamb 2014, 28-30; Norris 1999, 9-13). Neglecting its multi-dimensionality risks oversimplifying and rendering the concept impractical. For instance, measuring Unity solely through trust in authorities may suggest that dissatisfaction with them could lead to state disintegration (Booth and Seligson 2009, 1-3; Dalton 2004, 1-5). However, this overlooks electoral mechanisms that allow for changing poorly performing authorities. Therefore, recognising the diverse dimensions and levels is crucial, as they each uniquely contribute to CSU. Using a Confirmatory Factor Analysis, we test the multi-dimensional nature of the CSU.
2. *Resilience dynamics hypothesis:* The diffuse and systematic levels of Citizen-State Unity are expected to

demonstrate enduring support, maintaining stability even during periods of public discontent with specific institutions and actors (Booth and Seligson 2009, 59; Dalton 2004, 24). This resilience is anticipated to enhance the overall stability of the political community and system. To test this hypothesis, we look at the state of support of diffuse and specific dimensions of CSU among the respondents and how it changed since 2021. In addition, we look at the strength of relations between various dimensions to establish how they are susceptible to the values of other dimensions.

► *Social Contract*

3. *Unique sources of CSU hypothesis:* In the Social Contract framework, the specific level of institutions and actors are expected to derive their sources from specific social outcomes (services, security, absence of corruption, etc.), while the diffuse dimensions are more entrenched in horizontal relations, personal values, and experiences (Booth and Seligson

2009, 14-15). These sources are elaborated with the hypotheses below.

4. *Protection hypothesis*: This hypothesis emphasises the state's monopoly on violence to ensure the physical survival of its citizens, which may manifest in the need for safety from external threats or from crimes within the country (Loewe, Zintl, and Houdret 2021). This security is ensured by the state's capacity to enforce the monopoly of violence and laws throughout its territory (Cloutier et al. 2021). Therefore, we expect that protection would be one of the drivers of CSU, especially its specific dimensions. The need for protection is also expected to have increased due to the full-scale invasion by Russia compared to the pre-war situation.
5. *Inclusiveness hypothesis*: The role of inclusiveness, defined as a social contract that benefits the broader population and common goals rather than selected private interests (Cloutier et al. 2021), is expected to be more pronounced compared to pre-war values given the common goal to ensure the survival of the state. One clear manifestation of this hypothesis could be increased desire for anti-corruption measures, as fair use of public assets is closely linked to prioritisation of common good over private gains or enrichment.
6. *Participation hypothesis*: During times of war, there is a heightened desire for civic participation in political decision-making (Loewe, Zintl, and Houdret 2021, 6). The reason for this increased desire for agency to influence these decisions is threefold: a. due to the direct impact political decisions have on individuals' lives; b. a response to marshal law that may curb or delay elections; and c. individual initiatives, horizontal networks, and volunteering, which are integral to resilience and resistance efforts, often increase the need for collaboration with the state for common purposes.
7. *EU integration hypothesis*: The desire for EU integration is anticipated to go beyond pragmatic and political choices, reflecting a deeper civilisational decision since the full-scale Russian invasion (Sydorenko 2022). The desire to move in the Western direction rather than remaining a bridge or non-aligned between Russia and the West is expected to become part of the Social Contract via becoming a national expectation beyond a political orientation. Therefore, it is expected to drive both diffuse and specific dimensions.
8. *Thickness hypothesis*: The thickness hypothesis emphasizes the role of the state in providing public services, goods, and wealth redistribution (Cloutier et al. 2021, 28). If a state is deeply involved in these processes, it is considered thick, contrary to the thin state. Previous studies have shown that respondents in Ukraine prefer a thick state (Brik and Krymeniuk 2019). This paper tests whether this is still the case under the current conditions.
9. *Harmonious horizontal relations hypothesis*: Harmonious relations between various political and geographic groups are crucial to make people feel part of a common 'imagined' community with shared core foundational views on the political organisation of the system. The role of this sense of belonging and horizontal harmony is expected to become stronger in Ukraine compared to the situation before the full-scale Russian invasion.

This paper is organized along the following chapters to answer the research questions above:

Chapter 1: Investigation of Citizen-State Unity. This chapter is conceptual. It ex-

plores the theoretical foundation of Citizen-State Unity, defines its state based on reSCORE 2023 data, and examines its dynamics, trends, and evolution.

Chapter 2: Deeper investigation of the drivers of Citizen-State Unity. This chapter is theoretical and based on statistical analysis. It uncovers the shape and nature of social contract by investigating the drivers of Citizen-State Unity.

Chapter 3: Practical implications of results and next steps. This chapter presents the main findings and offers practical recommendations for policymakers aiming to strengthen state-citizen relations and resilience. It also outlines the next steps for utilising the developed Social Contract instruments for monitoring, evaluation, learning, and strategic communication. Additionally, it explores opportunities for further research on the resilience of the social contract.

By comparing the two datasets, first two chapters aim to analyse how the Social Contract and Citizen-State Unity have changed after the Russian full-scale invasion in comparison to the period before. While chapter one looks at this from a diagnostic perspective and compares the level of the CSU components, the second chapter looks at it from the drivers' perspective and compares the extent to which influence of different drivers on CSU has changed between the two time points. The third chapter offers recommendations for incorporating these insights into program design and suggests areas for further research.

CITIZEN-STATE UNITY: THE CONCEPT AND TRENDS

1.1. The concept of Citizen-State Unity: theory and operationalisation

The chapter's objective is to elucidate the discourse about citizen-state unity and operationalise the concept using the (re) SCORE indicators, enabling deeper analysis. Given the link between citizen-state unity and legitimacy, we first explore normative and empirical approaches to the concept, and then its multi-dimensionality and structure, relations between the dimensions, and the possible interpretation of values for them.

Normative and empirical approaches:

There are two primary approaches to evaluating legitimacy. The first approach is normative¹ approach, suggesting that political actors, institutions, or orders must meet specific ideal conditions and standards to be deemed legitimate (McCullough 2015, 7). In this approach, the researcher establishing the reference standards assumes that the population being studied shares their normative views on legitimacy or considers their opinions irrelevant (Lamb 2015, 31). The normative approach often aligns with Western liberal values, such as democratic elections and respect for hu-

man rights (McCullough 2015, 7). However, even if we ask citizens to evaluate the state of democratic values, their commitment to these ideals does not necessarily indicate the extent to which state actors and institutions act according to these ideals (Mishler and Rose 2001, 305). Consequently, since the 1990s, this approach has faced increasing scrutiny from scholars and practitioners (McCullough 2015, 7).

The second approach to legitimacy is the realist or empirical approach, which considers legitimacy as determined by both the governed and the authorities in a society. This approach focuses on people's perceptions of actors, institutions, or the political order (McCullough 2015, 8). However, relying solely on individuals' beliefs, as in Max Weber's understanding of legitimacy, risks biases inherent in measuring opinions. It also assumes that ordinary people understand the concepts of legitimacy or citizen-state unity, which even scholars themselves often struggle with (Beetham 1991, 13). Moreover, this approach would suggest that legitimacy lies in the hands of

¹ When we refer to Citizen-State Unity (CSU) or legitimacy as a normative concept, we mean that it provides normative or moral grounds for voluntarily following rules and supporting the political order. The specific content of these grounds, whether they involve certain values or other considerations, is not explicitly defined. However, when discussing approaches to legitimacy, the normative approach refers to an assessment conducted in reference to predefined normative ideals shared by the researcher, which often include democratic values and ideals.

authorities and successful public relations campaigns, emphasising presentation over reality (Beetham 1991, 9). According to this perspective, one can conclude that the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, for instance, was mostly due to a deficiency in public relations, rather than any inherent flaws in the system of rule itself (ibid). This underscores that while beliefs are crucial, they should not be directly assessed for legitimacy. Instead, the focus should be on whether the power relationship in society aligns with people's beliefs (Beetham 1991, 11). Additionally, legitimacy extends beyond attitudes and perceptions to encompass actions and behaviours, a point that will be elaborated upon when constructing the dimensions of Citizen-State Unity below.

In this paper, citizen-state unity conceptualisation falls somewhere in-between the two approaches. The multi-dimensional concept we build in this paper seeks to evaluate citizen-state unity against pre-defined criteria (or dimensions), providing a manifestation of citizen-state unity that aligns with the normative approach. However, the evidence is based on a household perception survey with criteria that are sufficiently flexible to allow citizens to evaluate dimensions of unity from their own perspective, which also speaks to the empirical approach and leaves room for contextual peculiarities to emerge without over-prescribing the notion and its components.

Multiple dimensions: The concept of Citizen-State Unity in this study is viewed as multi-dimensional. While researchers acknowledge the multi-dimensional nature of legitimacy, empirical measurements often focus on a single dimension, typically using a few items related to 'trust in government.' However, this limitation is more likely due to constraints in questionnaire design than to strong theoretical arguments against the multi-dimensional perspective (Booth and

Seligson 2009, 10). Similarly, the practical value of considering legitimacy and Citizen-State Unity (CSU) as multi-dimensional concepts is evident in two examples.

Booth and Seligson addressed the 'legitimacy puzzle' in their book, which concerns the declining mass support for politicians, government, and public institutions in stable democracies since the 1960s. According to legitimacy theory, if legitimacy is equated solely with such support, its erosion should have observable effects on political stability. However, collapse was nowhere near in these countries, and widespread anti-system protest activity was uncommon (Booth and Seligson 2009, 1-3; Dalton 2004, 1-5). This discrepancy arises because various dimensions of legitimacy do not necessarily operate in unison. Individuals may be dissatisfied with the performance of state institutions and political leaders, yet still strongly believe in their political communities and principles (Booth and Seligson 2009, 257).

Similarly, Russia miscalculated Ukraine's response when planning its full-scale military aggression, relying in part on low support for authorities and public institutions. They hoped that Ukrainians would not object if the political parties and politicians they distrusted were replaced by occupation administrations (Reynolds and Watling 2022). However, not only the perceptions of authorities can change, such as the 'rallying round the flag' effect, in response to existential threats (Chatagnier 2012), but also legitimacy of the state is not solely based on support for authorities and public institutions. It encompasses other more systemic dimensions that citizens highly value like the sense of political community or shared political principles and values.

Structure of Citizen-State Unity: David Easton delineated two primary domains of political support, as summarised by Booth

and Seligson: diffuse support, which encompasses attitudes toward the political community and the regime (or political system), and specific support, which is oriented toward the performance of political authorities (Booth and Seligson 2009, 9). There are nation-forming and systemic levels, which are more diffuse and abstract, as well as more concrete levels involving specific institutions, political leaders, or actors, which are more volatile and reactive to immediate factors and events. As such, this distinction is helpful in understanding different sources of legitimacy and to study distinct consequences.

The sense of **political community** is foundational, providing a deep attachment to the nation beyond current government structures, and a willingness to cooperate politically (Norris 1999, 10). This feeling represents a group coming together to establish a constitution to govern their political relationships. While the structure of these relationships can change, as long as members feel connected to the group as a whole, they support the ongoing existence of the political community (Dalton 2004, 5-6). This sense of belonging to the 'imagined community' is crucial. It extends beyond citizens' relationships with the state to include social norms, which are deeply ingrained and resistant to change (Brunnermeier 2021, 47). Further, a common identity is instrumental in sustaining implicit social norms, as when individuals identify with a group rather than acting solely out of self-interest, they build sense of solidarity, which can significantly contribute to resilience during crises (Brunnermeier 2021, 47-48; Kimhi and Eshel 2019, 519). The sense of political community is operationalised using the **Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity** indicator of reSCORE. This indicator assesses the degree to which individuals believe that everyone living in Ukraine, regardless of their ethnic or religious background, is equally Ukrainian,

and that those living in Ukraine have always been one people despite historical conflicts and divisions.

From a legal perspective, legitimacy equates to legal validity, meaning power is considered legitimate if it is *acquired* and *exercised* in accordance with the law. David Beetham's framework identifies **conformity to established rules** as an important dimension (Beetham 1991, 4). When this condition is not met, such as in cases of rule breaches, the power is deemed illegitimate (Beetham 1991, 16). This aspect of legitimacy provides a sense of predictability, as people are aware of the rules and confident in their non-arbitrary enforcement (Lamb 2014, 28-29). The acquisition of power, the first part of legal validity, is measured by reSCORE through the **Election Efficacy** indicator. This indicator assesses respondents' belief that their vote can make a difference, along with the behavioural aspect of casting a ballot during elections. Legal validity at a more specific level is manifested in a daily exercise of power according to the rules and law. It can be measured with trust in courts and police as law enforcement institutions, following Bruce Gilley's measurement (2006, 62). Our conceptualisation does not include a separate indicator to measure this dimension as trust in courts and police correlate with trust in other public institutions such as the president, parliament, government, local institutions, which was used to construct other dimensions (i.e., Trust in Central Institutions and Trust in Hromada Institutions). This may indicate a close relationship in Ukraine between the enforcement and establishment of rules, and thus the institutions responsible for these functions, which are usually divided to maintain a system of balances and checks. Therefore, the exercise of power according to the rules is taken into account in our model in the form of trust in courts, however, not as a separate dimension,

contrary to conceptual expectation, but as a part of Trust in Central Institutions.

While conformity to rules is a necessary condition for legitimacy and vertical unity, it is not sufficient. The rules themselves should be perceived as morally justified and shared by citizens. This aspect is central to most accounts of legitimacy, reflecting people's judgments of what is right, good, and admirable, and thus deserving of their support (Lamb 2014, 29). This introduces calls for another dimension, namely **the justifiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs**. When there is a discrepancy between rules and supporting beliefs, or when shared beliefs are absent, power relations experience a legitimacy deficit (Beetham 1991, 17-18). For instance, the British first-past-the-post electoral system suffers from a legitimacy deficit because it produces results that differ from the proportion of votes cast, contradicting beliefs in the representative purpose of elections (Beetham 1991, 11).

David Beetham highlights three considerations relevant to the justifiability of rules: one concerns the authoritative sources of rules, and the other two concern the content of rules. In the case of Ukraine, the **authoritative source of rules** is internal, stemming from society at present,² which is common in contemporary democratic societies (Beetham 1991, 75). To operationalise this dimension, we refer to democratic values, which have people as the ultimate source of rules. Ukraine's Constitution declares the country as a democrat-

ic state in its first article (Ukraine's Constitution, art. 1). Similarly, other conceptual frameworks measure the regime principles through basic democratic values like freedom, participation, tolerance, moderation, respect for legal-institutional rights, and the rule of law (Norris 1999, 11), which would correspond to the Beetham's dimension about authoritative source of rules. We operationalise this dimension with the reSCORE indicator called **Support for Political Rights**, which assesses individuals' beliefs about the importance and necessity of various rights and freedoms in society, including freedom of religion, freedom of expression without censorship, and the right to engage in peaceful protest.³ These measurements allow us to estimate support for key democratic principles embedded in Ukraine's Constitution (Ukraine's Constitution, art. 34, 35, 39).

The justification for rules extends beyond their sources. Their content also matters. Rules should justify the access of those in power to essential resources, activities, and positions (principle of differentiation) and serve the common interest of society (principle of common interest). The principle of differentiation establishes the qualities that make those in power suitable to exercise authority, separating the lives and powers of rulers and the ruled. In contrast, the principle of common interest links the state with its citizens (Beetham 1991, 77-90).

To measure the **principle of common interest**, we use the **Ukrainian Authorities Care** indicator, which assesses the extent

2 The society at present refers to the representatives of people while the society in the past as a source of rules refers to tradition which conveys authorities upon 'elders' and those whose role is to study and perpetuate a society's cultural legacy.

3 This dimension stands out as the only normative and idealist aspect in the structure, contrasting with the realist evaluation of actual experiences, entities, and behaviours. It assesses the abstract ideal of democracy and the extent of citizens' demand for it, without directly evaluating the level of democracy provided or whether these freedoms are guaranteed (Norris 1999, 17). However, this should not overshadow the analysis of the extent to which the government upholds the proclaimed values and principles. Legitimate power and strong unity between citizens and the state are built on authorities respecting the rules and underlying principles on which they are based (Beetham 1991, 35).

to which individuals feel that Ukrainian authorities represent their concerns and views, care about all parts of Ukraine equally, and are willing to listen. This indicator provides insights into feelings of equitability (i.e., fairness), accessibility (i.e., assurance that their voice is heard), and respect (i.e., treatment consistent with human dignity and pride) (Lamb 2014, 29-30). On the other hand, the **principle of differentiation** is operationalized with the ***Trust in Central Institutions*** indicator, which measures the overall trust in national institutions such as the president, parliament, government, and courts.

Research on legitimacy and vertical unity at the **local level** is limited, as noted by John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. However, this level is crucial as it is where citizens primarily interact with the government, being the closest to them. Additionally, decentralisation reform has been a focal point for many development agencies and is a key reform in Ukraine (Booth and Seligson 2009, 41). Despite some centralisation tendencies in response to the existential threat from Russia, the role of local authorities is vital for Ukraine's functioning after the liberation of areas occupied by Russia, for EU integration, and for recovery and reconstruction from the destruction caused by Russian attacks (Boyko 2024; *Ukrinform* 2023). Our model distinguishes the local level from the national one with the ***Trust in Hromada Institutions*** indicator, which measures trust in local administrations and heads of towns and villages.

Supports for institutions and specific political actors or authorities are typically distinguished as separate dimensions (Booth and Seligson 2009, 49; Dalton 2004, 24; Norris 1999, 10). However, in reSCORE, trust in institutions like courts, parliament, or local administration and political actors like president and may-

or factor into single dimensions. This can be due to the personalised nature of Ukrainian politics, which is evidenced by the observation that voters are often influenced more by the personalities of candidates during the elections rather than their political ideas or programmes (Razumkov Center 2018, 59).

The six dimensions and their indicators mentioned above are grouped into two categories for advanced statistical analysis in [Chapter 2](#). This consolidation follows the diffuse-specific political support distinction proposed by Easton, which serves as the initial reference point for some other authors as well as for this conceptualisation. Diffuse support refers to deep-seated attitudes towards the political community and the functioning of the political system, which are relatively resistant to change. In contrast, specific support is more closely tied to the actions and performance of the government or political elites (Booth and Seligson 2009, 9; Dalton 2004, 23; Norris 1999, 10). Therefore, we have created Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles by grouping three dimensions, namely Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity, Election Efficacy, and Support for Political Rights to measure the diffuse aspects of Citizen-State Unity (CSU). The second category titled Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions also combines three dimensions, namely, Ukrainian Authorities Care, Trust in Central Institutions, and Trust in Hromada Institutions to represent the specific aspects of CSU (see [Annex 01](#)).

Up to this point, all identified dimensions focus on individual opinions and attitudes. However, to understand the level of Citizen-State Unity in a comprehensive manner, we must also consider the behavioural dimension, i.e., the actions that express consent to the power structure

(Beetham 1991, 90-97). These actions should not be mere acts of obedience that may be maintained by coercion; they should be voluntary choices that involve making a promise for the future (ibid). Examples of such actions include voting in elections (ibid) or voluntarily paying taxes (Gilley 2006, 62).

In order to mitigate social desirability bias, we avoided asking respondents directly about their own actions but instead asked them to evaluate the actions of Ukrainians in general. This approach helps us assess the level of consent in a **quasi-behavioural** manner. The **Sense of Civic Adherence** indicator measures individuals' perceptions of the absence of unethical behaviours towards the state among their compatriots, such as claim-

ing government benefits that they are not entitled to, cheating on taxes, and making underhanded commission arrangements to win public tenders.

Another behavioural item, Voting in Elections, is part of the Election Efficacy indicator. However, incorporating this item with the items from the Sense of Civic Adherence indicator resulted in a significantly worse model fit. This discrepancy may be due to the different nature of the questions: one asks about one's own actions while the other evaluates the behaviour of others. Additionally, participation in elections is a systemic behaviour that supports the nature and functioning of a democratic political system, while tax payment is more related to the daily exercise of power.

TABLE 01. DIMESIONS OF CITIZEN-STATE UNITY

		Categories	Dimensions
Attitudes	Diffuse support	Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles	The Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity indicator gauges the sense of <i>political community</i> , which is the most fundamental and diffuse dimension of Citizen-State Unity. It measures the extent to which individuals believe that regardless of their ethnic or religious background, everyone living in Ukraine is equally Ukrainian. This includes the belief that those living in Ukraine have always been one people, despite historical conflicts and divisions.
			The Election Efficacy indicator evaluates the extent to which individuals perceive themselves as the primary <i>source of power acquisition</i> . It assesses respondents' belief in the impact of their vote and their <i>actual behaviour</i> in casting ballots during elections.
			The Support for Political Rights indicator gauges fundamental support for key democratic principles that emphasise the people as the ultimate and <i>authoritative source of rules</i> . It assesses individuals' beliefs regarding the significance and necessity of various rights and freedoms in society, such as freedom of religion, freedom of expression without censorship, and the right to engage in peaceful protest.

	Categories	Dimensions
Specific support	Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions	<p>The Ukrainian Authorities Care indicator assesses the extent to which individuals perceive a <i>sense of common interest</i> uniting the state and its citizens. It measures how much respondents feel that Ukrainian authorities represent their concerns and views, equally care about all parts of Ukraine, and are willing to listen to the populace.</p>
		<p>The Trust in Central Institutions indicator evaluates the <i>principle of differentiation</i>, assessing the extent to which individuals believe that those in power possess the necessary qualities to exercise authority. Specifically, it measures trust in institutions responsible for both <i>creating rules and enforcing them</i>, ensuring legal validity. This indicator measures trust in key institutions including the president, parliament, government, and courts.</p>
		<p>The Trust in Hromada Institutions indicator is unique in that it assesses unity at the <i>local level</i>, which is closest to citizens. It measures trust in local administrations and heads of towns and villages.</p>
Quasi-behavioural		<p>The Sense of Civic Adherence indicator evaluates the <i>quasi-behavioural</i> aspect of Citizen-State Unity at the specific level of the <i>exercise of power</i>. It gauges individuals' perceptions of the absence of unethical behaviours towards the state, such as claiming government benefits that they are not entitled to, cheating on taxes, and engaging in underhanded commission arrangements to win public tenders, among their compatriots in Ukraine.</p>
<p>It is bilateral: Legitimacy and citizen-state unity are bilateral. While societies seek justifiable rules, the powerful seek to secure consent to their power from at least the most important individuals or groups among their subordinates (Beetham 1991, 3). The procurement of legitimacy and thus the citizen-state unity is reciprocal and dialogical by nature: citizens judge the state's legitimacy, and state leaders judge whether people are worthy of citizenship and worthy of being governed. Both sides must consider each other worthy for a stable political system. The 'right to rule' of the government is always limited by the 'right to dissent' of every member of society (Haldenwang 2016, 3-4; Lamb 2014, 36). Thus, there are two cycles of legitimation: On the demand side, citizens express their expectations directed towards authorities, which</p>	<p>the latter can decide to meet, repress, or compensate. On the supply side, citizens respond to the legitimacy claims of state officials by endorsing or rejecting these claims (Haldenwang 2016, 3-4).</p>	
<p>A holistic and comprehensive assessment of citizen-state unity should include the perspectives of both sides. This paper focuses on the demand side due to reSCORE's nature as a public opinion survey. Thus, the analysis and the recommendations are provided with that lens. Implications for policy and programming, as well as potential future research directions for bilateral investigation are presented in Chapter 3.</p>	<p>Relations between dimensions: Booth and Seligson (2009, 59) suggest that while diffuse dimensions (Pluralistic Ukrainian</p>	

Identity, Election Efficacy, Support for Political Rights) are anticipated to exhibit high and stable values, more specific dimensions (e.g., Ukrainian Authorities Care, Trust in Central Institutions, Trust in Hromada Institutions, Sense of Civic Adherence) are likely to show lower and more variable values. It is expected that there will be a certain level of consistency in terms of the evaluations among the attitudinal and behavioural dimensions. Consistently positive evaluations would indicate a high level of legitimacy and unity between citizens and the state. Conversely, if some indicators show high values while others are low, it may indicate that factors other than legitimacy and vertical unity, such as coercion or self-interest, are influencing the relationship (Lamb 2014, 39). If simultaneous increases across these evaluations are observed, this would suggest that the processes of legitimation and vertical unification is ongoing (Ibid).

Interpretation of values: Indicators are constructed by combining multiple questionnaire items that measure agreement or disagreement with statements, or levels of trust or mistrust. These items are then aggregated into a single indicator with a scale from 0 to 10. Given that all the indicators of Citizen-State Unity are positively worded (e.g., Election Efficacy rather than Election Inefficacy, or Authorities Care rather than Authorities Neglect), values above 6 on a 0-10 scale generally reflect

positive assessments of unity, while those below 4 suggest negative assessments or absence of unity. Values that float between 4 and 6 could be considered moderate assessments or neutral positioning.⁴

Positive assessments that indicate strong legitimacy and vertical unity are expected to bring voluntary compliance with rules and reforms. Negative assessments and absence of unity are expected to manifest in active opposition or civic dissent. Meanwhile, the neutral positioning or a moderate stance would be characterised both by absence of support and non-compliance (Lamb 2014, 17-18). For example, if the government is raising taxes and citizens believe the government has the right to ask for it (i.e., the request is legitimate), the citizens will pay their taxes even if higher taxes hurt their income. If citizens think that the government is not justified in raising the taxes (i.e., the request is not legitimate), citizens will evade taxes. If citizens think that it is wrong for the government to ask for taxes in the first place, citizens will protest actively to stop the government from collecting taxes from everybody (i.e., the request has weak legitimacy). Looking at the dimensions used in this paper, we can interpret low values on Election Efficacy as weak legitimacy, low values of Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions as legitimacy deficit, and low values in Sense of Civic Adherence as withdrawal of consent (see Beetham 1991, 20).

1.2. The trends and dynamics in Citizen-State Unity

Overview of national trends: Looking at the findings from both SCORE 2021 and reSCORE 2023, we observe that the diffuse dimensions of Citizen-State Unity


are generally perceived as high and stable, reflecting their deep-rooted nature in societal beliefs and values. In contrast, the specific dimensions tend to be

⁴ Respondents, lacking neutral options, are forced to take a stance, so weak agreement or disagreement could lead to a value around the midpoint (e.g., 5.0), indicating a more neutral position.

more moderate and volatile, influenced by immediate factors and events. This confirms one of our expectations coming from literature (Dalton 2004, 8). For instance, Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity, Election Efficacy, and Support for Political Rights consistently score between 7.0 and 8.0 out of 10, showing little to no change between 2023 and 2022, or

between 2023 and 2021, despite the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine (refer to Figure 01 and Figure 02).⁵ This indicates a strong and stable support for the political community and democratic rights, with elections viewed as an effective mechanism for power transition, highlighting the strong democratic ethos of the Ukrainian nation.

FIGURE 01. TRENDS IN CITIZEN-STATE UNITY, RESCORE 2023 & SCORE 2021



Note: Sense of Civic Adherence is only available in the 2023 reSCORE dataset, and therefore its value in 2021 is unknown.

The more specific dimensions of Citizen-State Unity tend to score lower, floating around the mid-point and exhibit more volatility. For instance, according to the (re)SCORE data, Trust in Central Institutions and the perception that Ukrainian Authorities Care increased notably in 2023 compared to 2021 (Figure 01). However, the SHARP data lets us compare between


2022, 2023, and 2024. As such, compared to 2022 values following the Russian full-scale invasion, the two indicators together with Trust in Hromada Institutions experienced a decline in 2023 (Figure 02). This decline slowed down in 2024. Specifically responsible for this decrease in 2024 is the president, as the percentage of those who fully trust decreased from 36% to 20%.

5 The comparison of values from 2023 to 2021 and 2022 is conducted separately due to the use of different survey instruments. The (re) SCORE survey, conducted face-to-face in 2023 and 2021, provides one set of data. The SHARP survey, a telephone survey conducted in 2023 and 2022, provides another. These surveys are not directly comparable. Therefore, to understand the changes from before the Russian invasion in 2022 and during the full-scale war, we must analyse them separately. While direct comparisons between (re) SCORE and SHARP are not possible, we can analyse the trends within each survey to discern patterns and trends. This approach allows us to create a comprehensive picture of the dynamics over time. SHARP survey measures 5 out of 7 dimensions of CSU. For further information, please refer to [Methodology \(Data collection\)](#) section.

These findings suggest that the Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions initially increased with the onset of the Russian full-scale invasion, but this rapid and sudden increase eroded to an extent as the war continued. Nonetheless, it still remains more positive compared to pre-full-scale

invasion evaluations. Despite fluctuations and volatility, we observe signs of legitimization and vertical unification, as the values for specific dimensions are significantly higher than pre-war scores. However, this conclusion necessitates further observation in the coming years.

FIGURE 02. TRENDS IN SOME DIMENSIONS OF CITIZEN-STATE UNITY, SHARP



When examining individual dimensions, Trust in Hromada Institutions (local administrations and heads of towns and villages), which are closer to the respondents, tends to be higher than Trust in Central Institutions (president, parliament, government, and courts). However, trust in the president, who also serves as the supreme commander-in-chief during times of war, enjoys the highest level of trust, which is expected. The Sense of Civic Adherence, a quasi-behavioural dimension reflecting specific non-systemic behaviours like paying taxes, has a comparable mediocre score to the perception of authorities and public institutions. The scores around the mid-point for Sense of Civic Adherence, as well as the Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions, suggest there is am-

ple room for improvement to foster unity. While public institutions may have gained more trust, they still need to demonstrate their worthiness and cultivate stronger confidence, especially given the volatile nature of these evaluations.

Thus, the analysis of Citizen-State Unity in Ukraine highlights strong and stable support for the political community, election efficacy, and political rights. However, specific dimensions such as the perception of authorities and public institutions, as well as quasi-behavioural civic adherence, show volatility and room for improvement. To ensure national resilience in the face of the existential threat from Russia, it is essential to build on these strong diffuse dimensions. To maintain

and enhance unity with authorities and public institutions, investments should focus on providing a sense of care and working towards the shared public interest, while considering the perspectives of ordinary people.

Most of the dimensions are positively correlated (see Table 02). The strongest associations are among Ukrainian Authorities Care, Trust in Central Institutions, and Trust in Hromada Institutions, which make up the category of Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions. This strong inter-dimension association indicates that trust in central and hromada institutions spill over, i.e., the attitudes to one may influence the attitudes to the other one. In addition, these attitudes are related to the feeling that they care equally about people

and take their views and needs seriously into account. In contrast, the relationships between elements of diffuse dimensions, i.e., Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity, Election Efficacy, and Support for Political Rights, are weaker, making them more distinct dimensions with less spillover from one to the other. This characteristic also makes them more resilient and less volatile to cross-effects, which is beneficial given their high scores. A robust reservoir of unity between citizens and the fundamental, foundational elements of the nation-state, can ensure national stability and smooth power transitions during periods of public discontent with incumbent government (Dalton 2004, 24). This can translate into resilience underpinned by collective commitment to defending the state against external threats.

TABLE 02. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CSU DIMENSIONS, RESCORE 2023


	Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity	Election Efficacy	Sense of Civic Adherence	Trust in Hromada Institutions	Ukrainian Authorities Care	Trust in Central Institutions
Support for Political Rights	0.17	0.21	0.06		0.03	-0.03
Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity		0.16	0.03	0.08	0.06	0.03
Election Efficacy			0.05	0.10	0.11	0.08
Sense of Civic Adherence				0.12	0.20	0.24
Trust in Hromada Institutions					0.36	0.42
Ukrainian Authorities Care						0.47

The Sense of Civic Adherence is more strongly associated with Trust in Central Institutions and the feeling that Ukrainian Authorities Care than with the diffuse dimensions of Citizen-State Unity, which is natural given that with this indicator we measure the perception of more specific forms of behaviour like paying taxes rather than the systemic ones like voting. Therefore, the quasi-behavioural manifestation of unity, which is the perception of adherence to state rules, is more closely related to the perception of concrete authorities and central institutions. This finding is significant because it highlights that specific dimensions, whether attitudinal or quasi-behavioural, have shared origins. It suggests that attitudes and behaviours are more interconnected and have a cross-cut-

ting effect compared to diffuse-specific dichotomy.

Demographic differences: The most notable demographic differences are observed between income groups across the three dimensions, namely, Ukrainian Authorities Care, Trust in Central Institutions, and Trust in Hromada Institutions (Figure 03).⁶ These disparities between high and low-income groups have increased further in 2023 when compared to 2021. Therefore, enhancing the economic welfare of citizens could be associated with better Perception of Authorities and Political Institutions, as the experience of increased economic wellbeing could translate into confidence that duty bearers are committed to common good.

FIGURE 03. SPECIFIC ATTITUDINAL DIMENSIONS OF CSU BY INCOME GROUPS, RESCORE 2023




⁶ The differences between the following demographic categories were tested: income, age, education, settlement type, employment, gender, displacement.

Additionally, individuals with higher levels of education tend to evaluate Election Efficacy more positively, potentially attributed to their greater opportunities to develop and practice civic skills during educational life (Figure 04). Although still observed and significant, the differences between primary school

graduates and those with higher education has somewhat diminished between 2021 and 2023. This may be due to the sharpening of the dichotomy between democratic and dictatorial ideologies, which became a prevalent part of public discourse since the full-scale Russian invasion.

FIGURE 04. ELECTION EFFICACY BY EDUCATION, RESCORE 2023



Regional differences: For a country as large as Ukraine, it is crucial to examine oblast level differences across different Citizen-State Unity’s dimensions and investigate whether any regional patterns

emerge. Oblast level investigation of dimensions also allows us to identify priority areas requiring targeted efforts to enhance Citizen-State Unity. The detailed findings are presented in Table 03 below.

TABLE 03. CSU DIMENSIONS BY OBLASTS, RESCORE 2023 & SCORE 2021

		Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity	Election Efficacy	Support for Political Rights	Ukrainian Authorities Care	Trust in Central Institutions	Trust in Hromada Institutions	Sense of Civic Adherence
Total	2021	7.3	6.9	8.1	2.6	2.4	4.8	5.6
	2023	7.6	7.1	7.8	4.6	4.4	5.2	
	Difference	0.3	0.2	-0.3	2.0	2.0	0.4	
Kyiv City	2021	7.3	7.1	8.5	3.0	2.9	4.0	5.8
	2023	7.9	7.3	7.9	5.1	4.8	5.3	
	Difference	0.6	0.2	-0.6	2.1	1.9	1.3	
Kyivska Oblast	2021	6.9	7.1	8.2	3.0	2.6	4.1	5.8
	2023	7.6	6.9	8.0	5.2	5.0	5.5	
	Difference	0.7	-0.2	-0.2	2.2	2.4	1.4	
Chernihivska	2021	7.5	7.0	7.6	2.2	1.7	4.9	6.2
	2023	7.0	7.3	7.5	4.3	4.7	4.7	
	Difference	-0.5	0.3	-0.1	2.1	3.0	-0.2	
Zhytomyrska	2021	8.0	7.2	8.2	2.9	2.3	5.0	5.3
	2023	7.4	6.4	6.9	4.2	4.3	4.8	
	Difference	-0.6	-0.8	-1.3	1.3	2.0	-0.2	
Cherkaska	2021	8.1	7.6	8.8	2.5	2.6	5.6	5.4
	2023	8.0	7.7	7.5	4.7	4.2	5.6	
	Difference	-0.1	0.1	-1.3	2.2	1.6	0.0	
Poltavska	2021	7.7	7.3	8.8	2.2	2.1	4.4	6.4
	2023	7.4	7.0	6.6	5.2	5.5	4.9	
	Difference	-0.3	-0.3	-2.2	3.0	3.4	0.5	
Kirovo-hradska	2021	7.4	5.6	7.8	2.0	2.3	4.0	5.6
	2023	7.3	6.7	8.8	5.1	4.5	5.5	
	Difference	-0.1	1.1	1.0	3.1	2.2	1.5	
Vinnytska	2021	8.2	7.6	8.2	2.6	2.3	6.0	5.6
	2023	7.8	7.7	7.9	4.5	4.4	5.5	
	Difference	-0.4	0.1	-0.3	1.9	2.1	-0.5	
Kharkivska	2021	6.5	6.2	7.8	1.6	1.6	4.2	5.7
	2023	7.9	7.0	8.0	4.7	4.1	6.3	
	Difference	1.4	0.8	0.2	3.1	2.5	2.1	
Sumska	2021	7.7	6.4	7.1	2.2	2.5	3.6	5.7
	2023	7.5	7.1	7.1	3.5	4.1	4.3	
	Difference	-0.2	0.7	0.0	1.3	1.6	0.7	
Dnipro-petrovska	2021	7.3	6.6	7.3	3.2	2.6	4.8	5.7
	2023	8.0	6.9	8.1	4.8	4.4	5.4	
	Difference	0.7	0.3	0.8	1.6	1.8	0.6	
Rivnenska	2021	7.5	8.0	8.6	3.8	2.8	6.1	5.3
	2023	6.6	6.7	7.7	3.8	4.2	3.8	
	Difference	-0.9	-1.3	-0.9	0.0	1.4	-2.3	

See continuation of the Table 3 on the next page ►►

►► Continuation of the Table 3. CSU DIMENSIONS BY OBLASTS, RESCORE 2023 & SCORE 2021

		Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity	Election Efficacy	Support for Political Rights	Ukrainian Authorities Care	Trust in Central Institutions	Trust in Hromada Institutions	Sense of Civic Adherence
Volynska	2021	7.4	8.1	8.6	2.8	2.4	5.5	5.5
	2023	6.7	6.8	8.0	4.8	4.9	5.0	
	Difference	-0.7	-1.3	-0.6	2.0	2.5	-0.5	
Khmelnyska	2021	7.0	7.0	7.9	3.5	2.4	5.9	5.5
	2023	7.1	6.8	7.8	4.1	4.1	5.1	
	Difference	0.1	-0.2	-0.1	0.6	1.7	-0.8	
Ivano-Frankivska	2021	6.4	7.5	8.7	2.1	2.1	5.3	4.5
	2023	7.6	7.2	7.5	4.8	3.0	5.4	
	Difference	1.2	-0.3	-1.2	2.7	0.9	0.1	
Lvivska	2021	7.6	7.9	8.7	2.4	2.1	6.1	5.4
	2023	7.9	8.0	8.4	4.7	4.4	5.3	
	Difference	0.3	0.1	-0.3	2.3	2.3	-0.8	
Ternopilska	2021	8.0	7.7	8.9	4.8	3.0	5.6	5.1
	2023	8.1	7.8	7.8	4.3	4.2	5.3	
	Difference	0.1	0.1	-1.1	-0.5	1.2	-0.3	
Zakarpatska	2021	7.2	6.3	7.8	1.9	2.2	4.4	6.0
	2023	6.6	5.6	7.4	4.8	5.0	5.1	
	Difference	-0.6	-0.7	-0.4	2.9	2.8	0.7	
Chernivetska	2021	7.3	7.8	8.0	2.9	2.9	5.6	5.5
	2023	8.0	6.9	7.6	4.6	4.2	5.3	
	Difference	0.7	-0.9	-0.4	1.7	1.3	-0.3	
Luhanska	2021	7.3	6.3	7.4	1.7	2.0	4.2	
	2023							
	Difference							
Donetska	2021	6.9	6.0	7.5	2.4	2.2	4.4	
	2023							
	Difference							
Zaporizka	2021	6.9	6.2	7.5	3.3	2.9	4.6	5.4
	2023	7.3	6.8	6.9	4.0	4.5	3.4	
	Difference	0.4	0.6	-0.6	0.7	1.6	-1.2	
Khersonska	2021	7.7	6.4	7.9	2.7	3.0	4.8	5.9
	2023	7.5	6.0	6.4	3.5	4.9	3.8	
	Difference	-0.2	-0.4	-1.5	0.8	1.9	-1.0	
Odeska	2021	7.5	6.9	8.4	1.6	1.9	4.9	5.6
	2023	8.4	7.0	7.8	4.4	4.0	5.2	
	Difference	0.9	0.1	-0.6	2.8	2.1	0.3	
Mykolaivska	2021	7.9	6.3	7.9	2.2	2.8	4.5	6.5
	2023	7.3	6.6	9.6	5.3	4.4	5.8	
	Difference	-0.6	0.3	1.7	3.1	1.6	1.3	

Note: Blue shading indicates higher values for the respective oblasts in 2021 and 2023 compared to the rest of the sample, or higher values in 2023 compared to 2021. Violet shading denotes lower values. Lighter shaded cells have Cohen's $d > 0.4$, and darker shades have Cohen's $d > 0.65$. Higher Cohen's d values signify stronger differences. All shaded differences are statistically significant based on the ANOVA test with a p -value < 0.05 .

In this context, Mykolaiv oblast stands out for its notably high levels of **Support for Political Rights** compared to other oblasts, exceeding its own 2021 scores and higher than the national average. Conversely, Poltava and Kherson oblasts show comparatively lower levels of support, albeit still above 6.0 out of 10. The perception that **Ukrainian Authorities Care** is weaker in Sumy and Kherson oblasts. Nevertheless, in both oblasts, this perception has improved compared to 2021, although the increase is less pronounced than in other oblasts. It's worth noting that higher values in 2023 compared to 2021 do not necessarily suggest a continuous positive trend, but a pre- and post- full-scale invasion comparison. A third timepoint is needed to see whether the line continues upwards, stagnates, or shows some depreciation. Poltava oblast demonstrates higher scores in **Trust in Central Institutions** compared to other oblasts, which also increased since 2021. In contrast, Ivano-Frankivsk oblast has the lowest score for this indicator, with its increase since 2021 being one of the weakest. In 2023, Kharkiv oblast demonstrates higher levels of **Trust in Hromada Institutions** compared to other oblasts, as well as an increase compared to its 2021 values. In contrast, Rivne, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts exhibit significantly lower levels both in comparison to other oblasts and when compared to 2021. Lastly, Poltava and Mykolaiv oblasts score higher than other oblasts in **the Sense of Civic Adherence**, while Ivano-Frankivsk oblast scores the lowest.

Policies targeting the Citizen-State Unity cannot adopt a one-size-fits-all approach for the whole country without considering which dimensions are strong or weak across different oblasts, and which groups and why. Each dimension requires specific tools and a tailored approach. Given the scores and dynamics of Trust in Central Institutions and the Sense of Civic


Adherence in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, the perception of Ukrainian Authorities Care in Kherson and Sumy oblasts, and Trust in Hromada Institutions in Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Rivne oblasts, these regions could be prioritised for intervention. Additionally, Kharkiv oblast, which is liberated and is on the frontlines, can be an intriguing case study for understanding the reasons behind relatively high Trust in Hromada Institutions and potentially emulating it across other oblasts with similar experiences.

CHAPTER 2.

SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR CITIZEN-STATE UNITY: THE CONCEPT AND TRENDS

2.1. The concept of social contract: theory and operationalisation

FIGURE 05. SOCIAL ORDERS BY WEBER & APPROACHES TO SOCIAL CONTRACT BY BRUNNERMEIER



The resilience of societies fundamentally depends on social contracts, which help in two important ways: they reduce the negative impacts that people's actions can have on each other, and they offer protection against outside threats (Brunnermeier 2021, 37). Markus Brunnermeier (2021, 42-58) outlines three main approaches to cultivating a social contract:

- **Social norms:** Strict social norms can lead to self-policing societies, but they may not adapt well to changing environments.

- **Government enforcement:** Governments can adjust and coordinate effectively but may lack the necessary information for effective interventions.
- **Markets:** Markets are efficient information aggregators, but they can be destabilising during extreme shocks.

It is crucial for each society to find the appropriate balance among these approaches to successfully cultivate a social contract.

These three approaches bear resemblance to Max Weber's classification of social order into three types, as summarised by Marquez (Marquez 2016, 23-24):

1. **Habitual order:** This corresponds to social norms and is sustained by the unthinking inertia of everyday activities, or 'habitual action.' Reflective processes can lead such orders to transform into interest-based or legitimate orders.
2. **Interest-based order:** This mirrors market dynamics, where actors are guided by their instrumental rationality and private interests.
3. **Legitimate order:** This aligns with government enforcement, characterized by people being guided not only by private motives but also by public or

shared reasons. In some cases, individuals can subordinate their private interests to the reasons of the common good.

Given the volatility and potentially destabilising nature of market or interest-based approaches, and the nature of the data we are using, this paper focuses on the state and legitimate order (i.e., the dimensions under Perception of Authorities and Political Institutions category as well as Sense of Civic Adherence) and social norms (i.e., Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity dimension) as the key process out of which social contract emerges. Although deeply entrenched and resistant to change, understanding these norms is crucial for ensuring the contextual sensitivity of policies. This understanding can maximise policy efficiency and mitigate the risk of policies backfiring.

Loewe, Zintl, and Houdret (2021, 3) define the social contract as the entirety of explicit or implicit agreements between all relevant societal groups and the sovereign (i.e., the government or any other actor in power), defining their rights and obligations toward each other. Similarly, the OECD and UNDP offer a comparable definition, describing the social contract as a dynamic agreement between the state and society regarding their mutual roles and responsibilities (Mezzera, Sogge, and Lister 2016, 9). These definitions facilitate an investigation and evaluation of current

nature and state of the social contract and how it changes over time (e.g., how the interaction between social norms and legitimate order may change) in a given context.

Based on the above conceptualisation and what was presented in Chapter 1, this paper treats the drivers influencing the dimensions of the Citizen-State Unity construct as the factors that help us understand the dynamic nature and shape of the social contract in Ukraine. The drivers of CSU can be classified into macro- and micro-social evaluations. Macro-social analysis focuses on state performance or on social and economic systems on a large scale (Booth and Seligson 2009, 108), which tells us more about the legitimate order or sources that help shape the social contract. In contrast, micro-social analysis is more concerned with individual features such as demographic characteristics, culture, personal experiences, and attributes (Booth and Seligson 2009, 113), and tells us more about the societal norms and habits. Macrosocial drivers are expected to be more relevant for specific dimensions of the CSU, such as Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions and Sense of Civic Adherence, as they constitute the social outcomes expected from the state by its citizens. Conversely, microsocial drivers are more likely to influence diffuse dimensions, such as Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles, as they are more closely related to values, culture, rights, and identity.

2.2. Drivers and dynamics: Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions

The Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions category encompasses Ukrainian Authorities Care, Trust in Central Institutions, and Trust in Hromada Institutions. Citizens' evaluation of these dimensions can be affective and based


on emotions or cognitive and based on experiences or performance (Booth and Seligson 2009, 49; Dalton 2004, 23; OECD 2017, 136). As such, understanding what matters to respondents when they evaluate and form their perceptions, as well

as their expectations from authorities will help us understand one aspect of the social contract. To that end, we analysed the drivers that influence Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions. These drivers are in line with and validate the main theories and hypothesis regarding the social outcomes citizens expect from authorities:

The inclusiveness hypothesis examines whether the social contract benefits the broader population or a select few (Cloutier et al. 2021, 28). This hypothesis is linked to input-based or process-based sources of Citizen-State Unity and is tested using indicators such as the Perceived Level of Corruption and Tolerance to Corruption and in-

vestigating whether or not they are drivers of the Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions category. The Perceived Level of Corruption exhibits the strongest negative effect on the Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions (refer to Figure 06). This finding suggests the importance of public figures prioritising the common good over personal interests and enrichment. This aspect is particularly relevant to high-level corruption, which involves high-level public officials such as judges, prosecutors, local authorities, police, and members of parliament. Ordinary citizens typically have limited personal experience with such officials and are more likely to follow high-profile corruption cases in the news.

FIGURE 06. DRIVERS OF PERCEPTION OF AUTHORITIES AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, RESCORE 2023



*Human Security encompasses Personal Security, Economic Security, and Health Security.

Note: Green and purple boxes represent the drivers, positive and negative, respectively. Dark blue box represents the dependent variable. Standardised beta weights are shown in the small light green and light purple boxes, p -value = 0.000. The light blue boxes on the left represent the label of theoretical hypothesis that is confirmed by the respective drivers on the right. The modeling was conducted with structural equation modelling. Here is visualised only part of the model. $R^2 = 0.45$. The model is controlled for age, gender, and urbanity. $N = 5,914$. For details on the full path model refer to [Methodology \(Data analysis\)](#) and [Annex 02](#).

It is important to note that the impact of the Perceived Level of Corruption on the Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions has increased in 2023 compared to 2021, as indicated by the beta coefficient of -0.27 in 2023 and -0.21 in 2021 (refer to Figure 07). This is observed alongside a slight reduction in the Perceived Level of Corruption from 6.9 in 2021 to 6.3 in 2023

(refer to Figure 08). These findings emphasise the need for urgent action; while the impact of corruption has increased, the actual perceptions about corruption are decreasing only marginally. High-level public officials must prioritise the public interest over private gains to maintain trust, especially in the face of an existential threat from Russia.

FIGURE 07. CHANGES IN SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR PERCEPTION OF AUTHORITIES AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, RESCORE 2023 & SCORE 2021





FIGURE 08. SCORE VALUES FOR DRIVERS OF PERCEPTION OF AUTHORITIES AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS: TRENDS, RESCORE 2023 & SCORE 2021



Note: The change in EU Orientation, Provision of Public Services, Human Security, and Scepticism about Reforms have Cohen’s $d > 0.40$ between 2021 and 2023.

On the other hand, Tolerance to Corruption positively influences the Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions. This tolerance encompasses attitudes such as indifference to corruption if authorities are effective, reluctance to report corruption if not directly affected, and rationalisation of small-scale bribery or gifts as acceptable conduct. Unlike high-level corruption, which citizens typically do not personally experience, individuals may encounter and tolerate a certain level of corruption in their interactions with the state. For example, when accessing public services such as schools, hospitals, and administrative services, individuals may encounter petty corruption.

This observation appears to align with the perspective that certain corrupt practices can be perceived as a form of 'grease in the gears' that facilitates bureaucratic processes when strict adherence to state laws would be impractical. By engaging in such practices, the state may increase the loyalty of its citizens (Seligson 2002, 411). Besides, from another perspective, this tolerance can be seen as a manifestation of the collective action dilemma. People understand that corruption harms both them and society in the long term, but they also realise that refraining from bribery alone will not change the prevailing social practice (Minich and Ikinici 2022, 12). Therefore, while paying bribes for public services may be unpopular, individuals may feel compelled to do so to avoid losing access to essential goods (Marquez 2016, 28).

Additionally, corruption can be viewed as a path dependent response to the totalitarian trauma from the Soviet era, during which the state was immensely powerful, unaccountable, and controlled nearly every aspect of individuals' lives (Hlibovytskyi

2024). In this context, corruption served to circumvent or mitigate harsh and harmful decisions. It is important to note, however, that not all respondents exhibit high levels of Tolerance to Corruption, as indicated by the relatively low score of 3.6 out of 10 for this indicator.

The protection hypothesis pertains to collective security against external threats, personal security against physical threats (e.g., criminal or politically motivated attacks, robbery, murder, illnesses, environmental damage), and legal security, encompassing the rule of law and enforcement of human and civil rights (Loewe, Zintl, and Houdret 2021, 6). It reflects the output-based or performance-based aspects of Citizen-State Unity. While collective security cannot be tested with the (re)SCORE due to the absence of indicators that can be relevant metrics, legal security is partly measured by the Provision of Public Services, which includes the provision of justice services and emerges as another driver. Personal Security component of Human Security in (re)SCORE, assesses individuals' sense of safety from violence in daily life and their confidence in the police's ability to protect them. Human Security emerges as a rather strong driver of the Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions, on par with the Perceived Level of Corruption, and is comprised of Personal Security, Economic Security, and Health Security, offering a comprehensive view of security from an individual's perspective.

The thickness hypothesis, pertaining to the state's role in providing public services, goods, and wealth redistribution (Cloutier et al. 2021, 28), can be validated by Health Security and Economic Security, both of which are part of Human Security indicator, along with the Provision of Public Ser-

vices.⁷ The thickness of the state depends on both its capacity to deliver services and civil society's ability to unite and demand services (Cloutier et al. 2021, 26-27; Loewe, Zintl, and Houdret 2021, 6). Studies have shown that respondents in Ukraine prefer a thick state (Brik and Krymeniuk 2019). This is confirmed by the strong and positive influence the drivers of Human Security and Provision of Public Services have on the Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions. Despite the infrastructural damages and the Russian attacks, the evaluation of Human Security and Provision of Public Services improved in 2023 compared to pre-war levels in 2021.

The desire for **change as a future vision** is evidenced by Scepticism about Reforms and EU Orientation drivers. Scepticism about Reforms is a relatively strong negative driver, which measures the extent to which individuals feel sceptical about the reform process and believe that reforms will only benefit the elite. This driver underscores the importance of focusing on the common interest for elites and state representatives. It also reflects a desire for change in state performance as a future vision, indicating a belief that state institutions and public policies should be reformed to benefit the broader population. This desire for reforms that benefit the majority is crucial for public institutions or individuals to be trusted and perceived as caring.

Reforms in Ukraine are closely tied to the process of **EU integration**, with EU Orientation⁸ being another driver of the Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions. EU Orientation is a composite indicator com-

prising Perceived EU Benefit, Confidence in EU Stability, Support for European Values, Support for EU Membership, and Support for NATO Membership. While its beta coefficient (i.e., the influence) in 2023 is not the highest (0.08), it has increased by 0.05 points compared to 2021, while the score for EU Orientation rising from 5.8 to 7.4. This indicates that effectively leading the country toward European integration is crucial for public authorities to be perceived as trustworthy and caring.

Moreover, previous research shows somewhat a reciprocal relationship: Trust in Central Institutions which is a component of Perception of Authorities and Political Institutions drives Support for EU Membership which is a component of EU Orientation (Minich, Cheryba, and Dagli-Hustings 2022, 39-42), suggesting that if citizens trust their authorities, then they would also perceive the political directions they set the country on positively. This can create a virtuous cycle between efforts aimed at increasing EU benefit and EU support and those that are aimed at building confidence in public authorities and institutions.

The final driver is Community Cooperation, which gauges the extent to which reSCORE respondents feel that they can rely on members of their community for help and that people in their community actively resolve common problems together. This indicator is linked to the concept of **social capital**, which refers to the resources embedded in social relationships and networks that individuals can utilise (Häuberer 2011, 147-148). Social capital can enhance legitimacy through promoting social cooperation, civic engagement,

7 Provision of Public Services indicator measures the availability and quality of the provision of public services: basic schooling, higher education, healthcare, justice services, administrative services, and welfare payments.

8 EU Orientation indicator is a meta indicator combining Perceived EU Benefit, Support for EU Membership, Confidence in EU Stability, and Support for NATO Membership.

empathy, and reciprocity norms (Booth and Seligson 2009, 107-107; Gilley 2006, 50). Another potential mechanism linking community cooperation and perceptions of authorities is the desire for affiliation. The sense of belonging and connection with one's community, fostered by community cooperation, may lead to a more positive view of authorities and public institutions of this political community (Marquez 2016, 29-30). A previous SCORE report on horizontal relationship also established a reverse relationship: Ukrainian Authorities Care was found to be a driver of Community Cooperation (Minich, Dagli-Hustings, and Zurabashvili 2024, 14). This suggests that these factors can mutually reinforce each other, creating another virtuous cycle between efforts aimed at Community Cooperation and those at Ukrainian Authorities Care.

The **participation hypothesis** envisions the expectation of participation of all citizens in political decision-making processes at different levels (Loewe, Zintl, and Houdret 2021, 6). This hypothesis is related to the input-based or process-based sources of Citizen-State Unity. In the current model for both 2021 and 2023 (see Figure 06), Civic Engagement indicator was used to test this hypothesis. However, this indicator that consists of various forms of social and political participation ranging from volunteering to attending events organised by local authorities was not found to be a statistically significant driver. This may be due to different reasons like the way the indicator is built as a large composite of eight indicator items similarly as the Perception of Authorities

and Public Institution is the composite of three dimensions and ten items.

Examining the correlations between items, we observe that reSCORE respondents in 2023 who attend events organised by local authorities (e.g., town hall meetings, meetings with local MPs, public hearings) are more likely to trust hromada administrations and heads, and to say that public authorities are attentive to the needs of ordinary people.⁹ Besides, in a separate study by SeeD, linear regression uncovered the availability of Civic Engagement Mechanisms as a driver of Trust in Local Institutions (Novosolova and Machlouzarides 2023, 16). Based on these findings, we can confirm the participation hypothesis at the level of local authorities, which is similar to the Trust in Hromada Authorities dimension with the exception of the Oblast Civil-Military Administrations, which are not included in the later. This is expected, as local authorities are closest to citizens and their political decisions directly impact citizens and the hromadas in which they live. Thus, citizens expect to be consulted or at least have accessible channels to voice their opinions in the local political process.

The changes in the effect size of the drivers of Perception of Public Authorities and Political Institutions help us investigate how social contract may shape and evolve in the face of calamitous shocks. This analysis also helps us identify policy and programmatic entry points and focus our efforts where the likelihood of impact on enhancing Citizen-State Unity via improving confidence in public institutions

9 The gamma coefficient, used due to the ordinal nature of the scales, between the 'Attend an event organised by local authorities' item and the 'Trust in the village/town administration' item of the Trust in Hromada Institutions indicator is 0.20. The gamma coefficient between the 'Attend an event organised by local authorities' item and the 'Trust in mayor or/and village/town head/head of military-civilian administration' item of the Trust in Hromada Institutions indicator is 0.25. Additionally, the gamma coefficient between the 'Attend an event organised by local authorities' item and the 'Public authorities are attentive to the needs of the ordinary people' item of the Ukrainian Authorities Care indicator is 0.23. The p-value for these coefficients is 0.000, indicating a statistically significant relationship.

is the greatest. While most expectations remained mostly unchanged between 2023 and 2021, two changes are particularly notable: an increased desire for in-

clusiveness, with a focus on high-level officials prioritising the common good over private gains, and an increased emphasis on pursuing the European path.

2.3. Drivers and dynamics: Sense of Political Community and Core Regime Principles

Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles encompasses the diffuse dimensions of Citizen-State Unity, reflecting the existence of the political community and the principles that form the political system. It includes Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity, Election Efficacy, and Support for Political Rights. Unlike the Perception of

Authorities and Public Institutions, which focuses on the social outcomes citizens expect from the state, Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles is more about nation- and system-making rather than citizens’ expectations, and thus is deeply rooted in societal beliefs and values. As such, its drivers also extend to a

Figure 09. DRIVERS OF SENSE OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND CORE POLITICAL PRINCIPLES, RESCORE 2023



*Readiness for Dialogue include the groups present in both 2023 and 2021. They are pro-EU oriented people, people from west of Ukraine, people from east of Ukraine, people living on areas occupied by Russia since 2014-15, IDPs, people from Crimea.

** Human Security combines Personal Security, Economic Security, and Health Security indicators.

Note: Green and purple boxes represent the drivers, positive and negative, respectively. Dark blue box represents the dependent variable. Standardised beta weights are shown in the small light green and light purple boxes, p-value = 0.000. The light blue boxes on the left represent the label of theoretical hypothesis that is confirmed by the respective drivers on the right. The modeling was conducted with structural equation modelling. Here is visualised only part of the model. R² = 0.24. The model is controlled for age, gender, and urbanity. N = 5,914. For details on the full path model refer to [Methodology \(Data analysis\)](#) and [Annex 02](#).

broader perception of the state as a political entity comprised of a group of people or a political community with a collective identity, organised politically based on a set of shared principles and values.

The most pronounced driver of the Political Community and Core Political Principles category is **EU Orientation** (Figure 09). This indicator revealing itself as a notable driver suggests that the sense of political community and core systemic principles are closely linked with the EU integration process in Ukraine. Respondents may view the EU integration as a sociotropic factor that benefits the entire country, rather than just themselves (Minich, Cheryba, and Dagli-Hustings 2022, 28, 31). It may also reflect a clear and strong preference for the Western direction of the country as a civilisational choice. Beyond its positive influence on the Political Community and Core Political Principles category of the Citizen-State Unity construct, EU Orientation visibly increased in 2023 compared to 2021 from a score of 5.8 to 7.4 out of 10 (Figure 11).

Another driver that relates to **future visioning** and that experienced a notable increase in scores between the two years is Civic Optimism. This indicator reflects the belief that future generations will be better off, and it increased from 4.7 to 6.4. This may indicate a belief that Ukraine will emerge from the current war in a better and stronger state, but it could also mean that things can only get better for the future generations given the extreme adversities the current generation is facing under war conditions.

Personal traits and attributes which drive Sense of Political Community and Core Po-

litical Principles are Critical Thinking and Tolerance to Corruption. Critical Thinking indicator have a positive effect on the diffuse dimensions of Citizen-State Unity, which refer to as the Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles category. This may be because alignment and reinterpretation of values and principles under changing contextual circumstances and needs from individual to social to state level requires relatively strong critical thinking and reflective soft skills. Consumers of online media score higher on this indicator.¹⁰ This may suggest that online media consumers are exposed to a greater diversity of news than non-consumers, and they are more likely to interact with others who have different views (British Council and COMPAS 2021, 15). Therefore, development of digital skills could be a strategic entry point for political interventions aimed at developing critical thinking skills.

Tolerance to Corruption, which is also a personal attribute like Critical Thinking, has a negative effect on Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles. This may suggest that corruption acceptance may erode public trust and is incompatible with prosocial behaviour and a sense of community (Minich and Ikcinci 2022, 18). Despite that the scores for Tolerance for Corruption between 2023 and 2021 did not change (Figure 11), the negative influence (i.e., beta coefficients) of Tolerance to Corruption on the Political Community and Core Political Principles category has decreased (Figure 10). This indicates this personal trait on the group or societal level now has a weaker but still a statically significant negative effect on Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles.


¹⁰ The Pearson's correlation is 0.25. It is 0.19 when controlling for age, income, and education levels, p-value=0.000.

Furthermore, the diffuse level of Citizen-State Unity relies on various indicators related to robust and resilient **horizontal relations**. These relations encompass the interconnectedness, interactions, and social ties among individuals and groups within a community or society. They serve as the foundation of political community and shared identity, as well as the core political principles, including the ability to self-express and civic orientations. Constructive intergroup relations relate to the Readiness for Dialogue, Social Tolerance, and Community Cooperation indicators which are crucial for regulating social relations in a multicultural society (Minich, Dagli-Hustings, and Zurabashvili 2024, 21).

The drivers of Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles that relate to horizontal relations changed and evolved in 2023 compared to 2021. The positive effect of the Readiness for Dialogue in-


dicator increased by 0.10 (Figure 10). In contrast, the role of Community Cooperation weakened by -0.06. This indicates that the belief in constructive dialogue and the mutual benefits with various socio-political and geographic groups (Readiness for Dialogue) became more important to feel part of a political community, but the role of individual's more localised community relations and networks (Community Cooperation) is now less pronounced. This may be due to a shift from a focus on the local to the national in citizens interpretation of their polity and prioritisation of diverse socio-political and geographical ingroups over personal relations and networks when facing an existential threat under war conditions. This phenomenon reflects the concept of the 'imagined community,' which does not require personal acquaintance and extends beyond the narrow geography of a community to encompass the entire country.

FIGURE 10. CHANGES IN SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR SENSE OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND CORE POLITICAL PRINCIPLES, RESCORE 2023 & SCORE 2021



Note: When comparing standardised beta coefficients, differences that are both statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) and where the size of the difference in beta coefficients is larger than or equal to 0.05 are considered noteworthy. In the above, this refers to Readiness for Dialogue, Community Cooperation and Tolerance to Corruption.

FIGURE 11. SCORE VALUES FOR DRIVERS OF SENSE OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND CORE POLITICAL PRINCIPLES: TRENDS, RESCORE 2023 & SCORE 2021



Note: The change in EU Orientation, Civic Optimism, and Human Security has Cohen's $d > 0.40$.

Personal experience, measured with Locality Satisfaction indicator, can also significantly impact the perception of diffuse dimensions of Citizen-State Unity. This indicator gauges a person's satisfaction with their place of residence in terms of its suitability for living, working, raising a family, and engaging in leisure activities. It can foster a sense of belonging and community. The effect of Locality Satisfaction (i.e., standardised beta coefficient) has not changed in 2023 compared to 2021 (Figure 10), and its score increased only marginally (Figure 11). The effect of Human Security is about the evaluation of the state's ability to meet individuals' needs for physical safety and other necessities, i.e., its **performance**. Human Security emerges as a driver with a positive effect on both specific and diffuse dimensions of Citizen-State Unity. In other words, human security investments not only build confidence in authorities

and institutions, but also help build belonging to the nation and core principles of the state. Human Security instills a sense of personal, economic, and health security, enabling individuals to feel more connected to the political community and share its core values by responding to their basic human needs.

The above analysis of the drivers of Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles show that future visions and horizontal relations play a pronounced role in cultivating diffuse dimensions of Citizen-State Unity construct. They are followed by drivers that relate to personal attributes, experiences, and performance. Besides, the effect of intergroup dialogue in enhancing the diffuse dimensions has become stronger. These findings underscore the importance of fostering inclusive and forward-looking narratives.


2.4. Common drivers of across dimensions

Generally, the drivers influencing the Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions differ from those affecting the Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles. This means that they mostly have distinct sources of influence and different ecology of expectations and interactions. Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions is largely influenced by immediate social outcomes and tangible expectations, such as public services and reforms. In contrast, the Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles derives its sources from horizontal relations, personal attitudes, and future visions, which are more societally engrained. Despite these dif-

ferences, there are shared drivers worth considering.

The fact that Human Security is a driver of Sense of Political Community and Core Political as well as Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions, positions the indicator as a strategic policy and programmatic entry point where efforts can yield multiplier effects towards fostering Citizen-State Unity. While it is more influential for the specific dimensions of Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions, it also plays a role in the diffuse dimensions of the Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles (refer to Figure 12).

FIGURE 12. COMMON DRIVERS OF PERCEPTION OF AUTHORITIES AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS & SENSE OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND CORE REGIME PRINCIPLES, BETA COEFFICIENTS, RESCORE 2023 & SCORE 2021



* Human Security combines Personal Security, Economic Security, and Health Security indicators.

Note: Green and purple boxes represent the drivers, positive and negative, respectively. Dark blue box represents the dependent variable. Standardised beta weights are shown in the small light green and light purple boxes, p-value = 0.000. The changes of the standardised beta weights in 2023 compared to the values in the models for 2021 are shown besides small light green and purple boxes with the sign + (stronger effect size) or - (weaker effect size). The modeling was conducted with path analysis. Here is visualised only part of the model. N = 5,914. For details on the full path model refer to [Methodology \(Data analysis\)](#) and [Annex 02](#).

EU Orientation also has an effect on both the diffuse and specific dimensions of Citizen-State Unity. Although its impact is weaker for the specific dimensions, its influence has increased since 2021. This suggests that delivering on EU harmonisation and further socio-political and economic integration is both a specific expectation of citizens from their authorities and public institutions as well as a future direction that shapes their sense of belonging and core principles. In other words, failing to deliver or achieve progress in this regard may risk undermining Citizen-State Unity in Ukraine as EU Orientation has become part of the social contract.

Social capital in the form of personal networks within the community, as measured by Community Cooperation, remains a weak but statistically significant driver for both diffuse and specific dimensions. However, its role in shaping the Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles has decreased in 2023 compared to 2021. This means that role of personal networks for building sense of belonging and generating shared principles has diminished when faced with an existential threat posed by Russia. Although diminished in importance for diffuse dimensions, Community Coopera-

tion still has a positive influence on specific dimensions that relate to Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions.

The final common driver is Tolerance to Corruption. Contrary to its positive effect on the Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions, its effects on Sense of Political Community and Core Principles is negative. This opposite relationship that Tolerance to Corruption has between diffuse and specific dimensions of Citizen-State Unity suggests that while some level of tolerance to corruption facilitate building confidence authorities as it may increase efficiently obtaining certain services and building a more personalised relationship with the duty bearers, it can undermine sense of political community and commitment to values and principles as it is incompatible with prosocial behaviour (Minich and Ikinici 2022, 18). Improving state performance and human security may render condonement of petty corruption unnecessary to navigate through delays and bureaucracy. In other words, if provision of services and human security was effective and efficient, this maladaptive relationship between Tolerance to Corruption and Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions may be broken.

2.5. Understanding Sense of Civic Adherence

The Sense of Civic Adherence indicator evaluates the *quasi-behavioural* aspect of Citizen-State Unity at the specific level of the *exercise of power*. It gauges individuals' perceptions of the absence of dissenting behaviours towards the state, such as fraudulently claiming government benefits, tax evasion, and engaging in corrupt practices to secure public tenders within Ukraine. It is closely associated with social outcomes expected from the state,

akin to the drivers influencing the **Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions**. Notably, the Perceived Level of Corruption (Figure 13) is a visible negative driver, highlighting the importance of ethical governance and rule of law for citizens to evaluate duty bearers as worthy. Additionally, the Accountability of Authorities serves as a positive driver, reinforcing the value of **inclusive** and equitable use of public resources for the common good.

FIGURE 13. DRIVERS OF SENSE OF CIVIC ADHERENCE, RESCORE 2023



*Readiness for Dialogue and Social Threat include the groups present in both 2023 and 2021. They are pro-EU oriented people, people from west of Ukraine, people from east of Ukraine, people living on areas occupied by Russia since 2014-15, IDPs, people from Crimea.


Note: Green and purple boxes represent the drivers, positive and negative, respectively. Dark blue box represents the dependent variable. Standardised beta weights are shown in the small light green and light purple boxes, p-value = 0.000. The light blue boxes on the left represent the label of theoretical hypothesis that is confirmed by the respective drivers on the right. The modeling was conducted with a linear regression algorithm. $R^2 = 0.18$. $N = 5,914$.

Moreover, the **thickness and protection** hypotheses are reconfirmed by the Basic Needs and Support Services indicator emerging as a driver of Sense of Civic Adherence. In other words, Civic Adherence is influenced by the availability of essential needs, such as sufficiently equipped bomb shelters and psychological counseling and support services, which are notably deficient (Figure 14). Additionally, 32% finds it difficult to assess the availability of psychological services, suggesting a

potential lack of awareness or search for such services.¹¹ The introduction of these services in local communities is crucial. However, it cannot be considered sufficient without concurrent efforts to raise awareness about mental health’s importance. This includes debunking related stereotypes and social stigmas, enhancing the positive perception of psychological assistance, and providing information on identifying one’s psychological state. (Gradus 2022; SeeD 2023).

11 Those who do not know about the availability of psychological counselling and support in their locality exhibit the same level of mental wellbeing (5.8) as those who provided an answer (5.7-5.9). Therefore, we exclude the possibility that the respondents do not pay attention to or are not interested in such services because of the better mental wellbeing and the absence of a need for psychological support.


FIGURE 14. BASIC NEEDS AND SUPPORT SERVICES, RESCORE 2023



The Sense of Civic Adherence indicator shares certain drivers with the diffuse dimensions of Citizen-State Unity. However, the impact of these drivers on Sense of Civic Adherence is weaker compared to the impact of the shared drivers with the specific attitudinal dimensions of CSU (i.e., Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions). One such driver is Civic Optimism, which reflects the belief that future generations will have a better life, indicat-

ing optimism about Ukraine's future and supporting **future vision** hypothesis. Additionally, Readiness for Dialogue with regional and political groups is a driver that impacts both diffuse dimensions of CSU and the Sense of Civic Adherence supporting **horizontal relations** hypothesis. This hypothesis is further supported by other drivers, such as the positive effect of Community Cohesion and the negative effect of Social Threat.


FIGURE 15. SCORES OF DRIVERS OF SENSE OF CIVIC ADHERENCE, RESCORE 2023



Personal negative **experiences** of Marginalisation have a negative effect on the Sense of Civic Adherence. The overall score for Marginalisation is notably low, at 0.6 out of 10 (Figure 15). While an overwhelming majority of respondents report

that they, their family members, or close friends have never experienced unfair treatment, approximately 2 in 10 indicate experiencing unfair treatment *sometimes* due to their income level and political opinion.

FIGURE 16. MARGINALISATION, RESCORE 2023



Traditional Media Consumption shows a direct negative impact on the Sense of Civic Adherence (refer to Figure 13). This indicator assesses the degree to which individuals depend on traditional **media** channels such as television, radio, newspapers, and political talk shows on-line or on TV to stay updated on current events. Despite the growing popularity of online media, particularly since Russia's full-scale war, television still remains the most used form of traditional media. However, it is not clear why Traditional Media Consumption would undermine Sense of Civic Adherence and further research is needed to explain this relationship and understand to what extent this is linked to content versus profile of traditional media consumers.

Therefore, the drivers of Sense of Civic Adherence overlap more with the drivers of specific attitudinal dimensions of Citizen-State Unity (i.e., Perception of Authorities and Political Institutions) compared to and, to a lesser extent, with the diffuse dimensions (i.e., Sense of Political Community and Core Principles). The Sense of Civic Adherence is positively associated with a strong, protective, and inclusive state, as well as constructive horizontal relations and an optimistic outlook for the future. Furthermore, it tends to be more positive when individuals perceive there is social inclusion and fair treatment.

When individuals feel excluded and disadvantaged, they are likely demonstrating their discontentment through behaviours they can control as individuals such as evading taxes or acting disorderly. In other words, when individuals feel excluded by society and unfairly treated by the state they are more likely to prioritise their personal gains over the common good. Conversely, when individuals feel included, cohesive, and optimistic,

they would be more willing and open to prioritising common good over personal gains, such as paying their taxes more diligently

CHAPTER 3.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RESULTS & NEXT STEPS

This section delves into the practical implications of the findings regarding Citizen-State Unity and the Social Contract. It addresses respondents' expectations from the state and factors contributing to unity, which could be considered in

programme design and implementation. These suggestions are strategic in nature rather than focusing on technical project details. They are adaptable and can be implemented in various forms depending on project objectives.

Practical implications for policies

Tailor your approach: The concept of Citizen-State Unity and the Social Contract is multi-dimensional, comprising both diffuse and specific dimensions with distinct sources and factors contributing to them. Therefore, programming should be tailored to address specific sources relevant to the dimensions under focus. Despite some common drivers, their impact strength on various dimensions varies. Working with the entire ecosystem of drivers can be more efficient, producing a larger cumulative effect.

Strengthen specific dimensions: Maintaining and increasing specific dimensions is crucial, as the diffuse dimensions of CSU tend to score high (above 7.0) and exhibit greater stability, unlike the specific dimensions, which score lower (around 4.0-5.0) and are more volatile. Focus should be on maintaining and improving the current level of trust in central institutions and the perception that authorities care. This could be followed by actions to enhance trust in local community institutions and the behavioural manifestations of CSU in civic adherence to state rules.

Coordinate and foster trust through care: Coordination and care are essential, given the strong relationships among specific attitudinal dimensions of Citizen-State Unity that relate to trust and sense of care. Inter-institutional coordination in policy implementation and public communication should be considered, as the perception of one institution can have a spillover effect on the entire ecosystem. Trust in institutions is closely related to the perception that authorities care. Improving this perception requires focusing on listening to and addressing the needs of ordinary people, ensuring equal treatment of different parts of the country, and working for common shared interests.

Drivers of specific dimensions: Efforts aimed at the Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions should focus on concrete social outcomes expected by citizens. This includes countering corruption at the level of high officials to ensure that authorities work for the wider population and common shared interests rather than private gains or the benefits of a narrow range of actors. Additionally, the expecta-

tion of a thick state providing quality public services and human security remains strong and should be taken into account. Participation mechanisms in local decision-making at the level of hromadas and sincere efforts to engage citizens would benefit the perception of hromada institutions.

Drivers of diffuse dimensions: Efforts aimed at the Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles should focus more on horizontal relations between various groups. While the belief in the necessity of constructive dialogue and mutual benefits from such engagement (Readiness for Dialogue) has become more important. Developing individual skills like critical thinking is another potential pathway to enhance Citizen-State Unity's diffuse dimensions.

Embrace European integration: Regarding European integration, respondents clearly see the future of Ukraine in the EU. The

Strategic communication

Evidence for strategic communication: Effective strategic communication begins with a situational analysis, examining the current situation, its causes, determinants, and opportunities for change. This analysis, also known as formative evaluation, helps identify the central determinants of a desired impact based on theory- and evidence-based knowledge (Rossmann 2015, 412). The Social Contract for Citizen-State Unity can serve for the purpose of situational analysis which then lays the foundation for defining communication messages, campaign goals, and strategies. Campaign developers must decide on media channels, genres, and programmes for disseminating campaign messages. One approach is to integrate messages informed by this study, such as the param-

eters of Social Contract for Citizen-State Unity, into a fictional story, similar to how the Behavioural Insights Team integrated messages informed by behavioral science to reduce corruption in Nigeria ahead of national elections (BIT 2024).

Regional policy: Regional policies targeting Citizen-State Unity cannot adopt a one-size-fits-all approach. Based on the scores and dynamics of key dimensions such as Trust in Central Institutions and the Sense of Civic Adherence in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, the perception of Ukrainian Authorities Care in Kherson and Sumy oblasts, and Trust in Hromada Institutions in Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Rivne oblasts, these regions could be prioritised for intervention. Additionally, Kharkiv oblast, which is partly occupied and liberated and shares a front-line, presents an interesting case study for learning lessons on relatively high Trust in Hromada Institutions.

Reality check: It is crucial for public campaigns to remain grounded in reality and not stray from it. Despite the allure of modern technology for constructing a purely virtual constructivist public sphere, the public sphere is inherently linked to citizens' experiences and daily life. In other words, public communications, speeches, discourse, and debates need to be reflective, truthful, and anchored in societal realities for credibility (Bentele and Nothhaft 2015, 68-71).

Media insights: Regarding media channels, our study suggests insights into their use in strategic communication. The rise of online media consumption and engagement with online platforms can enhance critical thinking by exposing individuals to diverse

views. Active information consumption and engagement with content can foster a sense of community, thus, contributing to unity on diffuse levels, and faith in moral behaviour in society's relations with the state.

Monitoring, evaluation, and learning implications

The dimensions of Citizen-State Unity can serve as a valuable tool for monitoring the effects of programmes aimed at enhancing CSU. In randomised controlled trials, practitioners can measure the dimensions of CSU before and after interventions and compare the results to control groups without intervention. This helps establish the direct effect of the intervention on the Unity (Glewwe and Todd 2022, 71-73). Changes in social contract parameters can also be mea-

sured if they are used as entry points for policy interventions. Interventions may include public policy changes, tangible actions, programmes, and communication campaigns to test messaging effects on target audiences. Given the volatility of specific dimensions, monitoring and evaluation tools should be designed to account for factors beyond the programme's influence to discern the programme's clean effect from other immediate factors and events.

Next steps in research

Strategic communication for social contract improvement: One avenue for research is strategic communication. Building on this research and its findings on the parameters of the current social contract and its dynamics, a public campaign can be developed. Using the other tools to evaluate the campaign's effectiveness can help understand how strategic communication can improve the resilience of the social contract by enhancing unity between the state and citizens.

Multimodal discourse analysis: Another research path in communication could involve multimodal analysis, combining discourse analysis with the analysis of other communication forms such as visual and sound elements in public addresses and press conferences by the president and other public figures. This analysis can reveal the narratives used to build unity

with citizens and compare them with citizens' beliefs about CSU. Reference for further methodological details: Poulakidakos 2021, analyzing Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis' public addresses on the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic (<https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-00912-9>).

Exploring the two-way street: In addition to the next iteration of this study to reveal changes in the Social Contract and Citizen-State Unity (CSU) and addressing the limitations of this study (refer to [Limitations](#) section), future research could investigate the perception of citizens by public authorities. Comparing the expectations and deliverables that each side—state officials and citizens—have in relation to the other side can help evaluate the resilience of the social contract. Addressing any discrepancies in expectations between the state and citizens could improve

resilience.

METHODOLOGY

Data collection

Data from the Ukraine reSCORE in 2023 relies on face-to-face, structured and quantitative interviews with citizens in Ukraine, collected between March 26th and June 12th, 2023. The data, covering 5,914 respondents, is representative of all territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine at the time of surveying, excluding the temporarily occupied areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, as well as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

The Ukraine SCORE in 2021 relied on data from face-to-face, structured and quantitative interviews with citizens in Ukraine, collected between January and May 2021. The data, covering 12,482 respondents, was representative of all territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine at the time of surveying, including Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.

How to read (re)SCORE indicators

reSCORE quantifies the levels of societal phenomena using indicators based on questions from the reSCORE survey. Using several questions to create one indicator allows us to reliably measure particular phenomenon from different perspectives. Scores for each indicator are given a value from 0 to 10, where 0 corresponds to the total absence of a phenomenon in an individual, location or in society, and 10 corresponds to its strong presence. Heatmaps, such as the one shown here, give the score

The SCORE-inspired Holistic Assessment of Resilience of Population (SHARP) is a surveying tool, funded by the Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine (PFRU), and implemented in partnership with SeeD, the USAID funded Democratic Governance East (DG East), USAID's Transformation Communications Activity (TCA) and the UNDP. The SHARP study and the data presented herein are based on a quantitative nationwide random sampling survey deployed at two time points – Wave 1 between September 23 and October 5, 2022 (N = 4,327), Wave 2 between June 27 and August 20, 2023 (N = 4,995), and Wave 3 between January 26 and March 14, 2024 (N=4,981). For the studies, data was collected through structured and quantitative computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI).

achieved by each oblast in our sample in that indicator.

For example, the indicator Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity shown here, is measured using two questions, on a scale from 0 (“Strongly disagree”) to 3 (“Strongly agree”).

1. I think all people living in Ukraine can be Ukrainians no matter their ethnic or religious backgrounds.

2. I think in Ukraine, we have always been one people, despite all wars, conflicts and historic divisions.

The responses to these questions are then summed and rescaled from 0 to 10 to give the scores shown on the map below, based on the equation: $(Q1+Q2)*(10/6)$.

Data analysis

Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was employed to evaluate the latent factorial structure of the data to confirm the multi-dimensionality of the CSU concept and establish that the items and indicators used are appropriate and adequate to measure the intended dimensions of CSU. We employ this algorithm to obtain a clear picture of latent dimensions within data, their strengths, and their interrelationships. The reflective measurement specification was employed. The global fit statistics (CFI, TLI, RMSEA, SRMR) are good. The lowest standardised factor loading is 0.43, the highest one is 0.91. For details, please refer to [Annex 01](#).

Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to detect the statistical significance of differences in the indicators over time, and between each oblast and the rest of the sample, as well as between demographic groups. Differences are highlighted if they are significant to $p < 0.05$, and if $F > 20$ or the Cohen's d effect size between two groups is greater than 0.4.

A **path analysis** was employed to identify the drivers of Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles, and Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions. The path analysis was run on 2023 data and separately on 2021 data. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to determine the statistical significance in differences in the standardised beta weights of drivers between the two time points, in order to determine whether the drivers of these dimensions of CSU have changed since the full-scale invasion. For details, please refer to [Annex 02](#).

Linear regression was applied to model the drivers of Sense of Civic Adherence in 2023. The Breusch Pagan Test showed homoscedasticity of the residuals (p -value < 0.001). The VIF was not greater than 1.2, indicating that there was no significant multicollinearity between the predictor variables. Cook's distance was examined to detect any influential outliers in the data, but none were found. R-square of the model is 0.176. For details, please refer to [Annex 03](#).

Limitations

In the context of measuring Citizen-State Unity, it is proposed to refine the measurement approach by distinguishing between the behavioural and attitudinal aspects related to the acquisition of power through elections in Ukraine. Currently, this dimension is measured with Election Efficacy which combines two items with different question stems, merging both attitudinal ('my vote

makes difference') and behavioural ('I vote') aspects into a single indicator.

Additionally, the measurement of CSU could benefit from assessing the exercise of power in daily life, specifically in terms of conformity to rules. Currently, trust in courts is combined with trust in other institutions. Initially, we attempted to separate trust in

courts and police into a distinct dimension, but this approach did not yield satisfactory results. Adding and measuring the aspects of exercise of power and its conformity to rules would benefit the study.

The study would benefit from incorporating objective and statistical data, particularly concerning behavioural dimensions. For example, examining whether citizens pay taxes or voter turnout rates in free and fair elections could provide valuable insights. Additionally, the results could be further validated through a political economy analysis that explores public attributes of the state, indicating the presence of citizen-state unity. If individuals report a belief in strong citizen-state unity (survey), if groups behave in ways that reflect this belief (data on behaviour), and if the system exhibits characteristics suggesting such unity (political economy analysis), then it becomes challenging (though not impossible) to argue against the presence of strong citizen-state unity in the structure (Lamb 2014, 32).

In terms of testing hypotheses related to the social contract, new indicators could be introduced. For example, indicators measuring collective security from external threats, such as various forms of Russian attacks on Ukraine, could provide valuable insights. Furthermore, the participation hypothesis could be further tested using other forms of conventional political participation beyond consultation mechanisms at the local level and the attendance of events organised by local authorities to enhance the robustness of the analysis.

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ANNEX 01. CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS: DIMENSIONS OF CSU

reSCORE 2023 dataset with second order dimensions

	Unstandardised estimate	Standard error	z-value	P(> z)	Standardised estimate
Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity	=~				
Q26.2. Historic unity	1	0.544	0.739		
Q26.1. Inclusive identity	0.914	0.071	12.876	0.000	0.58
Election Efficacy	=~				
Q25.4. My vote makes difference	1	0.599	0.616		
Q19.2. Voting	0.881	0.065	13.555	0.000	0.516
Support for Political Rights	=~				
Q23.2. Freedom of expression	1	0.458	0.799		
Q23.1. Freedom of religion	0.772	0.025	30.956	0.000	0.532
Q23.3. Freedom of peaceful protest	0.831	0.025	33.477	0.000	0.682
Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles	=~				
Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity	1	0.473	0.473		
Election Efficacy	1.617	0.159	10.188	0.000	0.694
Support for Political Rights	0.852	0.076	11.173	0.000	0.478
Trust in Central Institutions	=~				
Q8.3. Cabinet of Ministers	1	0.745	0.894		
Q8.1. President	0.587	0.015	38.725	0.000	0.493
Q8.2. Verkhovna Rada	0.99	0.013	76.892	0.000	0.86
Q8.4. Courts	0.693	0.013	54.627	0.000	0.652
Trust in Hromada Institutions	=~				
Q8.7. Village/town administration	1	0.778	0.907		
Q8.8. Head of village/town	0.988	0.022	45.003	0.000	0.819
Ukrainian Authorities Care	=~				
Q4.6. Authorities are attentive to need of people	1	0.694	0.796		
Q4.3. Authorities represent my biews	0.911	0.017	54.705	0.000	0.718
Q4.4. Authorities care equally about all parts of Ukraine	0.961	0.017	57.483	0.000	0.753
Q4.5. Authorities are open to dissent views	0.926	0.016	59.365	0.000	0.777
Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions	=~				
Trust in Central Institutions	1	0.754	0.754		
Trust in Hromada Institutions	0.857	0.031	27.639	0.000	0.619
Ukrainian Authorities Care	0.852	0.031	27.231	0.000	0.69

Covariances

Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles	~~				
Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions	0.025	0.004	6.402	0.000	0.174

Variances:

Q26.2. Historic unity	0.246	0.023	10.650	0.000	0.453
Q26.1. Inclusive identity	0.488	0.021	23.316	0.000	0.663
Q25.4. My vote makes difference	0.586	0.029	20.462	0.000	0.620
Q19.2. Voting	0.766	0.025	30.702	0.000	0.733
Q23.2. Freedom of expression	0.119	0.006	19.889	0.000	0.362
Q23.1. Freedom of religion	0.317	0.007	46.554	0.000	0.717
Q23.3. Freedom of peaceful protest	0.167	0.005	33.713	0.000	0.535
Q8.3. Cabinet of Ministers	0.139	0.006	24.847	0.000	0.200
Q8.1. President	0.597	0.011	52.250	0.000	0.757
Q8.2. Verkhovna Rada	0.191	0.006	31.570	0.000	0.260
Q8.4. Courts	0.361	0.007	49.369	0.000	0.576
Q8.7. Village/town administration	0.130	0.012	10.636	0.000	0.177
Q8.8. Head of village/town	0.291	0.013	22.624	0.000	0.330
Q4.6. Authorities are attentive to need of people	0.279	0.007	38.163	0.000	0.367
Q4.3. Authorities represent my views	0.375	0.008	44.459	0.000	0.484
Q4.4. Authorities care equally about all parts of Ukraine	0.340	0.008	42.143	0.000	0.433
Q4.5. Authorities are open to dissent views	0.271	0.007	40.031	0.000	0.396
Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity	0.230	0.022	10.398	0.000	0.777
Election Efficacy	0.186	0.027	10.398	0.000	0.518
Support for Political Rights	0.162	0.008	19.971	0.000	0.771
Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles	0.066	0.009	7.739	0.000	1.000
Trust in Central Institutions	0.239	0.012	19.614	0.000	0.431
Trust in Hromada Institutions	0.373	0.015	25.129	0.000	0.616
Ukrainian Authorities Care	0.253	0.011	23.142	0.000	0.524
Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions	0.316	0.015	21.394	0.000	1.000

Fit statistics:

Test Statistics	1053.916	Root Mean Square Error of Approximation:	
Degrees of freedom	112	RMSEA	0.038
p-value (chi-square)	0.000	90 Percent confidence interval - lower	0.036
		90 Percent confidence interval - upper	0.040
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)	0.972	P-value H ₀ : RMSEA ≤ 0.050	1.000
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)	0.966	P-value H ₀ : RMSEA ≥ 0.080	0.000
Akaike (AIC)	211823.968	Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR)	0.036
Bayesian (BIC)	212098.056		
Sample-size adjusted Bayesian (SABIC)	211967.770		

reSCORE 2023 dataset with first order dimensions

	Unstan- dardised estimate	Standard error	z-value	P(> z)	Stan- dardised estimate
Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity	=~				
Q26.1. Inclusive identity	1				0.58
Q26.2. Historic unity	1.095	0.081	13.54	0.000	0.74
Election Efficacy	=~				
Q25.4. My vote makes difference	1				0.642
Q19.2. Voting	0.812	0.059	13.69	0.000	0.496
Support for Political Rights	=~				
Q23.1. Freedom of religion	1				0.531
Q23.2. Freedom of expression	1.301	0.042	31.085	0.000	0.801
Q23.3. Freedom of peaceful protest	1.077	0.033	32.385	0.000	0.681
Ukrainian Authorities Care	=~				
Q4.3. Authorities represent my views	1				0.72
Q4.4. Authorities care equally about all parts of Ukraine	1.054	0.02	52.41	0.000	0.754
Q4.5. Authorities are open to dissent views	1.015	0.019	53.806	0.000	0.777
Q4.6. Authorities are attentive to need of people	1.094	0.02	54.764	0.000	0.794
Trust in Central Institutions	=~				
Q8.1. President	1				0.494
Q8.2. Verkhovna Rada	1.686	0.044	38.52	0.000	0.862
Q8.3. Cabinet of Ministers	1.694	0.044	38.775	0.000	0.891
Q8.4. Courts	1.184	0.035	34.259	0.000	0.655
Trust in Hromada Institutions	=~				
Q8.7. Village/town administration	1				0.908
Q8.8. Head of village/town	0.987	0.022	45.463	0.000	0.818
Sense of Civic Adherence	=~				
Q30.1. Nobody commits benefit fraud	1				0.683
Q30.2. Nobody cheats on taxes	1.185	0.026	45.839	0.000	0.808
Q30.3. Nobody corrupts procurement	1.084	0.024	45.745	0.000	0.76
Covariances					
Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity	~~				
Election Efficacy	0.091	0.009	10.234	0.000	0.293
Support for Political Rights	0.045	0.004	10.559	0.000	0.255
Ukrainian Authorities Care	0.025	0.006	4.283	0.000	0.078
Trust in Central Institutions	0.004	0.004	1.084	0.279	0.019
Trust in Hromada Institutions	0.044	0.007	6.13	0.000	0.114
Sense of Civic Adherence	0.006	0.004	1.443	0.149	0.026
Election Efficacy	~~				
Support for Political Rights	0.072	0.005	13.536	0.000	0.328
Ukrainian Authorities Care	0.065	0.008	8.014	0.000	0.163
Trust in Central Institutions	0.033	0.005	6.141	0.000	0.122
Trust in Hromada Institutions	0.073	0.01	7.553	0.000	0.151

Sense of Civic Adherence	0.024	0.006	4.149	0.000	0.085
Support for Political Rights	~~				
Ukrainian Authorities Care	0.007	0.004	1.994	0.046	0.032
Trust in Central Institutions	-0.005	0.002	-2.123	0.034	-0.034
Trust in Hromada Institutions	0.001	0.004	0.243	0.808	0.004
Sense of Civic Adherence	0.011	0.003	4.181	0.000	0.07
Ukrainian Authorities Care	~~				
Trust in Central Institutions	0.145	0.006	24.079	0.000	0.523
Trust in Hromada Institutions	0.207	0.008	24.42	0.000	0.419
Sense of Civic Adherence	0.07	0.005	14.41	0.000	0.241
Trust in Central Institutions	~~				
Trust in Hromada Institutions	0.16	0.007	23.73	0.000	0.471
Sense of Civic Adherence	0.054	0.004	15.33	0.000	0.269
Trust in Hromada Institutions	~~				
Sense of Civic Adherence	0.055	0.006	9.71	0.000	0.154

Variances:

Q26.1. Inclusive identity	0.488	0.02	24.36	0.000	0.664
Q26.2. Historic unity	0.245	0.022	11.164	0.000	0.453
Q25.4. My vote makes difference	0.555	0.03	18.403	0.000	0.588
Q19.2. Voting	0.788	0.024	33.273	0.000	0.754
Q23.1. Freedom of religion	0.317	0.007	46.674	0.000	0.718
Q23.2. Freedom of expression	0.118	0.006	19.934	0.000	0.359
Q23.3. Freedom of peaceful protest	0.167	0.005	34.084	0.000	0.536
Q4.3. Authorities represent my views	0.374	0.008	44.426	0.000	0.482
Q4.4. Authorities care equally about all parts of Ukraine	0.339	0.008	42.125	0.000	0.432
Q4.5. Authorities are open to dissent views	0.271	0.007	40.112	0.000	0.396
Q4.6. Authorities are attentive to need of people	0.281	0.007	38.366	0.000	0.369
Q8.1. President	0.596	0.011	52.236	0.000	0.756
Q8.2. Verkhovna Rada	0.189	0.006	31.531	0.000	0.258
Q8.3. Cabinet of Ministers	0.143	0.006	25.835	0.000	0.206
Q8.4. Courts	0.359	0.007	49.276	0.000	0.571
Q8.7. Village/town administration	0.129	0.012	10.731	0.000	0.176
Q8.8. Head of village/town	0.291	0.013	22.902	0.000	0.33
Q30.1. Nobody commits benefit fraud	0.239	0.006	42.058	0.000	0.534
Q30.2. Nobody cheats on taxes	0.156	0.006	27.289	0.000	0.347
Q30.3. Nobody corrupts procurement	0.18	0.005	33.858	0.000	0.423
Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity	0.247	0.021	12.012	0.000	1
Election Efficacy	0.389	0.032	12.292	0.000	1
Support for Political Rights	0.125	0.007	18.751	0.000	1
Ukrainian Authorities Care	0.401	0.013	29.959	0.000	1
Trust in Central Institutions	0.192	0.01	19.206	0.000	1
Trust in Hromada Institutions	0.605	0.018	34.002	0.000	1
Sense of Civic Adherence	0.209	0.008	26.639	0.000	1

Fit statistics:		Root Mean Square Error of Approximation:	
Test Statistics	1136.215	RMSEA	0.033
Degrees of freedom	149	90 Percent confidence interval - lower	0.032
p-value (chi-square)	0.000	90 Percent confidence interval - upper	0.035
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)	0.975	P-value H ₀ : RMSEA ≤ 0.050	1.000
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)	0.968	P-value H ₀ : RMSEA ≥ 0.080	0.000
Akaike (AIC)	241799.358	Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR)	0.027
Bayesian (BIC)	242207.148		
Sample-size adjusted Bayesian (SABIC)	242013.308		

SCORE 2021 dataset with second order dimensions

	Unstan- dardised estimate	Standard error	z-value	P(> z)	Stan- dardised estimate
Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity	=~				
Q26.1. Inclusive identity	1				0.624
Q26.2. Historic unity	1.035	0.06	17.169	0.000	0.735
Election Efficacy	=~				
Q25.4. My vote makes difference	1				0.595
Q19.2. Voting	0.719	0.04	18.053	0.000	0.619
Support for Political Rights	=~				
Q23.1. Freedom of religion	1				0.604
Q23.2. Freedom of expression	1.153	0.022	52.455	0.000	0.773
Q23.3. Freedom of peaceful protest	1.078	0.02	53.137	0.000	0.715
Ukrainian Authorities Care	=~				
Q4.3. Authorities represent my views	1				0.754
Q4.4. Authorities care equally about all parts of Ukraine	1.011	0.012	86.453	0.000	0.773
Q4.5. Authorities are open to dissent views	1.09	0.011	97.563	0.000	0.87
Q4.6. Authorities are attentive to need of people	1.026	0.011	95.646	0.000	0.851
Trust in Central Institutions	=~				
Q8.1. President	1				0.694
Q8.2. Verkhovna Rada	1.03	0.011	90.701	0.000	0.896
Q8.3. Cabinet of Ministers	1.067	0.012	91.51	0.000	0.911
Q8.4. Courts	0.752	0.011	66.217	0.000	0.633
Trust in Hromada Institutions	=~				
Q8.7. Village/town administration	1				0.948
Q8.8. Head of village/town	0.873	0.015	58.518	0.000	0.804
Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions	=~				
Ukrainian Authorities Care	1				0.529
Trust in Central Institutions	1.62	0.06	27.218	0.000	0.876
Trust in Hromada Institutions	1.25	0.035	35.375	0.000	0.498
Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles	=~				

Support for Political Rights	1				0.51
Election Efficacy	2.514	0.21	11.961	0.000	0.572
Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity	1.245	0.103	12.065	0.000	0.426
Covariances					
Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles	~~				
Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions	0.003	0.001	2.903	0.004	0.05
Variances:					
Q26.1. Inclusive identity	0.512	0.02	25.793	0.000	0.611
Q26.2. Historic unity	0.297	0.02	14.511	0.000	0.459
Q25.4. My vote makes difference	1.347	0.044	30.638	0.000	0.647
Q19.2. Voting	0.614	0.022	27.478	0.000	0.617
Q23.1. Freedom of religion	0.255	0.004	63.462	0.000	0.635
Q23.2. Freedom of expression	0.131	0.003	37.489	0.000	0.403
Q23.3. Freedom of peaceful protest	0.163	0.003	47.794	0.000	0.489
Q4.3. Authorities represent my biews	0.321	0.005	66.701	0.000	0.431
Q4.4. Authorities care equally about all parts of Ukraine	0.292	0.004	65.131	0.000	0.403
Q4.5. Authorities are open to dissent views	0.162	0.003	49.26	0.000	0.243
Q4.6. Authorities are attentive to need of people	0.17	0.003	53.731	0.000	0.276
Q8.1. President	0.436	0.006	72.084	0.000	0.518
Q8.2. Verkhovna Rada	0.106	0.002	43.816	0.000	0.198
Q8.3. Cabinet of Ministers	0.094	0.002	38.5	0.000	0.17
Q8.4. Courts	0.343	0.005	74.083	0.000	0.6
Q8.7. Village/town administration	0.084	0.012	7.114	0.000	0.1
Q8.8. Head of village/town	0.312	0.01	31.989	0.000	0.353
Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity	0.267	0.017	15.842	0.000	0.819
Election Efficacy	0.495	0.037	13.335	0.000	0.673
Support for Political Rights	0.108	0.005	23.152	0.000	0.74
Ukrainian Authorities Care	0.305	0.008	40.415	0.000	0.72
Trust in Central Institutions	0.094	0.01	9.136	0.000	0.232
Trust in Hromada Institutions	0.563	0.015	38.319	0.000	0.752
Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions	0.119	0.006	20.458	0.000	1
Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles	0.038	0.004	10.56	0.000	1

Fit statistics:

Test Statistics	2116.105	Root Mean Square Error of Approximation:	
Degrees of freedom	112	RMSEA	0.038
p-value (chi-square)	0.000	90 Percent confidence interval - lower	0.036
		90 Percent confidence interval - upper	0.039
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)	0.977	P-value H ₀ : RMSEA ≤ 0.050	1.000
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)	0.972	P-value H ₀ : RMSEA ≥ 0.080	0.000
Akaike (AIC)	434237.174	Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR)	0.039
Bayesian (BIC)	434541.888		
Sample-size adjusted Bayesian (SABIC)	434411.594		

ANNEX 02. PATH MODEL: CHANGE IN SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR CSU

reSCORE 2023 dataset

Dependent variable	Independent variables	Unstandardised estimate	Standard error	z-value	p-value	Lower bound of confidence interval	Upper bound of confidence interval	Standardised estimate
Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions	Perceived Level of Corruption	-0.276	0.012	-23.956	0.000	-0.299	-0.254	-0.272
	Scepticism About Reforms	-0.193	0.010	-19.613	0.000	-0.213	-0.174	-0.229
	Provision of Public Services	0.172	0.016	11.086	0.000	0.142	0.202	0.128
	Community Cooperation	0.065	0.008	8.257	0.000	0.049	0.080	0.089
	EU Orientation	0.084	0.012	7.054	0.000	0.060	0.107	0.077
	Human Security	0.302	0.013	22.651	0.000	0.276	0.328	0.268
	Tolerance to Corruption	0.099	0.009	11.584	0.000	0.082	0.116	0.119
	Age	0.001	0.001	0.528	0.598	-0.002	0.003	0.005
	Gender (being a woman)	0.011	0.004	2.985	0.003	0.004	0.019	0.030
	Urbanity	-0.090	0.040	-2.240	0.025	-0.169	-0.011	-0.023
Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles	EU Orientation	0.146	0.013	11.113	0.000	0.120	0.172	0.154
	Locality Satisfaction	0.065	0.010	6.539	0.000	0.045	0.084	0.085
	Social Tolerance	0.073	0.008	8.857	0.000	0.057	0.089	0.109
	Community Cooperation	0.030	0.008	3.662	0.000	0.014	0.045	0.047
	Human Security	0.104	0.013	8.040	0.000	0.079	0.130	0.106
	Civic Optimism	0.050	0.007	6.926	0.000	0.036	0.065	0.089
	Critical Thinking	0.118	0.010	11.569	0.000	0.098	0.138	0.148
	Readiness for Dialogue	0.105	0.010	10.656	0.000	0.086	0.125	0.136
	Tolerance to Corruption	-0.076	0.009	-8.626	0.000	-0.093	-0.059	-0.105
	Age	0.013	0.001	11.158	0.000	0.011	0.016	0.130
Gender (being a woman)	0.018	0.004	4.671	0.000	0.010	0.026	0.054	
Urbanity	-0.068	0.043	-1.597	0.110	-0.152	0.016	-0.020	

Variations/Covariances

Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions	Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions	1.992	0.039	51.169	0	1.916	2.068	0.552
Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles	Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles	2.084	0.042	49.795	0	2.002	2.166	0.758
Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions	Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles	-0.121	0.027	-4.411	0	-0.174	-0.067	-0.059

R-Square:

- Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions 0.448
- Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles 0.242

Fit statistics:

Test Statistic	70.795	Root Mean Square Error of Approximation:	
Degrees of freedom	8	RMSEA	0.036
p-value (chi-square)	0.000	90 Percent confidence interval - lower	0.029
		90 Percent confidence interval - upper	0.044
Akaike (AIC)	42013.292	Comparative Fit Index (CFI)	0.988
Bayesian (BIC)	42180.419	Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)	0.953
Sample-size adjusted Bayesian (SABIC)	42100.976	Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR)	0.007

SCORE 2021 dataset

Dependent variable	Independent variables	Unstandardised estimate	Standard error	z-value	p-value	Lower bound of confidence interval	Upper bound of confidence interval	Standardised estimate
Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions	Perceived Level of Corruption	-0.200	0.009	-21.586	0.000	-0.218	-0.182	-0.205
	Scepticism About Reforms	-0.192	0.007	-25.812	0.000	-0.207	-0.177	-0.254
	Provision of Public Services	0.195	0.012	15.811	0.000	0.170	0.219	0.155
	Community Cooperation	0.038	0.005	6.828	0.000	0.027	0.048	0.057
	EU Orientation	0.022	0.006	3.615	0.000	0.010	0.035	0.032
	Human Security	0.263	0.011	24.693	0.000	0.242	0.284	0.237
	Tolerance to Corruption	0.101	0.006	16.292	0.000	0.089	0.113	0.139
	Age	-0.003	0.001	-3.061	0.002	-0.005	-0.001	-0.026
	Gender (being a woman)	0.015	0.003	4.949	0.000	0.009	0.021	0.040
Urbanity	-0.231	0.033	-6.935	0.000	-0.297	-0.166	-0.058	

Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles	EU Orientation	0.085	0.007	12.668	0.000	0.072	0.098	0.135
	Locality Satisfaction	0.073	0.007	10.671	0.000	0.059	0.086	0.110
	Social Tolerance	0.092	0.006	15.755	0.000	0.081	0.104	0.152
	Community Cooperation	0.063	0.005	11.550	0.000	0.053	0.074	0.108
	Human Security	0.073	0.010	7.177	0.000	0.053	0.093	0.075
	Civic Optimism	0.030	0.005	5.507	0.000	0.019	0.040	0.057
	Critical Thinking	0.098	0.007	14.250	0.000	0.084	0.111	0.146
	Readiness for Dialogue	0.028	0.006	4.642	0.000	0.016	0.040	0.043
	Tolerance to Corruption	-0.101	0.006	-16.394	0.000	-0.113	-0.089	-0.157
	Age	0.015	0.001	15.908	0.000	0.013	0.017	0.150
	Gender (being a woman)	0.015	0.003	4.802	0.000	0.009	0.020	0.044
	Urbanity	-0.227	0.034	-6.681	0.000	-0.293	-0.160	-0.065

Variances/Covariances

Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions	Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions	2.017	0.031	64.569	0.000	1.955	2.078	0.585
Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles	Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles	2.117	0.030	69.978	0.000	2.058	2.177	0.780
Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions	Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles	-0.057	0.021	-2.695	0.007	-0.099	-0.016	-0.028

R-Square:

- Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions 0.415
- Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles 0.220

Fit statistics:		Root Mean Square Error of Approximation:	
Test Statistic	105.988	RMSEA	0.031
Degrees of freedom	8	90 Percent confidence interval - lower	0.026
p-value (chi-square)	0.000	90 Percent confidence interval - upper	0.037
Akaike (AIC)	89003.017	Comparative Fit Index (CFI)	0.99
Bayesian (BIC)	89188.818	Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)	0.962
Sample-size adjusted Bayesian (SABIC)	89109.37	Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR)	0.007

ANOVA for the time difference in values of drivers

An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test was conducted to determine the statistical significance of the differences in the values of drivers between 2023 and 2021.

Dependent variables	Independent variables	reSCORE 2023 Standardised estimate	SCORE 2021 Standardised estimate	Difference in effect sizes	Adjusted p-value
Perception of Authorities and Public Institutions	Perceived Level of Corruption	-0.27	-0.21	0.06	0.00
	Scepticism About Reforms	-0.23	-0.25	-0.02	0.76
	Provision of Public Services	0.13	0.16	-0.03	1.00
	Community Cooperation	0.09	0.06	0.03	0.02
	EU Orientation	0.08	0.03	0.05	0.02
	Human Security	0.27	0.24	0.03	1.00
	Tolerance to Corruption	0.12	0.14	-0.02	1.00
	Age	0.01	-0.03	-0.02	0.00
	Gender (being a woman)	0.03	0.04	-0.01	1.00
	Urbanity	-0.02	-0.06	-0.04	1.00
Sense of Political Community and Core Political Principles	EU Orientation	0.15	0.14	0.01	1.00
	Locality Satisfaction	0.09	0.11	-0.02	0.94
	Social Tolerance	0.11	0.15	-0.04	0.00
	Community Cooperation	0.05	0.11	-0.06	0.00
	Human Security	0.11	0.08	0.03	1.00
	Civic Optimism	0.09	0.06	0.03	0.12
	Critical Thinking	0.15	0.15	0.00	1.00
	Readiness for Dialogue	0.14	0.04	0.10	0.00
	Tolerance to Corruption	-0.11	-0.16	-0.05	0.00
	Age	0.13	0.15	-0.02	0.00
	Gender (being a woman)	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.02
	Urbanity	-0.02	-0.07	-0.05	1.00

ANNEX 03. LINEAR REGRESSION FOR SENSE OF CIVIC ADHERENCE

Linear regression was applied to model the drivers of Sense of Civic Adherence in 2023. The Breusch Pagan Test showed homoscedasticity of the residuals (p-value <0.001). The VIF was not greater than 1.2, indicating that there was no significant multicollinearity between the predictor variables. Cook's distance was examined to detect any influential outliers in the data, but none were found. R-square of the model is 0.176.

Independent variables	Standardised beta coefficients	P-value
Marginalisation	-0.113	0.000
Community Cohesion	0.110	0.000
Accountability of Authorities	0.078	0.000
Perceived Level of Corruption	-0.255	0.000
Civic Optimism	0.050	0.000
Social Threat	-0.059	0.000
Basic Needs and Support Services	0.083	0.000
Traditional Media Consumption	-0.086	0.000
Readiness for Dialogue	0.049	0.000

