




Social Cohesion in Ukraine:

KEY TRENDS BASED ON RESCORE 2024
WITH COMPARATIVE INSIGHTS FROM RESCORE 2023
AND SCORE 2021





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1

Introduction

As Ukraine is approaching the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2025, cohesion and unity of Ukrainian society remain critical to its ongoing fight and post-war recovery. Social cohesion, defined broadly as the strength of relationships and solidarity among different groups and between citizens and institutions, is a fundamental element of the stability and prosperity of nations. In times of crisis, its importance becomes even more pronounced, as it fosters unity, trust and collective response from all layers of society and from different actors – individuals, communities and authorities. Studying social cohesion in the context of Ukraine's ongoing war is vital, as it helps to understand how different segments of the population are coping, as well as how intergroup relations are evolving, where vulnerabilities are arising, and how resilience is being strengthened.

This report offers a detailed analysis of the current state of social cohesion in Ukraine, shedding light on how Ukrainians are navigating the complex social, political, and economic challenges posed by the Russian invasion. More specifically, the report addresses the following questions: **what are the current levels of social cohesion in Ukraine, and how have these levels evolved in comparison to the pre-full-scale invasion¹ situation, as well as in comparison with the immediate aftermath of the invasion?**

This report presents the key findings from the reSCORE Ukraine 2024 survey and provides a comprehensive picture of how Ukrainian society is experiencing and responding to the ongoing war. The report draws on the Social Cohesion and Resilience, Recovery and Reconstruction Index (reSCORE²), an innovative analytical tool designed to measure and track different dimensions and elements of social cohesion in a comprehensive and sophisticated way. More specifically, it uses a conceptual framework comprising eight indicators that assess societal dynamics across people-to-state and people-to-people relations. Importantly, it highlights trends in social cohesion over time by comparing the 2024 data with previous SCORE reports from 2023 and 2021. The strength of this approach lies in the ability to examine both pre- and post-invasion data, offering deeper insights into the impact of Russian aggression on social dynamics in Ukraine. It also captures oblast-level trends and breaks

1 Hereafter, the report uses the terms 'pre-invasion' and 'pre-war' to denote the period before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian federation in February 2022. The terms are used solely for clarity and ease of reading.

2 The tool in Ukraine was previously known as the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index, or SCORE Ukraine in short. Following Russia's full-scale invasion, it was recalibrated to focus on Resilience, Recovery and Reconstruction. Hence, a new name, reSCORE Ukraine was introduced.

down findings by demographic groups (e.g., gender, age, urbanity, education), providing a detailed examination of the varying experiences and perceptions across different segments of the population.

The survey was conducted using face-to-face, structured, quantitative interviews. Data collection was carried out by Metrica, a Kyiv-based company specializing in opinion research, and took place from May 30, 2024, to September 5, 2024, with a total of 7,758 respondents interviewed across the territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine at the time of surveying. reSCORE 2024 also includes panel data, consisting of 646 citizens who were surveyed in both 2023 and 2024.

The report opens by outlining how reSCORE 2024 captures the complex phenomenon of social cohesion, setting the stage with a detailed analysis of each indicator. It then provides a more nuanced perspective, examining national and oblast-level trends over different timepoints. Finally, the report utilises longitudinal panel sample to explore the underlying dynamics of change, with a focus on the Authorities care indicator, to better understand the factors behind its significant decrease between 2023 and 2024. It also includes a methodology section at the end.

2

reSCORE's approach in measuring social cohesion

Several scholars have explored the interplay between national identity and social dynamics in the context of Ukraine. Mykola Riabchuk (2015) analyses the complexities of forming a unified national consciousness in post-communist Ukraine. Olga Onuch and Gwendolyn Sasse (2016) delve into the Maidan movement, emphasizing the diversity of the protest and its impact on Ukraine's social and political dynamics. Volodymyr Kulyk (2018) examines how Ukraine has been redefining its national identity in the aftermath of the Euromaidan. Finally, Eugenii Golovakha et al. examine the main markers of change that indicate the formation of a new national-civic identity among the citizens of Ukraine (2024).

Several studies have also provided valuable quantitative data that enhance our understanding of social cohesion dynamics in Ukraine. Notably, the annual reports by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Panina 2022) offer a long-term, systematic monitoring of social attitudes and identities from 1992 to 2022, providing insights into the evolving nature of national unity and societal values. Collectively, these studies emphasise the critical importance of social cohesion for the resilience of Ukraine, while also highlighting the necessity for ongoing research to fortify social bonds in the years to come.

Complementing and enriching these works are the series of reports dedicated to social cohesion in Ukraine by the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD). SeeD's Ukraine-related reports from 2021 (Guest and Panayiotou 2021; Panayiotou et al. 2021) utilise the SCORE methodology to analyse horizontal and vertical dimensions of social cohesion. Building on these insights, the two-part analytical series published by SeeD in 2023 (Minich 2023; Minich et al. 2023) offer a deeper exploration of shifts in horizontal and vertical dynamics against the backdrop of the ongoing war, including how the 'ingredients' of social cohesion have changed over time³.

Notably, the importance of a united society for national resilience is also acknowledged by Ukraine's Internal Resilience Plan (Office of the President of Ukraine 2024). The Plan stipulates that national unity is an essential element for the success of the war effort and recovery process, but also a key to ensuring the consistency and coherence of plans and action, as it enables stronger response

3 The present report is the fifth in the series of reports dedicated to social cohesion in Ukraine produced by SeeD. Two volumes were published 2022: [Social Cohesion in Ukraine Part I: Defining and Measuring Social Cohesion Using the SCORE](#) and [Social Cohesion in Ukraine Part II: Towards a Tolerant, Cohesive and Inclusive Society](#), and another two were published in 2024: [Social Cohesion in Ukraine Part 1: Trends Based on reSCORE 2023 and SCORE 2021](#) and [Social Cohesion in Ukraine Part II: Understanding Horizontal Relations Based on reSCORE 2023](#).

to external and internal challenges. In addition, social cohesion is among the top priorities of international actors, including but not limited to USAID's DG East Programme (USAID DGE 2023) and to UNDP efforts in supporting recovery and resilience in Ukraine (UNDP 2023). Recognising the importance of social cohesion and the role SCORE plays in assessing it in a robust and longitudinal way, SCORE and reSCORE data has been integrated in various monitoring, evaluation and learning frameworks and assessment reports of donors over the years (e.g. 2023 UN Human Impact Assessment Report, 2024 UNDP Country Programme Document, and UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework in Ukraine, forthcoming in 2025). In light of this, the authors hope that the findings of this report will help inform both national and international policies and programmes aimed at fostering unity, resilience and recovery of wartime and post-war Ukraine.

The reSCORE Ukraine's approach to measuring social cohesion includes eight indicators grouped under vertical and horizontal dimensions that collectively make up the concept of social cohesion and hence its assessment. On the vertical level, the indicators include Ukrainian authorities care⁴, Accountability of authorities⁵ and Sense of civic duty⁶; and, on the horizontal level, Social tolerance⁷, Pluralistic Ukrainian identity⁸, Sense of belonging to the country⁹, Community cooperation¹⁰, and Social threat¹¹. Hence, for the purposes of this report, social cohesion is understood as **the interconnectedness and unity among diverse entities at national and local levels – individuals, social groups, and institutions – and the positive, collaborative, and harmonious interactions and relationships among those entities in a society encompassing shared norms, values, and identities.**

Although a few indicators went through some recalibration and adaptation between 2021 and 2023, the indicators used in the 2024 study are identical to those used in 2023. Yet, many of these indicators were also measured in the same form in 2021, providing a strong reference point for understanding the direction of changes in social cohesion among Ukrainians. For a full description of the indicators used in this report, please refer to the glossary section.

4 The degree to which one feels that Ukrainian authorities represent their concerns and views, equally care about all parts of Ukraine and are ready to listen.

5 The degree to which one feels that representatives of authorities are and can be held accountable.

6 A composite indicator made up of sense of agency and civic responsibility. It measures the degree to which one feels responsible for the future and well-being of their society and country, and to which one feels that ordinary people can change things in their community.

7 The combined level of social tolerance towards different minority and marginalised groups (e.g. immigrants, Roma community, Muslims) in terms of personal interaction and/or acceptance in the community.

8 The degree to which one believes that everyone who lives in Ukraine despite their ethnic or religious background is equally Ukrainian and that those living in Ukraine have always been one people despite all conflicts and historic divisions.

9 The degree of attachment to one's country.

10 The degree to which one feels that people in their community can rely on each other for help and the extent to which people in their community actively solve common problems together.

11 The degree to which one feels that different socio-demographic groups may undermine the unity of their community.

3

Executive summary

According to the findings of the reSCORE 2024 survey, three years into Russia's full-scale invasion, Ukrainian society remains united and cohesive, particularly on the horizontal dimension of social cohesion. Conducted between May 2024 and September 2024 with a nationally representative sample of 7,758 respondents, the survey provides valuable insights into the societal dynamics of wartime Ukraine. Drawing on the Social Cohesion and Resilience, Recovery and Reconstruction (reSCORE) Index, a robust tool developed by the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD) and contextually calibrated in over 20 countries, the survey offers a comprehensive picture of how the ongoing full-scale war is shaping the Ukrainian society. Specifically, it addresses key questions about the current level of cohesion in Ukraine, using eight distinct indicators that measure connectedness across vertical and horizontal dimensions, as well as how these indicators have evolved over the years.

KEY FINDINGS

Strong and inclusive national identity: Against the backdrop of the ongoing war, Ukrainians continue to demonstrate a strong sense of national identity and belonging to their homeland. The **Pluralistic Ukrainian identity**, an indicator measuring unity across diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds, is high (7.3 out of 10¹²) and reflects remarkable consistency over the years. This sense of unity is crosscutting for all segments of the population and across most oblasts, highlighting a strong presence of shared identity in Ukraine. Additionally, **Sense of belonging to the country** remains notably high (8.7), with many Ukrainians feeling a deep attachment to their homeland. Taken together, these findings highlight the strength of Ukraine's national identity, as an important unifying force in the face of the ongoing war. For more on these findings, see *Key findings by indicators (subsections 4.1 and 4.2)*.

Decreasing confidence in authorities: the reSCORE 2024 findings reveal a notable decline in public confidence towards the Ukrainian authorities. Specifically, the **Accountability of authorities** indicator, which measures the degree to

12 The findings are presented as scores ranging from 0 to 10. A score of 0 indicates that the phenomenon being measured is not observed at all, while a score of 10 signifies that it is strongly and prevalently observed. For example, in the case of Accountability of authorities, one of the indicators of the social cohesion framework, a score of 0 means that no one in the society anywhere feels that the authorities are accountable, whereas a score of 10 indicates that every individual everywhere perceives that the authorities are accountable.

which respondents feel that the authorities are and can be held accountable, has returned to pre-war levels, dropping from a peak of 4.1 in 2023, to 3.1 in 2024, which is similar to the 2021 score of 2.7. Similarly, the **Authorities care** indicator, which reflects how responsive and considerate Ukrainian authorities¹³ are perceived to be, also saw a significant drop, falling from 4.6 in 2023 to 3.0 in 2024, returning to levels similar to those recorded before the full-scale war. While both indicators have returned to what might be considered their baseline values, these declines still merit attention, as they signal a growing sense of disappointment in the authorities' performance. These shifts pose significant risks to vertical cohesion, particularly in the context of the ongoing war which requires sustained trust and cooperation between the public and authorities to ensure resilience and effective governance. When public confidence in government institutions erodes, it can weaken societal response, hinder public cooperation and fuel distrust in the authorities' decisions. If these trends are not addressed, the growing gap between citizens' expectations and the authorities' perceived actions may further undermine social cohesion in Ukraine and weaken country's resilience against external aggression. For more on these findings, see *Key findings by indicators (subsections 4.7 and 4.8)* and *Change in Authorities care* sections.

Continued commitment to common good: Ukrainians continue demonstrating commitment to common good. **Sense of civic duty**, which is made up of items that measure sense of agency and sense of civic responsibility, remains stable at 6.2 in 2024, experiencing only a minor decrease compared to 2023. Meanwhile, **Community cooperation**, although relatively stable, remains at an average score of 5.2, comparable to the 5.5 recorded in 2023. While the former indicator relating to Sense of civic duty is more about feelings and intentions, the latter is more about behaviours and actions. Taken together, these indicators reflect a moderate but stable sense of individual and collective responsibility and participation in Ukraine. For more on these findings, see *Key findings by indicators (subsections 4.3 and 4.4)*.

Stable intergroup attitudes: the level of intergroup attitudes have remained stable in 2024 compared to 2023, showing between the average to below-average results across the measured indicators. **Social tolerance**, or the degree of acceptance of minority and marginalised groups stands at 5.4 out of 10, only a negligible decrease from 5.7 in 2023 and 5.6 in 2021. Roma people, alongside the LGBTQI+ community and individuals struggling with addiction, continue to face lower acceptance compared to other groups. Looking at geographic variation in 2024, Ivano-Frankivsk and Zakarpattia oblasts score notably lower than the national average in terms of tolerance, while Kherson and Mykolaiv, oblasts near the frontline, show higher scores. **Social threat**, an indicator measuring the feeling of threat by people from different regions, backgrounds and displacement status, stands at 3.9 in 2024, reflecting a slight increase

13 The respondents were asked about public authorities in general, without specifying national and oblast level authorities.

from 3.6 in 2023, and a more notable rise from 2.8 in 2021. Although the change in the past year is minimal, the trend suggests growing concerns among Ukrainians about potential threats emanating from certain groups, particularly from those with experiences of living under occupation in the non-government controlled areas of Ukraine, those with pro-Russian views and those from Crimea. The large-scale displacement caused by the war created many socio-economic challenges for communities, families and individuals, but these challenges have not created pervasive intergroup grievances or tensions between internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities. As such, reSCORE respondents generally report positive feelings about IDPs. For more on this finding, see *Key findings by indicators (subsections 4.5 and 4.6)*.

Geographic and demographic variations: The findings reveal that **Mykolaiv** oblast has showed consistently high scores in 2023 and 2024, maintaining a stable level of social cohesion. **Kherson, Cherkasy** and **Lviv** oblasts, alongside **Kyiv city**, have also performed strongly, surpassing other oblasts in aggregate values across all indicators. In contrast, **Ternopil** and **Zakarpattia** oblasts consistently scored lower than other oblasts; they also saw the largest declines in social cohesion in 2024 compared to the previous year. Zakarpattia ranks lowest or visibly lower than other oblasts in all indicators, except for Accountability of authorities. It also experienced significant declines in Ukrainian authorities care and Sense of belonging, as well as a significant increase in **Social threat**. Similarly, Ternopil scores below the national average in nearly all indicators except for **Pluralistic Ukrainian identity** and **Sense of civic duty**, with the sharpest declines in **Ukrainian authorities care** and **Accountability of authorities**. Both oblasts display challenging social dynamics, highlighting the need for targeted and evidence-based interventions to address these gaps and potential weaknesses, and reinforce cohesion. For more on this finding, see *Social cohesion in Ukraine: Oblast level dynamics*.

In terms of demographic factors, the reSCORE 2024 findings reveal that characteristics such as age, income, education, urbanity and displacement status, do not seem to be significant determining factors of social cohesion. However, income matters for **Ukrainian authorities care** – people with higher income tend to report higher scores on this indicator, and also on **Sense of civic duty**. In other words, those with higher income feel less neglect and more civic responsibility and agency towards Ukraine, highlighting how economic insecurity and poverty can undermine vertical social cohesion. For more on these findings, see *Key findings by indicators*.

For more information on the survey results, we recommend visiting SeeD's data platform – <https://app.scoreforpeace.org/en/ukraine/datasets>

The subsequent section provides a detailed analysis of each indicator, including a closer examination of the overall national scores and their transformation over time.

4

Key findings by indicators

4.1 SENSE OF BELONGING TO THE COUNTRY

Sense of belonging to the country, which measures the degree of attachment individuals feel towards their homeland, is a crucial element for fostering and maintaining national unity, particularly in times of external threats and adversity. reSCORE Ukraine measures belonging on different levels, including settlement, regional and national. However, while all levels are studied, it is the country level belonging that is considered a constituent element of the social cohesion framework. A strong shared sense of national belonging strengthens resilience amid the invasion and fosters a deeper collective commitment to Ukraine's endurance.

The reSCORE data reveals that the Sense of belonging to the country is notably high, with an average score of 8.7 out of 10, making it the highest-ranking indicator among all eight indicators in the social cohesion framework. The survey also shows that the 2024 figure aligns closely with that of 2023, which stood at 9.0. It is also worth noting that the Sense of belonging saw a significant increase in 2023, rising from 7.9 in 2021 to the record-high of 9.0. This corresponds with the onset of the full-scale Russian invasion, reflecting a surge in national unity in response to an existential threat. The slight decrease in the indicator from 2023 to 2024 should not be interpreted as meaningful¹⁴. Overall, the continued high levels of belonging in both years suggest a sustained, strong sense of national belonging in the country.

TABLE 1. SENSE OF BELONGING TO THE COUNTRY (2021-2023-2024)


Indicator	2021	2023	2024
Sense of belonging to the country	7.9	9.0	8.7

Further analysis of the data shows some oblast-level differences. Kherson oblast stands out with the highest score of 9.9, reflecting the emotional impact of its liberation after the period of Russian occupation. In contrast, oblasts such as Poltava (7.6) and Zakarpattia (7.7) report relatively lower scores compared to other parts of the country. The latter's score suggests

¹⁴ For the purposes of this report, only differences and changes equaling plus or minus 1 or above plus or minus 1 score point are considered meaningful. Those between these values should be considered insignificant.

a gradual return to pre-war levels of belonging (6.8 in 2021), while Poltava oblast’s score is slightly lower than its pre-invasion level (8.3 in 2021). These changes warrant more qualitative examination to be able to interpret the findings more comprehensively, however, such analysis goes beyond the scope of this report.


HEATMAP 1. SENSE OF BELONGING TO THE COUNTRY (2024)



4.2 PLURALISTIC UKRAINIAN IDENTITY

Pluralistic Ukrainian identity, which measures the inclusivity of the Ukrainian national identity, ranks as the second-highest indicator of the social cohesion framework, standing just behind the Sense of belonging to the country. This indicator has shown remarkable consistency over the years, reflecting enduring sentiments of pluralism and inclusion (see Table 2). This consistency is especially significant during times of war, as strong dedication to pluralistic identity facilitates solidarity, helps overcome social chasms and fight against marginalisation, while enabling different groups to cooperate and work together. Pluralistic identity also fosters a shared sense of purpose and collective self, regardless of differences. Furthermore, the temporal stability of this indicator suggests that the sense of pluralism transcends the short-term effects of war and that it is deeply embedded in the national consciousness of Ukrainians.

FIGURE 1. ITEMS FOR PLURALISTIC UKRAINIAN IDENTITY




The Pluralistic Ukrainian identity indicator assesses the phenomenon at two levels: first, whether respondents believe that all people living in Ukraine, regardless of ethnic or religious background, can be Ukrainians; and second, whether they believe Ukrainians have always been one people, despite wars, conflicts and divisions. The findings reveal that 82% of respondents agree with the first statement, which is consistent with the figure from 2023 (86%). Similarly, 76% agree with the second statement, which remains unchanged compared to 2023.

TABLE 2. PLURALISTIC UKRAINIAN IDENTITY (2021-2023-2024)

Indicator	2021	2023	2024
Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity	7.3	7.6	7.3

There are no significant demographic differences in the levels of Pluralistic Ukrainian identity, meaning that age, gender, urbanity and similar demographic markers are not determining factors for this indicator. Regional variation is also minimal, except for Zakarpattia oblast, which scores notably lower (5.8), and Mykolaiv oblast, which scores notably higher (8.5) than the national average of 7.3 out of 10. This indicates a strong presence of inclusive identity across all groups in Ukraine. Yet, low scores in Zakarpattia oblast, followed by Volyn and Chernihiv oblasts deserve further attention and examination as absence or weak pluralism can potentially lead to intergroup frictions.

HEATMAP 2. PLURALISTIC UKRAINIAN IDENTITY (2024)



4.3 SENSE OF CIVIC DUTY

Sense of civic duty, a composite indicator measuring a sense of agency and civic responsibility, reflects the extent to which individuals feel accountable for the future and well-being of their surroundings, as well as a feeling of a sense of control over destinies indicated by their belief that ordinary people can bring about change in their communities. It complements governance indicators by focusing on citizens’ active role in shaping societal outcomes, highlighting their influence and participation in these processes. A strong Sense of civic duty is particularly important in the context of war, as it fosters a shared sense of ownership and commitment to the country and its future, thereby encouraging citizens to contribute to collective efforts.

The Sense of civic duty in 2024 scores above the midpoint, standing at 6.2 out of 10. This is similar to the corresponding figure from 2023 (6.6) and higher than the score from 2021 (5.4). This suggests that Ukrainians remain motivated to bring about positive change and are confident in their ability to influence and improve their communities.


TABLE 3. SENSE OF CIVIC DUTY (2021-2023-2024)

Indicator	2021	2023	2024
Sense of civic duty	5.4	6.6	6.2

There are no differences across age, urbanity and displacement status, but results vary by income and education. Low-income groups report a lower Sense of civic duty (5.5) compared to high-income groups (6.6). Similarly, individuals with primary education have lower scores (5.5) than those with higher education, who report a higher sense of civic duty (6.7). The gaps in the Sense of civic duty indicator between these groups suggest that those with fewer resources and lower educational attainment may feel less empowered or less capable of influencing change in their communities. This sense of disconnection can lead to a lack of participation in civic activities, reducing their political and civic voice.

The Sense of civic duty is generally consistent across most oblasts, with some notable exceptions. Zakarpattia and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts show lower levels, averaging 5.2 and 5.3, respectively. Kherson oblast, in contrast, demonstrates notably higher levels of civic duty, 8.1, likely reflecting the impact of de-occupation. Findings reveal that Ivano-Frankivsk oblast experienced the largest drop in 2024, declining from 6.8 in 2023 to 5.3 in 2024, while Kherson oblast has experienced a slight increase compared to 7.3 in 2023. Zakarpattia oblast, on the other hand, recorded some of the lowest levels of civic duty as early as 2021 (4.5) and 5.6 in 2023.

HEATMAP 3. SENSE OF CIVIC DUTY (2024)



4.4 COMMUNITY COOPERATION

Community Cooperation, as measured in this survey, refers to the degree to which individuals feel that people in their community can rely on one another for support, as well as the extent to which they actively collaborate to address shared challenges. Cooperation at the community level is essential for social cohesion as it deepens social bonds, reinforcing mutual support and solidarity. In wartime, this ability becomes essential, as it helps communities adapt to emerging challenges and find collective solutions to the adversities posed by the invasion. It is also worth noting that unlike other indicators discussed so far, this indicator is the most behavioural, focusing more on actions rather than perceptions. This makes it particularly telling and important for interpretation.


The level of community cooperation remains moderate, averaging 5.2 out of 10, with minimal variation over the years. There are no significant demographic differences (age, urbanity, displacement status, income, education), and regional variation is also minimal. This suggests that stability in community cooperation persists, and that it transcends the effects of war. Though, there is still some room for improvement.

TABLE 4. COMMUNITY COOPERATION (2021-2023-2024)


Indicator	2021	2023	2024
Community cooperation	5.1	5.5	5.2

This indicator measures community cooperation at two levels. First, whether respondents feel that they can rely on their community or neighbours for help if they have a serious problem; and second, whether their community actively solve common problems together. The findings reveal that in 2024, 83% of respondents said they can rely on others for help (measured by the sum of “to some extent” and “very much” responses), which is consistent with the corresponding figure from 2023 (86%). Many people have also seen their community working together to solve common problems. Namely, 73% said people agreed to this statement, which aligns with the picture from 2023 (77%).

FIGURE 2. ITEMS FOR COMMUNITY COOPERATION



HEATMAP 4. COMMUNITY COOPERATION (2024)



4.5 SOCIAL TOLERANCE

Social Tolerance measures the degree of acceptance and willingness to interact with minority and marginalised groups in Ukraine. This indicator is crucial for cohesive societies, as it fosters acceptance and understanding among diverse groups, reducing potential for frictions. The Social tolerance indicator measures the extent to which one accepts immigrants, Roma people, Muslims, Jews, LGBTQI+ individuals and people with different skin colours in their community.

The level of social tolerance in 2024 remains average, standing at 5.4 out of 10, with minimal difference from the corresponding scores in 2023 (5.7) and 2021 (5.6). The most accepted groups for personal interaction are people with different skin colour, immigrants, Jews and Muslims. Roma people, alongside the LGBTQI+ community and individuals struggling with drug addiction, continue to experience lower acceptance compared to other groups (Figure 3). Notably, 73% of people do not want individuals with drug addiction in their community (70% in 2023), and 51% feel the same about the LGBTQI+ individuals (unchanged from 2023).


Given that Ukraine is fighting not only for the integrity of its territories but also for human rights and progressive values, the findings on social tolerance highlight the critical need for initiatives that effectively challenge

stereotypes and promote greater acceptance of marginalised groups. This is especially salient in the context of Ukraine’s European integration, as social tolerance and inclusivity are crucial for meeting EU standards on human rights and equality, while also being part of the greater concept of social cohesion and complementing its other elements such as pluralism and intergroup relations.

TABLE 5. SOCIAL TOLERANCE (2021-2023-2024)


Indicator	2021	2023	2024
Social tolerance	5.6	5.7	5.4

FIGURE 3. ITEMS FOR SOCIAL TOLERANCE (2024)




There are no significant demographic differences in levels of Social tolerance across various groups. Notably, however, there is visible regional variation: tolerance is generally higher in the southeastern oblasts and tends to decrease moving westwards. This pattern, consistent with 2023 findings, emerged following the start of the full-scale Russian invasion. Interestingly, Ivano-Frankivsk and Zakarpattia oblasts have the lowest scores for social tolerance in 2024, averaging 3.1 and 4.2, respectively, while Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts score highest, with averages of 7.3 and 7.0, respectively. This suggests that social tolerance has increased in regions along the frontline and those that experienced de-occupation, indicating a growing openness to minority groups in the aftermath of occupation.

HEATMAP 5. SOCIAL TOLERANCE (2024)




The year-on-year change in social tolerance towards LGBTQI+ individuals is minimal, with a slight increase from 3.3 in 2023 to 3.4 in 2024. However, a closer look at the regional data reveals interesting dynamics. Unlike other groups, attitudes towards LGBTQI+ individuals are relatively homogeneous across most of Ukraine, with notable exceptions in the southeastern oblasts. Ivano-Frankivsk again stands out with the lowest score of 2.1, while Kherson tops the list with a score of 5.8. Although overall figures for 2023 and 2024 are near-identical, the change is more pronounced at the oblast level, with most oblasts either increasing or decreasing in values. Mykolaiv and Vinnitsia oblasts reported notable decreases (-1.4 and -1.1, respectively), while Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk and Volyn oblasts experienced notable increases (1.5, 1.1 and 1.0, respectively).

HEATMAP 5A. SOCIAL TOLERANCE – LGBT COMMUNITY (2024)



Tolerance towards those struggling with drug addiction remained stable in 2024, standing at 1.6 compared to 1.8 in 2023. It is the lowest in Zakarpattia (1.1), and the highest in Kherson (3.1) and Kirovohrad (3.0) oblasts. The largest drop occurred in Mykolaiv oblast (-2.2), while the largest increase was registered in Volyn (+1.7). The rest of the oblasts show no meaningful changes since last year. Despite the relative stability of this indicator, the overall low scores highlight the need for greater attention to this area, especially in light of the consequences of war, including trauma, family fragmentation and other stressors that might contribute to an increase in substance abuse.

HEATMAP 5B. SOCIAL TOLERANCE – DRUG ADDICTS (2024)



4.6 SOCIAL THREAT FROM DIFFERENT GROUPS

The Social threat indicator measures the presence of feelings that people from different regions, linguistic groups, political and civic attitudes, as well as those with displacement status or backgrounds, can undermine the unity of their community. Strong perception of social threat from one or more groups can undermine social cohesion, especially on the local level, because it creates palpable anxieties that shape behaviour and perceptions, even if they are not objective security threats.

The reSCORE 2024 findings indicate a gradual increase in the perception of social threat since 2021. The indicator has risen from 2.8 in 2021 to 3.6 in 2023, and further to 3.9 in 2024 (however, this change should be interpreted with caution, as the measure has been adjusted, making the 2021 figure not fully comparable across years¹⁵). Although the change between 2023 and

15 In 2023 and 2024, respondents were asked about their views on IDPs, individuals living in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts as of before February 2022, individuals living in areas occupied by Russia since 2022, people from the west and the east of Ukraine, Russian-speaking Ukrainians, those with pro-EU orientations, residents of Crimea, men avoiding military service, and Ukrainians who left the country after Russia's full-scale invasion. This excludes pro-Russia oriented people and those working with occupying forces, which were accounted in the 2021 survey. Thus, the 2021 score is not fully comparable with 2023 and 2024.

2024 is minimal, the trend suggests that, over time, Ukrainians are becoming more concerned about potential threats from different groups. This warrants closer attention at the group level, with a tailored focus on oblast-level variations based on where and how the perceived threats emerge.


TABLE 6. SOCIAL THREAT FROM DIFFERENT GROUPS (2021-2023-2024)

Indicator	2021	2023	2024
Social threat from different groups	2.8*	3.6	3.9

*Not fully comparable with 2023 and 2024 due to changes in measured items. See footnote 15 for detailed explanation.

Figure 4 shows that people from west (2.2) and east of Ukraine (2.8), Russian-speaking Ukrainians (2.8), pro-EU oriented people (2.7), and those who left Ukraine after the full-scale invasion (2.7) are all among groups that are perceived to not be threatening to the unity of communities. At the same time, respondents report higher perceptions of social threat from people living in non-government-controlled areas (5.1). They are closely followed by people from Crimea and people living under occupation since 2022. It is also worth noting that despite substantial displacement, IDPs are widely accepted and seen as part of the community wherever they are, which is in line with the findings of reSCORE’s previous iteration.


FIGURE 4. SOCIAL THREAT FROM DIFFERENT GROUPS (2023 – 2024)



No notable differences emerge when comparing the data from 2023 and 2024 regarding social threat, which highlights stability of public sentiments towards different groups. However, one notable change is still observed: perceptions of threat from individuals residing in the non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (as defined before February 2022) increased by 0.8 points, rising from 4.3 to 5.1. While the difference falls below the 1 score point threshold, the change – if increased over time – would suggest that, as time passes, Ukrainians are becoming increasingly concerned regarding those who lived for an extended time under Russian occupation.

Moreover, no significant demographic differences are observed in perceptions of social threat, indicating that age, gender, education and similar demographic markers are not determining factors for such anxieties. Regional variation is also moderate, with Zaporizhzhia oblast, scoring lowest with 3.0, and Ternopil oblast, scoring highest with 4.8, which is notably higher than the national average of 3.9 out of 10.

HEATMAP 6. SOCIAL THREAT FROM DIFFERENT GROUPS (2024)



4.7 ACCOUNTABILITY OF AUTHORITIES

Accountability of authorities measures the degree to which respondents feel that the authorities are and can be held accountable. Together with Authorities care and Sense of civic duty, it forms the vertical dimension of the framework, reflecting the interaction between citizens and the state. Accountability is important for cohesion as it ensures transparency and strengthens public confidence in institutions, all of which contribute to healthier citizen-state relations.


Accountability of authorities stands at a relatively low level in 2024, averaging 3.1 out of 10. Table 4 shows that the indicator experienced a sharp peak in the aftermath of the invasion, growing from 2.7 in 2021 to 4.1 in 2023. These trends demonstrate that the post-invasion surge of confidence in institutions is gradually declining, which could lead to civic dissatisfaction, heightened grievances, and a weakening of legitimacy and the war efforts.

TABLE 7. ACCOUNTABILITY OF AUTHORITIES (2021-2023-2024)

Indicator	2021	2023	2024
Accountability of authorities	2.7	4.1	3.1

There are no significant demographic differences (age, urbanity, displacement status, income, education) in the levels of Accountability of authorities. Regional variation is also minimal, with the exception of Ternopil oblast, which scores

HEATMAP 7. ACCOUNTABILITY OF AUTHORITIES (2024)



notably lower (2.0), and Volyn (4.9) and Ivano-Frankivsk (4.4) oblasts, which score notably higher than the national average of 3.1.

The reSCORE findings show that Accountability of authorities is negatively correlated with both **Perceived level of corruption** (-0.321)¹⁶ and **Scepticism about reforms** (-0.333), suggesting that higher perceptions of corruption and reform scepticism are linked to lower accountability. Conversely, Accountability of authorities is positively correlated with **Trust in central institutions** (0.404), indicating that greater accountability is associated with higher public trust in national authorities.

4.8 AUTHORITIES CARE

The Authorities Care indicator measures how responsive and considerate the Ukrainian authorities are perceived to be by their citizens, reflecting the government’s ability to address their needs, take their concerns into account, and devote fair amount of attention to all constituents. This element is crucial for social cohesion because a government that is seen as unfair and unresponsive might cause sense of neglect and weaken bonds between the state and its people. Moreover, in times of crisis, such as the war, citizens are more likely to unite and cooperate when they feel the government is acting in their best interest and is working to protect the common good.

The Authorities care indicator showed a significant increase following the full-scale invasion, rising from a low level (2.6) in 2021 to a moderate level (4.6) in 2023. However, in 2024, it registered a significant decline, falling back to 3.0, just above its pre-war levels. The drop suggests that the 2023 spike was a temporary surge, likely driven by the ‘rally-around-the-flag’ effect, a phenomenon often observed during times of crisis. As the war continues, this effect diminished, bringing the score closer to its pre-invasion levels. This trend is also observed in the Accountability of authorities indicator. Nevertheless, the consistently low scores of both indicators across years warrant attention, as the observed trends highlight a growing disconnect between citizens’ expectations and the perceived responsiveness of state institutions. This mismatch could undoubtedly harm both war and post-war recovery efforts, fostering a broader sense of apathy.


TABLE 8. AUTHORITIES CARE (2021-2023-2024)

Indicator	2021	2023	2024
Ukrainian Authorities Care	2.6	4.6	3.0

16 In this analysis, our focus is on correlations surpassing 0.30 or falling below -0.30. Consequently, not all correlations are reported.


There are no significant demographic differences in the levels of Authorities care, except for income, with high-income groups reporting higher scores (3.4) compared to low-income groups (2.3). Regional variation is minimal overall, but some oblasts stand out: Ternopil oblast had notably lower scores (1.5), while Volyn (5) and Ivano-Frankivsk (4.8) oblasts report higher scores than the national average of 3.0. The heatmap below reveals that western oblasts, except Ternopil, tend to report a higher degree of care from authorities, while those closer to the frontline, particularly in the east, report lower levels. In other words, people with lower income and those with proximity to the frontlines feel a greater sense of neglect, where they feel unheard, and their needs and interests are not adequately represented by the authorities.

HEATMAP 8. UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES CARE (2024)



When evaluating changes over the year, it is notable that the decline in Authorities Care is more pronounced in central regions, while the decrease is smaller in the western regions. A distinct case is the de-occupied part of Kherson oblast, as well as Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, where the perception of the Ukrainian authorities care has remained stable over the past two years.

HEATMAP 9. UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES CARE (CHANGE FROM 2023 TO 2024)



The reSCORE findings show that Authorities care is positively correlated with **Provision of public services**¹⁷ (0.316) and **Personal security**¹⁸ (0.422), while negatively correlated with **Perceived level of corruption** (-0.357) and **Scepticism about reforms** (-0.398). It is worth noting here, **Scepticism about reforms** and **Personal security** have experienced visible shifts from 2023 to 2024, with the former rising from 5.1 to 6 and the latter falling from 5.5 to 4.8. These changes may have contributed to the observed decline in the perception of Authorities care¹⁹.

The subsequent section will examine the dynamics of social cohesion in Ukraine at the national level, focusing on general findings across key indicators and the evolving trends over the past few years.

17 The degree to which a person is satisfied with the provision of public services such as education, healthcare and social welfare payments.
 18 The degree to which one feels safe from violence in daily life and that the police can protect them.
 19 However, it is crucial to acknowledge that these correlations do not provide insight into causality of relations or the direction of causation. More on the drivers of specific elements of social cohesion can be found in the Seed’s social cohesion reports from 2023.

5


Social cohesion in Ukraine: National level dynamics

The reSCORE 2024 findings suggest that Ukrainian society remains united and cohesive, particularly in the horizontal dimension of social cohesion, despite the ongoing war and its multiple implications. The sense of shared identity continues to be a strong unifying force, with both the **Sense of belonging to the country** (8.7 out of 10) and **Pluralistic Ukrainian identity** (7.3) – top-ranking indicators in the social cohesion framework – demonstrating remarkable stability over the years. This high level of shared identity and attachment to the country suggest a sustained, strong sense of national belonging in Ukraine, which is vital in the face of the external aggression. This should be maintained and nurtured, as it forms the bedrock of Ukraine’s collective strength.

However, the data also highlights emerging risks, particularly in the vertical dimension of social cohesion. Public confidence in the authorities has notably declined, with both **Ukrainian authorities care** (3.0) and **Accountability of authorities** (3.1) seeing significant drops from 2023. This can be attributed to several factors, including the dissipation of the ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect, where the spike in confidence in authorities in the early stages of the full-scale invasion gradually gave way to growing dissatisfaction in the overall handling of the war effort, further compounded by the territorial losses experienced in 2024. The reSCORE data also suggests that this decline can be linked to growing perceptions that authorities are becoming increasingly unable to perform their functions adequately, particularly about implementing reforms, countering corruption, and ensuring personal security. While it is true that these indicators have returned to their pre-invasion levels, they also rank lower than average and lowest than other cohesion indicators. This merits attention as a growing gap between citizens’ expectations and authorities’ perceived actions could undermine cohesion and weaken the collective response to the war, posing challenges to Ukraine’s war and post-war recovery efforts.

Interestingly, **Sense of civic duty** (6.2), the third indicator measuring vertical relations, remains above average and higher than the pre-invasion level, which illustrates that Ukrainians, despite the ongoing war, continue to feel a strong personal responsibility towards their country. This heightened sense of commitment suggests a growing awareness of the importance of individual contributions to common good. It highlights that citizens of Ukraine, rather than relying solely on institutional leadership, are willing to take initiative to support the broader national effort. This should be further encouraged, particularly against the backdrop of waning confidence in authorities, as it reflects a key strength in Ukraine’s social fabric.

FIGURE 5. PERFORMANCE OF SOCIAL COHESION INDICATORS (2021-2023-2024)



Additionally, Ukrainians show an average level of **Community cooperation** (5.2), reflecting a modest sense of mutual support and collaboration within local networks. While there is some variation across years, the overall trend suggests that Community cooperation remains steady despite the war. This spirit of collaboration has proven vital for navigating the wartime challenges, but there still is a potential for strengthening collective support and solidarity across the country.

The level of intergroup attitudes has remained stable in 2024, with some regional variations in tolerance levels and perceptions of social threat. **Social tolerance** stands at 5.4 out of 10, a decrease from 5.7 in 2023 and 5.6 in 2021. Roma people, alongside the LGBTQI+ community and individuals struggling with addiction, continue to face lower acceptance compared to other groups. Importantly, certain oblasts stand out. Ivano-Frankivsk and Zakarpattia oblast score notably lower in terms of tolerance, while Kherson and Mykolaiv, oblasts located near the frontline, show higher scores, in line with their standing in 2023. This calls for a more thorough examination of oblasts which demonstrate positive results, alongside targeted efforts to address the underlying factors contributing to these variations in attitudes.

Social threat, an indicator measuring the feeling of threat across people from different regions, backgrounds and displacement status, stands at 3.9 in 2024, reflecting a slight increase from 3.6 in 2023, and a more notable rise from 2.8 in 2021²⁰. Although the change in the past year is minimal, the overall trend suggests growing concerns among Ukrainians about potential threats emanating from certain groups, particularly from those with experiences of living under occupation. Additionally, despite ongoing displacement due to the war, Ukrainians generally maintain positive attitudes toward IDPs, which is an encouraging trend that should be maintained as the war continues.

Overall, the reSCORE 2024 findings highlight the continued strength of shared identity, civic duty, intergroup relations and community cooperation in Ukraine, all of which have remained stable compared to last year. Despite the challenges posed by the full-scale invasion, most Ukrainians continue to feel deeply connected to their country and committed to the common good. However, a growing scepticism about the government's ability to fulfil its mandate and promises poses a significant challenge to citizen-state relations. To ensure Ukraine's long-term cohesion and collective strength, efforts must be focused on fostering a more responsive and effective governance. Addressing these concerns will be essential to maintaining the resilience and solidarity that have been crucial in Ukraine's fight for sovereignty and independence.

The following section offers a detailed overview of the performance of each oblast, describing their standing in relation to the full sample figures for 2024²¹, as well as the values from other oblasts. Comparisons are also made with corresponding values from 2023.


20 The figure for 2021 is not fully comparable with 2023 and 2024 due to changes in measured items. For a more detailed explanation, see the respective section in 'Key findings by indicators'.

21 For the purposes of this section, only differences and changes equalling plus or minus 1 or above plus or minus 1 score point are considered meaningful. Those between these values should be considered insignificant.

6 Social cohesion in Ukraine: Oblast level dynamics

The survey also analysed oblast-level dynamics in social cohesion by comparing respective data from 2023 and 2024. The findings reveal that Mykolaiv oblast has showed consistently high scores in both years, maintaining a stable level of social cohesion. Kherson, Cherkasy and Lviv oblasts, alongside Kyiv city, have also performed strongly, surpassing other oblasts in aggregate values across all indicators. In contrast, Ternopil and Zakarpattia oblasts consistently underperformed; they also saw the largest declines in social cohesion in 2024 compared to the previous year.

FIGURE 6. THE STATE OF SOCIAL COHESION IN 2024 AND 2023 (BY OBLASTS)



Performance of oblasts across all social cohesion indicators in 2023 and 2024 (average of aggregated scores).

Cherkasy oblast emerges as a well-performing oblast in both 2023 and 2024. In 2024, it scores similarly or above the full sample average across most indicators, with the most pronounced difference in **Pluralistic Ukrainian identity** (8.3), where it surpasses the nationwide figure (7.3) by 1.0 score point. It also ranks higher than other oblasts in the same indicator, second to Mykolaiv oblast only. Cherkasy oblast shows minimal change from 2023, except in the Authorities care and Accountability of

authorities indicators, where it experienced declines of 2.0 and 1.1 score points, respectively.

Chernihiv oblast shows average performance in 2024, scoring similarly to or lower than the full sample average across most indicators. The most notable gap is in **Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity**, where the oblast scores 6.3, falling 1.0 below the nationwide average of 7.3. It also ranks lower than most other oblasts on this indicator, exceeding only Zakarpattia oblast (5.8), while Volyn oblast shares the same score of 6.3. This oblast saw a decrease across most indicators, with the exception of Social tolerance, which showed a minimal increase from 6.1 in 2023 to 6.3 in 2024.

Chernivtsi oblast aligns closely with the nationwide trends in 2024, showing minimal deviation from the full sample averages. However, compared to the previous year, the oblast experienced a decline across most indicators. The most significant drop occurred in **Ukrainian authorities care**, where the score fell from 4.6 in 2023 to 3.5 in 2024 (-1.1).

Dnipropetrovsk oblast follows the nationwide picture in 2024, showing minimal difference from the full sample averages. However, when compared to the previous year, the oblast shows a decline across most indicators. The most significant decrease was recorded in **Ukrainian authorities care**, where the score fell from 4.8 in 2023 to 2.5 in 2024 (-2.3), and in **Accountability of authorities**, where the score fell from 4.3 in 2023 to 2.7 in 2024 (-1.6).

Ivano-Frankivsk oblast shows average performance in 2024. It scores below the full sample figures in three indicators. The most significant gap is in **Social tolerance**, where the oblast scores 3.1, well below the national average of 5.4. Importantly, this marks the lowest value across all oblasts. However, Ivano-Frankivsk oblast performs better than the full sample average in five indicators, with the most notable differences in **Ukrainian authorities care** and **Accountability of authorities**, where the oblast exceeds the national average by 2.3 and 1.6 score points, respectively. These are among the highest values across all oblasts, with only Volyn oblast recording higher scores. The year-on-year comparison shows little change in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, except in **Sense of civic duty**, which dropped by 1.5 points, from 6.8 in 2023 to 5.3 in 2024. This places it among the lowest in Sense of civic duty.

Kherson oblast stands out as the top-performing oblast in 2024, with scores significantly exceeding national averages in three indicators: **Sense of belonging to the country**, **Sense of civic duty** and **Social tolerance**. The oblast's Sense of belonging score is 9.9, well above the national average of 8.7. Kherson exceeds the national average by 1.9 points in both Sense of civic duty (8.1) and Social tolerance (7.3) (national averages: 6.2 and 5.4, respectively). In these three indicators, it also ranks highest across all oblasts. The yearly comparison shows that Kherson oblast experienced a meaningful change only in Sense of belonging to the country, increasing from 8.7 in 2023 to 9.9 in 2024 (+1.2).

Khmelnyskyi oblast aligns closely with the nationwide trends in 2024, showing minimal deviation from the full sample averages. It also demonstrates minimal change since 2023.

Kirovohrad oblast shows below-average performance in 2024, scoring lower than the national average across most indicators. The only two exceptions are the Social tolerance and the Lack of social threat²² indicators, where it shows differences of 0.8 and 0.2 points, respectively. Compared to 2023, the oblast registered consistent declines across most indicators, with **Ukrainian authorities care** decreasing from 5.1 in 2023 to 2.5 in 2024 (-2.6) and **Accountability of authorities** decreasing from 3.5 in 2023 to 2.3 in 2024 (-1.2). This places Kirovohrad oblast among the lowest ranking oblasts in Accountability of authorities (alongside Ternopil oblast, which scores 2.0 in 2024).

Kyiv oblast aligns closely with the nationwide picture in 2024, showing nearly identical values across most indicators. It also demonstrates minimal change since 2023, except **Ukrainian authorities care**, where the score fell from 5.2 in 2023 to 3.0 in 2024 (-2.2), and in **Accountability of authorities**, where the score fell from 4.1 in 2023 to 3.1 in 2024 (-1.0).

Kyiv city aligns closely with the nationwide trends in 2024, showing no significant differences with full sample averages. It also demonstrates minimal but consistent change compared to the corresponding figures from 2023, including in **Ukrainian authorities care**, which declined from 5.1 in 2023 to 3.5 in 2024 (-1.6), and in **Accountability of authorities**, which decreased from 4.7 in 2023 to 3.3 in 2024 (-1.4). Notably, Community cooperation in Kyiv city declined by 0.6, from 5.1 in 2023 to 4.5 in 2024. This decrease places Kyiv city among the lowest-ranking areas for this indicator, alongside Zaporizhzhia and Zakarpattia oblasts, with each scoring 4.4 in 2024.

Kharkiv oblast is largely aligned with the nationwide trends in 2024, showing minimal deviation from the full sample averages. However, compared to 2023, the oblast experienced a decline across most indicators. The most significant drop occurred in **Ukrainian authorities care**, where the score fell from 4.7 in 2023 to 2.3 in 2024 (-2.4). The scores also decreased for **Accountability of authorities**, from 3.8 to 2.6 (-1.2) and for **Lack of social threat**, from 6.9 to 5.9 (-1.0).

Lviv oblast emerges as a strong performer in both 2023 and 2024. In 2024, it consistently scores above the full sample average, though the differences are minimal. The only exception is the Lack of social threat indicator, where it shows a marginal difference of 0.3 points. Compared to 2023, Lviv oblast

22 This is a reverse of the Social threat indicator. The values are displayed in positive terms for ease of interpretation.

registered consistent but insignificant declines across most indicators, with **Ukrainian authorities care** decreasing by 1.5 score points, from 4.7 in 2023 to 3.2 in 2024.

Mykolaiv oblast maintained consistently high scores in both years, indicating a relatively stable level of social cohesion. In 2024, it scores similarly or above the full sample average across most indicators, with the most pronounced difference in **Social tolerance** (7.0), where it surpasses the nationwide figure (5.4) by 1.6 points. It also ranks higher than other oblasts in the same indicator, trailing Kherson oblast only. Mykolaiv oblast scores visibly higher than the full sample average in **Pluralistic Ukrainian identity**, with an average of 8.5, which marks the highest score for this indicator across oblasts. It also scores higher than other oblasts in **Lack of social threat** (7.2). The year-on-year comparison shows little change in the oblast, except for Pluralistic Ukrainian identity, which increased from 7.3 in 2023 to 8.5 in 2024 (+1.2), and Ukrainian authorities care, which decreased from 5.3 in 2023 to 3.1 in 2024 (-2.2). When compared to other oblasts, Mykolaiv oblast ranks highest in **Pluralistic Ukrainian identity** (8.5) and **Lack of social threat** (7.2).

Odesa oblast shows below-average performance in 2024, with scores slightly lower than the national averages across most indicators, though the differences are not statistically significant. The two exceptions are the Pluralistic Ukrainian identity and Lack of social threat indicators, where Odesa oblast scores 0.7 and 0.6 points higher, respectively. Compared to 2023, it demonstrates declines across most indicators. The most pronounced ones are in **Ukrainian authorities care**, which fell from 4.4 in 2023 to 2.2 in 2024 (-2.2), **Accountability of authorities**, which fell from 4.5 in 2023 to 2.6 in 2024 (-1.9) and **Social tolerance**, which fell from 6.6 in 2023 to 5.3 in 2024 (-1.3). Drop in the Ukrainian authorities care puts Odesa oblast as one of the lowest ranking oblasts on this indicator.

Poltava oblast aligns closely with national trends in 2024, with values for most indicators closely matching the national averages. However, there are two notable exceptions. First, in the **Ukrainian authorities care** indicator, Poltava oblast scores 0.8 points higher than the national average (national average: 3.0 | Poltava oblast: 3.8). Second, in **Sense of belonging to the country**, it scores 1.1 points lower than the national average (national average: 8.7 | Poltava oblast 7.6). These differences reflect annual decline: namely, the Sense of belonging dropped from 8.8 in 2023 to 7.6 in 2024, while Ukrainian authorities care fell from 5.2 in 2023 to 3.8 in 2024. As a result, Poltava oblast is now the lowest-ranking oblast in the **Sense of Belonging**. The rest of the yearly changes in the oblast are insignificant, with no notable variations on the remaining indicators.

Rivne oblast's scores in 2024 are in line with national averages, showing no notable differences across most indicators. The oblast demonstrates year-on-year stability, with one key exception: **Community cooperation**, which

shows an increase from 4.9 in 2023 to 5.8 in 2024. This made Rivne oblast the highest-ranking oblast on this indicator. The oblast also experienced a decline in **Sense of belonging to the country** from 9.2 in 2023 to 8.4 in 2024.

Sumy oblast aligns closely with the nationwide trends in 2024, showing minimal deviation from the full sample averages. It also demonstrates minimal change since 2023. The only exception is the Ukrainian authorities care, which dropped by 1.3 points, from 3.5 in 2023 to 2.2 in 2024.

Ternopil oblast scores lower than the national averages in all indicators in 2024, except for Pluralistic Ukrainian identity and Sense of civic duty, where the oblast has identical values. The differences are most pronounced for **Ukrainian authorities care** (national average: 3.0 | Ternopil oblast: 1.5), and **Accountability of authorities** (national average: 3.1 | Ternopil oblast: 2.0). It ranks lowest in both indicators. When compared to 2023, Ternopil oblast shows a decline on all indicators, with notable changes in Ukrainian authorities care (from 4.3 in 2023 to 1.5 in 2024), Accountability of authorities (from 3.7 in 2023 to 2.0 in 2024), and Social tolerance (from 5.6 in 2023 to 4.5 in 2024).

Vinnitsia oblast shows below-average performance in 2024, with values that are either similar to or slightly below the national averages across most indicators. Compared to 2023, the oblast demonstrated consistent declines across all indicators. The most pronounced ones are in **Ukrainian authorities care**, which fell from 4.5 in 2023 to 2.2 in 2024 (-2.3), **Accountability of authorities**, which fell from 3.7 in 2023 to 2.4 in 2024 (-1.3) and **Social tolerance**, which fell from 6.0 in 2023 to 5.0 in 2024 (-1.0). Drop in the Ukrainian authorities care puts it as one of the lowest ranking oblasts on this indicator.

Volyn oblast presents a mixed picture in 2024. It trails the national averages in five out of eight indicators, including **Pluralistic Ukrainian identity**, where the difference stands at 1.0 points (national average: 7.3 | Volyn oblast: 6.3), positioning it among the lowest-ranking oblasts in this category. On the other hand, the oblast performs better than the national average in **Ukrainian authorities care**, with a difference of 2.1 points (national average: 3.0 | Volyn oblast: 5.1), and in **Accountability of authorities**, with a difference of 1.8 (national average: 3.1 | Volyn oblast: 4.9). It ranks highest in both of these indicators. When compared to 2023, oblast scores show a mixed picture as well. There were slight declines across four indicators, while scores improved in others, with the most notable change being a +1-point increase in **Accountability of Authorities**.

Zakarpattia oblast scores lower than the national averages in nearly all indicators in 2024, with the exception of Accountability of authorities, where it shows a slight increase. Across four indicators – **Sense of belonging to the country**, **Pluralistic Ukrainian identity**, **Sense of civic duty**, and **Social tolerance** – the oblast trails the national average by 1.0 point or more than 1.0 point, with differences of 1.0, 1.5, 1.0 and 1.2 points, respectively. As a result, Zakarpattia oblast ranks the lowest, or visibly lower, than other oblasts in

these four indicators. It also scores the lowest in two additional indicators – Lack of social threat (5.2) and Community cooperation, where it is tied with Zaporizhzhia oblast, both scoring 4.4. The year-on-year comparison shows a decline across all indicators in the oblast. The change is most pronounced for Sense of belonging to the country (from 8.7 in 2023 to 7.7 in 2024), Community cooperation (from 5.5 in 2023 to 4.4 in 2024), Lack of social threat (from 6.9 to 5.2) and Ukrainian authorities care (from 4.8 to 2.5).

Zaporizhzhia oblast consistently scores above the full sample average, though the differences are minimal. The two exceptions are in **Community cooperation**, where the oblast trails the national figure by 0.8 points (national average: 5.2 | Zaporizhzhia oblast: 4.4), and **Lack of Social threat**, where it exceeds the national average by 0.9 (national average: 6.1 | Zaporizhzhia oblast: 7.0). Notably, it ranks lowest in Community cooperation (tied with Zakarpattia oblast, which also scores 4.4), and highest in Lack of social threat (alongside Mykolaiv oblast, which has 7.2). There is minimal change between 2023 and 2024 in Zaporizhzhia oblast scores, with only Ukrainian authorities care standing out. It decreased by 1.1 points between the two years.

Zhytomyr oblast aligns closely with the nationwide trends in 2024, showing minimal deviation from the full sample averages. It also demonstrates minimal change since 2023. The only exception is the Ukrainian authorities care, which dropped by 1.4 points, from 4.2 in 2023 to 2.8 in 2024.

More detailed data can be seen in Table 9 below or accessed through SeeD's data platform - <https://app.scoreforpeace.org/en/ukraine/score/2024/1/map?row=tn-3-0>

The subsequent section explores the underlying dynamics of change in the Authorities care indicator, utilizing the longitudinal panel sample.

TABLE 9. THE STATE OF SOCIAL COHESION IN 2024 AND 2023 (BY OBLASTS)

	Sense of belonging to the country		Pluralistic Ukrainian identity		Sense of civic duty		Community cooperation		Social tolerance		Social threat (lack of)		Accountability of authorities		Ukrainian authorities care	
	2023	2024	2023	2024	2023	2024	2023	2024	2023	2024	2023	2024	2023	2024	2023	2024
Kherson	8.7	9.9	7.5	7	7.3	8.1	5.2	5.3	7.4	7.3	6.6	6.5	4.2	3.6	3.5	3.4
Mykolaiv	9.9	9.4	7.3	8.5	6.8	6.5	5.1	5	8.1	7	7.8	7.2	3.4	3.5	5.3	3.1
Cherkasy	9.1	9.4	8	8.3	7	7.1	5.5	5.5	6.4	6	6.4	6.4	3.8	2.7	4.7	2.7
Lviv	9.3	9	7.9	7.4	7.1	7.1	6.2	5.6	5.7	5.7	6.2	5.8	4.5	3.6	4.7	3.2
Zaporizhzhia	9.1	9.1	7.3	7.6	6.4	6.5	4.4	4.4	5.7	5.7	6.1	7.0	3.9	3.7	4	2.9
Volyn	8.7	8.4	6.7	6.3	6.5	6	5.2	5.7	4.5	4.8	6.0	5.4	3.9	4.9	4.8	5.1
Kyiv city	9.3	8.6	7.9	7.6	6.9	6.4	5.1	4.5	6.1	5.4	6.8	6.6	4.7	3.3	5.1	3.5
Zhytomyr	8.7	8.9	7.4	7.2	6.4	6.1	5	5	5.7	5.3	6.3	6.7	3.5	3.6	4.2	2.8
Chernivtsi	9.4	8.9	8	7.2	6.7	6.3	5.7	5.1	5.6	5.2	6.0	5.9	4.2	3.4	4.6	3.5
Ivano-Frankivsk	9.3	9.2	7.6	7.6	6.8	5.3	5.6	5.6	3.8	3.1	5.0	5.5	4.1	4.4	4.8	4.8
Rivne	9.2	8.4	6.6	6.7	6.8	6.2	4.9	5.8	5.5	5.5	6.3	5.9	4	3.7	3.8	3.3
Khmelnitskyi	8.5	8.8	7.1	6.7	6.4	6.5	5	5	4.9	5	6.5	6.3	4.2	3.8	4.1	3.3
Dnipropetrovsk	9.1	8.9	8	7.4	6.4	6.2	6	5.4	6.3	6.2	6.3	6.0	4.3	2.7	4.8	2.5
Poltava	8.8	7.6	7.4	7.4	6.4	6.4	5.6	5.4	5.5	5.3	5.9	5.9	4	3.2	5.2	3.8
Kyiv	8.5	8.9	7.6	7.3	6.6	5.9	5.4	5.4	5.1	5.1	6.6	6.1	4.1	3.1	5.2	3
Chernihiv	8.6	8.1	7	6.3	6.8	6.4	5.7	4.9	6.1	6.3	6.8	6.2	3.8	3	4.3	3.5
Kharkiv	9.1	9	7.9	7.6	6.5	6.2	5.9	5.2	6.5	5.9	6.9	5.9	3.8	2.6	4.7	2.3
Sumy	9.1	9.1	7.5	7.5	6.7	6.2	5	4.7	5.5	5.2	6.9	6.5	3.7	2.8	3.5	2.2
Odesa	9.1	8.6	8.4	8	6.6	5.7	5.4	4.8	6.6	5.3	6.7	6.7	4.5	2.6	4.4	2.2
Vinnitsia	9.3	8.8	7.8	7.1	7	6.4	5.8	5.5	6	5	6.9	6.3	3.7	2.4	4.5	2.2
Kirovohrad	8.5	8	7.3	6.4	5.8	6	6	5.1	7	6.2	6.5	6.3	3.5	2.3	5.1	2.5
Ternopil	8.6	8.3	8.1	7.3	6.6	6.2	5.4	4.8	5.6	4.5	5.6	5.3	3.7	2	4.3	1.5
Zakarpattia	8.7	7.7	6.6	5.8	5.6	5.2	5.5	4.4	4.6	4.2	6.9	5.2	4.4	3.5	4.8	2.5

Oblasts arranged from top to bottom in their overall performance in 2024. Gradient colours applied to 2024 data per indicator.

7

Change in Authorities care: Insights from the panel data

To gain a deeper understanding of changes related to social cohesion, **particularly the Ukrainian authorities care**, which went through the most significant shift since 2023, the report explores whether certain groups have experienced more pronounced changes in their standing compared to others. To do so, it draws on reSCORE's panel sample, a dataset of 646 participants²³, who were interviewed both in 2023 and 2024. The panel sample analysis increases explanatory power by tracking the same individuals over time, allowing for a detailed examination of changes across the two timepoints.

Four distinct groups were identified based on the analysis of changes between 2023 and 2024:

1. **Zero confidence group:** individuals whose scores **dropped to zero in 2024 after being above zero in 2023** (18% of the panel). Analysis revealed that this group is empirically distinct from the Growing sense of neglect group, as not only their confidence decreased but also dropped to a complete zero;
2. **Growing sense of neglect group**, with individuals who report **lower scores in Authorities care indicator in 2024 compared to their scores in 2023**, meaning it is a group with a **decreasing confidence** in authorities and **increasing sense of neglect** (49% of the panel);
3. **Growing sense of confidence group**, with individuals who report **higher scores in Authorities care indicator in 2024 compared to their scores in 2023**, meaning it is a group with an **increasing confidence** in authorities (19% of the panel);
4. **Stable group**, whose scores remained **stable in 2024 compared to 2023**, and any reported change was within a range of +0.5 and -0.5 points (14% of the panel).

A notable subgroup within this analysis is the **Zero confidence group**, or the group that reported zero scores in 2024, reflecting a complete lack of belief in Ukrainian authorities care. The size of this group is rather large, 18% of the panel respondents, which means that they are not a small group of outliers. This group is difficult to identify demographically, and it has a

²³ For demographic composition of the panel sample, please refer to the Annex.

very heterogeneous mixture in terms of age, gender, urbanity, education, income and IDP status when compared to the mean distribution and to other groups. The only statistically significant difference is that people with higher education are less likely to be in this group. When it comes to non-demographic indicators, individuals in this group have lower human security (personal, political, economic and health security), lower trust in central institutions and hold the perception that authorities are not accountable.


The **Growing sense of neglect group**, which makes up the largest portion of the sample, largely mirrors the general population in terms of its socio-demographic characteristics given that a downward trend in Authorities care indicator is a national phenomenon.

The group that has **Growing sense of confidence** experienced improvements in their economic and personal security indicators since 2023, and their human security indicators are higher than the national average in 2024. They are more likely to be industrial enterprises workers with secondary education. Although their trust in institutions is in line with the national average, they perceive improvements in accountability of authorities. 45% of the respondents in this group are from south-eastern oblasts²⁴.

Last but not least, the **Stable group** unsurprisingly reports little to no change across various indicators between 2023 and 2024. 42% of the respondents in this group are from south-eastern oblasts. However, similar to the group with Growing sense of confidence, the Stable group is showing trends that are not in the same direction as the national means, as in, while the national mean for Authorities care indicator is decreasing, for this group, it remains unchanged.

24 Within the framework of reSCORE 2024, oblasts were grouped into four macro-regions. West: Rivne, Volyn, Khmelnytskyi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, Chernivtsi oblasts. Centre: Cherkasy, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia oblasts. North: Chernihiv, Sumy, Zhytomyr, Kyiv oblasts and Kyiv city. South-East : Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.

FIGURE 7. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FOUR DISTINCT GROUPS OF CHANGE BETWEEN 2023 AND 2024 ON UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES CARE INDICATOR



8

Methodology

Data from the Ukraine reSCORE in 2024 draws on face-to-face, structured and quantitative interviews with citizens in Ukraine, collected between June 8, 2024, and September 1, 2024. The data, collected from 7,758 respondents, is representative of all territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine at the time of surveying, and excludes Luhansk oblast, Donetsk oblast and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. This sample also includes a booster sample of Kirovohrad oblast (N = 298), as well as of the cities of Kryvyi Rih, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Odesa (total N = 1,496).

Data from the Ukraine reSCORE in 2023 relied on face-to-face, structured and quantitative interviews with citizens in Ukraine, collected between March 26, 2023, and June 12, 2023. The data, covering 5,914 respondents, was representative of all territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine at the time of surveying, excluding the temporarily occupied areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, as well as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Additionally, reSCORE 2023 also included a distinct sample of 167 panel respondents who were surveyed as part of SCORE 2021.

The Ukraine SCORE in 2021 relied on data from face-to-face, structured and quantitative interviews with citizens in Ukraine, collected between January and May 2021. The data, covering 12,482 respondents, was representative of all territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine at the time of surveying, including unoccupied parts of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.


8.1 HOW TO READ RESCORE

reSCORE quantifies the levels of societal phenomena using indicators based on questions from the reSCORE survey. Using several questions to create one indicator allows us to reliably measure particular phenomenon from different perspectives. Scores for each indicator are given a value from 0 to 10, where 0 corresponds to the total absence of a phenomenon in an individual, location or in society, and 10 corresponds to its strong presence. Heatmaps, such as the one shown here, give the score achieved by each oblast in our sample in that indicator.

For example, the indicator Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity shown below, is measured using two questions, on a scale from 0 (“Strongly disagree”) to 3 (“Strongly agree”).

- 1 I think all people living in Ukraine can be Ukrainians no matter their ethnic or religious backgrounds.
- 2 I think in Ukraine, we have always been one people, despite all wars, conflicts and historic divisions.

The responses to these questions are then summed and rescaled from 0 to 10 to give the scores shown on the map below, based on the equation: $(Q1+Q2)*(10/6)$.



For the purposes of this report, only differences and changes equalling plus or minus 1 or above plus or minus 1 score point are considered meaningful. Those between these values should be considered insignificant.

More on the SCORE methodology can be found in the [How to read SCORE guide](#).

8.2 GLOSSARY

Indicator	Definition
Authorities care	The degree to which one feels that Ukrainian authorities represent their concerns and views, equally care about all parts of Ukraine and are ready to listen.
Accountability of authorities	The degree to which one feels that representatives of authorities are and can be held accountable.
Sense of civic duty	A composite indicator made up of sense of agency and civic responsibility. It measures the degree to which one feels responsible for the future and well-being of their society and country, and to which one feels that ordinary people can change things in their community.
Social tolerance	The combined level of social tolerance towards different minority and marginalised groups (e.g. immigrants, Roma community, Muslims) in terms of personal interaction and/or acceptance in the community.
Pluralistic Ukrainian identity	The degree to which one believes that everyone who lives in Ukraine despite their ethnic or religious background is equally Ukrainian and that those living in Ukraine have always been one people despite all conflicts and historic divisions.
Sense of belonging to the country	The degree of attachment to one's country.
Community cooperation	The degree to which one feels that people in their community can rely on each other for help and the extent to which people in their community actively solve common problems together.
Social threat	The degree to which one feels that different socio-demographic groups may undermine the unity of their community.

9

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ANNEX A: SAMPLE STRUCTURES (NATIONAL & PANEL)

		NATIONAL REP	PANEL
		Total	Total
Language	Ukrainian	79%	80%
	Russian	21%	20%
Gender	Men	48%	41%
	Women	52%	59%
Age group	18-35	28%	23%
	36-59	44%	45%
	60+	28%	32%
Urban or rural	Rural	34%	27%
	Urban	66%	73%
Current Settlement Type	Large city (500K+)	23%	24%
	Large town or city (50K-500K)	22%	37%
	Small town (Less than 50K)	21%	12%
	Village / Rural	34%	27%
Forced to flee due to the Russian Invasion on Feb 24, 2022	Displaced persons	3%	3%
	Returnees	7%	5%
	Stayers	89%	92%
Income groups	No money for food	7%	5%
	Money for food but not clothes	27%	31%
	Money for clothes but not expensive goods	49%	52%
	Enough money for expensive goods	17%	12%
Education groups	Primary	1%	1%
	Secondary academic	15%	10%
	Secondary vocational	45%	47%
	Higher	39%	42%
Employment status categorical	Employed/ Working, Full Time (includes military and self-employment)	52%	54%
	Employed/ Working, Part Time (includes military and self-employment)	8%	5%
	On maternity leave	2%	4%
	Running a household / looking after family	3%	4%
	Pensioner	24%	27%
	Student	3%	1%
	Unemployed and looking for a job	5%	3%
Unemployed but not looking for a job	2%	2%	

ANNEX B:

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF FOUR CHANGE GROUPS IN PANEL DATA

	Went to zero	No change	Increasing	Decreasing
Men	16%	14%	20%	50%
Women	19%	13%	19%	49%
18-35	16%	16%	19%	48%
36-59	18%	13%	21%	48%
60+	18%	13%	17%	52%
Displaced persons	29%	6%	24%	41%
Returnees	23%	16%	3%	58%
Stayers	17%	14%	20%	49%
North	14%	16%	21%	49%
West	15%	11%	26%	48%
Centre	23%	7%	19%	52%
South-East	21%	19%	12%	49%
Large city (500K+)	21%	16%	11%	52%
Large town or city (50K-500K)	15%	13%	22%	50%
Small town (Less than 50K)	21%	16%	25%	38%
Village / Rural	17%	11%	21%	51%
Rural	17%	11%	21%	51%
Urban	18%	15%	19%	48%
No money for food	33%	15%	18%	33%
Money for food but not clothes	19%	10%	21%	50%
Money for clothes but not expensive goods	16%	16%	20%	48%
Enough money for expensive goods	11%	14%	16%	59%
Employed	18%	15%	22%	46%
Running a household / maternity leave	20%	9%	16%	56%
Pensioner	18%	13%	14%	55%
Student	0%	43%	14%	43%

See continuation of the ANNEX B on the next page ►►

►► Continuation of the ANNEX B

Unemployed	15%	12%	24%	48%
Manual construction work	28%	6%	22%	44%
Factory or mine work	11%	14%	41%	34%
Cleaning or maid work	22%	11%	33%	33%
Clerical support work	21%	0%	21%	57%
Beauty services	7%	21%	57%	14%
Service sector, trade	20%	17%	21%	42%
IT sector (e.g. programming)	0%	15%	15%	69%
Agricultural work	10%	10%	40%	40%
Technician work	14%	11%	14%	61%
Healthcare worker	12%	12%	29%	47%
Education work	9%	3%	16%	72%
Management	21%	27%	12%	39%
Professional	16%	18%	16%	50%
Business Owner	25%	6%	31%	38%
Not Business Owner	17%	15%	22%	47%
No children	18%	14%	20%	48%
One or more children	17%	14%	17%	52%

About reSCORE

reSCORE Ukraine, which is a joint initiative funded by the USAID and UNDP, and implemented by the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD), serves as an annual assessment tool of societal resilience and recovery aimed at informing the policies and programming of national, regional, and international partners. Like its predecessor, the Ukraine SCORE 2018 to 2021, it aims to identify pathways to meaningful change and respond to complex needs, geared at strengthening individual and collective coping mechanisms, and fostering a democratic, just, inclusive, and cohesive Ukraine.

About partners

The Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD) works with international development organisations, governments and civil society leaders to design and implement evidence-based and people-centred strategies for the development of peaceful, inclusive, and sustainable societies. Working globally, SeeD provides policy advice for social transformation that is based on citizen engagement strategies and empirical understanding of the behaviour of individuals, groups, and communities.

Democratic Governance East Activity (DG East) is an eight-year programme of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). DG East works with civil society, local government entities, and independent media outlets in and from eastern and southern Ukraine to strengthen the connection and trust between citizens and their government. The overall objectives of DG East are to 1) support greater acceptance of a shared civic culture based on common values and understanding; and 2) promote participation to improve Ukraine's governance, reform processes, and help resolve community problems. The programme addresses immediate war-response needs, promotes good governance, and strengthens an inclusive civic identity.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supports strategic capacity development initiatives to promote inclusive growth and sustainable human development. Through partnerships with national, regional, and local governments, civil society, and the private sector, UNDP strives to support Ukraine in its efforts to eliminate poverty, develop the population's capacity, achieve equitable results, sustain the environment, and advance democratic governance.

Transformation Communications Activity (TCA) is a six-year activity of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which aims to strengthen Ukrainian democracy through comprehensive research, innovative communication initiatives, and the creation of socially meaningful content.

