Social Cohesion in Ukraine

Part II: Towards a tolerant, cohesive and inclusive society
Acknowledgements

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The views, conclusions and recommendations presented in this document do not necessarily reflect the position of USAID, UNDP, or their partners.
About SCORE

The Social COhesion and REconciliation Index (SCORE) is an analytical tool providing a solid evidence base for developing policies and programs that strengthen national unity, social cohesion, and resilience and monitoring the progress of their implementation.

SCORE Ukraine is implemented on an annual basis and designed to improve the understanding of societal dynamics in Ukraine. It is a joint initiative funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Union (EU) and implemented by the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD).

This conceptual and analytical paper is based on the SCORE Ukraine data set collected between January – April 2021, which consists of a nationally representative sample of 12,482 face-to-face interviews across the country, excluding Crimea and non-government controlled areas (NGCAs) in eastern Ukraine. The sample is representative of the adult population of Ukraine, and the sampling strategy was based on population estimates of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine as of January 1, 2019.

The SCORE index is a tool designed to measure social cohesion and reconciliation in post-conflict societies around the world and has been applied in more than 15 conflict-affected countries across the globe. For more information on SCORE, the full list of SCORE Ukraine indicators and their glossary definitions, visit our online data platform here.
About Partners
Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development works with international development organizations, governments, and civil society leaders to design and implement evidence-based, people-centred strategies for the development of peaceful, inclusive, and sustainable societies. Working in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia, SeeD provides policy advice for social transformation that is based on citizen engagement strategies and empirical understanding of the behaviour of individuals, groups and communities. The SeeD approach focuses on understanding the root causes of social problems by developing and empirically testing a science-based theory of change.

USAID has partnered with Ukraine since 1992, providing more than US$3 billion in assistance. USAID’s current strategic priorities include strengthening democracy and good governance, promoting economic development and energy security, improving healthcare systems, and mitigating the effects of the conflict in the east.

USAID’s DG East program is a five-year activity to improve trust and confidence between citizens and government in eastern Ukraine, building opportunities for the region to lead Ukraine’s democratic transformation. DG East aims to strengthen the connection and trust between citizens and their government in eastern Ukraine by promoting good governance and inclusive civic identity, increasing interaction between citizens and civil society, and increasing collaboration between government and citizens and citizen participation in community development and local decision-making.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supports strategic capacity development initiatives to promote inclusive growth and sustainable human development. Through partnerships with national, regional, and local governments, civil society, and the private sector, UNDP strives to support Ukraine to eliminate poverty, develop people's capacity, achieve equitable results, sustain the environment, and advance democratic governance. To respond to the negative impacts of the Russian military invasion of Ukraine, the UNDP has designed a new comprehensive Resilience Building and Recovery (RBR) Programme. The RBR is intended to provide an umbrella for nexus work across the country and will be continually updated to respond to the scope and scale of needs, as well as emerging realities relating to UN access and the prevailing security environment, and possible future scenarios. The overall objective of the Programme is to preserve development gains in Ukraine as fully as possible, mitigating risks of descent into protracted crisis, embedding activities for recovery from the onset of the humanitarian effort, and facilitating a swift return to development pathways and processes for national attainment of the SDGs. The RBR is based on the experiences, methodologies, partnerships, and lessons learned from implementing other UNDP-led actions, including a comprehensive UN Recovery and Peacebuilding Programme (UN RPP).
Disclaimer

This analytical report is the second of two volumes on Social Cohesion in Ukraine (Guest & Panayiotou, 2022). The report was largely prepared prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, it has been adjusted to consider the unfolding consequences of the war on social cohesion in Ukraine. Following the invasion, the SCORE 2021 data and our analyses remain relevant, revealing key factors and entry points that can bolster social cohesion during this tumultuous time for the country. Specifically, this report is relevant for understanding how communities can build the capacity for cooperation, social support, and solidarity. It provides recommendations that are important for marginalised communities, to ensure that these vulnerable groups, who face increased risk of social isolation, are integrated into their communities. This report also discusses citizens’ attitudes towards different socio-political and regional groups, which can inform interventions to reduce prejudice and polarisation. Additionally, this report examines national attachment and identification, and whether these are contingent upon regions and spoken language. These findings highlight the unique Ukrainian identity and its importance for further reinforcing social cohesion. Moreover, as institutions currently are under extreme strain, our focus on vertical social cohesion is limited, as more post-invasion data is needed to understand the evolving dynamics of citizen-state relations. However, we investigate and reveal the relationships between civic behaviour and accountability and responsiveness of institutions, which could be important to rebuild the balanced interplay of the social contract in the post-war period. Tracking institutional quality was a priority before the invasion and will be pertinent once reconstruction begins. The SCORE data can reveal the underlying civic mechanisms to monitor and support institutional responsiveness and accountability. Thus, it is envisioned that future SCORE surveys will be able to track measures of vertical social cohesion, compare pre- to post-invasion scores and draw evidence-based recommendations on improving institutional responsiveness and accountability. Thus, considering the war-related suffering and the emerging humanitarian crisis with mass population displacements, disruption of social cohesion and potential exacerbation of social cleavages, the report retains value in both the current turbulent and post-war periods.
Executive Summary
In this report we aimed to understand the underlying processes of horizontal social cohesion. Specifically, how different factors can positively or negatively influence key aspects of social cohesion including social tolerance towards marginalised groups, community cooperation, harmonious co-existence between the different groups, national attachment, and inclusive identification. The current report offers evidence-based recommendations to further prepare the country to absorb and persevere through war-related shocks. Parts of this report can also be useful in the post war period allowing Ukrainian citizens to be more prepared for rebuilding the country.

LGBTQI+ people, members of the Roma community, and drug addicts were among the least tolerated groups in Ukrainian society. Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Zakarpattia oblasts were the least tolerant towards the Roma people. Zakarpattia, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts were the least tolerant towards members of the LGBTQI+ community, while people from Lviv, Zakarpattia, and Chernivtsi oblasts were not willing to accept drug addicts into their communities. The analysis revealed areas that demonstrated high levels of tolerance towards marginalised groups such as Kyiv city (for LGBTQI+ people) and Kirovohrad oblast (for drug addicts and the Roma people), which warrant further study so that similar action programs can be developed in oblasts and regions that demonstrated lower levels of tolerance towards marginalised groups. Moreover, CSOs should develop programs that promote pluralistic identification with the country. This was a key driver for promoting the inclusion of members of the Roma community. Such programs should be coupled with interventions for fostering open and progressive attitudes such as gender equality, acceptance, and belief in human rights. These were critical for increasing tolerance and inclusion of members of the LGBTQI+ community.

Before Russia’s invasion, Ukrainian citizens were found to have low community cooperation with one in four feeling they had never relied on other community members to solve problems. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine probably led to an increase in collaborative community problem-solving, however it may be that higher initial scores of cooperation could have led to even more solidarity. Community cooperation was particularly problematic in regional centres, including Kharkiv, Odesa, Ternopil, and Poltava. The drivers for increasing cooperation were Empathy, Pride in locality, Trust in NGOs, Sense of agency, Social tolerance, and Provision of healthcare. During the war, strong community cooperation can play an important role in ensuring the well-being and resilience of communities and its members. Nonetheless, given the wide differences between localities, extreme contextual care should be taken. The state’s emergency services, local authorities, and representatives of civil society (both organisations and volunteers) should be at the forefront of empowering Ukrainian citizens to form cooperative social networks for support, recovery, and solidarity. Strong community cooperation will ensure communities are better prepared to absorb the shocks of the war and deal with its consequences together.

Before the 2022 invasion, Ukrainian citizens felt distant and somewhat threatened from Pro-Russian oriented people, people living in the NGCAs, people in support of separation of the NGCAs and to a lesser extent towards Ukrainian Nationalists. The invasion of Ukraine has likely worsened citizens’ attitudes towards these groups. Local institutions should be at the forefront of campaigns and interventions aiming to strengthen intergroup relations, as citizens’ trust in their authority might be key. Local institutions should develop prejudice reduction and inclusion programmes, thereby building social tolerance and provide opportunities to members of their communities for constructive and positive contact with
the various different groups. Such efforts should be coupled with prosocial attitudes including Empathy and Pluralistic Ukrainian identity. Such programmatic efforts should signal that, irrespective of socio-political orientations, all Ukrainian citizens (including members of marginalised groups and minorities) have a central role in their communities and society in general. These should be used as the blueprint to promote effective campaigns for harmonious co-existence and productive collaboration thereby ensuring that levels of violence within communities and between the different socio-political groups remain low.

Pluralistic Ukrainian identity and Sense of belonging to the country enjoyed high support in Ukraine. There were no significant differences between western and eastern oblasts. Pluralistic Ukrainian identity and Sense of belonging to the country also did not vary based on spoken language (Russian or Ukrainian). Both identity and belonging were associated with an array of positive factors that can foster social cohesion, including Beliefs in human rights, Empathy, and Family coherence. To foster harmonious co-existence and strengthen social support, civil society actors should design interventions that promote pluralistic forms of identification with the country. Such programming will be especially needed in the immediate post-war period to rebuild positive social bonds between and within different communities that may be undermined during the war.

Vertical social cohesion is in a feedback loop with active civic behaviour. This means that increasing vertical social cohesion decreases Active civic behaviour, while increasing Active civic behaviour increases vertical social cohesion. That is, citizens tend to respond to a perceived lack of vertical social cohesion by becoming more active citizens. Conversely, vertical social cohesion tends to increase when there is a more active citizenry. However, when institutions are perceived to be functioning well (high vertical social cohesion) citizens tend to become more passive. Therefore, mechanisms to reduce passivity and to actively involve citizens in decision-making processes will ensure that citizens’ needs are met, and local and central authorities are kept in check. Such dynamics of government institutions correcting their accountability and service provision in response to boisterous participation and activism is a healthy foundation to base the new Ukrainian social contract between the state and citizens. New methods of civic participation, appropriate for the turbulent present, and which plant seeds of a prosperous future of Ukraine need to be explored.
1. Introduction

The present study aimed to provide quantitative evidence of the challenges hindering social cohesion in Ukraine. It is the second volume of a pair of papers. The first volume outlined the theoretical framework for social cohesion in Ukraine, proposed measurable components based on SCORE Ukraine 2021 and examined regional variations on these key components (Guest & Panayiotou, 2022). In brief, we posited that social cohesion is a network phenomenon characterized by the interconnectivity of actors in society, whereby actors include both citizens and institutions (i.e., state authorities and non-state organisations). Thus, Social cohesion refers to the state of harmonious, mutually beneficial relations and reciprocity between actors. It put forward two distinct yet mutually reinforcing dimensions of social cohesion: Horizontal social cohesion capturing citizen-citizen relationships and Vertical social cohesion capturing citizen-institution relationships. Further, initial analyses, in volume one, revealed that at a national level Ukraine enjoys moderate levels of horizontal social cohesion with key components including Community Cooperation, Social Tolerance, and Social Proximity/Lack of Threat which tap on the acceptance of, harmony, and cooperation among different groups having the lowest scores undermining horizontal social cohesion (see Figure 1.1.).

Figure 1.1.: National Scores of Overall, Vertical and Horizontal Social Cohesion, including their individual components, calculated using SCORE 2021 survey data from a sample of more than twelve thousand citizens across Ukraine.

This second volume delved deeper to better understand the root causes and disrupting factors of social cohesion. Specifically, this report primarily focused on the challenges that impede citizen–citizen relationships and examined the links between social cohesion and constructive and problematic forms of citizenship to discover entry points to build social cohesion in Ukraine. Evidence-based recommendations by which policymakers and other relevant stakeholders can foster inclusive and tolerant communities, cooperation, and harmonious co-existence between different socio-demographic groups are provided.

1 For further details on the theoretical and measurable frameworks proposed by SeeD as well as regional variation on components of social cohesion across Ukraine please refer to “Social Cohesion in Ukraine Part 1: Defining and measuring social cohesion using the SCORE” (Guest & Panayiotou, 2022).
Social Cohesion during war

The military aggression by the Russian Federation that culminated in the invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022, has inconceivably changed contextual realities and challenges in the country. With more than 8 million people, mostly women and children, forced to flee the country and an estimated 7.1 million internally displaced 2, the invasion of Ukraine has triggered a catastrophic humanitarian crisis (Panayotatos, Atanda, & Schwartz, 2022). Ukrainians are, nonetheless, bravely resisting. They are fighting for the survival of their democracy and national sovereignty, demonstrating robust levels of social cohesion, and the necessary resilience to persevere through destruction and suffering. Despite the ferocity of Ukrainian resistance, the reverberations of this trauma will likely affect, among other things, the social cohesion and harmony of Ukrainian society for generations to come. Short- and long-term programming is warranted to develop the necessary capacities to absorb war-related shocks and minimise the damage and deterioration of the social fabric.

Given that data were collected, and analyses were conducted prior to the February 2022 invasion by the Russian Federation, our theoretical framework has been broadened to take into account the influence of conflict and war on social cohesion (Fiedler & Rohles, 2021). The war is affecting both horizontal (i.e., Citizen – Citizen relationships) and vertical cohesion (i.e., Citizen – Institutions relationships). For instance, for vertical social cohesion, research literature suggests that the physical and symbolic threats bolster people’s support for their home state and its leaders (rally round the flag effect, Davies, 2002; Lai & Reiler, 2005) and tend to increase demands and support for decisive military response (Lambert et al., 2010). For horizontal social cohesion, which is the focus of this report, overt threat strengthens national identification and attachment. While this often entails a wave of solidarity and cooperation among members of the ingroup, there is increased risk of ostracisation of individuals and groups that do not conform to the ingroup (e.g., ethnic and religious minorities; Fiedler & Rohles, 2021; Tajfel, & Turner, 1979, 1986). This may result in the social exclusion of ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities and other vulnerable communities. The report focused on different psychosocial phenomena of horizontal cohesion, including social tolerance, community cooperation, pluralistic forms of identification, and intergroup harmony. Decision-makers can use this report to design evidence-driven action plans for developing resilience, a strong civil society, and strategic messages of solidarity and unity and thus support the Ukrainian people during these challenging times.

Outline of the different sections

This report begins by investigating social tolerance towards marginalised groups (Section 2). Particularly, in Section 2 we identified which marginalised groups were the least tolerated, which regions/oblasts were the least tolerant towards marginalised groups and key factors that buffer or exacerbate social exclusion of these groups. Then, Section 3 examines the levels of community cooperation which was the lowest among the components of horizontal social cohesion (Figure 1.1.). A particular focus is placed on larger settlements (population of 500,000 or more) which had lower levels of community cooperation, revealing drivers that can increase cooperation in such communities. Further, levels of proximity and threat between different socio-demographic groups are investigated (Section 4). This section provides valuable information to effectively design prejudice and polarisation prevention campaigns. Section 5 explores whether there were systematic regional and linguistic variations in national attachment and identification and the associated benefits of strong national attachment and

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2 Data were retrieved on 27th of June, 2022 from https://data.humdata.org/visualization/ukraine-humanitarian-operations/
identification, highlighting the fundamental role these have in promoting an inclusive, tolerant, and democratic society. Section 6, using panel data from the government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (collected in 2019 and 2021), we examined the causal links between civic activism, participation, and horizontal and vertical social cohesion. These findings highlight the importance of sustaining and reinforcing horizontal social cohesion to mitigate violent citizenship and maintain support towards authorities and institutions. Each section provides key conclusions and proposes evidence-based recommendations for governmental, non-governmental institutions and groups, as well as other relevant stakeholders, to resolve challenges and foster social cohesion.
2. Social Tolerance

The analysis below is based on the data collected in 2021 – prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In recent years, Ukraine has gone through political upheavals and warfare in the eastern oblasts and the annexation of Crimea. Conditions were, nonetheless, relatively stable with conflict only simmering. SCORE Ukraine from 2016 to 2021 show a positive trend of social tolerance towards different marginalised groups within Ukrainian society. Nonetheless, the impact of Russia’s invasion might heighten the risk of exacerbation of existing social ruptures and cleavages, particularly towards minorities and marginalised groups. This warrants further attention to issues of social tolerance and acceptance, to ensure that vulnerable groups are not further discriminated and socially excluded, but rather integrated into their communities in the spirit of solidarity and a strong united front against the perpetrators. This section identifies marginalised groups that face increased risk of exclusion, the areas where exclusion was more likely and key factors that can buffer social exclusion and intolerance. This can be used for intervention and policy design that takes a more inclusion-sensitive lens when working on emergency response in the immediate future, and reconstruction in the long-term.

Building tolerance, understanding, and acceptance of minorities and marginalised is key for horizontal social cohesion (Vollhardt, Migacheva, & Tropp, 2009). Tolerance ensures that differences between groups, including their values and practices, do not result in discrimination, social exclusion, and violence. Also, it connotes a sense of enhanced unity, respect for diversity, and in extent social cohesion between citizens (Moody, & White, 2003). SCORE Ukraine 2021 defines social tolerance as accepting certain marginalised groups into the community and being comfortable interacting with them. It is considered a central component of horizontal social cohesion (Chan, To, & Chan, 2006; Guest & Panayiotou, 2022). The groups the SCORE Ukraine 2021 focused on are: immigrants, Jews, Muslims, people with a different skin colour, Roma people, LGBTQI+ people, and drug addicts. These groups were chosen following calibration of the SCORE which showed that these groups were more likely to be marginalised in Ukraine.

First, national levels of social tolerance towards different groups and how these have changed through the years are reported. Further, predictive analyses reveal what can enhance or reduce social tolerance towards non-tolerated groups and more generally. Finally, the most tolerant and the three least tolerant oblasts towards the different groups are identified. This enables programming to learn from oblasts where social tolerance is high, and direct strategies for improvement to regions where social tolerance is low.

National scores and trends of Social tolerance
Table 2.1. shows social tolerance scores towards different groups for 2016, 2018, and 2021. Across all groups, there was a positive trend. This suggests that over time Ukrainian citizens have become more tolerant towards marginalised groups. Notable increases include tolerance towards people with a different colour of skin (+2.3), LGBTQI+ people (+1.9), and Muslims (+1.4). Despite the positive trend, levels of social tolerance towards drug addicts,

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3 Ukraine SCORE 2021 assessed the levels of tolerance only towards minorities and marginalised groups (mentioned above). For regional (e.g., people from eastern Ukraine) and socio-political groups (e.g., Pro-EU oriented people, Ukrainian Nationalists) the SCORE assessed different components of intergroup harmony including Social proximity and Social threat; see Section 4 for further details).

4 Differences above 0.5 are considered to be noteworthy.
members of the LGBTQI+ community, and Roma in Ukraine SCORE 2021 were critically low. This puts them at risk of being further excluded from local communities, undermining horizontal social cohesion in Ukrainian society in general.

Table 2.1.: National level change in scores for social tolerance towards various marginalised groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Tolerance towards</th>
<th>National SCORE 5</th>
<th>Increase from 2016 to 2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with a different colour of skin</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBTQI+ people</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma people</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug addicts</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.1.: Citizens’ responses to items on social tolerance towards different groups, Score Ukraine 2021

Figure 2.1. shows that drug addicts were overwhelmingly the least tolerated group, with 67% of citizens not willing to accept them in their communities at all and a further 20% would accept them but would avoid personal interactions with them. In fact, only 10% would accept interacting with drug addicts personally. LGBTQI+ people and Roma people are also not very tolerated by Ukrainian citizens. SCORE Ukraine 2021 finds that 45% of citizens would not

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5 Sample sizes for National SCORE were: for 2016, n = 7,737; for 2018, n = 9,018 and for 2021 n = 12,482.
accept LGBTQI+ people in their communities. A further 29% would accept them but avoid any interactions with them. Moreover, 32% of citizens would not accept Roma people in their communities, while 34% would accept them but avoid communication. For the remaining groups, 50%–60% of Ukrainian citizens were happy to accept them in their communities and interact with them but still 28% - 34% would accept them in their community but avoid them.

Furthermore, demographic analyses show that compared to younger cohorts (18-35 years of age: 6.1; 35-59 years of age: 5.8), older people (60+ years of age) were generally less tolerant towards marginalised groups (2.7). Older people were particularly less tolerant towards drug addicts (1.6) compared to the other two age groups (2.5 & 2.3). Further, the analyses show that the youngest cohort was the most tolerant (4.6) towards members of the LGBTQI+ community, compared to the other cohorts (18 to 35 years of age: 3.7; 60+ years of age: 2.7). This suggests that, before the war, younger people were more accepting and respecting each person’s internal and individual experience of gender. No other demographic factors, including gender and type of settlement (urban vs. rural) had a significant relationship with social tolerance towards these groups.

What drives or impedes Social tolerance?

To better understand what drives social tolerance, a series of separate predictive analyses were conducted with general social tolerance, as well as social tolerance towards Roma, LGBTQI+ people, and Drug Addicts as outcomes. For all models the effects of gender, urbanity, age, and oblast were accounted for. Taken together, the analyses revealed which factors were common across social tolerance towards the different groups and in general and importantly which factors are more relevant for specifically increasing tolerance towards each of the marginalised groups. Thus, this analysis can provide recommendations for programming tailored to each marginalised group.

Table 1.2. shows positive and negative drivers of social tolerance. Drivers that were of magnitude .10 or higher are considered key in shaping social tolerance. Drivers of lower magnitude are somewhat less important. Further, positive β coefficients are associated with higher tolerance. These can be seen as good entry points for building a culture of tolerance. Negative β coefficients are associated with lower levels of tolerance towards marginalised groups and can be seen as triggers which might lead to developing intolerant attitudes.

Broadly speaking, the most important common positive driver was social proximity. Social proximity and social tolerance reflect different types of intergroup attitudes. The current finding suggests that increased proximity between different socio-demographic groups can have spill-over positive effects on social tolerance of minorities and marginalised groups. Conversely, the most important common negative driver of social tolerance was perceived levels of corruption. Perceiving governing institutions and important sectors in society (e.g., Police, Parliament, Judiciary, etc.) as corrupt might suggest the absence of just and transparent processes (i.e., the absence of a fair arbiter) which in turn can negatively influence people’s levels of trust and general tolerance. It is thus important to build the capacity for transparency and ensure the healthy functioning of institutions.

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6 Only age is a statistically significant predictor of (general) social tolerance, towards LGBTQI+, drug addicts with younger cohort demonstrating increased levels of tolerance across different groups and generally (all Fs>65, all ps<.001). No statistically significant differences of age are observed on social tolerance towards Roma (Fs<9).

7 Considering the current analysis along with the one reported in Section 4, which shows social tolerance as key in increasing social proximity, demonstrates that the two components of horizontal cohesion reflect different types of intergroup attitudes and thus are deeply interlinked (r=. 33; p<.001).
Further, positive drivers for general Social tolerance include Belief in human rights and Gender equality mindset. In fact, these two drivers along with Support for European values were crucial for fostering tolerance towards members of the LGBTQI+ community. Protection of human rights and the cultivation of progressive beliefs underlined by openness, opportunity for all, and a strong sense of justice can help increase tolerance towards marginalised groups, particularly LGBTQI+ people. For Social tolerance towards the Roma community and drug addicts, however, the role of this nexus of progressive attitudes was somewhat less relevant.

Sense of civic responsibility increased tolerance towards Roma and drug addicts. This suggests that strengthening civil society through different participatory mechanisms (e.g., public consultations, and participatory budgeting) can have positive effects on social tolerance towards Roma people and drug addicts.

Moreover, while Pluralistic Ukrainian identity had a positive effect on general Social tolerance, Ukrainian nationalism had a negative effect on general Social tolerance. Taken together, these highlight how different forms of identification with Ukraine can influence social tolerance and in extent social cohesion in society. Nationalism, for instance, is often characterised by inflated beliefs in ingroup superiority and entitlement (Cichocka & Cislak, 2020).

8 Except for Belief in human rights which nonetheless had a secondary role.
9 This may be the case because the narrative supporting tolerance for LGBTQI+ people is frequently couched in terms of human rights concerns, whereas the narratives supporting tolerance for the Roma and drug addicts are couched in terms of humanitarian concerns (i.e., economic and health issues).
10 It should be highlighted that nationalism, as operationalized and measured by SCORE, pertains to problematic forms of attachment and identification with the nation (ingroup) that often entail grandiose images of the ingroup (one SCORE item gauging nationalism asked: ‘I think Ukrainians are superior to other nationalities’) and exclusionary - impermeable boundaries of the identity (one SCORE item gauging nationalism asked: ‘I think only those who are ethnic Ukrainians should hold high positions in the government.’). The SCORE captures more conventional and inclusionary forms of identification with the nation with Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity scale (e.g., ‘I think all people living in Ukraine can be Ukrainians no matter their ethnic or religious backgrounds.’). In fact, social and political psychology literature demonstrates that insecure identification (i.e., nationalism) positively predicts both ingroup support and outgroup derogation while secure identification positively predicts ingroup support and negatively predicts outgroup derogation (for a review see Brewer. 2017; see also, Schatz, 2020). In the current context, this distinction is maintained and discussed as war can lead to radicalization and further escalation of violence.
This can render members of the ingroup intolerant of marginalised groups as they may feel that these groups threaten the ingroup’s normative image (De Zavala et al., 2009). On the other hand, pluralistic forms of identification (i.e., Pluralistic Ukrainian identity) are more accepting of others as fellow ingroup members irrespective of their ethnic and cultural background. Pluralistic identities can provide the foundations for a tolerant, inclusive, and cohesive society and thus help foster social tolerance towards marginalised groups (Brewer, 2009). Indeed, Ukrainian nationalism and Pluralistic Ukrainian identity, along with linguistic diversity, were the most important for shaping tolerance towards the Roma community, highlighting the importance of developing pluralistic Ukrainian identity for reducing prejudice and promoting cultural pluralism/diversity.

Furthermore, the perception that Ukrainian authorities increased social tolerance towards drug addicts. That is, the extent to which one feels that Ukrainian authorities listen and equally care about all parts of Ukraine helps citizens become more tolerant towards drug addicts. This suggests institutional responsiveness may play a key role in reducing prejudice and increasing warmth towards drug addicts.

**Where are marginalised communities the least and most tolerated?**

Figure 2.2. shows three lowest scoring and the highest scoring oblasts on social tolerance towards the different marginalised groups. Relevant organisations and stakeholders can use this map to identify oblasts that have particularly problematic attitudes towards marginalised communities. Also, this map can be helpful for stakeholders to identify strategies that have been implemented in highly tolerant oblasts to develop similar action programs in oblasts with low tolerance towards the different marginalised communities.

*Figure 2.2.: Oblasts with the three lowest scores or the highest score of social tolerance towards the different groups.*
Key Findings

1. Comparing three time points: 2016, 2018, and 2021, on a national level, there was a positive trend in levels of social tolerance towards different marginalised groups. The most notable increases in tolerance were found towards people with a different colour of skin and members of the LGBTQI+ community.

2. Despite these positive trends, national scores in 2021 for drug addicts, LGBTQI+ people, and Roma were critically low. Immigrants, Jews, Muslims and people with a different colour of skin, on the other hand, were moderately to highly tolerated in Ukrainian society. Programming and interventions should thus primarily target improving social inclusion of and tolerance towards drug addicts, the Roma and LGBTQI+ communities.

3. Social Tolerance was low, especially in the western oblasts of Lviv and Zakarpattia and the northern oblasts of Chernihiv and Sumy. Khmelnytskyi and Kirovohrad, on the other hand, appeared to be relatively tolerant towards marginalised groups.

4. Different strategies should be followed to increase tolerance towards the marginalised groups of Roma, LGBTQI+ people, and drug addicts:
   - For Roma, promotion of diversity and development of pluralistic and inclusionary forms of identification can increase tolerance towards them. Further, Zakarpattia, which according to the 2001 population census, has the highest population of Roma (approximately 15,000) and thus warrants increased attention for building tolerance towards this group (State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2001). Media interventions depicting the commitment of Roma communities to the common fight against the aggressor could positively contribute to the enhancement of social tolerance and social cohesion.
   - For LGBTQI+ people, protection of human rights and cultivation of progressive beliefs underlined by gender equality, openness, an opportunity for all, and a strong sense of justice (i.e., European values) are key for accepting them in Ukrainian communities.
   - For drug addicts, further investment is required in institutional systems of care for rehabilitation and implement projects to promote a healthy lifestyle and culture. Overall, tackling corruption and improving institutional responsiveness can help foster social tolerance towards them.
Considering the impact of the war, programming should, at the first instance, address immediate safety concerns (i.e., lack of access to shelters) and necessities (e.g., food, medicine, access to power and connectivity, access to clean water, hygiene, etc.). Extreme hardship, limited access to resources, and heightened anxiety can lead to psychosocial and physical exhaustion. Such states of duress can have negative consequences on protection of human rights and social tolerance. Humanitarian aid and emergency relief should, thus, ensure that members of these communities and in particular ethnic Roma, LGBTQI+ people, and drug addicts have equal access to emergency aid and support. Support should be targeted in areas that demonstrate problematic levels of social tolerance particularly in Lviv and Zakarpattia oblasts in the west and in Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts in the north. Areas where, since the onset of war, several cases of human rights violations and laws-of-war violations have been documented including, Chernihiv, Kharkiv and the outskirts of Kyiv city should also be targeted (OCHA Ukraine, 2022).

Moreover, civic society organisations should be at the forefront defending universal human rights. Given that violation of human rights is more evident during armed conflicts, CSOs should continue developing instruments aiming to alleviate human suffering, ensuring that victims of war are aware of and have their human rights protected under the human rights, refugee, and humanitarian laws. Programming should ensure that CSOs, especially those representing marginalised groups are included in coordination mechanisms and decision-making processes at all levels. Such close coordination and cooperation with CSOs should ensure that priorities in terms of humanitarian response and peace and security efforts are met. Focus especially in developing the capacity of CSOs for support, including safety and security training and on how to operate in an emergency context.
3. Community Cooperation

The prevailing aim of this analysis is to provide evidence-based and actionable recommendations for fostering community cooperation in Ukraine. While the SCORE Ukraine 2021 data showed community cooperation as the lowest and most concerning among the five components of horizontal social cohesion, facts on the ground following Russia’s invasion reveal Ukrainian citizens’ capacity for cooperation, support, and solidarity. The presented findings should thus be treated as a baseline during a period of relative stability (on the national scale), while the emerged citizenship networks of resistance as the potential for positive transformation. The presented findings reveal possible entry points to fulfil this potential. A sustained level of community cooperation will be vital to ensure rebuilding of communities and re-networking of relationships following the end of the invasion.

Community cooperation is an indicator of horizontal social cohesion, measuring the extent to which community and neighbourhood relationships can support the individual in times of need. Community cooperation constitutes the most informal social safety net that someone can rely on. It is, thus, an essential aspect of social cohesion. A citizen that does not feel any solidarity from their community, may be less resilient to stressors and less able to resolve problems or crises. Among the five indicators of horizontal social cohesion, community cooperation was the lowest (only 5.1), motivating the need for deeper study.

Across Ukraine, 15% of citizens reported that they cannot rely at all on their neighbours for help in case of a serious problem, while 24% have never solved problems together with other community members. However, this appears to be contingent upon the size of the respondent’s settlement. Specifically, in cities with a population greater than half a million, 21% felt they can’t rely on their neighbours, while in villages (with a population of 50,000 or less), only 9% felt this way.

Figure 3.1.: Citizens’ responses to items on Community cooperation, disaggregated by settlement size. Note the increased percentage of respondents in large cities who feel they cannot rely at all on others in their communities.
Naturally, in larger cities, Ukrainians are more individualistic and less co-dependent on their neighbours. Community cooperation ranges from 4.4 in cities larger than half a million, to 5.8 in villages (see Figure 3.2.). In smaller settlements, like Mariinka, the score of Community cooperation is 7.7, which is among the highest in the country. Despite eastern Ukraine being ravaged by the conflict, the citizens of Mariinka, which is at the contact line, weathered the storm, and report that they act together in resolving common problems, unlike much larger cities. No other demographic factors have a significant relationship with community cooperation like settlement size does.

Figure 3.2.: Community cooperation scores in settlements of different sizes, showing that community cooperation is much lower in larger settlements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population over 500 thousand</th>
<th>4.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population between 50 and 500 thousand</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population less than 50 thousand</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villages</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.3. shows levels of Community cooperation in several cities with a population over than half a million, and in several cities with a population between 50 thousand and half a million. Among large cities, Dnipro scored the highest (5.5) while Kharkiv and Odesa scored the lowest (3.6 and 3.7). Among smaller cities, Pavlohrad, Konotop, Nizhyn, and Rubizhne score highly (between 6.6 and 6.9), while Ternopil and Poltava scored very low (3.1 and 2.5 respectively). These results highlight that there is a great variation among cities as to how close-knit citizens feel to one another. It also helps focus attention on cities where Community cooperation was lower compared to other cities of a similar size. Among large cities, Odesa and Kharkiv had lower Community cooperation than expected, while among smaller cities with less than 500,000 population, Ternopil and Poltava had lower Community cooperation than expected.

Figure 3.3.: Scores in Community cooperation for settlements with population over 500 thousand (left) and settlements with population between 50 and 500 thousand (right). Smaller settlements omitted. Sample sizes of the reported settlements ranged from 26 to 654.
Programming should therefore learn from cities where community cooperation is high, and direct strategies for improvement to cities where community cooperation is low.

In settlements with population greater than 50 thousand Civic engagement and Community cooperation were significantly correlated ($r = 0.23, p<.001$). This implies that there is some relationship between informal community solidarity as measured by Community cooperation, and participation in civic life (i.e., voting, activism, etc.). Given the low levels of Civic engagement in Ukraine, Community cooperation may therefore be a good entry point to increase engagement among citizens.

**What are the prerequisites for building Community cooperation in larger settlements?**

Predictive analyses revealed drivers which underpin Community cooperation. Achieving an increase in these drivers (see figure 3.4.) is expected to lead to an increase in Community cooperation. These drivers include feelings towards others, such as Empathy and Social tolerance, suggesting that a positive and warm disposition towards others and towards marginalised groups, leads to stronger networks of solidarity. Another important driver was Trust in NGOs. Building community cooperation should, thus, come through civil society organisations, which can provide the social glue and the social network to build cooperation in areas where it was found to be low. Interestingly, the only governmental service that was strongly associated with Community cooperation was the Provision of healthcare. Adequate healthcare services may allow citizens to feel taken care of, appreciated and part of the community and society at large which, in turn, can motivate them to be more prosocial and open to cooperate with fellow citizens for the common good. Although these drivers had a significant impact on community cooperation, taken together they only explained 12% of the variance in the outcome. Several other economic, conflict-related, and psychosocial factors

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11 In typical social studies, it is expected that a model should be able to explain between 20% and 30% of the variance of the outcome.
were tested as drivers, but were found to not significantly impact the outcome. Community cooperation might be a phenomenon governed by individual or local specificities which are random\textsuperscript{12}. That is, each settlement has a unique kind of social network that is not fully explainable by that settlement’s basic characteristics. This strongly motivates taking an extremely contextual and localised view of community cooperation.

**Key Findings**

1. On average, one in five Ukrainian citizens reported high levels of community cooperation. However, this depended on the size of the settlement, with smaller settlements such as small towns and villages demonstrating higher levels than larger settlements like large towns and cities.

2. Focus on building community cooperation in larger settlements (with population over 50,000) and especially in Kharkiv, Odesa, Ternopil, and Poltava.

3. Given the positive relationship between community cooperation and civic engagement, building community cooperation should be seen as a key step for encouraging more active, engaged, and responsible citizenship.

4. To achieve higher community cooperation work must be done at the nexus of empathy, social tolerance, community cooperation, through existing trusted NGOs and CSOs.

5. Given the wide variation of scores in community cooperation, and because these seven drivers only weakly explained community cooperation, extreme contextual care

During war, strong community cooperation can play an important role in ensuring the well-being and resilience of communities and its members. Local authorities, emergency services, representatives of civil society (both organisations and volunteers) should be at the forefront in empowering Ukrainian citizens to form cooperative and social networks for support, recovery, and solidarity. These will ensure communities are better prepared to absorb the shocks of the war. For instance, solidarity networks can ensure community members are there for each another, for vulnerable groups, and more prepared to incorporate displaced citizens into their communities. Further, CSOs should train and support communities in operating, at least to some extent given the circumstances, basic provisions such as healthcare and education.

Strong networks of support and cooperation will also prepare Ukraine for rebuilding once the war is over. Programming should aim to bring local authorities closer to members of the community and actively involve them in the decision-making at the local, neighbourhood, and municipal level (i.e., through public consultations and participatory budgeting). Asserting control over their own development not only ensures that available resources are better utilised for the needs of the community (i.e., access to healthcare) but can also foster locals’ pride for their community and bolster their sense of agency which are essential for community cooperation. Such involvement can serve as a segue for more active participation in political and civic life.

\textsuperscript{12} This is not to suggest that the seven drivers we identified do not play a role, but rather that local specificities are important in predicting Community cooperation. To reveal these local specificities, SCORE studies that have been calibrated to particular regions or cities, and which include granular contextual factors, should be deployed.
should be taken, respecting whatever local networks already exist, which may wildly differ from locality to locality.
4. Intergroup Relations in Ukraine

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has challenged relations between different regional and socio-political groups of the country. The aim of this section was to assess citizens’ attitudes towards different regional and socio-political groups to better understand how harmonious intergroup relations were prior to the invasion. Intergroup dynamics data become increasingly relevant because they can help identify key drivers that can foster harmonious co-existence, collaboration, and social cohesion. Key drivers that can foster harmonious intergroup relations are presented in this section, which can enable programmatic design for prejudice reduction and inclusion interventions as well as to minimise polarisation. Findings from such data could form the basis for a cohesion-building national discussion on the future journey of Ukraine once the warfare ends.

A cohesive society should be characterised by harmonious relationships and emotional connectedness between its citizens, irrespective of the groups they belong to, their socio-demographic background, and ideological orientation. In a war-ridden environment like Ukraine, social cohesion is a long-term challenge, as is the effort to reinstate positive relationships between the different groups. In this section we aim to better understand citizens’ (intergroup) attitudes, that is their feelings towards members of various groups with different socio-political orientations. The first part of this section focuses on the levels of proximity and threat Ukrainian citizens felt towards different socio-demographic groups in Ukraine. We then identify key social and psychological drivers that can foster social proximity towards these groups. The results can inform strategies for preventing tension, increasing intergroup harmony and inclusion, and fostering social cohesion.

The state of intergroup relations in Ukraine, prior to the invasion
SCORE Ukraine 2021 assessed citizens’ attitudes towards different groups which are known to be in potential strife in Ukraine: people from western and eastern Ukraine, people living in the NGCAs, those who support the separation of the non-governmental controlled territories (NGCAs) in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, Pro-EU oriented and Pro-Russia oriented people, Nationalists, and IDPs. Specifically, using the nationally representative sample, SCORE Ukraine 2021 measured levels of social proximity towards, social threat from, readiness for dialogue and contact with these different groups. Social Proximity and Social Threat are key components of horizontal social cohesion and are used to assess intergroup harmony in society (Guest & Panayiotou, 2022). Social proximity measures the extent to which one would accept members of different socio-demographic groups as their close friends and colleagues. Social threat, on the other hand, is used to measure the extent to which one feels that different socio-demographic groups undermine the unity of their community. Contact measures the frequency of direct personal contact with members of these groups and Readiness for dialogue captures the belief that people from different groups would hear one’s arguments and be ready to discuss matters and have a mutual benefit from engaging in dialogue (see in Table 4.1.). Social proximity is strongly positively and social threat is negatively associated\(^\text{13}\) with readiness for dialogue and intergroup contact, respectively.

\(^{13}\) The abovementioned associations between the intergroup indicators range between .24 and .54 (all ps<.001).
People from western Ukraine and people from eastern Ukraine were the groups citizens reported feeling more proximal towards, least threatened from, most in contact with, and more readiness to engage in dialogue with. This suggests that, at least before the invasion, the place one lived or came from (i.e., in western or eastern parts of the country) did not constitute a source of intergroup tension nor did it carry any strong negative associations. Indeed, the variations of social proximity and social threat across oblasts were small and not significant further supporting this finding (Guest & Panayiotou, 2022). This is contrary to the commonly encountered narrative that Ukraine is deeply divided along cultural and linguistic lines (Matlock, 2021). Rather, it shows that citizens felt equally warm towards other Ukrainian citizens irrespective of which part of the country they came from.

Moreover, respondents reported satisfactory levels of warmth (i.e., high proximity, frequent contact, and readiness for dialogue and low levels of threat) towards Pro-EU oriented people. This is rather expected given that European integration, along with the rule of law, opposition to authoritarianism and corruption were the key issues underlying the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 and its aftermath (Reznik, 2016). Importantly, there were no systematic variations between western and eastern parts of the country with both broad regions reporting moderate to satisfactory levels of proximity towards Pro-EU oriented people. Nonetheless, compared to western oblasts, eastern oblasts reported somewhat higher levels of perceived threat from Pro-EU oriented people (see Guest & Panayiotou, 2022). Presumably the higher levels of social threat from Pro-EU oriented people in eastern oblasts might have been due to their high proximity to the conflict-affected areas, the NGCAs and the borders with Russia. An advance towards European integration may have been perceived by people in eastern oblasts as a risk factor that can lead to conflict escalation which would affect eastern oblasts more directly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social proximity</th>
<th>Social threat</th>
<th>Readiness for dialogue</th>
<th>Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Ukraine</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Ukraine</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-EU oriented people</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATO or JFO military personnel</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from Crimea</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian nationalists</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People living in NGCA</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Russia oriented people</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in support of NGCA separation</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All groups (averaged)</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

People in support of NGCA separation reported feeling more proximal towards, least threatened from, most in contact with, and more readiness to engage in dialogue with. This suggests that, at least before the invasion, the place one lived or came from (i.e., in western or eastern parts of the country) did not constitute a source of intergroup tension nor did it carry any strong negative associations. Indeed, the variations of social proximity and social threat across oblasts were small and not significant further supporting this finding (Guest & Panayiotou, 2022). This is contrary to the commonly encountered narrative that Ukraine is deeply divided along cultural and linguistic lines (Matlock, 2021). Rather, it shows that citizens felt equally warm towards other Ukrainian citizens irrespective of which part of the country they came from.

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14 The oblast-level scores on all of the intergroup relations indicators can be found on the SCORE platform: [https://app.scoreforpeace.org/en/ukraine/2021/1/map?row=tn-198-170](https://app.scoreforpeace.org/en/ukraine/2021/1/map?row=tn-198-170) (see also, Social Cohesion Vol. 1 where regional variations on proximity and threat, along with other key components of social cohesion are explored in more detail)

15 See also Section 5 of the current report where we examined the extent to which, before the invasion, Ukrainian identity and nationhood were contingent upon linguistic lines.

16 An exception to this tendency was found in the Sumy oblasts where respondents reported low levels of social proximity towards Pro-EU oriented people (3.5 out of 10). This however may be accounted for by the observation that respondents from the Sumy oblast reported the lowest level of contact with Pro-EU oriented people (1.2 out of 10). Perceived social threat from this group was also low (2.5 out of 10).
and immediately. Indeed, in retrospect, people from the eastern oblasts\textsuperscript{17} have been the most affected following the Russian invasion both with direct exposure to active warfare as well as massive depopulation and displacements\textsuperscript{18}.

This is not to suggest that people in eastern oblasts favoured Pro-Russian oriented people. On the contrary, respondents from eastern oblasts reported similar levels of social threat and social distance from Pro-EU and Pro-Russian oriented people. Further, there was no significant variation between western and eastern oblasts on levels of social threat from Pro-Russia oriented people. Moreover, nationally, the lowest levels of social proximity and highest levels of social threat were reported towards pro-Russia oriented people and people who support the separation of the NGCAs. The mutual presence of low proximity and relatively high threat indicate that there was some tension against the Pro-Russia oriented individuals and people who support the separation of the NGCAs. Ukrainian citizens also reported low levels of social proximity and high levels of social threat towards Ukrainian Nationalists and people living in the NGCAs. For all groups the levels of proximity, threat, and readiness for dialogue did not vary across gender, age groups, or type of settlement (all ps>.05). Conversely, older people (60 years of age or older) reported more frequent contact with people living in the NGCAs and those who support the separation of these areas from Ukraine compared to age groups.

In the subsection that follows, we aimed to identify the key positive and negative drivers that shape social proximity and in turn provide entry points for intervention and programming. In the main part of the report we examined the effects of different social and psychological drivers on (general) social proximity focusing on common factors across the various regional and socio-political groups. In the Annex we included a series of separate predictive analyses on social proximity towards the vulnerable groups and the groups Ukrainian citizens were least warm towards. This way, we examined whether the key factors that shaped social proximity in general also shaped proximity towards nationalists, IDPs, Pro-Russia oriented people, people in support of the separation of the NGCAs and people living in the NGCAs (See Table S1).

**What are the key factors for improving Social proximity?**

Social proximity towards the different groups was primarily driven by the frequency of contact with them. Particularly, we found that frequent exposure and interaction with members of the different regional and socio-political groups increased citizens’ willingness to befriend and/or work with members of these groups. The current finding corroborates the intergroup contact hypothesis revealing that contact with outgroups can improve intergroup relations (Allport, 1954, Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). Moreover, social tolerance towards marginalised groups was found to be an equally important driver of social proximity towards the different groups, suggesting that promotion of minority inclusion and diversity can improve intergroup relations in general\textsuperscript{19}. Preference for social distance from groups that hold different opinions and intolerance of marginalised groups can contribute towards a vicious cycle of unfavourable intergroup relations. Especially in the Ukrainian context, given the sustained Russian military aggression, prejudice reduction initiatives should focus on local-level interventions in which members of the various groups engage in interactive activities (e.g., sporting activities) and

\textsuperscript{17} A recent survey by the International Republican Institute following the invasion showed that people from the east demonstrated higher willingness to accept concessions to end the war including Ukraine declaring neutral status compared to respondents from other regions of the country (IRI, 2022).

\textsuperscript{18} https://data.humdata.org/visualization/ukraine-humanitarian-operations/

\textsuperscript{19} The strong association between social proximity and social tolerance was also demonstrated in Section 2, where we posited that different intergroup dimensions are often closely interlinked and can facilitate one another.
psychological exercises to improve intergroup relations (Paluck, Porat, Clark, & Green, 2020). Once the situation in Ukraine is more stable, local-level interventions could be scaled up and involve dialogue between the different groups to promote more favourable intergroup attitudes.

Furthermore, social proximity was also driven by Empathy, while Pluralistic Ukrainian identity also appeared as a driver of Social proximity, albeit a weaker one. Additionally, feelings of marginalization were evidenced to have a negative effect on social proximity towards members of various socio-political groups. Alongside Social tolerance, and Intergroup contact, these drivers suggest that prejudice reduction and social inclusion programmes, by promoting prosocial attitudes underlined by openness, understanding and inclusiveness, can have multiple, wide reaching benefits on intergroup relations. This is further supported by the observations that Empathy, pluralistic identification with Ukraine and Social tolerance were positively associated with one another as well as with important life skills such as Growth mindset and Distress tolerance.20

Trust in local institutions also emerged as a positive driver of social proximity, which emphasises the central role that institutions can have in shaping intergroup relations. Combining local-level prejudice reduction interventions within an institutional framework of minority representation and inclusion might be a fruitful path for improving social proximity and harmony between the different regional and socio-political groups. Local authorities’ position for direct engagement with the local communities can facilitate positive intergroup contact, sending strong signals that, irrespective of socio-political orientations, all Ukrainian citizens (including members of marginalised groups and minorities) have a central role in society. Thus, local institutions and the people within them can promote more tolerance, improve intergroup relations and, in extent, foster social cohesion.

Figure 4.1: Drivers of Social Proximity towards members of various groups in Ukrainian society. This model is controlled for age, gender and urbanity. $R^2 = 0.21$. Sample size = 12482.

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20 Partial correlations controlled for Social proximity, ranged between $r=.10$ to $.30$ for empathy, social tolerance, pluralistic Ukrainian identity, growth mindset and distress tolerance, all $p<.001$. 
**Key Findings**

1. Intergroup relations in Ukraine, prior to the invasion by Russia, were somewhat tensed especially towards Pro-Russia oriented people, people living in the NGCAs and people who support the separation of the NGCAs. Citizens also felt some distant towards Ukrainian Nationalists, albeit to a lesser extent.

2. Encouraging intergroup Contact, open and accepting attitudes including Social tolerance, Pluralistic Ukrainian identity and Empathy while addressing issues of Marginalisation can contribute to reducing social distance towards the different socio-political groups. Improving intergroup harmony may, in turn, positively influence readiness for dialogue. Strengthen prejudice reduction and minority inclusion programmes to signal the value and centrality of the different groups in Ukrainian society. All this points to the need of a comprehensive intergroup contact programme to be deployed in Ukraine, to rebuild social relationships between groups, help promote dialogue and discussion of the traumatic experience of the invasion, which is still ongoing, and lay the foundations of a new understanding and modus operandi between the various social and regional groups of Ukraine.

3. The presence of trustworthy local institutions can also foster proximity to divergent groups. In line with the recent decentralisation reforms, local authorities which now have decision-making power in education and health services can use these systems to pave the way for inclusion, tolerance, and positive contact between the different groups. This would also require long term strategies to develop institutional frameworks of minority inclusion and representation. However, in areas where local institutions are not displaying good governance and become mistrusted by citizens, this could be a warning sign of a breakdown in social proximity. Anti-corruption and trust-building interventions therefore should have an eye on potential added benefits of their work in contributing to social cohesion.

It is unclear if social rifts have been exacerbated following the invasion of Ukraine by Russia; upcoming rounds of data collection using the SCORE will reveal to what extent these indicators have deteriorated or improved. Either way, the above analysis is crucial for both the immediate and post-war periods, because it reveals what factors need to be in place to ensure cohesive intergroup relations. Civil society organisations should promote openness to and acceptance of people with different beliefs and socio-political orientations. Promotion of such common values and attitudes and an inclusive form of identification should also ensure that levels of intergroup tensions within communities and between the different socio-political groups remain low. These should be used as the blueprint to promote effective campaigns and to design interventions to reduce tensions and negative intergroup attitudes.
5. Pluralistic Ukrainian identity and Sense of belonging to the country

In attempts to justify the 2022 invasion, the Russian Federation has been dismissive of Ukrainian nationhood, claiming that Russians and Ukrainians are one people. Such an explicit refusal of Ukrainian people’s unique identity connotes an outright quash of their right to self-determination and independence. SCORE Ukraine 2021 findings reveal a strong national attachment among Ukrainian citizens that was defined by the diverse and pluralistic backgrounds of its citizens and not by strict linguistic or ethnic criteria. Further, we found that national attachment and identification did not differ between people from eastern parts and people from western parts of the country and did not depend on spoken language. Sense of belonging and pluralistic forms of identification (coined as Pluralistic Ukrainian identity) are considered key components of horizontal social cohesion in Ukraine (Guest & Panayiotou, 2022). In fact, the catalytic role of the latter in promoting liberal and democratic values of tolerance, diversity, and individual rights also demonstrated throughout the current report and suggests that future programming should build on this notion of inclusionary and pluralistic identity to improve social cohesion (see also Sections 2 & 4). This section, also, provides evidence that enables design of effective communication strategies.

Pluralistic Ukrainian identity and Sense of belonging to the country are critical components of horizontal social cohesion in Ukraine (Guest & Panayiotou, 2022). Pluralistic Ukrainian identity captures the extent to which one endorses inclusive forms of identification with the nation and the country. Such an identity recognises others as Ukrainian as long as they live in the country and thus is not based on strict ethnic, linguistic or cultural criteria. Sense of belonging to the country gauges the level of attachment to Ukraine one feels. In Ukraine these two indicators are foundational for the harmonious co-existence and cooperation of its citizens. In fact, social psychology literature suggests that a superordinate identity that recognises and accommodates multiple other social identities is effective in promoting cultural diversity and inclusiveness, while it reduces intergroup prejudice (for a review see Brewer, 2009).

In this section, we take a closer look at the national attachment and identification that underpin Ukrainian nationhood. Specifically, using data that were collected before the invasion, we, first, examined whether Pluralistic Ukrainian identity and Sense of belonging were contingent upon regional and linguistic differences. In turn, we investigated the associations of Pluralistic Ukrainian and Sense of belonging with views about the conflict in eastern Ukraine, institutions, and authorities as well as with a range of psychosocial traits and skills. Finally, we examined whether there were any systematic variations in Sense of belonging to the country and Pluralistic Ukrainian identity based on the media sources respondents rely on to get informed about current and political affairs. These findings can help shape communication strategies to bolster social cohesion and counter misinformation and propaganda.
Regional and linguistic variations in Sense of belonging and pluralistic identification

As reported in Social Cohesion part I, both indicators enjoyed high levels of endorsement across the country. In fact, no systematic variations across oblasts were observed. Rather, relatively low scoring oblasts were randomly scattered around the country. Importantly there was no discrepancy in the scores between the eastern and western parts of the country with both broad regions enjoying similarly high scores (see Figure 5.1.). This demonstrates that Ukrainians feel strongly attached to the country and open and accepting of others irrespective of their sociodemographic backgrounds. These findings counter the narrative that Ukraine is not a nation in its own right and that Ukrainians do not have their own unique identity that is distinct from Russian identity. Further, the findings also counter the narrative that eastern Ukraine is less attached to Ukraine or feels less Ukrainian than other regions. The high scores in Pluralistic Ukrainian identity and Sense of belonging to the country may, at least, partly account for the wave of solidarity, cooperation and resistance Ukrainian civilians have demonstrated following the invasion by Russia.

Further, we assessed whether Sense of belonging to the country and Pluralistic Ukrainian identity vary based on respondents’ spoken language. Table 5.1. below shows scores in Pluralistic Ukrainian identity and Sense of belonging to the country as a function of: i) the language participants used to respond to the SCORE survey and ii) their self-reported proficiency in Ukrainian and Russian languages. Respondents that completed the survey in Ukrainian (35%) reported somewhat higher levels of Pluralistic Ukrainian identity and Sense of belonging to the country, compared to those that completed the survey in Russian (65%). Further, the Ukrainian language was weakly positively correlated with Pluralistic Ukrainian identity ($r = .07$) and Sense of belonging to the country ($r = .13$). Knowledge of the Russian
language was weakly negatively correlated with Pluralistic Ukrainian identity ($r = -.05$) and Sense of belonging to the country ($r = -.08$).

Table 5.1: Comparisons between spoken language on Pluralistic Ukrainian identity and Sense of belonging to the country; $N = 12482$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pluralistic Ukrainian identity</th>
<th>Sense of belonging to the country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language of the survey</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian (n = 4329)</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian (n = 8153)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ukrainian language knowledge</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No knowledge (n=170)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic (n=1290)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fluent (n =4087)</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native (n=6935)</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Russian language knowledge</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Knowledge (n=123)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic (n=1116)</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fluent (n = 7005)</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native (n = 4238)</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although significant the correlations reported above were weak. Especially those between Knowledge of the Russian language and Sense of belonging to the country and Pluralistic Ukrainian identity. Further, the scores for both sense of belonging and pluralistic identification with the country were satisfactorily high across language spoken and language proficiency which suggests that language plays a limited role in shaping people’s attachment to and identification with the country, and thus language is not a divisive issue.

**Why are Sense of belonging to the country and Pluralistic Ukrainian identity key for horizontal social cohesion?**

Moreover, we investigated the associations of these two indicators with views about the conflict in eastern Ukraine, institutions, and authorities as well as with a range of psychosocial traits and skills. Both indicators were positively associated with key psychosocial traits and attitudes such as Empathy, Belief in human rights, and Family coherence. Pluralistic Ukrainian identity was also positively associated with Growth mindset and Social tolerance. Taken together, these positive associations further highlight the importance of these two indicators in cultivating democratic values of openness, tolerance, acceptance, protecting human rights and building a future of harmonious co-existence between citizens in pluralist societies like Ukraine.

Moreover, Pluralistic Ukrainian identity was positively associated with future visions that place the NGCAs back into Ukraine and negatively associated with solutions where the NGCAs are envisioned as independent countries. These associations highlight the key role Pluralistic Ukrainian identity can have in envisioning a common and inclusive future for the country. Further, Sense of belonging to the country and Pluralistic Ukrainian identity were also positively associated with Trust in Ukrainian Army, while the latter was also positively associated with Trust in NGOs.
Table 5.2. Significant correlates of Sense of belonging to the country and Pluralistic Ukrainian identity; In all cases \( p < 0.001; N = 12482 \). Blank cells imply the correlation for that indicator was not statistically significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sense of belonging to the country</th>
<th>Pluralistic Ukrainian identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belief in human rights</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family coherence</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth mindset</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social tolerance</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Ukrainian Army</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in NGOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future vision for NGCA: Part of Ukraine</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future vision for NGCA: Independent countries</td>
<td>- .15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Building Trust in NGOs will therefore be a step towards building Pluralistic Ukrainian identity, and could form a good partner to work on disinformation, sense of belonging, social/service improvement projects, human rights, etc, as a steppingstone to building pluralistic Ukrainian identity. Pluralistic Ukrainian identity is a powerful tool that fosters inclusivity, acceptance, and tolerance (Section 2). Thus, to foster harmonious co-existence, civil society actors should design interventions that promote inclusive forms of identification with the country. Such programming will be especially needed in the immediate post-war period to rebuild positive social bonds between and within different communities that may have been damaged during the war.

**Media preferences, national attachment, and identification**

We also examined whether there were any systematic variations on Sense of belonging to the country and Pluralistic Ukrainian identity based on the different TV channels respondents watch for current affairs. As shown in Figure 5.2., respondents watching ICTV or TRK Ukraina reported higher levels of Sense of belonging, compared to those who do not watch these channels to get informed about the current affairs. Respondents who watch Novy Kanal for current affairs reported lower levels of Sense of belonging to the country than those who do not watch Novy Kanal for the news\(^{21}\). Figure 5.2. shows variations on levels of Sense of belonging to the country based on viewership of different channels. Although a similar pattern was observed with Pluralistic Ukrainian identity, these differences were not statistically significant\(^{22}\).

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\(^{21}\) These findings do not necessarily suggest a causal link (i.e., that watching a specific channel increases/decreases levels of national attachment and identification). It might be that people with higher levels of belonging and national identification prefer watching ICTV and TRK but not Novy Kanal.

\(^{22}\) Pluralistic Ukrainian identity scores for viewership of different channels ranges between 7.2 and 7.5 and not statistically significant.
Key Findings

1. No systematic regional variations (i.e., east-west) were observed for Sense of belonging to the country and Pluralistic Ukrainian identity. Sense of belonging and Pluralistic Ukrainian identity correlated positively with Knowledge of the Ukrainian language and negatively with Knowledge of the Russian language, albeit weakly. Across proficiency in Ukrainian and Russian languages, however, sense of belonging and inclusive identification with the country scores were satisfactorily high. This demonstrates that language is not a divisive issue and does not shape people’s identification with and attachment to the country.

2. Pluralistic Ukrainian identity was positively associated with inclusive future visions of the country as well as a range of positive social and psychological attitudes, including Belief in human rights, Family Coherence, and Empathy. These findings demonstrate the importance of national attachment and healthy/inclusive identification with the country.

3. People who watch ICTV and TRK Ukraina reported higher sense of belonging to the country compared to those who don’t watch these channels. Conversely, those who watch Novy Kanal for current affairs reported lower sense of belonging to the country compared to those who don’t watch this channel. This information is relevant for developing communication strategies to target different audiences accordingly.
Feeling attached to the country has likely increased, especially under the current circumstances where national sovereignty and independence are under threat. How the war may have impacted Pluralistic Ukrainian identity however is less clear. This form of identification places more weight to a civic understanding of national identification where one is recognised as a Ukrainian citizen without necessarily sharing similar ethnic or cultural roots. In the post-war period the risk of radicalisation and social exclusion of marginalised and vulnerable groups might increase. There is a need to keep Pluralistic Ukrainian identity as part of the narrative to counter exclusionary forms of identification. Given its key role, programming should thus run campaigns and interventions to bolster Pluralistic Ukrainian identity. For instance, campaigns that demonstrate acts of solidarity and resistance by minority and marginalised groups and individuals that are Ukrainian citizens but do not share similar ethnic and cultural origins should cultivate positive perceptions of and social proximity towards these groups and thus embedding inclusiveness and pluralism as key feature of Ukrainian civic identity.

The lack of systematic variations between eastern and western parts of the country on attachment to and identification with the country as well as the lack of convincing associations of Russian or Ukrainian language knowledge with belonging or identification, suggest that claims of East-West and linguistic divisions are unsubstantiated. These findings should be disseminated to counter narratives that reduce Ukrainians their nationhood or aim to create divisions between citizens.
6. The link between Social Cohesion and Citizenship

Once the war is over, there will be a need to rebuild the country including the relationships between citizens and the government. SCORE Ukraine 2021 data reveal that Ukrainian citizens, prior to the war, felt that central/governmental authorities were unaccountable and unresponsive (Guest & Panayiotou, 2022). Post-war programming should thus focus on building these relationships. For instance, citizens need to get more involved in decision-making processes, keep the government in check and ensure is responsive to their demands. Central and local authorities should establish channels of communication with citizens and encourage them to participate and express their questions and demands. This should help establish active and constructive civic engagement which might be key for vertical social cohesion. Accordingly, this section examined the interplay between civic participation and vertical social cohesion. Further, considering that the war is creating deep ruptures that disturb both citizen – citizen and citizen – institution relationships, this section also examined how vertical and horizontal social cohesion are interrelated with violent and non-violent active forms of citizenship. Understanding these associations will help to ensure that citizenship and civic engagement that will emerge after the end of the war, will be constructive, not violent and radicalised or destructive.

An active citizenry ensures that governing bodies and non-governmental organisations represent the will and interest of the local community. It can promote positive social change, and hold governmental authorities accountable. It, thus, lies at the core of a well-functioning and cohesive society (UNDP, 2020). Nonetheless, not all forms of active civic participation necessarily promote social cohesion (Guest, Dagli, & Machlouzarides, 2022). For instance, active citizens with aggressive tendencies tend to feel more threatened and anxious and justify violence more often and report stronger negative stereotypes towards outgroups (USE, 2018). In contrast, active and constructive citizens tend to have high levels of economic and political security, contact and readiness for dialogue with different groups. While the latter is seen as an exemplar of civil civic participation, the former is seen uncivil and a major risk to social cohesion (USE, 2018). That is, active civic participation can bolster horizontal social cohesion, while when coupled with violent tendencies can hamper horizontal social cohesion. Further, past research found that constructive (versus passive) civic participation in Ukrainian cities can positively affect the responsiveness of local governance (Aasland & Lyska, 2015). This suggests that constructive civic participation can positively contribute to vertical social cohesion.

How the different dimensions of social cohesion predict civic participation and its different forms remain unexplored. In the first volume of this report, we posited that civic participation and both horizontal and vertical social cohesion are closely interlinked in a bi-directional feedback loop (Guest & Panayiotou, 2022). In the current section, we tested the causal nature of these interrelationships. Do higher levels of social cohesion lead to certain patterns of more intense civic participation or not? Or, is social cohesion an outcome emerging from certain patterns of civic participation? Using panel data from Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the presented analysis examined the causal dynamics of social cohesion and civic behaviours revealing whether social cohesion precedes civic behaviours or vice versa. By civic behaviour we mean activism or civic participation, including actions like participation in protests, signing petitions, and attending events organised by local authorities or NGOs. Civic behaviour can be
organised or spontaneous, constructive or destructive, reconciliatory or adversarial, peaceful or violent.

To simplify and capture the wide spectrum of potential civic behaviour, this analysis focussed on two indicators: Active civic behaviour (Civic engagement and Active citizenship) and Violent citizenship. These two dimensions allow us to distinguish between civic behaviours which are constructive and positive (that is, active engagement which avoids violence) and those which are more confrontational and open to violent means (Guest, Dagli, & Machlouzarides, 2022). Citizens may score highly in Active civic behaviour but low in Violent citizenship: these citizens are consistently engaged in activism but consciously avoid any kind of violent adversarial methods to achieve their political aims. Other citizens may score high in both Active civic behaviour and Violent citizenship. This suggests they are more open to using violence against others. Citizens who are passive and have disengaged from participation in any of its forms, would score low on both indicators.

Our conceptualisation of social cohesion purposely excludes civic behaviour, activism, or civic and political participation from the definition of social cohesion (Guest & Panayiotou, 2022). Although other frameworks include participation as a component of social cohesion, we conceptualise civic behaviour as a response to potential ruptures in social cohesion. Separating cohesion from civic participation also allows us to investigate the links between social cohesion and patterns of civic behaviour. This allows us to establish whether there is a positive or negative feedback loop between them. Civic behaviours could arise as a response to deteriorating relations between political or ethnic groups, or between the governed and governing institutions. Conversely, positive and constructive civic behaviour could potentially blossom in the presence of high levels of social cohesion, when bonds within a community are cohesive, or when citizens and governing institutions synergise to respond to resolve common issues. We thus, present an analysis which attempts to disentangle causal pathways, revealing what comes first: the tight-knit community or the active citizen.

Figure 6.1 below shows the web of possible predictive pathways between Horizontal social cohesion, Vertical social cohesion, Active Civic Behaviour and Violent Citizenship (scenario). Although it is certain that other factors, beyond social cohesion, may be related to patterns of civic behaviour, the scope of this analysis is to understand the interplay between social cohesion and civic behaviour. Unlike other models, which are run on data collected at the same timepoint, this analysis was run on panel data, that is data of the same respondents who were surveyed twice, in 2019 and 2021. Re-surveying of the same sample allows us to robustly establish the causal links between indicators and helps reveal feedback loops between indicators, using cross-lagged modelling. This analysis tested which of the grey arrows in the figure below are statistically significant. Pathways that are found to be significant indicate that there may be a causal relationship between drivers in 2019 and outcomes in 2021.

For example, if pathway a1, from Horizontal social cohesion to Active civic behaviour is found to be significant, that means that Horizontal social cohesion in 2019 significantly predicts Active civic behaviour in 2021. This would suggest that higher levels of horizontal social

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23 See Appendix Tables S2 & S3 for the specific items of Violent and Active citizenship and how meta-indicator Active Civic behaviour was created.

24 In the analyses that follow, Horizontal Social Cohesion has been aggregated at the community level (for communities that have 10 or more responses) or at the rayon level for communities with less than 10 responses. Aggregating responses is done to that Vertical Social Cohesion.

25 Indeed, an upcoming SCORE report on citizenship will investigate what other economic, social, psychological, and conflict-related factors affect civic behaviour.
cohesion in 2019 lead to more active civic behaviour in 2021. Panel data, however, allows us to test pathway $a_2$, from Active civic behaviour in 2019 to Horizontal social cohesion in 2021. Finding this pathway to be statistically significant would suggest that civic participation generates horizontal social cohesion in the future, and not the other way around. Cross-lag models on panel data, therefore, allow us to generate evidence to order events temporally. It is also possible that both $a_1$ and $a_2$ are statistically significant, implying that there is a positive feedback loop between Horizontal social cohesion and Active civic behaviour, revealing that the two phenomena reinforce and enhance each other.

Figure 6.1: Schematic of the possible predictive pathways between variables which will be tested. An arrow implies a pathway from an indicator measured in 2019 to an indicator measured in 2021. Due to the panel nature of the sample, this allows us to investigate both directions of impact between two variables (e.g., pathways denoted $a_1$ and $a_2$), as well as auto-regressive pathways\(^{26}\) (e.g., pathway $b$). All pathways are tested and are controlled for each other.

It is also possible that pairs of indicators could be in negative feedback loops, that is, that they inhibit each other. Also, it is possible indicator $X$ in 2019 predicts indicator $Y$ in 2021 positively, but indicator $Y$ in 2019 predicts indicator $X$ in 2021 negatively. This would imply that indicators $X$ and $Y$ are in a state of corrective equilibrium: an increase in one leads to a decrease in the other, leading to a decrease in the original indicator. Figure 6.1. shows the relationships between cohesion and citizenship indicators included in the model based on the panel sample from Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The analysis controlled for age, gender and urbanity of settlement.

Understanding the ordering of phenomena and the links of social cohesion with forms of citizenship will allow interventions and programmes to understand the potential future impacts, as well as place their activities more consciously in an evidence-based theory of change. Understanding which phenomena impact others, can help prioritise where more attention should be focussed.

We found that Horizontal social cohesion predicted Vertical social cohesion, and not the other way around. This suggests that citizens in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts tend to develop bonds among themselves first, and when those are well established, they begin to develop vertical social cohesion with more accountable and caring authorities. Given that the reverse predictive pathway was not significant (and thus not shown in Figure 6.2), the data does not support that the functioning of authorities and institutions is a prerequisite for cohesive

\(^{26}\) Pathways from an indicator in 2019 to the same indicator in 2021, as in pathway $b$. The strength of such a pathway indicates how strongly the previous state of an indicator affects the future state of it. If that pathway is very weak, that implies that that indicator does not depend so strongly on past scores, and its future score is less predictable from previous measurements.
citizen-citizen bonds within communities. In fact, this evidence suggests that the reverse is true.

Figure 6.2: Cross-lagged model of the dimensions of social cohesion and citizenship behaviour indicators, with standardised beta-weights of the pathways between them. This model was run on a panel sample of 777 respondents in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, who responded to surveys in both 2019 and 2021. TLI = .838, CFI = .994, RMSEA = 0.067. The model is controlled for Gender, Age, and Settlement Type. All pathways significant to p < 0.05. Non-significant pathways not shown.

The cross-lagged model revealed an intricate interplay between Active civic behaviour and Vertical social cohesion. These two indicators were in a corrective equilibrium, keeping each other in check. Vertical social cohesion was found to reduce Active civic behaviour, while Active civic behaviour was found to increase Vertical social cohesion. This means that where Active civic behaviour was high, those communities had higher scores in Vertical social cohesion two years later. This might be because of authorities’ responsiveness to the clamour of citizens for better governance. Our analysis provides evidence that Vertical social cohesion can be improved through a more active and engaged citizenry. The second half of the self-equilibrating mechanism is the predicted reduction of Active civic behaviour in communities with higher Vertical social cohesion. This implies that when authorities are rated to be functioning better (i.e., communities with higher levels of Vertical social cohesion), a decrease in engagement and participation among the citizenry follows. This hints that complacency and passivity may arise in respondents who live in communities that have higher Vertical social cohesion, due to the perceived higher quality of institutions and authorities. Such a phenomenon may be a kind of social cohesion trap – where civic participation is actually dampened by positive perceptions of authorities. To get out of this trap, a kind of active citizenship should be cultivated in Ukrainian communities that is vigorous when authorities are perceived negatively but remains demanding even when authorities are making progress towards better governance.

To investigate which of the components of Vertical Social Cohesion were central to this interplay, a similar model was run, but separating the components. This revealed that the key indicator at work in this mechanism was Ukrainian authorities care, as it was the indicator most significantly predicting and being predicted by Active civic behaviour. This suggests that the responsiveness of institutions, or their perceived responsiveness, contributes to shaping civic behaviours.

We can attempt to validate this link in the rest of Ukraine, but without a panel sample we cannot distinguish the direction of the link with certainty. Evidence from the full Ukraine
sample in 2021 showed that communities with more active citizens scored higher in Vertical social cohesion. A future panel sample across the whole of Ukraine could reveal if the self-equilibrating mechanism holds across the country.

Another finding of the model was that Active civic behaviour predicted Violent Citizenship, suggesting that civic engagement can potentially develop into violent forms of participation, and that the barrier between peaceful and adversarial forms of civic participation is blurred under certain circumstances. The model also revealed the importance of Horizontal social cohesion in inhibiting Violent citizenship. Individuals with higher scores in Horizontal social cohesion were more likely to have lower scores in Violent citizenship. Again, additional modelling was carried out to separate Horizontal social cohesion into its components, which identified Social tolerance as the indicator responsible for mitigating violent tendencies of civic participation. These findings indicate that Horizontal social cohesion may measure the bonds that keep citizens from generating more tension through their violent activism. They are the guard rails that can limit adversarial civic activism from becoming too violent.

To check the validity of these results, and to test how generalisable they are to the rest of Ukraine, we validated these relationships in the full Ukraine 2021 sample. The analysis showed that Violent citizenship was positively predicted by Active civic behaviour ($\beta = 0.38$) and negatively predicted by Horizontal social cohesion ($\beta = -0.18$), which suggests that what applies in Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts is likely to apply across Ukraine.

Auto-regressive pathways from a variable in 2019 to the same variable in 2021 were strong, except for Violent citizenship, which was weak ($\beta = 0.08$). This implies that violent citizenship only weakly depends on past violent citizenship. This makes sense, since violent civic tendencies tend to erupt spontaneously in response to crises or abnormal circumstances rather than being part of a long-term strategy of sustained violent behaviour. This is markedly unlike Active civic behaviour, where the autoregressive pathway was much higher ($\beta = 0.34$), meaning that citizens who were active in the past are more likely to be active in the future. Active citizenship is therefore a sustained, regular and more predictable characteristic of individuals, whereas violent civic participation is erratic and an aberration from normal behaviour. This further highlights the need to ensure high levels of Horizontal social cohesion (especially Social tolerance) to dampen violent tendencies.

Furthermore, evidence suggest that a lack of Horizontal social cohesion further blurs the lines between non-violent and violent forms of civic participation. In fact, the correlation between Active civic behaviour and Violent civic behaviour was dependent on the level of Horizontal social cohesion individuals reported. Using the data from the full-country sample, Table 6.1. shows that the link between Active civic behaviour and Violent citizenship was much stronger (0.54) among citizens who had very low Horizontal social cohesion. Even among those who scored high on Horizontal social cohesion the relationship between Active civic behaviour and Violent citizenship were related. However, increasing Horizontal social cohesion will help to distinguish between active and violent forms of civic participation.

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27 The regression used a sample of 12,482 respondents across Ukraine, had an $R^2$ of 0.20, and was controlled for gender, age, and settlement type, while the sample was weighted to ensure proportionality. We also find that Vertical Social Cohesion predicts Violent Citizenship, albeit weakly ($\beta = 0.08$).
Table 6.1.: Correlations between Active civic behaviour and Violent Citizenship Scenario for citizens who scored low, average and high on Horizontal Social Cohesion. In all cases p < 0.001. N = 12482. Controlled for Gender, Settlement Type, and Age.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Horizontal Social Cohesion</th>
<th>Correlation between Active civic behaviour and Violent citizenship (Scenario)</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One or more standard deviations below the mean</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>2039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Horizontal Social Cohesion</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>8371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within one standard deviation of the mean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Horizontal Social Cohesion</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>2072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One or more standard deviations above the mean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key Findings

1. Horizontal social cohesion, and Social tolerance in particular, inhibited Violent Citizenship and should thus be included when designing activities and programmes that aim to increase Active civic behaviour. This will ensure that the form of activism and participation that blossoms are cohesive and do not cause further social ruptures or violent tendencies. Citizens with less horizontal social cohesion had less of a distinction between active and violent forms of civic participation.

2. Active civic behaviour and Vertical social cohesion were in a feedback in Donetsk and Luhansk. The key indicator here was Ukrainian authorities care. Poor Vertical social cohesion, and perceptions that Ukrainians authorities do not care, motivate citizens to become more actively engaged in their localities. Communities that reported higher levels of Active civic behaviour in 2019, reported that Ukrainian authorities care more in 2021, implying that their active citizenship had an impact on increasing perceptions that authorities care, and increasing Vertical social cohesion more generally. This highlights the importance of constructive civic participation and its potential to bring about piecemeal structural change, such as an increase in the transparency, responsiveness, and inclusiveness of institutions and leaders. Programming should work with active members of the community to promote engagement and thus ensure that engagement does not peter out when there is a small perceived improvement.

3. Horizontal social cohesion tended to precede Vertical social cohesion. This suggests that relevant civic organisations should target improving networks of support and collaboration at the community level, as a step towards improving governance and Vertical social cohesion. Results suggest that trying to do the
reverse, that is, improve social relationships by working on improving vertical social cohesion, may be unfounded.

Considering the devastating impact of the sustained Russian military aggressions on the country, the importance of the current findings is to highlight how the creating tension between an engaged cohesive citizenry and responsive governance can blossom.

First, horizontal social cohesion can positively contribute to vertical social cohesion. This calls for immediate programming to protect and bolster key aspects of horizontal social cohesion in the face of physical and psychological violence. Much of the report is devoted on how and to which areas policymakers should focus on to ensure that key aspects of horizontal social cohesion are protected and enhanced. Further, active citizenship can also positively contribute to vertical social cohesion. It is crucial that this self-correcting dynamic between active citizenship and vertical social cohesion is preserved. Programming should, thus, aim to develop mechanisms to actively involve citizens in decision-making processes (e.g., public consultations, participatory budgeting, complaint mechanisms, etc.). Particularly, civic programming should ensure that satisfaction with citizen-state relations does not turn into complacency, and thus weakening the oversight mechanism of citizens on institutional behaviour. Actively involving citizens into decision-making processes will ensure that their needs are met, and local and central authorities are responsive. This should find citizens and authorities more prepared and unified to rebuild the country once the war is over.

Second, horizontal social cohesion dampened violent forms of civic participation. Ensuring that Ukrainian society remains inclusive, tolerant, and democratic should dampen violent tendencies of Ukrainian citizens. The horrors of war can inflict deep psychological traumas that can lead to alienation or outbursts of violence among citizens. Robust citizen-citizen relations in a strongly cohesive and tolerant society can be a safety net mitigating such risks of exclusion or violence.

Moreover, in the post-war period it is important to further investigate vertical social cohesion and how it can be rebuilt. For instance, future SCORE surveys will be able to track measures of vertical social cohesion, compare pre- to post-invasion scores and draw evidence-based recommendations on how to improve institutional responsiveness and accountability.
Appendix

Table S1: Drivers of Social Proximity towards members of various groups in Ukraine. All models are controlled for age, gender, and urbanity. For Social Proximity towards a target group, contact with the target group (rather than contact towards all groups) was used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>All Groups</th>
<th>People living in NGCAs</th>
<th>IDPs</th>
<th>In support of NGCA separation</th>
<th>Ukrainian Nationalists</th>
<th>Pro-Russia oriented People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>β</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social tolerance</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in local institutions</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralistic Ukrainian identity</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalisation</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( F )-test</td>
<td>361.24</td>
<td>218.52</td>
<td>265.84</td>
<td>196.39</td>
<td>298.71</td>
<td>266.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( p )-value</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( n )</td>
<td>12482</td>
<td>12482</td>
<td>12353</td>
<td>12482</td>
<td>12482</td>
<td>12106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All models are controlled for age, gender, and urbanity. For Social Proximity towards a target group, contact with the target group (rather than contact towards all groups) was used. For predicting Social Proximity towards IDPs, all respondents with an IDP status were excluded prior the analysis.
Appendix: The items of the citizenship orientation:

Table S3: The Scenario and the items SCORE Ukraine 2021 used to measure Passive, Active, & Violent forms of citizenship.

**Q51.** (Scenario) Imagine that the wrong direction the authorities have taken is drastically worsening the situation in the country. Citizens in your area are coming to the streets, there are clashes with police. People in such situations behave differently. To what extent does each of the following statements describe you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not at all like me</th>
<th>A little like me</th>
<th>Somewhat like me</th>
<th>Very much like me</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Passive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. I will continue with my daily routine as normal and let others figure things out.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I will follow the news and hope that the deadlock would resolve itself.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I will actively contribute to public debate either online or offline.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I will participate in protest peacefully, making sure to avoid provocation of violence.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Violent</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I will participate in the protests, ready to counter and combat police with force if necessary.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. I will join a militia to continue the fight until the desired decision is made.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table S4: The items SCORE Ukraine 2021 used to measure Civic Engagement.

| Civic Engagement | Q21. How often do you... | Never | Sometimes | Often | Very often | DK |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Attend an event organized by local authorities (e.g. town hall meetings, meetings with local MP, public hearings)? | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 99 |
| 2. Vote in elections | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 99 |
| 3. Sign a petition on an issue that is important for you? | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 99 |
| 4. Participate in the events organized by NGOs | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 99 |
| 5. Volunteer or/donate money/clothes/other items for good causes? | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 99 |

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28 SCORE defines Passive citizenship as: “The degree to which one is unwilling to engage in civic and political matters to improve the current conditions of their community and prefers to focus only on personal affairs.”

29 SCORE defines Active citizenship as: “The degree to which one is willing to change things in their community and society, using political and social means of action”.

30 SCORE defines Active citizenship as: “The degree to which one is willing to engage in civic and political matters to improve things in their community and society, using all means of change including violence if necessary”. The way Violent citizenship is phrased in the questionnaire, it is not very “toxic” to have a violent citizenship orientation. It is important thus not to demonise or reject it in a context like Ukraine.

31 SCORE defines Civic engagement as: “The degree to which one participates in formal and informal civic, social and political matters such as voting in elections, attending events organized by local authorities, volunteering, participating in activities aimed at improving one’s neighbourhood, etc.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Participate in public demonstrations supporting causes you believe in?</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>99</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Participate in activities aimed at improving your apartment/building and neighborhood (e.g. condominium meeting)?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Post and debate social, political and civic issues via online groups and networks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Active Civic Behaviour is a meta-indicator and is computed by taking the mean of the two items of Active Citizenship (scenario) and the eight Civic engagement items.
References


Fiedler, C., & Rohles, C. (2021) Social Cohesion After Armed Conflict. German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)


